IT NEVER S N O W S IN SEPTEMBER

arrived on 18 September to assume controlof the Division Erdmann and 176 Division,enabling General Student to give his un-divided attention to his units more activelyinvolved in containing the Allied salient onthe western side of the corridor.The heaviest attack this time was to comefrom the east. Obstfelder was to employthe now regrouped and reinforced Kampf-gruppe 'Walther' that had originally beencut in two by the XXX Corps break-through in the Neerpelt bridgehead. Col-onel Walther received his orders atLXXXVI Corps command post in theHillenraed-Swamen castle near Roermondduring the afternoon of 21 September. Hismission was to cut the Eindhoven-Graveroad at Veghel, seize the town, and destroythe bridge across the Zuid Wilhelms Vaartcanal. He was to prevent the passage ofreinforcements along this road, and re-establish contact with German forces oper-ating on the other side of the corridor, whowould be mounting a joint attack from westof the town.The new Kampfgruppe Walther was tocontrol Major von Maltzahn's Panzer Bri-gade 107, a small contingent from the 10SSPanzer Division - the Kampfgruppe'Richter' - an artillery battalion (105mmand 150mm) from the Regiment 180 andthe 1st Battalion of Grenadier Regiment 16- a 'replacement' battalion - also from 180Division, and a heavy flak battery. Theother units of Walther's group would rejoinhim as soon as they were relieved in theline, that is, two reinforced infantry bat-talions and an SS artillery battery. Theseincluded the 1st Battalion FallschirmjägerRegiment 21, and the SS Tank-DestroyerBattalion 10, commanded by SS CaptainRoestel, who were picking up replacementassault guns and crews in Gemert. ColonelWalther commanded an imposing force.Von Malzahn's panzer brigade was still at90 per cent strength, despite its losses inaction against the 101 Division at Son 48

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hours before. The infantry, however,lacked combat experience and the artillerywas short of ammunition.' H ' hour for the attack was to be early on22 September. Walther voiced his concernat the short time available to march hisunits to their forward assembly areas andconduct a reconnaissance of the attackterrain and forming-up points. General vonObstfelder overruled all objections; thesituation demanded that the KampfgruppeWalther attack as soon as was humanlypossible. Contrary to all expectations, themarching units arrived on time. Althoughthe bulk of his original units were notrelieved in the line until 23 September, thenew assault formations were already arriv-ing in the vicinity of this newly establishedcommand post in Gemert during the earlymorning hours of 22 September. MajorFreiherr von Maltzahn, commanding Pan-zer Brigade 107, reconnoitred the forming-up places and secured the road bridgeacross their first water obstacle, the Aariver in Erp. Security screens were postedto cover the Uden flank. Undetected by theenemy, the strongest force yet assembled tostrike the corridor from the east awaited thesignal to advance.

Meanwhile, in the west a regimentalcombat team from the 59th Division,shored up with replacements after its initialdisastrous commitment at Best, lay waitingin its forming-up points. Commanded byMajor Huber, this Kampfgruppe includedthree infantry battalions, a battalion of105mm howitzers, a battery of 20mm anti-aircraft guns, seven anti-tank guns and four'Jagdpanther' from the 1st company ofTank-Destroyer Battalion 559 attachedfrom the Kampfgruppe Chill. Huber's rightflank was loosely covered by the Kampf-gruppe Zedlitz on the Wilhelmina canalaround Oirschot, and the FallschirmjägerBattalion 'Bloch' held S'Hertogenbosch tohis rear. The axis of attack for the Kampf-gruppe Huber was from Schijndel through

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