IT NEVER S N O W S IN SEPTEMBER

Now they would have a fight on theirhands; XXX Corps had arrived.

Slowing the advance.Jabs against the corridor19-20 September . . .

What, in the meantime, was barring theirprogress to Nijmegen? 59 Infantry Division,commanded by Generalleutnant Poppe,continued its fragmented attacks againstselected points of 101 (US) Division's corri-dor as and when he received reinforce-ments. Attrition, particularly the stalemateforced by the outnumbered Americans inthe Son forest, was beginning to have anoticeable effect upon the quality of Ger-man resistance. Veteran paratroopers werefighting the German reservists to a stand-still. Lacking the basic fundamentals, suchas artillery support, and particularly ammu-nition, there was little more to be done withthe resources at hand except maintain whatpressure they could muster. LXXXVIIICorps, when exhorted to do more, advisedStudent that the logistic situation was tight,and that there were ammunition shortages;it was also pointed out that to fight a battlethe troops must be adequately supplied.The Corps diary commented: 'Commandhas the tenacious will to achieve all that ispossible, but one cannot hide the fact that alarge proportion of the troops are showingsigns of exhaustion, and a lowering ofmorale.' Student's response was that theirmission - to hold their present position,and destroy the air-landed enemy troops -remained. In short - they were to get onwith it.

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The troops were, however, beginning tocrack under the strain. Kampfgruppe Chill(85 Infantry Division) reported difficulties,questioning the conduct of Fallschirm-jaeger Battalion 'Stephan' fighting along-side von der Heydte's FallschirmjägerRegiment 6. Stephan's 5th Company had

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reported an armoured breakthrough, inwhich the word 'surrender' had allegedlybeen overheard on the radio. In addition,7th Company was overrun, 'leading to apart withdrawal of the battalion, without',as the Corps diary relates, 'the accompany-ing enemy infantry, mounted on lorrieswith the tanks, once being engaged'. Chillrelieved Stephan of his command, transfer-ring it to von der Heydte's Regiment. Thehapless commanding officer was posted torear-area bridge security duties.Despite the cost, German pressure wasmaintained. Resolve and the knowledge ofBritish intentions were there, but sufficientforces to do anything about it were not.Inexorably the armoured spearheadsground onwards. 'Motorised movement onthe road between Son and St Oedenrodetowards the north' was reported duringLXXXVIII Corps' evening situation reporton 19 September." Counter-measures toblock this traffic had already been insti-tuted by Student. Some of the reserve Fall-schirmjaeger battalions that had beenassembled in S'Hertogenbosch were now inposition and began to interfere with trafficon 'Hell's Highway' between 18-20 Sep-tember. Despite this, at around 1000 on the18th the first British tanks began crossingthe bridge at Grave, after having establishedcontact with the 82nd Airborne Division 90minutes before. Behind them, furtherdelaying the Allied build-up, Germanunits, having mobilised, attacked from thewest.Major Hans J u n g w i r t h , previouslyattached to Student's 1st FallschirmjägerArmy Headquarters, was sent to Hertogen-bosch to co-ordinate attacks against thecorridor between Oedenrode and Veghel.Four Fallschirmjäger 'march' battalionsand the Grenadier Regiment 1036 wereordered to block the highway. Jungwirthoperated as a type of 'supremo', co-ordinating measures to obstruct the road asnecessary. A veteran of Poland, France,

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