Most of those who have written about the emotions and about the manner of living of human beings give the impression that they are discussing things that are outside of nature rather than natural things that follow the common laws of nature. In fact, they seem to conceive of man in nature as an empire within an empire.43 This is because they believe that human beings disrupt rather than follow the order of nature and that they have absolute power over their actions and are wholly self-determining. They then attribute the cause of the powerlessness and inconstancy of human beings not to the common power of nature but to some sort of fault in human nature. As a result they deplore, despise and ridicule human nature, and very often condemn it; and anyone who shows superior eloquence or ingenuity in denouncing the powerlessness of the human mind is regarded as a prophet.
But there have also been some outstanding authors (to whose labor and industry we admit that we owe a great deal), who have written many fine things about the right manner of living and have given advice full of prudence. However, no one has determined, so far as I know, the nature and strength of the emotions and what the mind in its turn can do to govern them. I am aware that the celebrated Descartes, despite his belief that the mind has absolute power 94over its actions, still strove to explain human emotions by their first causes and at the same time to point out a path by which the mind could have absolute sovereignty over the emotions. But in my opinion anyway all that he proved was the brilliance of his own genius, as I shall show in the appropriate place. For the time being I would like to return to those who prefer to abuse or ridicule human emotions and actions rather than understand them. They will certainly find it strange that I attempt to treat human faults and follies in geometrical fashion and that I should wish to prove by certain demonstrative reasoning these things which they constantly say defy reason and are foolish, absurd and abhorrent.
Here is my reasoning.44 Nothing happens in nature which can be regarded as nature’s fault. Nature is always the same, and everywhere there is one and the same virtue in it, one and the same power of action. That is, the laws and rules of nature by which all things happen and change from one form to another are always and everywhere the same, and therefore there must also be one and the same method of reasoning for understanding the nature of anything whatsoever, namely through the universal laws and rules of nature. Therefore the emotions of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as do other particular things. Accordingly they have specific causes by which they are to be understood, and they have specific properties which are as well worth studying as the properties of any other thing that we take pleasure in observing. I will therefore discuss the nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them using the same method I followed in the previous Parts in discussing God and the mind; I will consider human actions and appetites exactly as if I were studying lines, planes or bodies.
1. I call a cause adequate if its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it, and I call a cause whose effect cannot be understood through itself alone an inadequate or partial cause.
2. I say that we act [agere] when something takes place within us or outside of us of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by the previous definition) when something follows from our nature, within us or outside of us, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. Conversely, I say that we are acted on [pati] when something takes place within us or something follows from our nature of which we are only a partial cause.
1. The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of action is augmented or diminished, as well as in other ways which do not make its power of action either greater or lesser.
This postulate or axiom rests upon post1 and on L5 and L7 after 2p13.
2. The human body may undergo many changes and still retain impressions or 96traces of objects (on which see 2post5) and consequently the same images of things (for the definition of which see 2p17s).
Our mind sometimes acts and is sometimes acted on. Insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts; and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily is acted on.
Some ideas in any human mind are adequate, while others are mutilated and confused (by 2p40s). Ideas which are adequate in anyone’s mind are adequate in God, insofar as he constitutes the essence of that mind (by 2p11c); and ideas then that are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God (by the same corollary), not insofar as he contains the essence only of that mind but insofar as he contains in himself also at the same time the minds of other things. Then, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by 1p36), and God is the adequate cause of this effect (see 3def1), not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is considered as affected by the given idea (see 2p9). But a mind is the adequate cause of an effect of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in that same mind (by 2p11c). Therefore (by 3def2) insofar as our mind has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts. This is the first point. Then, the mind is not an adequate but a partial cause of anything that follows necessarily from an idea which is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the mind of one person only, but insofar as he has in himself the minds of other things simultaneously with that person’s mind (by the same 2p11c). Accordingly (by 3def2), insofar as the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily is acted on. This is the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q. E. D.
It follows from this that the more inadequate ideas a mind has, the more passions it is subject to, and conversely the more adequate ideas it has, the more it acts.
The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).
All modes of thinking have God as their cause insofar as he is a thinking thing and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute (by 2p6). Therefore what determines the mind to think is a mode of thinking and not a mode of extension, i.e. (by 2def1) it is not body; that is the first point. Then, motion and rest in a body must arise from another body, which has also been determined to motion or to rest by another body, and, absolutely, anything that arises in a body must have had its origin in God, insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of extension and not insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of thinking (by the same 2p6). That is, it cannot arise from the mind, which (by 2p11) is a mode of thinking; and that is the second point. Therefore the body cannot determine the mind etc. Q. E. D.
These things will be understood more clearly from what we said in 2p7s, namely that mind and body are one and the same thing which is conceived sometimes under the attribute of thought and sometimes under the attribute of extension. This is why the order or connection of things is one whether nature is conceived under the one attribute or the other, and consequently that the order of our body’s actions and passions is simultaneous in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the way in which we proved 2p12.
But although this is how things are and there remains no reason to doubt it, still I hardly believe that people can be brought to think about these things with a fair mind if I do not confirm the matter by experience, 98so firmly are people convinced that it is solely at the mind’s behest that the body is sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest and does all sorts of actions that depend solely upon the will of the mind and its skill in thinking. For no one has yet determined what actions the body can do, i.e. experience has not yet taught anyone what actions the body can and cannot do without being determined by the mind simply on the basis of the laws of nature insofar as nature is viewed solely as corporeal. For no one has yet achieved such an accurate knowledge of the body’s structure that he could explain all its functions, not to mention that we observe quite a few things in animals that far surpass human skills, and that sleepwalkers do many actions in their sleep which they would not dare do while awake. This is all good evidence that merely by the laws of its own nature a body can do many things by itself that strike the mind with wonder.
Then, no one knows the manner or mechanism by which the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give the body and how fast it can make it move. It follows from this that when people say that one or another of a body’s actions originates in the mind which governs the body, they do not know what they are talking about. They are merely admitting in plausible words that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action without wondering at it.
But they will argue that whether they do or do not know by what means the mind moves the body, they are nevertheless aware by experience that if the human mind were not capable of thinking, the body would be inert. Then they claim to know by experience that it is within the abilities of the mind alone to speak or be silent, and a host of other things which they believe to depend similarly on a decision by the mind. But on the first point, I ask them whether experience does not also teach them the contrary – that if the body is inert, the mind too at the same time is incapable of thinking. For when the body is at rest and asleep, the mind remains asleep with it at the same time and does not have the ability to think that it has when it is awake. Then, I believe that everyone has experienced that the mind is not always equally capable of thinking about the same object, but the more capable the body is to have an image of this or that object aroused in it, the more capable the mind is of thinking about this or that object.
But they will argue that it is impossible for the causes of buildings, pictures and such things, 99which are made by human art alone, to be deduced solely from the laws of nature insofar as nature is considered as merely corporeal; and the human body would not be able to build, say, a great temple unless it were determined and guided by a mind. But I have already shown that they do not know what the body can do or what can be deduced from merely studying its nature. Also they themselves experience that a whole host of things happen simply by the laws of nature which they would never believe could happen without direction by a mind, such as a sleepwalker’s actions in his sleep which even he wonders at when he wakes up. I would also mention the fabric of the human body itself which far surpasses in craftsmanship any structure ever made by human art, to say nothing of the point I proved above that infinite things follow from nature under whatever attribute it is considered.
Now on the second point, human affairs would certainly get along better, if it were as much within the abilities of a human being to be silent as to speak. But experience abundantly shows that human beings have nothing less within their control than their tongues, and there is nothing people are so bad at as governing their appetites. This is why many believe that we do freely only those actions that we pursue tepidly, because the appetite for those things can easily be countered by remembering some other thing that we frequently recall, but not those things that we pursue with a great emotion that cannot be calmed by recalling some other thing. But nothing would stop them from believing that we do all things freely, if they had not experienced that we do quite a lot of things that we later repent; for example, when we are assailed by contrary emotions, we often see the better and follow the worse.45 Similarly an infant believes he wants milk freely, an angry boy thinks he tries to get vengeance freely and a timid person thinks that he tries to run away freely. Then, a drunken person believes that it is from a free decision of his mind that he says things which later when he is sober he will wish he had not said. Similarly a delirious person, a chattering woman, a child, and lots of people of this sort believe they are speaking by the free decision of their minds, whereas the truth is they can’t contain their impulse to talk. Thus experience and reason alike clearly show us that people believe they are free merely because they are conscious of their actions but are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. They also show us that the mind’s decisions are nothing but the appetites themselves, which vary as the disposition of the body varies. For every person governs everything by his emotions; and those who are assailed by 100contrary emotions do not know what they want. Those who are not moved by any emotion are driven this way and that by the slightest of influences.46
Surely this all clearly shows that the decision and appetite of the mind and the determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather they are one and the same thing. When it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained through that, we call it a decision, and when it is considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call it determination. This will become clearer later from what we have still to say.
But there is another thing which I would like to stress above all. It is that we can do no action by a decision of the mind unless we recall it. For example, we cannot speak a word unless we recall it. Then, it is not within the free abilities of the mind to recall something or to forget it. So the only thing that is believed to be within the abilities of the mind is, by the sole decision of the mind, to be silent or to speak about a thing which we recall.
But when we dream that we are speaking, we believe that we are speaking by a free decision of the mind. However we are not speaking, or if we are, it is happening as a result of a spontaneous motion of the body. Then we dream that we are hiding certain things from people and that we are doing this by the same decision of the mind by which, when awake, we keep quiet about things that we know. We dream finally that we are doing certain actions as a result of a decision of the mind which we don’t dare to do when we are awake. Thus I would very much like to know whether there are two kinds of mental decision, one of dream things and the other of free things?
But if we are unwilling to stray so far into nonsense, we must necessarily admit that this decision of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguished from imagination itself or from memory, and that it is nothing but the affirmation which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves (see 2p49). Therefore these mental decisions arise in the mind by the same necessity as ideas of things that actually exist. Therefore those who believe that they speak or keep silent or do anything whatsoever as a result of a free mental decision are fantasizing.
Actions of the mind arise only from adequate ideas; but passions depend solely upon inadequate ideas.
The first thing that constitutes the essence of a mind is simply the idea of an actually existing body (by 2p11 and 2p13). This idea (by 2p15) is composed of many others, some of which (by 2p38c) are adequate and some inadequate (by 2p29c). Therefore anything that follows from the nature of the mind and of which the mind is the proximate cause through which it has to be understood, must follow necessarily from an adequate or an inadequate idea. But insofar as the mind (by 3p1) has inadequate ideas, to that extent it is acted on. Therefore actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and for this reason the mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas. Q. E. D.
We see therefore that passions are only attributed to the mind insofar as it contains something which involves negation, or insofar as it is considered as a part of nature which by itself, apart from other things, cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived. I could also show in a similar manner that the passions are attributed to particular things in the same way as to the mind and cannot be perceived in any other manner. But my design is to discuss only the human mind.
This proposition is self-evident. For the definition of anything affirms the essence of the thing itself and does not negate it, or it posits the thing’s essence and does not take it away. So long therefore as we focus only on the thing itself and not on external causes, we will not be able to find anything in it which can destroy it. Q. E. D.
Insofar as a thing can destroy another thing, to that extent they are of contrary natures, i.e. to that extent they cannot be in the same subject.
If they could agree with each other or be at the same time in the same subject, there could possibly be something in that subject which could destroy it; and this is absurd (by the previous proposition). Therefore insofar as a thing, etc. Q. E. D.
Every single thing endeavors as far as it lies in itself47 to persevere in its own being.
Particular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a specific and determinate way (by 1p25c), i.e. (by 1p34) they are things that express in a specific and determinate way the power of God by which God is and acts, and no thing has anything in itself by which it may be destroyed or which may take away its existence (by 3p4). To the contrary, it is opposed to everything that can take away its existence (by the previous proposition). Therefore, it endeavors as far as lies in itself, to persevere in its own being. Q. E. D.
The endeavor [conatus] by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being is simply the actual essence of the thing itself.
Certain things necessarily follow from the given essence of anything whatsoever (by 1p36), and things can only do what necessarily follows from their determinate nature (by 1p29). Therefore each thing’s power or endeavor, by which it acts or endeavors to do any action, either alone or in combination with other things, i.e. (by 3p6) the power or endeavor by which it endeavors to persevere in its own being, is simply the given or actual essence of the thing itself. Q. E. D.
The endeavor by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being, involves not a finite time but an indefinite time.
If it involved a limited time which determined the thing’s duration, it would follow merely from the power itself by which the thing exists, that the thing would be unable to exist after that limited time and that it must be destroyed; and this (by 3p4) is absurd. Therefore the endeavor by which a thing exists does not involve a defined time. To the contrary (by the same 3p4), unless it is destroyed by an external cause, it will continue to exist for ever by the same power by which it now exists. Therefore this endeavor involves an indefinite time. Q. E. D.
Both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, the mind endeavors to persevere in its own being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this endeavor it possesses.
The essence of the mind consists of adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in 3p3), and therefore (by 3p7) it endeavors to persevere in its own being both insofar as it has the latter and insofar as it has the former, and (by 3p8) for an indefinite duration. And since (by 2p23) the mind is necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the affections of the body, it is therefore (by 3p7) conscious of its own endeavor. Q. E. D.
When this endeavor is related to the mind alone, it is called will. But when it is related to mind and body simultaneously, it is called appetite, which accordingly is nothing but a human being’s very essence, and things that serve his preservation necessarily follow from its nature, and therefore a person is determined to do those 104things. Then, there is no difference between appetite and desire except that desire is very often attributed to people insofar as they are conscious of their appetite, and therefore it can be defined as follows: desire is appetite together with consciousness of it. From all this therefore it is clear that we do not endeavor anything, we do not will anything, we do not seek or desire anything, because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor it, will it, seek it and desire it.
An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.
Nothing that can destroy our body can be in it (by 3p5). Therefore the idea of that thing cannot be in God either, insofar as he has the idea of our body (by 2p9c), i.e. (by 2p11 and 2p13) the idea of that thing cannot be in our minds. To the contrary, since (by 2p11 and 2p13) the first thing that constitutes the essence of a mind is the idea of an actually existing body, the first and most important element of our mind is the endeavor (by 3p7) to affirm the existence of our body. Therefore an idea that excludes the existence of our body is contrary to our mind, etc. Q. E. D.
The idea of anything that augments or diminishes, assists or restrains our body’s power of action, also augments or diminishes, assists or restrains the mind’s power of thought.
This proposition is evident from 2p7; also from 2p14.
We see therefore that the mind can undergo great changes. Sometimes it passes to greater perfection and sometimes to lesser perfection. These 105passions provide us with an explanation of the emotions of joy and sadness. By joy therefore in what follows I shall mean the passion by which the mind passes to greater perfection. By sadness I shall mean the passion by which it passes to lesser perfection. Also when the emotion of joy is related to mind and body simultaneously, I call it delight or cheerfulness. When the emotion of sadness is related to mind and body simultaneously I call it distress or melancholy. But note that delight and distress are attributed to a person when one part of him is more affected than the rest; cheerfulness and melancholy are attributed to him when all parts are equally affected. Then, I explained what desire is in 3p9s. These three are the only primary emotions I recognize; in what follows I will show how all the other emotions arise from them. But before I go further, I should like to explain 3p10 more fully; I want to give a better understanding of how one idea may be contrary to another idea.
In 2p17s I showed that the idea that constitutes the essence of mind involves the existence of body for so long as the body itself exists. Then, it follows from what we proved in 2p8c and its scholium that the present existence of our mind depends solely upon the fact that a mind involves the actual existence of a body. Finally, I showed that the power by which the mind imagines and recalls things also depends on this (see 2p17 and 2p18 with its scholium), because it involves the actual existence of a body. From these things it follows that the present existence of a mind and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of a body.
But the reason why a mind ceases to affirm this existence of a body cannot be the mind itself (by 3p4), nor can it be that the body ceases to be. For (by 2p6) the reason why a mind affirms the existence of a body is not because the body has begun to exist. Therefore by the same reasoning, neither does it cease to affirm the existence of the body itself because the body ceases to be. It arises (by 2p8) from another idea which excludes the present existence of our body and consequently the present existence of our mind and which therefore is contrary to the idea which constitutes the essence of our mind.
So far as it can, the mind endeavors to imagine things which augment or assist the body’s power of action.
So long as the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of an external body, the human mind will regard that body as present (by 2p17). Consequently (by 2p7) as long as a human mind regards any external body as present, i.e. (by the scholium to the same p17) as long as the mind imagines it, the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of that external body. Therefore as long as the mind is imagining things that augment or assist our body’s power of action, for so long the body is affected in ways that augment or assist its power of action (see 3post1), and consequently (by 3p11) for so long the mind’s power of thought is augmented or assisted. Accordingly (by 3p6 or 3p9), so far as it can, the mind endeavors to imagine those things. Q. E. D.
When the mind imagines things which diminish or restrain the body’s power of action, it endeavors, so far as it can, to recall things that exclude the existence of those things.
As long as the mind imagines such a thing, the power of mind and body is diminished or restrained (as we proved in the previous proposition). But it will still imagine it, until it imagines something else which excludes the present existence of the thing (by 2p17). That is (as we have just shown) the power of both mind and body continues to be diminished or restrained until the mind imagines something else which excludes the existence of that thing. Therefore (by 3p9) the mind will endeavor to imagine or recall that other thing so far as it can. Q. E. D.
It follows from this that the mind is averse to imagining things that diminish or restrain its own and the body’s power.
From all this we see clearly what love and hatred are. Love is simply joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause and hatred is simply sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Then we see that a person who loves necessarily endeavors to have the presence of the thing that he loves and to preserve it. Conversely a person who hates endeavors to get rid of the thing that he hates and to destroy it. But we will discuss all these topics more extensively later.
If the mind has at some time been affected by two emotions simultaneously, when it is later affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.
If a human body has at some time been affected by two bodies at the same time, when the mind later imagines one of them, it will also immediately recall the other one (by 2p18). But our mind’s imaginings indicate the emotions of our body more than the nature of the external bodies (by 2p16c2). Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (see 3def3), has at some time been affected by two emotions, when it is affected at a later time by one of them, it will also be affected by the other. Q. E. D.
Suppose that the mind is affected by two emotions at the same time. One of them neither augments nor diminishes its power of action; the other does either augment or diminish it (see 3post1). The previous proposition established that when a mind is affected at a later time with the first emotion, the true cause, which 108(by hypothesis) through itself neither augments nor diminishes the mind’s power of thought, it will immediately also be affected by this other emotion, which does augment or diminish its power of thought, i.e. (by 3p11s) it will be affected by joy or by sadness. Therefore that thing will be the cause of joy or of sadness not through itself but accidentally. It can easily be shown in the same fashion that a thing can accidentally be a cause of desire. Q. E. D.
We can love or hate a thing for the sole reason that we have regarded it with an emotion of joy or sadness, though it is not itself the efficient cause of either.
This is the sole reason (by 3p14) why the mind is affected by an emotion of joy or sadness when it imagines this thing later, i.e. (by 3p11s) why the power of the mind and body is augmented or diminished etc., and consequently (by 3p12) it is the sole reason why the mind desires to imagine the thing or (by 3p13c) is averse to doing so, i.e. (by 3p13s), why it loves it or hates it. Q. E. D.
We see from this how it can happen that we love or hate certain things for no cause known to us – merely (as they say) from sympathy and antipathy. We must also include here objects that affect us with joy or sadness simply because they are quite similar to objects that habitually affect us with the same emotions, as I show in the next proposition. I know of course that the writers who first introduced these terms sympathy and antipathy meant them to signify certain occult qualities of things; despite this, I believe we may also understand them to refer to evident or observable qualities.
We shall love or hate a thing simply because we imagine that it has some similarity to an object which habitually affects our minds with joy or sadness, 109even if the point of similarity with the object is not the efficient cause of these emotions.
We have regarded with an emotion of joy or sadness the point of similarity to the object in the object itself (by the hypothesis). Therefore (by 3p14) the mind will immediately also be affected by one or other of these emotions when it is affected by an image of it. Consequently the thing which we perceive to have this point of similarity will (by 3p15) be a cause of joy or sadness accidentally. Therefore (by 3p15c) although the point of similarity that it possesses to the object is not the efficient cause of these emotions, we shall nevertheless love it or hate it. Q. E. D.
If we imagine that a thing which habitually affects us with an emotion of sadness has some similarity to another thing which habitually affects us with an equally great emotion of joy, we will hate it at the same time as we love it.
This thing is (by hypothesis) a cause of sadness through itself, and (by 3p13s) insofar as we imagine it with this emotion, we hate it. But insofar as we imagine that it has some similarity to another thing that habitually affects us with an equally great emotion of joy, we shall love it with an equally great burst of joy (by the previous proposition). Therefore we shall hate it at the same time as we love it. Q. E. D.
This state of mind that arises from two contrary emotions is called wavering of spirit. Accordingly it is related to emotion as doubt is related to imagination (see 2p44s); and wavering of spirit and doubt differ from each other only in degree.
But note that in 3p16 I deduced these waverings of spirit from causes which in the case of one emotion was the cause through itself of that emotion and in the case of the other emotion was the cause accidentally of it. I did this because in that way I could more easily deduce them from previous propositions, not because I deny that waverings 110of spirit very often arise from an object which is the efficient cause of both emotions. For (by 2post1) the human body is composed of a very large number of individual things of diverse nature and therefore (by a1′′ after L3 which you will find following 2p13) can be affected in very many different ways by one and the same body. Conversely, as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many different ways. From all this we can easily conceive that one and the same object may be the cause of many contrary emotions.
A person is affected by the same emotion of joy and sadness from the image of something in the past or something in the future as from the image of something in the present.
As long as a person is affected by the image of something, he will regard the thing as present even if it does not exist (by 2p17 with its corollary); and he does not imagine it as past or as future, except insofar as its image is combined with an image of past or future time (see 2p44s). Therefore a thing’s image, considered in itself alone, is the same whether it is related to future time or past time or present time. That is (by 2p16c2), the bodily constitution or emotion, is the same whether the image is of something in the past, the future or the present. Therefore the emotion of joy and sadness is the same, whether the image is of something in the past, the future or the present. Q. E. D.
Here I call a thing past or future insofar as we have been affected by it or will be affected by it. For example, insofar as we have seen it or will see it, insofar as it has made us better or will do so, has hurt us or will do so, and so on. For insofar as we imagine it, we affirm its existence, i.e. our body is unaffected by any emotion which excludes the existence of the thing. Therefore (by 2p17) the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. However, since it often happens that those who have experienced several things waver as long as they regard a thing as future or past 111and are seriously in doubt about the outcome of it (see 2p44s), the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not all equally consistent but are frequently disturbed by images of other things so long as people are uncertain about the outcome of a thing.
From what we have just said we see what hope, fear, assurance, despair, relief and remorse are. Hope is simply an inconstant joy arising from the image of something in the future or in the past about whose outcome we are in doubt. Conversely fear is an inconstant sadness which also arises from an image of something that is in doubt. Once the doubt is taken away from these emotions, hope turns into assurance and fear into despair, i.e. into the joy or sadness arising from the image of the thing we either feared or hoped for. Then, relief is joy arising from the image of a thing in the past of whose outcome we had been in doubt. And remorse is the sadness that is the opposite of relief.
Anyone who imagines that something he loves is destroyed will be sad; but if he imagines that it is preserved, he will be joyful.
So far as it can, the mind endeavors to imagine things that augment or assist the body’s power of action (by 3p12), i.e. (by 3p13s) things that it loves. But the imagination is assisted by anything that posits the existence of the thing and conversely is restrained by anything that excludes the existence of the thing (by 2p17). Therefore images of things that posit the existence of the thing it loves assist the endeavor of the mind by which it endeavors to imagine the beloved thing, i.e. (by 3p11s) they affect the mind with joy. Conversely things that exclude the existence of the beloved thing, restrain this endeavor of the mind, i.e. (by the same scholium) they affect the mind with sadness. Anyone therefore who imagines that something he loves is destroyed will be sad, etc. Q. E. D.
The mind (by 3p13) endeavors to imagine things that exclude the existence of anything by which the body’s power of action is diminished or restrained, i.e. (by 3p13s) it endeavors to imagine things that exclude the existence of anything that it hates. Therefore an image of a thing that excludes the existence of something the mind hates, assists this endeavor of the mind, i.e. (by 3p11s) it affects the mind with joy. Therefore anyone who imagines that something he hates is destroyed will be joyful. Q. E. D.
Anyone who imagines something he loves as affected by joy or sadness, will also be affected by joy or sadness; and both these emotions will be greater or lesser in the lover, according as they are greater or lesser in the beloved thing.
Images of things (as we proved in 3p19) that posit the existence of a thing one loves assist the endeavor of the mind by which it endeavors to imagine the very thing that one loves. But joy posits the existence of a joyful thing, and the greater the emotion of joy is, the more it does so; for (by 3p11s) it is a passage to greater perfection. Therefore a lover’s image of the joy of the beloved thing assists his mind’s endeavor, i.e. (by 3p11s) it affects the lover with joy, and with all the more joy, the greater this affect is in the beloved thing. That is the first point. Then, insofar as a thing is affected by some sadness, it is to that extent destroyed, and all the more, the greater the sadness that affects it (by the same 3p11s). Therefore (by 3p19) anyone who imagines that something he loves is affected by sadness will also be affected by sadness, and with all the greater sadness, the greater this emotion is in the beloved thing. Q. E. D.
If we imagine someone affecting a thing we love with joy, we will be affected by love for him. Conversely if we imagine him affecting that thing with sadness, we too on the contrary will be affected by hatred for him.
Anyone who affects a thing we love with joy or sadness, also affects us with joy or sadness when we imagine the beloved thing as affected by that joy or sadness (by the previous proposition). But the supposition is that this joy or sadness is accompanied in us by the idea of an external cause. Therefore (by 3p13s) if we imagine that someone is affecting a thing we love with joy or sadness, we shall be affected by love or hatred for him. Q. E. D.
Proposition 21 explains for us what pity is; we may define it as a sadness arising from injury to another person. I don’t know what term we should use for the joy that arises from another person’s success. Then love for someone who has done good to another person we shall call approval, and hatred for someone who has treated another person badly, we shall call indignation. Finally, note that we feel pity not only for a thing we have loved (as shown in p21), but also for a thing that we had not previously felt any emotion for, provided we judge that it is similar to us (as I shall show below).48 Consequently, we approve of someone who has done good to someone similar to ourselves, and conversely we are indignant with a person who has caused injury to someone similar to us.
Anyone who imagines that something he hates is affected by sadness will be joyful; if conversely he imagines it as affected by joy, he will be sad; and both these emotions will be greater or lesser as the contrary emotion is greater or lesser in the thing he hates.
Insofar as something we hate is affected by sadness, it is to that extent destroyed, the more so, the greater the sadness by which it is affected (by 3p11s). Therefore (by 3p20) anyone who imagines a thing he hates as affected by sadness, will in contrast be affected by joy, and the greater the sadness with which he imagines the thing he hates to be affected, the greater his joy will be. That is the first point. Then, joy posits the existence of that which is joyful (by the same 3p11s), and all the more so, the greater the joy is conceived to be. If anyone imagines a person he hates to be affected by joy, this imagination (by 3p13) will restrain his endeavor, i.e. (by 3p11s) the one who hates him will be affected with sadness, etc. Q. E. D.
This joy can scarcely be unmitigated and without any conflict of spirit. For (as I shall show just below in 3p27) insofar as he imagines a thing that is similar to himself as affected by an emotion of sadness, to that extent he must be sad; and the contrary, if he imagines the same thing to be affected by joy. But here we are dealing only with hatred.
If we imagine someone as affecting with joy a thing that we hate, we will be affected by hatred for him too. If conversely we imagine him affecting the same thing with sadness, we will be affected by love for him.
This proposition is proved in the same way as 3p22; please consult.
These and similar emotions of hatred are related to envy, which therefore is simply hatred itself, insofar as hatred is considered as disposing a person to enjoy harm to another person and to be saddened by his success.
We endeavor to affirm of ourselves and of anything we love all that we imagine affects us or the beloved thing with joy; conversely we endeavor to deny all that we imagine affects us or the beloved thing with sadness.
What we imagine affects the beloved thing with joy or sadness, affects us with joy or sadness (by 3p21). But (by 3p12) the mind endeavors to imagine, so far as it can, things that affect us with joy, i.e. (by 2p17 and its corollary) it regards them as present; and conversely (by 3p13), it endeavors to exclude the existence of things that affect us with sadness. Therefore we endeavor to affirm of ourselves and of the beloved thing everything that we imagine affects us or the beloved thing with joy, and the contrary. Q. E. D.
We endeavor to affirm about a thing that we hate everything that we imagine affects it with sadness and conversely to deny what we imagine affects it with joy.
This proposition follows from 3p23 as 3p25 follows from 3p21.
We see from all this that it easily happens that a person thinks too well of himself and of a beloved thing and conversely thinks too poorly of a thing that he hates. When this imagination concerns a person who thinks too well of himself, it is called pride. Pride is a species of madness because the person fantasizes that he can actually do everything that he achieves only in his imagination, and therefore regards his imaginary successes as realities and exults in them as long as he cannot imagine things that exclude their existence and determine his power of action. Pride then is joy arising from a person’s thinking too well of himself. 116Then, the joy that arises from his thinking too well of another person is called adulation. Finally the joy that arises from thinking too poorly of another person is called disdain.
Our imagining that something that is similar to us, for which we have had no emotion, is affected by some emotion causes us to be affected by a similar emotion.
Images of things are affections of the human body, and ideas of them represent external bodies as present to us (by 2p17s). That is (by 2p16), the ideas we have of them involve the nature of our body and the nature of the external body as present at the same time. If the external body’s nature is similar to our body’s nature, the idea of the external body that we imagine will involve an affection of our body similar to the external body’s affection. Consequently, if we imagine something similar to us being affected by some emotion, this imagination will express an affection of our body similar to that emotion. Therefore from our imagining that something similar to us has been affected by some emotion, we are affected by a similar emotion. But if we hate a thing that is similar to us, we will to that extent (by 3p23) be affected by a contrary emotion and not by a similar one. Q. E. D.
When this imitation of emotions is related to sadness, it is called pity (on pity see 3p22s). When it is related to desire, it is called emulation; accordingly emulation is simply a desire for a thing arising in us from our imagining others who are similar to us having the same desire.
If we imagine that someone for whom we have felt no emotion affects a thing that is similar to us with joy, we will be affected with love for him. If on the other hand we imagine him affecting the same thing with sadness, we will be affected with hatred for him.
This is proved from the last proposition in the same way as 3p22 from 3p21.
We cannot hate a thing that we pity from the fact that its misery affects us with sadness.
If we could hate a thing because of this, then (by 3p23) we would be made joyful because of its sadness, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
A thing that affects something we pity with sadness affects us also with a similar sadness (by 3p27). Therefore (by 3p13) we will endeavor to think up everything that takes away the existence of that thing or destroys it, i.e. (by 3p9s) we will want to destroy it or we will be determined to destroy it; and therefore we will endeavor to relieve the misery of anything we pity. Q. E. D.
This will or appetite to confer a benefit, which arises from our pity for the thing we want to benefit, is called benevolence; benevolence accordingly is simply the desire that arises from pity. But see 3p22s on love and hatred for a person who has treated well or badly something that we imagine to be similar to us.
We endeavor to bring about everything that we imagine contributes to joy; but we endeavor to get rid of or destroy all that we imagine to be contrary to joy or which we imagine contributes to sadness.
We endeavor to imagine, so far as we can, whatever we imagine contributes to joy (by 3p12), i.e. (by 2p17) we shall endeavor, so far as we can, to regard it as present or actually existing. But the mind’s endeavor, or its power in thought, is equal and simultaneous in nature with the endeavor of the body or its power in action (as clearly follows from 2p7c and 2p11c). Therefore we absolutely endeavor to make it exist or (and this is the same thing by 3p9s) we want to make it exist and we exert ourselves. That is my first point. Then, if we imagine that a thing we believe to be a cause of sadness, i.e. (by 3p13s) a thing we hate, is destroyed, we will be joyful (by 3p20). Therefore we will endeavor to destroy it (by the first part of this proposition), or (by 3p13) to be rid of it, so that we may not see it as present. That is the second point. Therefore we endeavor to make everything happen that we imagine contributes to joy, etc. Q. E. D.
We shall also endeavor to do whatever actions we imagine people view with joy, and conversely we shall be averse to doing actions that we imagine people are averse to.49
From our imagining that people love something or hate it, we too will love it or hate it (by 3p27), i.e. (by 3p13s) we shall be made joyful or sad by the mere presence of that thing; and therefore (by the previous proposition) we shall endeavor to do whatever actions we imagine people love or view with joy, etc. Q. E. D.
This endeavor to do actions and also to omit doing them simply in order to please people is called ambition, especially when we make such an immense endeavor to please the crowd that as a result we do or omit to do actions to our own or someone else’s detriment; otherwise it is usually called 119human kindness. Then, I apply the term praise to the joy with which we imagine an action by another person by which he has endeavored to please us; conversely the sadness with which we are averse to an action of his, I call blame.
If anyone has done some action that he imagines affects other people with joy, he will be affected by a joy which is accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause of it; or he will look upon himself with joy. Conversely if he has done some action that he imagines affects other people with sadness, he will look upon himself with sadness.
Anyone who imagines that he is affecting other people with joy or sadness, will, simply because of that, be affected by joy or sadness himself (by 3p27). And (by 2p19 and 2p23) since a person is conscious of himself through the affections which determine his actions, anyone who has done some action which he imagines affects other people with joy, will be affected by joy himself and will be conscious of being its cause, or he will look upon himself with joy, and vice versa. Q. E. D.
Love (by 3p13s) is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is a sadness which is also accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and therefore this joy and this sadness will be species of love and hatred. But because the love and hatred are directed toward external objects, we will give these emotions other names, as follows. Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, we shall call glory, and the sadness which is contrary to this, we shall call shame – I mean when the joy or sadness arises from a person’s believing that he is being praised or blamed; otherwise joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, I will call self-contentment, and the sadness contrary to it I will call repentance. Then, because (by 2p17c) it may happen that the joy with which someone imagines he affects other people is merely imaginary, and (by 3p25) everyone endeavors to imagine about himself everything that he imagines will affect him with joy, 120it can therefore easily happen that a person who is vainglorious is proud and imagines that he is pleasing everybody when he is being very irksome.
If we imagine that someone loves or desires or hates something that we ourselves love or desire or hate, we shall love it more firmly simply because of that, etc. But if we imagine that someone is averse to a thing we love, or vice versa, then we shall undergo a wavering of spirit.
Simply because we imagine that someone loves something, by that very fact we shall love the same thing too (by 3p27). But the supposition is that we love it even without that; so there is a new cause of love coming in which feeds ours; and therefore we will love what we love more firmly just because of this. Then, simply because we imagine someone is averse to something, we shall be averse to it too (by the same proposition). But if we suppose that at the same time we love the thing, we shall both love and be averse to the same thing at the same time, or (see 3p17s) we shall undergo a wavering of spirit. Q. E. D.
For this reason and because of 3p28, it follows that each person, so far as he can, endeavors to have everyone love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates. Hence the poet’s couplet:
This endeavor to make everyone approve of what one loves or hates oneself is in truth ambition (see 3p29s). And thus we see that everyone by nature wants other people to live in conformance with his own character. But as they all want this equally, they are all a hindrance to one another. And as everybody wants to be praised or loved by everybody else, they end up hating each other.
If we imagine that someone enjoys something that only one person can possess, we shall endeavor to ensure that he shall not possess it.
By simply imagining that someone enjoys something (by 3p27 with 3p27c1) we shall love that thing ourselves and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine that his enjoying it obstructs this joy. Therefore (by 3p28) we shall endeavor to ensure that he does not possess it. Q. E. D.
We see therefore that it is largely the natural tendency of human beings to pity those who are doing badly and to envy those who are doing well, and (by 3p32) to hate them all the more, the more they love the thing they imagine the other person possessing. Then, from the same property of human nature from which it follows that people are compassionate, we see that it also follows that they are envious and ambitious. And finally if we care to consult experience itself, we shall find it teaching the same thing, especially if we focus on the earlier years of life. We shall see that because children’s bodies are always as it were in equilibrium, they laugh or cry merely because they see others laughing or crying; they instantly desire to imitate anything they see others doing; and they desire to have for themselves everything they imagine others are pleased with. This is because images of things, as we have said, are the very affections of the human body or the modes by which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed to do one thing or another.
When we love a thing that is similar to ourselves, we endeavor, so far as we can, to have it love us in return.
Above all other things we endeavor to imagine, as far as we can, the thing that we love (by 3p12). Therefore if the thing is similar to ourselves, 122we shall endeavor to affect it with joy in preference to others (by 3p29), or we shall endeavor, so far as we can, to ensure that it is affected by a joy which is accompanied by an idea of ourselves, i.e. (by 3p13s) we shall endeavor to have it love us in return. Q. E. D.
The greater the emotion that a beloved thing has for us, in our imagining, the more we shall glory in it.
We endeavor, so far as we can (by the previous proposition) to have a beloved thing love us in return, i.e. (by 3p13s) to have the beloved thing be affected by a joy that is accompanied by an idea of ourselves. Therefore the greater the joy with which we imagine the beloved thing is affected because of us, the more this endeavor is assisted, i.e. (by 3p11 with its scholium) the greater the joy with which we are affected. But when we are joyful because we have affected someone who is similar to ourselves with joy, then we look upon ourselves with joy (by 3p30). Therefore the greater the emotion that a beloved thing has for us, the greater the joy with which we shall look upon ourselves, or (by 3p30s) the more we shall glory. Q. E. D.
If anyone imagines that a beloved thing unites another to itself with a similar or even a closer bond of friendship than that with which he alone possessed it, he will be affected by hatred for the beloved thing itself, and he will envy the other.
The greater the love with which he imagines that the beloved thing is affected for himself, the more (by the previous proposition) he will glory, i.e. (by 3p30s) the more joy he will be affected with. Therefore (by 3p28) he will endeavor, so far as he can, to imagine that the beloved thing is bound to him by the closest ties, and this endeavor or appetite is intensified if he imagines that another person desires the same thing as himself (by 3p31). 123But the supposition is that this endeavor or appetite is restrained by the image of the beloved thing itself accompanied by an image of the person whom the beloved thing joins to himself. Therefore (by 3p11s) simply because of this he will be affected by a sadness which is accompanied by the idea of the beloved thing as its cause and at the same time by an image of the other person. That is (by 3p13s) he will be affected by hatred for the beloved thing and simultaneously (by 3p15c) for the other person, whom he will envy precisely because (by 3p23) he takes pleasure in the beloved thing. Q. E. D.
This hatred of the beloved thing, when combined with envy, is called jealousy. Accordingly, jealousy is nothing but a wavering of spirit arising from simultaneous love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of the other person, the envied one. Furthermore this hatred of the beloved thing will be greater in proportion to the joy which the jealous person used to derive from the reciprocated love of the beloved thing and also in proportion to the emotion with which he was affected toward the person whom he imagines as uniting with the beloved thing. For if he hated him, he will hate the beloved thing just for that (by 3p24), because he imagines that the beloved thing affects something he hates with joy, and also because (by 3p15c) he is compelled to associate the image of the beloved thing with an image of someone he hates. This plays a very large part in the case of love for a woman. A man who imagines a woman he loves making love to another man will not only be saddened because his own appetite is restrained, but he will also be averse to thinking about her because he is compelled to associate the image of the beloved with the genitals and emissions of the other man. And finally the jealous man is not welcomed with the same smile as the beloved used to give him, and this is another reason why the lover is saddened, as I shall now show.
A person who calls to mind a thing which once gave him pleasure desires to possess it with the same circumstances as when he first took pleasure in it.
Everything that a person once saw simultaneously with the thing that gave him pleasure will (by 3p15) accidentally be a cause of joy. Therefore 124(by 3p28) he will desire to possess it all simultaneously with the thing that gave him pleasure, or he will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances as when he first found pleasure in it. Q. E. D.
If therefore he finds one of the circumstances lacking, the lover will be saddened.
For insofar as he finds some circumstance lacking, to that extent he imagines something that excludes its existence. But (by 3p36) he desires that thing or circumstance out of love, and therefore (by 3p19) insofar as he imagines it as lacking, he will be saddened. Q. E. D.
Insofar as this sadness concerns the absence of the thing that we love, it is called longing.
A desire that arises out of sadness or joy and out of hatred or love is greater, the greater the emotion is.
Sadness (by 3p11s) diminishes or restrains a person’s power of action, i.e. (by 3p7) it diminishes or restrains the endeavor by which a person endeavors to persevere in his own being. Therefore (by 3p5) it is contrary to this endeavor; and whatever a person affected by sadness endeavors to do, he does it to be rid of the sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater the sadness, the greater the amount of a person’s power of action that is needed to oppose it. Therefore the greater the sadness, the greater the power of action a person will put into the endeavor to be rid of the sadness, i.e. (by 3p9s) the greater the desire or appetite he will put into getting rid of the sadness. Then, since (by 3p11s) a person augments or assists his power of action through joy, it is easy to prove in the same manner that a person who is affected by joy desires only to preserve it, and the greater 125the joy, the greater the desire will be. Finally, as hatred and love are themselves emotions of sadness or joy, it follows in the same way that the endeavor, appetite or desire that arises from hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the hatred and the love. Q. E. D.
If anyone has begun to hate a beloved thing so much that love is completely destroyed, he will, all other things being equal, pursue it with greater hatred than if he had never loved it, and the greater his previous love, the greater his hatred.
If anyone begins to hate a thing he loves, more of his appetites are restrained than if he had not loved it. For love is joy (by 3p13s), and (by 3p28) a person endeavors to preserve joy as much as he can. He does so (by the same scholium) by regarding the beloved thing as present and by affecting it (by 3p21) with joy as much as he can. Now (by 3p37) the greater his love is, the greater his endeavor to do so, and the greater his endeavor to have the beloved thing return his love (see 3p33). But these endeavors are restrained by his hatred of the beloved thing (by 3p13c and by 3p23). Therefore (by 3p11s) the lover will be affected by sadness because of this too, and his sadness will be all the greater, the greater his love had been. That is, in addition to the sadness that was the cause of his hatred, a further sadness arises from his having loved the thing; and consequently, he will regard the beloved thing with a greater emotion of sadness. That is (by 3p13s) he will pursue it with greater hatred than if he had never loved it, and the greater his previous love, the greater his hatred. Q. E. D.
Anyone who hates someone will endeavor to do something bad to him, unless he is afraid that something worse will happen to himself as a result; conversely anyone who loves someone will, by the same rule, endeavor to benefit him.
To hate someone is (by 3p13s) to imagine him as a cause of sadness; and thus (by 3p28) anyone who hates someone will endeavor to get rid of him or destroy him. But if he fears the outcome will be something sadder, or (which is the same thing) something worse, for himself, and if he believes that he can avoid it by not inflicting on the person he hates the bad things he was meditating, he will want to refrain from inflicting it (by the same 3p28); and (by 3p37) this endeavor will be greater than the endeavor to inflict it, and will therefore prevail, as we proposed. The proof of the second part proceeds in the same way. Therefore anyone who hates someone, etc. Q. E. D.
By good here I mean every kind of joy and anything that contributes to it, especially anything that satisfies a longing, whatever that longing may be. By bad I mean every kind of sadness, and especially that which frustrates a longing. For we showed above (in 3p9s) that we do not desire a thing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary what we desire we call good; and consequently what we are averse to, we call bad. Therefore it is by his own emotions that every person judges or estimates what is good or bad, what is better or worse, and what is the best or the worst.
For example, an avaricious person judges a pile of money to be the best thing and a lack of it to be the worst thing. An ambitious person desires nothing so much as glory and fears nothing so much as shame. Then to an envious person nothing is more pleasing than another person’s unhappiness and nothing more irksome than someone else’s happiness. Thus each of them is judging by his own emotion whether a thing is good or bad, useful or useless.
In addition, the emotion by which a person is of a disposition to refuse what he wants and to accept what he does not want is called timidity. Timidity thus is merely fear insofar as a person is ready through fear to avoid something bad which he foresees in the future by means of a lesser evil (see 3p28). But if the bad thing he fears is shame, then timidity is called modesty. Finally if the desire of avoiding a future evil is restrained 127by timidity in the face of another bad thing, so that he does not know which he would rather have, then the fear is called consternation, especially if both of the bad things he fears are very serious.
Anyone who imagines that he is hated by another person and doesn’t believe he has given any cause for hatred will hate that person in return.
Anyone who imagines that someone is affected by hatred, will also, simply because of that, be affected by hatred (by 3p27), i.e. (by 3p13s) by a sadness which is accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But (by hypothesis) he imagines no other cause of this sadness than the person who hates him. Therefore as a result of imagining that he is hated by someone, he will be affected by a sadness which is accompanied by the idea of the person who hates him, or (by the same scholium) he will hate him. Q. E. D.
But if he imagines that he has given just cause for hatred, in that case (by 3p30 and its scholium) he will be affected by shame. But (by 3p25) this rarely happens. Besides, such reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred is succeeded by an endeavor to do something bad to the hated person (by 3p39). Therefore anyone who imagines that he is hated by someone will imagine the same person as the cause of some bad thing or of sadness. Thus he will be affected by a sadness or fear which is accompanied by the idea of the person who hates him as its cause, i.e. he will be affected by hatred in return, as above.
Anyone who imagines that someone he loves is affected by hatred for him will be assailed by hatred and by love at the same time. Insofar as he imagines that he is hated by the person, he is determined (by 3p40) to hate him in return. But (by hypothesis) he still loves him. Therefore he will be assailed by love and by hatred at the same time.
If anyone imagines that some harm has been done to him out of hatred by someone for whom previously he had no emotion, he will immediately endeavor to inflict the same harm back on him.
Anyone who imagines that someone is affected by hatred for him will hate him in return (by 3p40), and (by 3p26) he will endeavor to devise anything that can affect him with sadness and will do his best to inflict it on him (by 3p39). But (by hypothesis) the first such thing he imagines is the harm inflicted on himself. Therefore he will endeavor to inflict the same harm back on him. Q. E. D.
The endeavor to inflict harm on someone we hate is called anger; and the endeavor to return the harm inflicted on us is called vengeance.
Anyone who imagines that he is loved by another person and does not believe that he has given any cause for it (which, by 3p15c and by 3p16, can happen) will return their love.
This proposition is proved in the same way as 3p40. See also its scholium.
But if he believes he has given good cause for love, he will glory in it (by 3p30 with its scholium), and this (by 3p25) happens quite often. We have also said that the contrary to it happens, when a person imagines himself to be hated by someone (see 3p40s). Further, this reciprocal love and (by 3p39) the consequent endeavor to benefit a person who loves us and who (by the same 3p39) endeavors to benefit us, is called gratefulness or gratitude. And thus it appears that human beings are far more inclined to vengeance than to returning a benefit.
Anyone who imagines that he is loved by someone he hates will be assailed by love and by hatred at the same time. This is demonstrated in the same way as 3p40c1.
But if hatred prevails, he will endeavor to do harm to the person who loves him, and this emotion is called cruelty, especially if it is believed that the one who loves has given no obvious cause for hatred.
Anyone who has conferred a benefit on someone, motivated by love or by a hope of glory, will be saddened, if he sees that the benefit is received in an ungrateful spirit.
Anyone who loves a thing that is similar to himself endeavors, so far as he can, to have them love him in return (by 3p33). Therefore anyone who has conferred a benefit on someone out of love did so because of the longing which possesses him to be loved in return, i.e. (by 3p34) in hope of glory or (by 3p30s) joy; and therefore (by 3p12) he will endeavor, as much as he can, to imagine this cause of glory or to see it as actually existing. But (by hypothesis) he is imagining another thing too which excludes the existence of that cause. Therefore (by 3p19) precisely because of that he will be saddened. Q. E. D.
Hatred is augmented by reciprocal hatred and conversely can be eradicated by love.
When anyone imagines that someone he hates is affected by hatred for him in return, by that very fact a new hatred (by 3p40) arises while the original hatred still continues (by hypothesis). Conversely if he imagines that the person is affected by love toward him, he regards himself with joy insofar as (by 3p30) he imagines this. 130To that extent also (by 3p29) he will endeavor to please him, i.e. (by 3p41) to that extent he endeavors not to hate him and not to affect him with sadness. This endeavor (by 3p37) will be greater or lesser in proportion to the emotion from which it arises. Therefore if it turns out to be greater than the emotion arising from his hatred, which makes him endeavor to affect the thing he hates with sadness (by 3p26), it will prevail over it, and will eradicate the hatred from his spirit. Q. E. D.
A hatred which is completely overcome by love passes into love, and the love is greater than if the hatred had not been there before.
This proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of 3p38. Anyone who begins to love something that he used to hate, or that he used to regard with sadness, is joyful simply because he loves. And apart from this joy which love involves (see its definition in 3p13s), there is an additional source of joy in the boost this gives to his endeavor to rid himself of the sadness involved in that hatred, accompanied as it was by the idea of the hated person as its cause (as we showed in 3p37).
Despite this, no one will endeavor to hate something or be affected with sadness in order to enjoy this greater joy. That is, no one will desire to have an injury inflicted on him in the hope of recovering from the injury; and no one will long to be sick in the hope of getting better. For everyone will always endeavor to preserve his own being and to rid himself of sadness as much as he can. If to the contrary it could be conceived that a person could desire to hate someone in order to show greater love to him later, then he will always long to hate him. For the greater the hatred that has been, the greater the love that will be, and therefore he will always long for the hatred to be more and more augmented. For the same cause a person will endeavor to get more and more sick, in order to have a greater joy later from the restoration of his health; and therefore he will always endeavor to be sick, which (by 3p6) is absurd.
If anyone imagines someone similar to himself being affected by hatred for a thing similar to himself which he loves, he will hate him.
The beloved thing returns the hatred of the person that hates it (by 3p40). Therefore the lover who imagines that someone hates the beloved thing, by that very fact imagines the beloved thing as affected by hatred, i.e. (by 3p13s) as affected by sadness, and consequently (by 3p21) he is saddened, and his sadness is accompanied by the idea of the person who hates the beloved thing as the cause, i.e. (by 3p13s) he will hate him. Q. E. D.
If anyone has been affected by joy or sadness by someone of a class or nation different from his own, and his joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of him as a representative of that universal class or nation as the cause, he will love or hate not only him but everyone who belongs to that class or nation.
The proof of this is evident from 3p16.
The joy arising from our imagining that something that we hate is destroyed or afflicted with some other harm does not arise without some sadness of spirit.
The proof is evident from 3p27. Insofar as we imagine that a thing that is similar to ourselves is affected with sadness, to that extent we are saddened.
This proposition can also be proved from 2p17c. Whenever we recall something, even if 132it does not actually exist, we still see it as present, and the body is affected in the same way. Therefore insofar as the memory of the thing is vivid, to that extent the person is determined to regard it with sadness. While the image of the thing lasts, this determination is of course restrained by the memory of the things that exclude its existence, but it is not taken away. Therefore the person is joyful insofar as this determination is restrained.
This is also why this joy, arising from the harm done to a thing we hate, comes back whenever we recall the thing. For as we have said, when an image of the thing is aroused, the image, because it involves the existence of the thing itself, determines the person to regard the thing with the same sadness with which he used always to see it when it existed. But because he has combined the image of this thing with other images that exclude its existence, this determination toward sadness is immediately restrained, and the person is joyful again. This happens whenever this is repeated.
It is for the same cause that people take joy in recalling some bad incident from the past, and why they are relieved to tell of the dangers they escaped from. When they imagine a danger, they see it as being still in the future and are determined to fear it, but this determination is restrained once again by the idea of the freedom which they combined with the idea of danger once they had escaped from it. This makes them feel safe all over again, and thus once again they have joy.
Love and hatred, e.g. for Peter, is destroyed if the sadness that hatred involves and the joy that love involves are combined with the idea of a different cause; and both are diminished, insofar as we imagine that Peter was not the only cause of either one.
This is evident solely from the definitions of love and hatred, for which see 3p13s. For the joy is called love for Peter, and the sadness is called hatred for Peter simply because Peter is considered to be the cause of both emotions. Therefore when this consideration is completely 133or partly taken away, the emotion toward Peter is also completely or partly diminished. Q. E. D.
Both love and hatred for a thing that we imagine to be free must be greater than for a necessary thing, all other things being equal.
A thing that we imagine to be free must (by 1def7) be perceived by itself apart from other things. Therefore if we imagine such a thing to be a cause of joy or of sadness, we shall (by 3p13s) love it or hate it simply for that, and we shall do so (by the previous proposition) with the greatest love or hatred that can be inspired by either emotion. But if we imagine the thing that is the cause of the same emotion as necessary, then (by the same 1def7) we shall imagine it not as the sole cause of that emotion but as one among others, and therefore (by the previous proposition) our love and hatred for it will be less. Q. E. D.
It follows from this that because human beings assume that they are free, they bestow greater love or hatred upon each other than upon other things. Imitation of emotions is also a relevant factor, on which see 3p27, 3p34, 3p40 and 3p43.
Anything at all may accidentally be a cause of hope or fear.
This proposition is proved in the same manner as 3p15; compare it with 3p18s2.
Things that are accidentally a cause of hope or fear are called good or bad omens. Then, insofar as these same omens are a cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear, which can be seen in 3p18s2) to that extent a cause of joy or sadness, and 134consequently (by 3p15c) we love them or hate them to that extent. And (by 3p28) we endeavor to use them as means to realize our hopes or to dismiss them as obstacles to them or causes of our fear. It also follows from 3p25 that we are so constituted by nature that we easily believe the things we hope and are reluctant to believe the things we fear, and we think too well of the one and too poorly of the other. This is the origin of the superstitions which assail human beings all over the world. But I don’t think that it is worthwhile here to portray the waverings of spirit that arise from hope and fear. For it follows simply from the definition of these emotions that there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope (as we shall explain more fully at the appropriate point).51 Besides insofar as we hope for anything or fear it, to that extent we love it or hate it; and thus everyone will easily be able to apply to hope and fear what we have said about love and hatred.
Different people may be differently affected by one and the same object, and one and the same person may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object.
The human body (by 2post3) is affected by external bodies in very many ways. Two people may therefore be differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by 2a1″ after L3 which you will find following 2p13) may be differently affected by one and the same object. Then (by the same postulate) a human body may be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, and consequently (by the same axiom) may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object. Q. E. D.
We see therefore that it may happen that one person may hate what another person loves; and that one person may fear what another does not; and that one and the same person now loves what he previously hated and now dares to do what he was afraid to do before, etc.
Then, because everyone judges by his own emotion 135what is good and what is bad and what is better and what is worse (see 3p39s), it follows that people can vary52 as much in judgment as in emotion. This is why when we compare different people, we distinguish them solely by difference of emotions. We call some people intrepid, others timid, and we have different terms for other people. For example, I will call a person intrepid who makes light of something bad that I am inclined to be afraid of. If I also notice that his desire to do harm to someone he hates and to benefit someone he loves is not restrained by fear of something bad which would tend to hold me back, I will call him courageous. Then, a person who is afraid of something bad that I habitually make light of will seem timid to me. If on top of that I notice that his desire is restrained by fear of some bad thing that cannot deter me, I will say that he is cowardly. Thus each one of us will make his own judgment.
Finally, from this inconstancy of human nature and human judgment, it follows that human beings often make judgments of things purely by emotion, and that the things are often purely imaginary that people believe make for joy or sadness and which (by 3p28) they therefore endeavor to bring about or to get rid of, to say nothing of the other points we made in part 2 about the uncertainty of things. As a result, we easily conceive that a person can often be the cause of his own sadness as much as of his own joy, or of his being as much affected by sadness as by joy accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause of them. And thus we easily understand what repentance is and what self-contentment is. For repentance is a sadness that is accompanied by the idea of himself as its cause, and self-contentment is a joy that is accompanied by the idea of himself as its cause. And these emotions are very vehement because human beings believe they are free (see 3p49).
An object which we have seen before simultaneously with other objects, or which we imagine has nothing about it that is not common to several other things, we will not regard for as long as one that we imagine has something special about it.
As soon as we imagine an object that we have seen along with other objects, we immediately also recall the others (by 2p18; see also the scholium there), and therefore we immediately pass from regarding one thing to regarding another. It is the same with reasoning about an object which we imagine has nothing about it that is not common to several objects. For we simply suppose that we see nothing in it that we have not seen before in the others. But when we suppose that we imagine in some object something special that we have never seen before, we are simply saying that while the mind is regarding that object, it has nothing else in it that would lead it to regard a different one. And thus the mind is determined to regard that object alone. Therefore an object, etc. Q. E. D.
This affection of the mind, or the imagination of a special thing insofar as it is in the mind all by itself, is called wonder, and if it is aroused by an object that we fear, it is called consternation, because wonder at something bad keeps a person so fixated on it that he becomes incapable of thinking about other things which might enable him to avoid it. But if what we wonder at is a person’s wisdom or industry or something of that sort, then our wonder is called veneration, because we immediately see the person as far superior to ourselves. Conversely, if what we wonder at is a person’s anger, envy, etc., it is called horror. Then, if we wonder at the wisdom, industry etc. of a person we love, our love (by 3p12) will be greater just because of that; love combined with wonder or veneration we call devotion. In this way we can also conceive of hatred, hope, assurance and other emotions in combination with wonder; and thus we will be able to deduce more emotions than the ones that are normally singled out in our usual vocabulary. It appears from this that the terms for the emotions have developed more from common usage than from an accurate knowledge of them.
Disdain is opposed to wonder. But its cause is largely our being determined to wonder at, love, fear etc. something because we see someone else 137wondering at it, or loving or fearing it etc., or because at first glance something looks similar to things we wonder at, love, fear etc. (by 3p15 with its corollary and 3p27). But if we are forced by the presence of the thing itself or by a more careful scrutiny of it to deny everything about it that can be a cause of wonder, love, fear, etc., then the mind remains determined by the very presence of the object to think more about what is not in the object than about what is, whereas in the presence of an object the mind normally thinks about what is in it. Further, just as devotion arises from wonder at a thing that we love, so derision arises from disdain for a thing that we hate or fear, and scorn arises from disdain for stupidity just as veneration arises from wonder at wisdom. Finally, we can conceive of love, hope, glory and other emotions in combination with disdain, and from this we can conceive yet other emotions that likewise we do not normally distinguish from others by any specific terms.
When the mind thinks about itself and its own power of action, it is joyful; and the more distinctly it imagines itself and its own power of action, the more joyful it is.
A person knows himself only by the affections of his own body and his ideas of them (by 2p19 and 2p23). Therefore when it happens that the mind is able to think about itself, we suppose that by this very fact it is passing to a greater perfection, i.e. (by 3p11s) it is affected by joy, and the more distinctly it can imagine itself and its own power of action, the greater its joy. Q. E. D.
This joy is the more and more fostered, the more a person imagines himself as praised by other people. For the more he imagines he is praised by other people, the greater the joy he imagines he is giving to others, and this 138is accompanied by an idea of himself (by 3p29s). Therefore (by 3p27) he himself is affected by greater joy, accompanied by an idea of himself. Q. E. D.
The mind endeavors to imagine only things that posit its power of action.
The endeavor or power of the mind is the very essence of the mind itself (by 3p7). The essence of the mind (self-evidently) affirms only what the mind is and can do, and not that which it is not and what it cannot do. Therefore it endeavors to imagine only things that affirm or posit its power of action. Q. E. D.
Whenever the mind imagines its own lack of power, it is saddened by this very fact.
The mind’s essence affirms only what the mind is and can do, or it is in the nature of the mind to imagine only things that posit its power of action (by the previous proposition). Therefore when we say that as the mind thinks about itself, it imagines its own lack of power, we are simply saying that though the mind endeavors to imagine something which posits its power of action, its endeavor in this case is restrained, or (by 3p11s) that it is saddened. Q. E. D.
This sadness is very much fostered, if a person imagines himself as blamed by other people; this is proved in the same way as 3p53c.
This sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own lack of power, is called humility, while the joy that arises from thinking about ourselves 139is called self-love or self-contentment. The latter is restored whenever a person thinks about his own virtues or his power of action, and consequently everybody is eager to talk about his own achievements and to make a show of his strength both of body and spirit; for the same reason other people find this irksome.
It also follows from this that human beings are envious by nature (see 3p24s and 3p32s), or are glad about the weakness of their peers and conversely are saddened by their virtue. For whenever a person imagines his own actions, he is affected by joy (by 3p53), which is all the greater, the more perfection he imagines his actions express and the more distinctly he imagines them, i.e. (by what we said in 2p40s1) the more he can distinguish them from others and see them as special things. Therefore everyone will most enjoy thinking about himself when he is regarding something in himself which he denies of other people. He will not be so glad if what he affirms of himself belongs to the universal idea of a human being or an animal. And conversely he will be saddened if he imagines that, in comparison with other people’s actions, his own are rather weak. He endeavors to get rid of this sadness (by 3p28) by misinterpreting the actions of his peers or by embellishing his own as much as possible. It appears then that human beings are prone to hatred and envy by nature, but how children are raised also comes in to it: parents tend to encourage their children’s virtue solely by the stimuli of kudos and envy. But a nagging thought may still remain that we quite often wonder at and venerate other people’s virtues. To banish this thought, I will add the following corollary.
Envy is hatred itself (see 3p24s), or (by 3p13s) sadness, i.e. (by 3p11s) the affection by which a person’s power or endeavor to act is restrained. But (by 3p9s) a person neither endeavors nor desires to do anything that cannot follow from his own given nature. Therefore a person 140will not want to be credited with any power of action, or virtue (they are the same), which fits someone else’s nature but is alien to his own. Therefore his desire cannot be restrained, i.e. (by 3p11s) he himself cannot be saddened, by his noticing some virtue in another person who is quite different from himself; consequently he will not be able to envy him either. But he does envy his peer, who is assumed to be of the same nature as himself. Q. E. D.
We said above in 3p52s that we venerate a person because we wonder at his wisdom, fortitude, etc. This happens (as is evident from the proposition itself) because we imagine that these virtues are special in him and not common to our nature, and therefore we will no more envy them in him than we envy height in trees or courage in lions, etc.
There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire as there are species of objects that affect us; and consequently there are as many species of every emotion compounded from them, such as wavering of spirit, or derived from them, e.g. love, hatred, hope, fear, etc.
Joy and sadness, and consequently the emotions compounded or derived from them, are passions (by 3p11s). But (by 3p1) we necessarily are acted on insofar as we have inadequate ideas, and (by 3p3) we are acted on only insofar as we have them. That is (see 2p40s) we necessarily are acted on only insofar as we imagine, or (see 2p17 with its scholium) insofar as we are affected by an emotion that involves the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. Therefore the nature of each passion must necessarily be expressed in such a way as to explain the nature of the object affecting us. For example, the joy arising from object A involves the nature 141of object A itself, and the joy arising from object B involves the nature of object B itself, and therefore these two emotions of joy are different in nature because they arise from causes of a different nature. So too the emotion of sadness arising from one object is different in nature from the sadness arising from a different cause. The same goes for love, hatred, hope, fear, wavering of spirit etc. Accordingly, there are necessarily as many species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc. as there are species of objects that affect us.
But desire is the very essence or nature of each person, insofar as it is conceived as determined by his given constitution whatever it may be to do a certain action (see 3p9s). Therefore just as each person is affected by external causes with one or another species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., i.e. just as his nature is constituted in one way or another, so his desire is necessarily one or the other, and the nature of one desire necessarily differs from the nature of another as much as the emotions from which each one arises differ from each other. Therefore there are as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love, etc., and consequently (by what we proved above) as there are species of objects which affect us. Q. E. D.
Notable among the species of emotions – and (by 3p56) they must be numerous – are gluttony, drunkenness, lust, avarice and ambition, which are simply notions of love or desire, which explain the nature of both emotions by the objects to which they are related. For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, avarice and ambition we mean simply an immoderate love or desire of food, drink, sex, wealth and glory. Further, insofar as we distinguish these emotions from others solely by the objects to which they are related, they do not have contraries. For temperance, sobriety and chastity, which we normally oppose to gluttony, drunkenness and lust, are not emotions or passions, but denote a power of the spirit which governs these emotions.
But I can’t explain here all the other species of emotion (because they are as many as there are species of objects), and it is unnecessary even if I could. For the purpose we have in mind, which is 142to determine the strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them, it is enough for us to have a general definition of each of the emotions. It is enough, I say, to understand the common properties of the emotions and of the mind, in order to be able to determine what sort of power the mind has and how effective it is in governing and restraining the emotions. Therefore although there is a great difference between different shades of the emotions of love or hatred or desire – for example between love for one’s children and love for one’s wife – there is no need to sort out these distinctions and pursue the nature and origin of the emotions any further.
Every individual’s every emotion differs from another’s emotion as much as the essence of one individual differs from the essence of another.
This proposition is clear from 2a1″ after L3, 2p13s. But we will demonstrate it from the definitions of the three basic emotions.
All emotions are related to desire, joy or sadness, as shown by the definitions we have given of them. But desire is the very nature or essence of each one of them (see its definition in 3p9s). Therefore every individual’s desire differs from another’s desire as much as one individual’s nature or essence differs from another’s essence. Then, joy and sadness are passions by which each individual’s power, or his endeavor to persevere in his own being, is augmented or diminished, assisted or restrained (by 3p11 and its scholium). But by the endeavor to persevere in his own being so far as it is related to both mind and body at the same time, we mean appetite and desire (see 3p9s). Therefore joy and sadness are desire or appetite itself insofar as it is augmented or diminished, assisted or restrained, by external causes, i.e. (by the same scholium) it is the very nature of each individual. And that is why the joy or sadness 143of each individual also differs from the joy or sadness of others as much as one individual’s nature or essence differs from another’s essence. Consequently every individual’s every emotion differs from another individual’s emotion as much, etc. Q. E. D.
It follows from this that the emotions of the so-called irrational animals (for once we know the origin of the mind, we cannot doubt that brute animals are sentient) differ as much from human emotions as their nature differs from human nature. It is true that both horses and human beings are affected by the lust to procreate, but the former is an equine lust and the latter a human lust. So too the lusts and appetites of insects, fish and birds must be different from each other. Therefore although every individual lives content with the nature that makes it what it is and enjoys it, yet the life with which each one is content and its enjoyment of it are simply the idea or soul of that individual, and therefore the enjoyment of the one differs from the enjoyment of the other as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally it follows from 3p57 that there is also a big difference between the enjoyment that drives a drunkard, for example, and the enjoyment that a philosopher possesses, as I just want to mention here in passing. So much for the emotions that are related to a person insofar as he is acted on. It remains to say a few things about the emotions that are related to him insofar as he acts.
Besides the joy and desire that are passions, there are other emotions of joy and desire that are related to us insofar as we act.
When the mind conceives itself and its power of action, it is joyful (by 3p53); and the mind necessarily thinks of itself when it conceives a true or adequate idea (by 2p43). But (by 2p40s2) the mind conceives certain adequate ideas. Therefore it is also joyful 144insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, i.e. (by 3p1) insofar as it acts. Then, the mind endeavors to persevere in its being (by 3p9) both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas. But by endeavor we mean desire (by 3p9s). Therefore desire is related to us also insofar as we understand or (by 3p1) insofar as we act. Q. E. D.
Among all the emotions that are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there is not one that is not related to joy or desire.
All the emotions are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions which we have given of them show. By sadness we mean that by which the mind’s power of thought is diminished or restrained (by 3p11 and its scholium). Therefore the mind’s power of understanding, i.e. of action (by 3p1), is diminished or restrained insofar as the mind is saddened. Therefore no emotions of sadness can be related to the mind insofar as it acts, but only the emotions of joy and desire, which (by the previous proposition) are also to that extent related to the mind. Q. E. D.
I attribute to fortitude all actions that follow from the emotions that are related to the mind insofar as it understands, and I divide fortitude into spiritedness and generosity. By spiritedness I mean the desire by which everyone endeavors to preserve his own being by the dictate of reason alone. By generosity I mean the desire by which each one endeavors to help other human beings by the dictate of reason alone and to unite them in friendship with himself. Therefore I attribute to spiritedness actions which aim only to be useful to the person doing the actions, and I attribute to generosity actions that aim to be useful to another person as well. Therefore temperance, sobriety and presence of mind in danger, etc. are species of spiritedness; consideration, clemency, etc. are species 145of generosity.
With this I think that I have explained the most important emotions and waverings of spirit that arise from compounding the three basic emotions – desire, joy and sadness. And I believe I have shown them through their first causes. It is apparent from all this that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, like the waves of the sea driven about by opposing winds, ignorant of our future and of our fate. But I stress that I have shown only the most important, not all, of the conflicts of spirit there may be. For by proceeding in the same manner as above, we can easily show that love has been combined with repentance, disdain, shame, etc. In fact I believe that what I have said establishes that the emotions can be compounded in so many ways with each other, and so many variations arise, that they cannot be numbered with any precision. It is enough for my purpose to have enumerated just the most important ones; the others, which I have omitted, would be more curious than useful.
Nevertheless, something still needs to be said here about love, because it very often happens that while we are enjoying the thing we were pursuing, the body acquires a new constitution as a result of that enjoyment. Its new constitution determines it to go in a different direction and arouses different images of things in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine something whose taste has always pleased us, we want to enjoy it, i.e. we want to eat it. But even as we are enjoying it, the stomach fills up, and the body is given a different disposition. Therefore if – now that the body is otherwise disposed – an image of the same food is offered because the food itself is now in front of us and an endeavor or desire to eat it is also aroused, the new constitution will conflict with that desire or endeavor, and consequently the presence of the food which we previously wanted will be distasteful; we call this disgust and satiety. I have also not dealt with the external affections of the body that are observed in emotions, such as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter etc., because they are related only to the body without any reference to the mind. Finally, we need to take note of a few things about the definitions of the emotions, so I will go over them again here in a systematic manner and make some observations on each one.
1. Desire [cupiditas] is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to act in some way as a result of any given affection of it.53
We said above in 3p9s that desire is an appetite with consciousness of itself, and that this appetite is the very essence of a human being, insofar as it is determined to act in those ways which serve his preservation. But in the same scholium I also noted that in truth I recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a person is conscious of his appetite or not, it still remains the very same appetite; and so to avoid the appearance of tautology, I avoided explaining desire by appetite. But I very much wanted to define it in such a way as to comprehend together all the endeavors of human nature which we indicate under the names of appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I could have said that desire is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to act in some way. But it would not follow from this definition (by 2p23) that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. In order to include the cause of this consciousness, I had to add (in the same proposition) insofar as it is conceived as determined to act in some way as a result of any given affection of it. For by any affection of the human essence we mean the constitution of that essence, whether it is innate or adventitious or conceived solely through the attribute of thought or solely through the attribute of extension or whether it is related to both at the same time. Under the term desire therefore I mean here any and all endeavors, impulses, appetites and volitions of a person, which vary with the varying constitution of the person and are quite often so opposed to each other that the person is pulled in different directions and does not know which way to go.
I say passing. For joy is not perfection itself. For if a person were born with the perfection he is passing to, he would be in possession of it without an emotion of joy. This appears clearly in the emotion of sadness, which is contrary to it. For no one can deny that sadness consists in the passing to a lesser perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself, since a person cannot be sad insofar as he shares in some perfection. Nor can we say that sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection. For privation is nothing; and the emotion of sadness is an act, and can therefore only be the act of passing to a lesser perfection, i.e. an act by which a person’s power of action is diminished or restrained (see 3p11s).
I give no definitions of cheerfulness, delight, melancholy and distress, because they are very closely related to the body and are simply species of joy or sadness.
In 2p18s we showed the reason why the mind instantly switches from thinking of one thing to thinking of another thing. It is because the images of those things are so arranged and connected with each other that one follows another, and this cannot be conceived when the image of a thing is novel. The mind will continue to think about it until it is determined by other causes to think of other things. Therefore the imagination of a new thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others. This is why I do not include wonder 148among the emotions. I see no reason to do so, since this captivation of the mind does not arise from a positive cause drawing the mind away from other things, but only arises because there is lacking a cause to determine the mind to move on from thinking of one thing to thinking of others.
Therefore (as I noted in 3p11s) I recognize only three basic or primary emotions: joy, sadness and desire. The only reason I discussed wonder is because it is usual to designate some of the emotions derived from the three basic emotions by special names when they are related to objects which we wonder at. The same reason also prompts me to add a definition of disdain.
5. Disdain [contemptus] is the imagination of something that makes so small an impact on the mind that, in the presence of the thing, it is tempted to imagine things which are not in the thing itself rather than those that are. See 3p52s.
I offer no definitions of veneration and scorn here because no emotions take their names from them, so far as I know.
This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough. The definition given by writers who define love as the will of the lover to unite himself with the beloved thing expresses not the essence of love but its property. These writers have not fully grasped the essence of love, and therefore they could not have any clear conception of its property, and consequently everyone has thought their definition to be very obscure. But note that when I say that it is a property in the lover to will to unite himself with the beloved thing, I do not mean by will either consent or mental deliberation or free decision (for we showed that this is fictitious in 2p48). Nor do I mean the desire of uniting himself 149with the beloved thing when it is absent, or of remaining with it when it is present; for love can be conceived without either desire. But by will I understand the lover’s contentment in the presence of the beloved thing, which strengthens or at least fosters his joy.
The required comment here is easily gathered from what we said in the Explanation to the previous definition. See also 3p13s.
8. Inclination [propensio] is joy accompanied by the idea of something that is accidentally a cause of joy.
We showed in 3p52 that wonder arises from the novelty of a thing. If therefore it happens that we often imagine something that we wonder at, we shall cease to wonder. We see therefore that the emotion of devotion easily declines into simple love.
Insofar as we disdain something that we hate, we deny its existence (see 3p52s), and to that extent (by 3p20) we are joyful. But since we are supposing that a person continues to hate the thing he derides, it follows that his joy is not unmitigated. See 3p47s.
It follows from these definitions that there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope. For anyone who depends upon hope and is in doubt about the outcome of a thing, is supposed to be imagining something that excludes the existence of a future thing, and therefore to that extent he is saddened (by 3p19), and consequently, so long as he depends upon hope, he is supposed to fear that the thing may happen. Conversely anyone who is in fear, i.e. is doubtful about the outcome of a thing he hates, is also imagining something that excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (by 3p20) he is joyful, and consequently to that extent he has hope that it may not happen.
Assurance arises from hope and despair arises from fear when the cause to have doubts about the outcome of the thing has been taken away. This happens because a person imagines that the past or future thing is at hand and he regards it as present, or because he imagines other things that exclude the existence of the things that gave rise to doubt. For although we can never be certain about the outcome of particular things (by 2p31c), it may still happen that we have no doubts about their outcome. For we have shown that it is one thing to have no doubts about something (see 2p49s), and it is another thing to have certainty about something. Therefore it may happen that we are affected by the same 151emotion of joy or sadness by the image of something in the past or in the future as from the image of a thing in the present, as we demonstrated in 3p18; see this together with its scholia.
16. Relief [gaudium] is joy accompanied by the idea of something in the past that came to pass contrary to expectation.
There seems to be no difference between pity and compassion [misericordia] except perhaps that pity refers to a single instance of the emotion, compassion to a habit of pity.
I know these words mean something different in common usage. But it is not my intention to explain the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to designate them with words whose meaning in common usage is not completely different from the meaning in which I want to use them. I hope it is enough to give this warning just this once. For the cause of these emotions see 3p27c1 and 3p22s.
Adulation then is an effect of love and contempt is an effect, or property, of hatred. Therefore adulation can also be defined as love insofar as it affects a person in such a way that he thinks too well of a beloved thing. Conversely contempt can also be defined as hatred insofar as it affects a person in such a way that he thinks too poorly of someone he hates. On this see 3p26s.
Compassion is commonly opposed to envy, and accordingly it can be defined as follows, despite the usual meaning of the word.
24. Compassion [misericordia] is love insofar as it affects a person in such a way that he enjoys another person’s good but is saddened by harm to him.
For envy, see the scholia to propositions 3p24 and 3p32.
These are the emotions of joy and sadness, which are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as cause either through itself or accidentally. Now I move on to other emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as cause.
Self-contentment is opposed to humility insofar as we mean by 153it the joy that arises from our thinking about our own power of action. But insofar as we also mean by it joy accompanied by the idea of some deed we believe we did by a free decision of the mind, then it is opposed to repentance, which we define as follows.
We have shown the causes of these emotions in 3p51s and in 3p53, 3p54 and 3p55 and 3p55s. On free decision of the mind, see 2p35s. Here we need to note that it is not surprising that sadness inevitably ensues on all actions that are conventionally called wrong, and joy follows on those that are called right. We easily understand from what we have said above that this depends very much on upbringing. Parents cause feelings [commotiones] of sadness to be attached to the former actions and of joy to the latter by criticizing the former and constantly scolding their children for them, and by commending and praising the latter. This is also confirmed by experience itself. For custom and religion are not the same for everybody. On the contrary things that are sacred for some people are profane for others, and things that are honorable for some people are base for others. Therefore each person feels repentance for some deed he has done or glories in it depending on how he has been brought up.
Pride thus differs from adulation because the latter refers to thinking too well of an external object, whereas pride refers to a person thinking too well of himself. And as adulation is an effect of love, so pride is an effect or property of self-love. For this reason it can also be defined as love of oneself or self-contentment insofar as it affects a person so much that he thinks too well of himself (see 1543p26s). There is no emotion contrary to this one. For no one thinks too poorly of himself because of self-hatred; moreover no one thinks too poorly of himself because he imagines that he cannot do something or other. For whatever action a person imagines that he cannot do, he necessarily imagines it, and is so disposed by this imagining that he cannot in reality do what he imagines he cannot do. As long as he imagines that he cannot do something or other, he is not determined to do it; and consequently for the time being it is impossible for him to do it.
However we will be able to conceive of the possibility that a person thinks too poorly of himself if we focus on things that depend on opinion alone. For it may happen that as someone in a sad mood is contemplating his own weakness, he imagines that he is disdained by everyone, even though others could not be further from disdaining him at all. A person may also think too poorly of himself if in the present time he says something negative about himself in the future, of which he is uncertain. For example, he may say that he can conceive nothing certain, and that he can desire or do no action which is not wrong or base, etc. Then, we may say that a person thinks too poorly of himself, when we see that, from an excessive fear of shame, he does not dare to do things that his peers dare to do. Therefore we can oppose this emotion to pride, and I will call it abjection. For as pride arises from self-contentment, so abjection arises from humility, and accordingly we define it as follows.
29. Abjection [abjectio] is to think too poorly of oneself out of sadness.
Usually however it is humility that we oppose to pride. But when we do so, we are focusing more on their effects than on their nature. For we normally call a person proud if he glories too much (see 3p30s), if he talks up only his own virtues and highlights other people’s faults, if he tries to get ahead of everyone, and if he goes around with the sort of pomp and circumstance affected by others whose position is far superior to his. By contrast, we call a person humble if he blushes too often, if he admits his own faults and talks up other people’s virtues, if he gives way to everyone and walks with his head down and if he neglects to make himself look good. But 155these emotions – humility and abjection – are very rare. For human nature, considered in itself, struggles against them as much as possible (see 3p15 and 3p54). Therefore those who are most believed to be abject and humble are usually the most ambitious and envious.
30. Glory [gloria] is joy accompanied by the idea of some action of our own that we imagine others praise.
31. Shame [pudor] is sadness accompanied by the idea of some action that we imagine others blame.
On these emotions see 3p30s. Here we note the differences between shame and modesty [verecundia]. Shame is the sadness that follows an action of which one is ashamed. Modesty is a fear or anxiety about shame which inhibits a person from doing something base. Shamelessness is normally opposed to modesty, but it is not in truth an emotion, as I shall show at the appropriate place;54 but the terms for the emotions (as I have already pointed out)55 owe more to usage than to their nature.
With this I have completed the explanation I proposed of the emotions of joy and sadness. I turn therefore to those that are related to desire.
When we recall something, as we have often said above, we are disposed, simply because we recall it, to regard it with the same emotion as we would if it were present. But while we are awake, this disposition or endeavor is usually restrained by images of things that exclude the existence of the thing we are recalling. Therefore when we remember a thing that affects us with some kind of joy, we endeavor by that very fact to regard it as present along with 156the emotion of joy, but this endeavor is immediately restrained by memory of things that exclude its existence. Therefore longing is in reality a sadness, which is opposed to the joy that arises from the absence of something we hate; on this see 3p47s. However I treat this emotion as belonging to the emotions of desire because the term longing seems to be related to desire.
A person who runs away because he sees other people running away or who is afraid because he sees that other people are afraid, or again a person who sees that someone else has burnt his hand and draws his own hand back and turns his body away as if his own hand were being burnt, is certainly imitating the other person’s emotion, but we will not say that he is emulating him. This is not because we recognize one cause for emulation and a different cause for imitation, but because it is normal to say that someone is emulating another person when he imitates something we judge to be honorable, useful or pleasing. See 3p27 with its scholium on the cause of emulation. For the reason why envy is very often associated with this emotion, see 3p32 together with its scholium.
34. Gratefulness [gratia] or gratitude [gratitudo] is a desire or impulse of love, by which we endeavor to benefit someone who, with an equal emotion of love, has conferred a benefit on us. See 3p39 and 3p41s.
36. Anger [ira] is the desire by which we are prompted by hatred to do harm to someone we hate. See 3p39.
Clemency [clementia] is opposed to cruelty; this is not a passion but a power of spirit by which a person governs anger and vengeance.
39. Timidity [timor] is the desire to avert a greater evil which we fear by means of a lesser evil. See 3p39s.
Cowardice then is simply the fear of some bad thing that most people do not usually fear; that is why I do not count it as an emotion of desire. But I wanted to explain it here, because insofar as we focus on the desire, it is in truth opposed to the emotion of courage.
Consternation then is a species of cowardice. But because consternation arises from a double form of timidity, it is better defined as a fear which gets such a grip on a stupefied or wavering person 158that he cannot rid himself of the bad thing. I say stupefied, because we understand that his desire to get rid of the bad thing is restrained by his wonder at it. I add wavering, because our supposition is that this desire is restrained by timidity in the face of another bad thing which torments him equally. The result is that he does not know which of the two he should get rid of. On all this see 3p39s and 3p52s. On cowardice and courage see 3p51s.
Ambition is a desire by which all the emotions (by 3p27 and 3p31) are nurtured and strengthened; and therefore this emotion can hardly be surpassed. As long as a person is in the grip of some desire, he is necessarily in the grip of this desire at the same time. Every good man, says Cicero, is motivated most of all by glory. Even philosophers put their names to the books they write about despising glory,56 etc.
This desire for intercourse, whether moderate or not, is usually called lust. Also, these five emotions (as I mentioned in 3p56s) do not have contraries. For consideration is a species of ambition (on this see 3p29s); then I have already pointed out that temperance, 159sobriety and chastity designate a power of mind and not a passion. Though it may happen that a person who is avaricious, ambitious or timid will refrain from excessive food, drink or sex, nevertheless avarice, ambition and timidity are not contrary to gluttony, drunkenness or lust. For an avaricious person often longs to indulge himself with other people’s food and drink. And an ambitious person will not show restraint in anything provided he expects it to stay secret, and if he lives among drunken and lustful people, he will be all the more prone to the same faults precisely because he is ambitious. Finally a timid person does things he does not want to do. Even if, to avoid death, an avaricious person throws his riches overboard into the sea, he still remains avaricious. And if a lustful person is saddened because he is unable to have his way, he does not therefore cease to be lustful. And absolutely, these emotions are not so much concerned with acts of feasting, drinking etc. themselves as with the appetite and love itself. Nothing therefore can be opposed to these emotions but generosity and spiritedness, which we will discuss later.57
I will not give definitions for jealousy [zelotypia] and other waverings of the mind, both because they arise from a compounding of emotions we have already defined, and because most of them have no names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical life to have only a general knowledge of them. But it is clear from the definitions of the emotions that we have explained that they all arise from desire, joy or sadness, or rather that they are nothing but these three, each of which is accustomed to be given a variety of names according to their various relations and extrinsic characteristics. If we would now care to focus on these basic emotions and on what we said above about the nature of the mind, we will be able to define emotions, insofar as they are related to the mind alone, as follows.
An emotion, which is called a passion [pathema]58 of the soul, is a confused idea, by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of the existence of its own body or of some part of it than before, and an idea given which the mind itself is determined to think of this thing rather than of that.
I say first that an emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea. For we have shown (see 3p3) that the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate or confused ideas.
Then I say that it is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of the existence of its own body or of some part of it than before. For all the ideas of bodies that we possess (by 2p16c2) indicate the actual constitution of our own body more than the nature of an external body. But this idea, which constitutes the form of an emotion, must either indicate or express the constitution of the body or of some part of it which the body itself or some part of it possesses because its power of action or the force of its existence is either augmented or diminished, assisted or restrained. But note that when I say a greater or lesser force of existence than before, I do not mean that the mind compares the present constitution of its body with its previous constitution. I mean that the idea that constitutes the form of the emotion affirms something about the body which in truth involves more or less reality than before. And since the essence of the mind consists (by 2p11 and 2p13) in affirming the actual existence of its own body, and since we understand the essence of a thing through its perfection, it follows that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens that it affirms something about its body or some part of it which involves more or less reality than before. When therefore I said above that the mind’s power of thought is augmented or diminished, I meant simply to say that the mind has formed an idea of its own body or of some part of it which expresses more or less reality than it had previously affirmed of its body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thought is judged by the excellence of the object.
Finally I added and an idea given which the mind itself is determined to think of this thing rather than of another in order to express the nature of desire as well as the nature of joy and of sadness which the first part of the definition explains.
End of the third part
43 The common Latin phrase ‘imperium in imperio’ traditionally refers to a political situation where some entity within a state, such as a church, functions as an independent state, exercising its own laws. Spinoza also uses the phrase to refer to human beings within nature in the Political Treatise, Chapter 2, paragraph 6.
44 Spinoza uses the same phrase at 4p45c2s. See Terence, Adelphi, 68.
45 Spinoza here is quoting Ovid, Metamorphoses 7, 20: video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. This phrase is also quoted, slightly differently, in 4pref, and in 4p17s.
46 This line is adapted from Terence, Andria, 266.
47 Spinoza’s phrase ‘quantum in se est’ is a Latin idiom that generally means ‘insofar as it can.’ Spinoza also employs the phrase in 4p18s. Descartes used this phrase to articulate the principle of inertia (Principles of Philosophy II, 37), which likely influenced Newton’s formulation of the principle of inertia. In this context, the phrase refers more specifically to motions that follow from the nature of a body without external influence.
48 See 3p27.
49 Spinoza’s footnote: ‘N. B. understand here and in what follows, people for whom we have entertained no emotion.’
50 This is a reference to Ovid, Amores 2, 19, 4–5, although Spinoza misquotes Ovid by transposing the lines. In Ovid the ‘other’ is the husband who ‘ignores’ his wife’s infidelity; Spinoza appears to understand it of one of the partners in the loving relationship. The translation here reflects the way Spinoza appears to understand the quote.
51 See DOE13ex.
52 Spinoza’s footnote: ‘we showed in 2p13s that this can happen despite the fact that the human mind is a part of the divine intellect.’
53 Most of Spinoza’s Latin terms for the emotions are given in the 1650 Latin translation of Descartes’s Passions of the Soul, a copy of which was in Spinoza’s library.
54 Spinoza mentions shamelessness again in 4p58s, but he does not show that it is not an emotion.
55 See DOE 20.
56 Cicero, Pro Archia, 11, 26.
57 See 3p59s.
58 Spinoza’s term for ‘passion’ here is not his usual ‘passio.’ ‘Pathema’ is Descartes’s term for passions in the Principles of Philosophy IV, 190.