IT NEVER SNOWS IN SEPTEMBER

logistic chain nourishing German offensivedesigns between the lower Rhine and Waalrivers was gone again. They could no longerbe realistically pursued. On the same day theHohenstaufen departed the Arnhem areabound for its belated rest and refurbish-ment in the Reich. All it had fought for wasnow destroyed. What was left was deniedto the civilian inhabitants who were forciblyevacuated, and systematically looted by theGerman army during the final winter of thewar.What had been the decisive factors contri-buting to German success? In the absence ofany previous comprehensive survey of theGerman reaction to MARKET-GARDEN,Allied historians have tended to blame mis-takes rather than effective counter-measures in order to account for the failure.

The main factor reducing the impact of theairlandings was not a 'betrayal myth' (nowrefuted ), that SS Panzer formations werepre-positioned to defeat an airborneassault; improvisation and a rapid build-upof force blunted the attacks. This arosefrom aggressive and swift counter-measuresimplemented by IISS Corps already located in situ and other ad hoc combat groupswhich were rushed to its aid.German reaction times were astonishing.On 17 September the Allies achieved totalsurprise, dropping six British and 18 Amer-ican airborne battalions behind enemy linesin southern Holland, supported by someartillery and anti-tank guns. By midnight,ten to eleven German battalions hadassembled in the Arnhem area, mainlybecause of the IISS Corps concentration,

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German reaction times were astonishing. The Allies could not matchthe German reinforcement rate, here moving to Arnhem.

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