IT NEVER S N O W S IN SEPTEMBER

the city, manned by small sections of 8 to 10soldiers. Two traffic circles 1,000 metressouth-east and south-west of the bridges -the Kaizer Karel Plein and Kaizer LodewijkPlein — provided the initial focal points forthe defence. Strong points were disposedaround the bridges themselves, and estab-lished in the small village of Lent oppositeon the north bank of the Waal, controllingaccess and providing observation over bothbridges. Important buildings such as thePost Office were also occupied and fortified.Henke's soldiers were understandablynervous. There was no firm information,apart from initially exaggerated reports ofthe geographical spread of the airbornelandings. The Ersatz Battalion from Wehrk-reis VI pessimistically radioed its head-quarters at 406 Division that there had been

'. . . enemy airlandings aroundZyfflich and Groesbeek. Nijmegendetachment surrounded, supporturgently requested.'

Major Rasch, the adjutant to the com-mander of 406 Division, was completelytaken aback. 'It hit us like a bombshell,' helater wrote, when further reports clarifiedthe extent and strength of the airlandings.Rasch surmised 'the three companies inNijmegen must be regarded as write-offs;no more reports were ever received'.During the afternoon and early eveningof 17 September there were no contactswith enemy units in Nijmegen. The 82nd(US) Airborne Division, fully occupiedwith seizing its initial objectives, did notsend a patrol into the city until 1830 hours,and this did not report until the followingmorning. During the first afternoon Bit-trich, the commander of IISS Corps,decided to send the bulk of the Kampf-gruppe Frundsberg - a brigade strengthbattle group - to defend Nijmegen. Thismission was his Schwerpunkt, or focalpoint of effort. Allied ground forces must

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be prevented from moving up the corridorto link up with the British Airborne div-ision at Arnhem. This could then bedestroyed at leisure, as it had clearly overreached itself. Kampfgruppe 'Reinhold'with the 10SS Engineer Battalion attachedwas to provide the vanguard. It wasspearheaded by the Battalion Euling, whichunexpectedly became enmeshed in thefighting to force a passage over the Arnhembridge. Only its leading elements werehowever, pinned down. SS-Captain Euling,its commander, well aware of the import-ance of his task to reach the Waal at bestspeed, displayed some initiative and turnedhis vehicles around. They drove east out oArnhem, seeking an alternative route.SS-Captain Viktor Graebner, the 30year-old Commander of the Hohenstaufen's Reconnaissance Battalion, reachedElst, 9km north of Nijmegen, at about 1900hours. In order to fulfil his mission ofclearing Betuwe — the island — betweenArnhem and Nijmegen, he dispersed hiscolumn on either side of the main roadRacing through villages and side roadsgroups of armoured half-tracks sought outunits of enemy airlanded forces, but foundnothing. Graebner himself radioed back 2kilometres south of the Arnhem bridge thatthere was no sign of enemy activity. Thecolumn re-formed and gathered speed, driv-ing toward Nijmegen. To their relief theapproaches to the bridges were alreadyoccupied by Henke's Kampfgruppe. Muchof what subsequently happened is basedupon conjecture supplemented by frag-mentary reports.Graebner left some half-tracks mounting75mm anti-tank guns in Elst. These, inaddition to security, provided a radio relaybetween 9SS Division in Arnhem and him-self. He was, however, by command ofHarmel's 10SS Division to whom he wasattached, under orders to remain in Nijme-gen. Graebner liked to use his initiative andcould be impetuous. He had probably beer

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