Accident, Arrest, Imprisonment, Death
They had not the excitement which is developed in any operation to sustain their nerves but remained all day and every day surrounded by the evidence of their work and waiting and dreading the inevitable informer.
—Thomas McNally, quartermaster, Third Northern Division, 1922
There were other issues of the arms trade that have only been hinted at thus far in this book. This chapter examines the money, dealings with criminals, accidents, and arrests, as well as the rebels’ attempts to ensure their arms were serviceable and useful to the men in the field. Finally, it will look at some of the means used against the republican arms traffickers by the various British forces.
Financial Matters
Smuggling and making contact with arms dealers were not the only acquisitions issues with which the various republican groups were concerned. While they were largely idealists, the arms dealers they dealt with were not, so paying for these activities was always an issue. Obvious lines of inquiry would be into the expenses incurred, mechanisms established, and problems encountered throughout this period. Where the republicans obtained the funds to pay has already been examined extensively by Francis Carroll, so there is no need here to look at the Dáil Loan and other fundraising activities in any depth, except to say that the republicans were energetic and mostly successful in their efforts to obtain sufficient funds.1
While the republican movement in Ireland received considerable funds from the Dáil Loans, Volunteer subscriptions, and the expatriate community, GHQ passed the cost of procuring weapons to the brigades and battalions by making them pay GHQ for the weapons they received.2 This was unchanged from O’Rahilly’s original plan in 1914 and the Howth rifles. The reasons behind O’Rahilly’s concept were simple: without wealthy donors to the cause or foreign government sponsorship, the original Irish Volunteers did not have sufficient funds to arm the force.3
In addition to the monthly dues that each Volunteer was supposed to pay, another source for funding was the local community, private individuals, and businesses. Local units collected funds from them, sometimes a fixed amount set by higher headquarters or any amount the person chose to give. Sometimes the Volunteers treated this like rate paying.4 In nationalist areas, they frequently got more, but on rare occasions they got nothing. At the same time, in other less supportive areas, these levies angered many.5
The trail of the money for arms was simple; the arms centers used cash or checks to purchase the arms and sent them to GHQ with a receipt showing the costs. Once the arms arrived at their final destination from GHQ, the operational Volunteer units, the unit quartermaster then arranged payment to GHQ’s accounts in the National Land Bank accounts in Dublin.6 Thus, each part of the supply chain, in theory, had sufficient operating funds.
For instance, in September 1920, the Tubbercurry Battalion, County Sligo, gave GHQ £180 and received “six Service Rifles [.303 Lee-Enfield] together with a quantity of ammunition and some gelagnite [sic] soon after.” There was considerable markup involved; the “wholesale” cost of a service rifle was £3 to £5 in 1920. Ammunition cost the arms purchasers from two and a half to three pence per round in 1919 and 1920, but the brigades usually paid about the same.7 It is hard to imagine GHQ having sufficient stocks of ammunition and gelignite for the remaining £150. The “profit” was used to purchase more arms, thereby creating an ever-expanding arms network. Considering ammunition was relatively cheap and gelignite cost the organization little, the cost of the Tubbercurry Battalion’s six SMLEs probably cost them somewhere around £6 each. This “profit margin” for ammunition was about one penny per round, while for rifles it was about £1. The price of ammunition also varied by type, rifle and pistol, as well as by caliber. For instance, rifle ammunition frequently cost more than pistol. By mid-1920, with more SMLE service rifles available, .303 ammunition was easier to obtain than pistol ammunition. Price differences between
7.9mm Mauser and .303 ammunition are not recorded, but the Mauser had to cost more, being in limited quantities coming from Germany.
Table 8.1. Costs of Arms, 6 September 1920
| Brigade | Item | Amount (rounds) | Total cost | Cost per round |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North Mayo | .303 | 200 | £2.10.- | 3d |
| Cork Second | .303 | 300 | £3.15.- | 3d |
| South Donegal | .303 | 500 | £3.15.- | 1.8d |
| Wexford | .45 Rev | 200 | £3.0.- | 3.6d |
| Fermanagh | .303 | 300 | £3.15.- | 3d |
Source: QMG, Army Goods Inwards and Outwards Book,” vol. 1, NAI DE 6/11/1.
Note: There is no indication in the record why South Donegal paid less per round for the .303 than the other brigades.
Table 8.2. Common Machine Guns Available from World War I
| Lewis | Vickers | Maxim | MG 08/15 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caliber | .303 | .303 | .303 | 7.92×57mm |
| Weight (kg) | 13.0 | 23.0 | 27.2 | 69 |
| Length (mm) | 1,280 | 1,120 | 1,067 | 1,175 |
Of course, costs and demands increased again when the IRA got machine guns, especially Lewis guns, which fired .303 ammunition. Commanders, and men wanted Lewis guns for their operations, but having them meant entering combat with fewer rounds per man because the machine gun needed them.
There were certain instances where GHQ permitted units to pay in trade with captured matériel—for instance, with the Mills grenades from the Derry raids of 1919 and with a large quantity of gun cotton that the Wexford Brigade captured in mid-1920. In both cases, the units received rifles and ammunition in exchange for supplies they had captured. One must expect, however, that GHQ set the exchange in its favor,8 which enabled the monies collected in other ways to go further than would otherwise have been the case.
The Purchasing Committee of Motherwell
Volunteer Andy Fagan of the Motherwell Company, Second Battalion, Scottish Brigade, one of Vize’s purchasers, helped to establish a committee in November 1920 to oversee and approve purchases of arms in Scotland. This was because some of the prices they were paying were too high, and they needed to establish norms. Additionally, as mentioned previously, some IRA units tried to get around GHQ prohibitions and sent men over to buy weapons and ammunition on their own.9 By bulling their way into the delicate arms market, these outsiders essentially starting a bidding war for the limited supplies because they were willing to pay higher prices. They also hurt security by introducing unknown elements; without the resources of the local Volunteer brigade, the outside purchasers could not correctly assess their contacts or sources. This placed the Scottish Brigade in jeopardy as well as its valid sources and contacts. Finally, the committee helped to prevent brigades getting around GHQ. Neither GHQ regulations nor the purchasing committee stopped the truly determined IRA commanders from getting arms in Britain, but they did their best to mitigate the problems this created.
Table 8.3. Costs of Arms, September 1920
| Date | Area | Sent to | Invoice no. | Receipt rec’d | Daybook to. | Stock book | Goods | £ | Shillings | Pence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sept. 6 | Cork 2 | — | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 3 Lee-Enfield rifles | 18 | 0 | 0 | |
| Sept. 23 | N. Mayo | Malloy | — | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 300 rounds .303 | 3 | 15 | 0 |
| Sept. 24 | Galway City | Taffe | 7 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 25 no. 2 Grenade timers | 12 | 10 | 0 |
| ✓ | ✓ | 3 .45 ACP | 18 | 0 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 50 rounds ACP | 15 | 0 | ||||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 3 .45 revolvers | 18 | 0 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 50 rounds .45 | 15 | 0 | ||||||
| Sept. 24 | S. Donegal | Gallen | 8 | ✓ | ✓ | 6 Lee-Enfield rifles | 36 | 0 | 0 | |
| ✓ | ✓ | 500 rounds .303 | 3 | 15 | 0 | |||||
| Sept. 28 | Wexford | Hand | 11 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 200 rounds .45 revolver | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| ✓ | ✓ | 50 rounds Parabellum | 15 | 0 | ||||||
| Sept. 29 | Fermanagh | 12 | ✓ | ✓ | 6 Lee-Enfield rifles | 36 | 0 | 0 | ||
| ✓ | ✓ | 300 rounds .303 | 3 | 15 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 200 no. 2 Mans. | 3 | 6 | 8 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 12” no. 2 grenades | 6 | 0 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 13 .45 revolvers | 78 | 0 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 300 rounds .45 revolver | 4 | 10 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 2 .38 revolvers | 10 | 0 | 0 | |||||
| ✓ | ✓ | 50 rounds .38 revolver | 15 | 0 |
Source: QMG, “Army Goods Inwards and Outwards Book,” vol. 1, NAI DE 6/11/1.
The purchasing committee began with the Motherwell Company, but shortly after its creation Vize took the idea brigade-wide. Leaving Motherwell in charge of it, the committee added men from the First Battalion and Patrick Thompson from Edinburgh. It examined purchases, set prices, and authorized payments. This committee’s work accomplished several goals. By establishing consistent prices for Scotland, it prevented sources from playing the various purchasing agents against one another, giving some control of the arms trade back to the Scottish Brigade and IRB/GHQ purchasers.10 The committee could not, however, make up for financial irregularities in Scotland.
Table 8.4. Members of the Purchasing Committee
| Name | Irish Volunteers position | Committee position |
|---|---|---|
| Andrew Fagen | Motherwell Coy | Chair |
| Michael Burke | Motherwell Coy | Member |
| James Byrne | Bde QM | Finance director |
| Patrick Clinton | Motherwell Coy | Member |
| Bernard Quinn | 2nd Bn Cmdt. | Member |
| Seamus Reader | 1st Bn Cmdt. | Member |
| Patrick Mills | Lt., Motherwell Coy | Member |
| Patrick O’Neill | — | Member |
| Patrick Thompson | Edinburg | Member |
Charges of Fiscal Mismanagement
Various authors over the years have examined the power struggle between Cathal Brugha and Michael Collins and, as Peter Hart has said, usually sided with Collins. Hart rightly notes that many of those in the republican government having issue with Collins were usually alienated by his unnecessarily brusque and condescending manner. He also noted that while most of these disputes were related to authority or power, the struggle with Brugha was personal. The Hart and Tim Pat Coogan biographies of Collins have examined these broader issues more extensively than is necessary here. One of Brugha’s attacks against Collins, while it may have been motivated by this clash of personality and power, concerned the finances of the Glasgow arms center.11
In July 1920, Joe Vize left Scotland and returned to Dublin.12 When Vize was arrested in October 1920, Liam Mellows replaced him as director of purchases. At the same time, Mellows took a seat on the IRA’s Army Council.13 This coincided with a reorganization of GHQ in November of that year. Considering the events of that month,14 this was probably necessary. Collins saw the appointment of the pro-Brugha Mellows as a power play by Brugha; based on subsequent events, he was probably right. Upon assuming his post, Mellows found the directorate disorganized.15
It was not until late December or early January that Brugha found that the Glasgow arms center could not account for some funds. In a blatant attack, Brugha blindsided Collins by asking about this in an open Dáil session.16 Worse yet, upon investigating, Collins indeed found there was money missing. To defend himself, however, was nearly impossible since the British now had the IRA unit receipts, which were in Tom Cullen’s custody when he was captured in an office raid on Bachelor’s Walk, Dublin.17
Meanwhile, Brugha pressed his attack in March by writing to Mick Staines, then in Mountjoy Prison, asking him about irregularities in the purchases accounts. On 16 March, Collins also wrote to Staines asking if he could assist in a defense. Staines replied to Collins the next day saying Brugha had written to him and then said that he could not remember specifics but that he had full confidence in Collins’s integrity. He then asked Collins to tell him what to say when responding to Brugha.18 Mulcahy, apparently, tried to intervene “to defuse” the situation. He angrily noted in a memorandum, however, the failure of Glasgow to purchase some nine thousand rounds of .303 ammunition due to lack of funds. He then insisted on “a full financial accounting.”19
Brugha’s accusations were that Collins used Volunteers’ funds for IRB purposes and that Collins gave money to a family member. General Mulcahy felt that Brugha “did definitely imply that monies that Collins had control of . . . were being wasted or mis-spent or unlawfully made use of by Collins or by persons to whom Collins distributed these funds” and, further, that Brugha “wanted for some particular reason to have Collins removed [from] his position on the GHQ staff.”20
As Brugha stayed out of the war while de Valera was in America, it is hard to accept that the timing of this very personal attack coinciding with de Valera’s return was accidental.
As Greaves noted, the IRB had a tradition of arms importation, which was why it initially established the arms centers in Britain. Ironically, the IRB circles in Scotland raised the Volunteer units, and now Brugha targeted Collins for somehow subverting the Volunteers’ mission with “nefarious” IRB business. As the Irish Volunteers grew after the Rising, the IRB did not have sufficient funds to pay for the arms. Greaves noted that it was “natural enough” for Collins to bring these arms centers under his umbrella of converging authorities as minister for finance, president of the IRB Supreme Council, and director of intelligence for GHQ.21 If there was any diverting of funds then, it was Collins using IRB funds for the Volunteers. Hart mentioned that Collins may have been sending Volunteer arms to IRB members commanding IRA units to maintain control, but one could also argue that the IRB members who got most of the arms were in charge of the units that did the most fighting.22
The real issue, as Hart identified, was power. Collins had more than virtually any other single person in the republican movement. As far as he went, Greaves was right about the confluence of positions, but what he did not say was that Collins maintained this confluence of positions because he could. He also could recognize talent in others and bring those individuals into positions where those talents would further the cause. Perhaps more importantly, Collins does not appear to have been jealous of or threatened by capable individuals. Based on the research thus far, it appears that Mulcahy recognized these advantages. What this brought to the republican movement was not only some semblance of unity of command but also the ensuing order this created. Hart said that there was no conspiracy against Collins, but Coogan saw de Valera using Brugha, Stack, and Mellows to put Collins in his place.23
The arms centers, then, were one pillar of Collins’s power base, and the finances were another.
De Valera brought the parties together in what Coogan called “an inquiry,” while Hart called it “a meeting for reconciliation.” It was probably a combination of the two, but Collins defended himself against the accusations, and de Valera declared himself satisfied with the explanation, but it was emotionally charged to the point that Collins openly wept and Brugha stomped out, refusing to shake hands.24 To defend Brugha somewhat: Collins was not only his subordinate in GHQ, but also, as director of intelligence, he was only the equal of the QMG, yet the QMG reported to Collins, as did the arms purchasers. It was this amalgamation of power that led to trouble.25
The effects of these emotionally charged politics ultimately hurt IRA units in the field. Neither Collins nor Mellows sent funds to Glasgow for several months. During this time, the men in Glasgow had difficulty in the arms trade.26 None of this, however, changes the simple fact that the arms centers had not properly accounted for the money.
Arm Centers’ Handling of Monies
This organizational-political drama demonstrated that the systems were not foolproof; due primarily to financial inexperience, the arms centers were continuously short of operating funds. On many occasions, Collins had to send additional funds to them to make up the deficits. For instance, in mid-1920, he sent a bank draft of £100 to IRB man Steve Lanigan in Liverpool with instructions that it was payable under an assumed name and anyone could endorse it. The same month (July) he sent £500 in Irish notes to Glasgow because “it is difficult to get English ones here at short notice.”27 Although the arms center heads were successful arms smugglers, they were dreadful accountants, and Collins continuously tried to get them to keep records, which they did only haphazardly. These cash-flow problems hampered their abilities to acquire arms, which was why Collins usually sent relief quickly.28 He
felt that if they had kept proper accounts, such disbursements would be unnecessary.
There were also real problems with funds in Scotland, as Noonan has uncovered. About the time Vize was arrested in October 1920, Collins received reports that an agent he sent to Glasgow named McCabe was using funds for personal maintenance. He spent “‘money lavishly’” on clothing and drink, “and his recent wedding had cost at least £100.”29 This must have been on his mind when Brugha’s accusations came forward just a few months later, but the problems of funding did not end with de Valera’s meeting in the spring of 1921 and after the truce; Germany came to the fore with Dowling’s incompetence, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Sean Beaumont said that Charles McGuinness used funds to pay for a good time in a notorious Berlin night club.30 Further, there were also MacBride’s suspicions about Briscoe’s dealings with the dummy corporation. In the smugglers’ defense, the world they were working in was fraught with dangers, not the least of which was the class of people with whom they were dealing.
Criminal Enterprises
Another problem for the arms centers was that their arms sources were criminals, either by profession or by happenstance. These people were out to make a profit and did not care how. And, as the war went on, prices went up. On separate occasions, about a year apart, the usually hot-tempered Collins had to calm down Lanigan, who was complaining about a dealer raising prices. Collins replied, “Of course prices cannot be helped and although one may have an idea about the people who profiteer yet we must get the goods.”31 With these sums of money, it is no surprise the criminal world took an interest in these activities.
In a situation seemingly right out of the first series of the popular BBC Two drama Peaky Blinders,32 many of the sources used were underworld figures and criminals. They were excellent for this, but the danger was being defrauded. For instance, in September 1919, Vize reported to Collins that he had been swindled and that he might act against the fellow. Unlike in the Peaky Blinders episodes, the Volunteers do not appear to have taken revenge against those outside the organization who cheated them. In part, this might have been due to the unsavory nature of the people with whom they were dealing and that their sources might dry up if they retaliated.33
The London center, primarily under Sam Maguire, worked through a Mr. Barrett who provided arms for about a year starting in 1919. He was irascible and tended to inflate prices. Worse yet, he was prone to contacting Collins directly when he did not like what he heard from the London center, placing both Collins and the center at risk.34 Manchester’s source was a Mr. Kavanaugh, who was a middleman, “buying the stuff from some East End crooks and possibly adding to the price to make a bit for himself.” Collins accepted this because Kavanaugh could supply Manchester with rifles for £5. By far the most intriguing of the underworld figures, however, was James Corbett of Parkhead. One day in late May 1919, he walked right into Collins’s office and offered to sell him detonators and gelignite. Corbett was put out that Collins did not give him funds to begin his arms transactions on the spot. Collins, obviously surprised by the encounter, sent word to Vize in Scotland to make inquiries. For his part, Vize was unconcerned because he had an ample source of “soft goods” and was uncertain about him as he seemed to be “out for blood, [and] want[s] to pay himself too well.” He also thought Corbett was “looking for too much information to be safe,” but Collins said that they did not have sufficient detonators for their needs, which was true. Vize purchased some detonators from Corbett and got on with him well enough, even though Corbett shortchanged him by £2. Vize’s contacts finally came through and identified Corbett as a mining contractor who dealt arms on the side. He had funneled arms, primarily explosives, to individual brigades and battalions in Ireland. He was troublesome and disreputable but eventually always came through, so Vize decided to let him work exclusively for the Glasgow center. Perhaps this was his method of keeping Corbett under some control as well as away from the battalions and brigades. Sean McGrath in London found another underworld figure, Christopher Kelly Mostyn of Manchester, who said he could provide arms. These were the types of people the arms centers had to deal with to fulfill their needs.35
The Dangers
The underworld and other such unsavory types were not the only dangers in the arms-smuggling and manufacturing world. There were other threats too.
Death and Dismemberment
The Volunteers in the arms factories faced conditions like no other Volunteers in their revolutionary work. They were confined to small, frequently loud, hot, poorly ventilated spaces, sometimes with toxic materials and without access to even the basic safety equipment that existed at the time. While this was not much different than any other arms worker at the time, these men were not working for pay. Furthermore, those working with the furnaces had to endure the heat, but those employed on machine tools frequently had the furnaces right next to them and thus endured that too. The furnaces gave off noxious fumes that made the men sick at Parnell Street; Patrick McHugh said the only remedy was to drink milk, “which counteracted [the] effect of fumes.”36 How this worked is unclear, but they would likely not have used it if it did not make them feel better. The long-term effects of these conditions on their health are unknown, although none of the workers appears to have claimed disability for anything similar to toxic exposure.
Arms production was dangerous work under the best of circumstances, but these conditions were especially dangerous when the workers started mixing their explosives. They made gunpowder from potassium chlorate procured by Patrick O’Daly in Liverpool and transported by Sean Lane, a courier working for the Clyde shipping company. James O’Donovan’s “war flour,” caused some accidents, leading him to develop “Irish cheddar.” They also used the volatile explosive picric acid, supplied by Liverpool.37
Due to the unstable nature of the substances they used, there was a constant danger of accidental explosion, which happened several times. For instance, in October 1920, an assembly site located in St. Kieran’s, Saltmills, County Wexford, exploded when the workers inside accidentally dropped a lit candle into a bag of gunpowder, which set off detonators and bags of gelignite. Six died, and one eyewitness survived. In another incident, a house cleaner found a bag of gelignite, assumed it was rubbish and was about to drop it into a fire when an occupant of the house, who just happened to walk in while she was cleaning, stopped her. The factory that Dan Breen helped establish with Paddy Keogh blew up one day while he was approaching from a distance, although the Volunteers never found out why.38
Not everything went well for O’Donovan in his work either. In 1918, he was mixing a batch of lacrimatory gas when it blew up in his face. He received second-degree burns over most of his face, which “was a mass of water blisters” and temporarily blinded him.39 He blithely claimed status as the “first poison-gas casualty” of the war.40
The munitions site at Parnell Street suffered a fatal accident in October 1920 when Mattie Furlong was testing a trench mortar he had cast with Peadar Clancy. Collins wanted a mortar to attack RIC barracks more safely and effectively but could find none for purchase. So, he had Furlong and Clancy make one. Their experiment failed when the mortar exploded as Furlong fired it, mortally wounding him.41
As with the arms depots, the munitions factories had to be well located to provide both security and ease of transportation of raw materials and finished products. For instance, the location on Waterloo Lane, Ballsbridge, in Dublin was a stable, which was eventually raided. At one location, situated in a ravine with running water, Tony Woods set up a foundry with a camouflaged roof to prevent its discovery.42
Sometimes, however, the dangers were what one could call “self-inflicted.” Sean MacEoin said that he found the Parnell Street location dangerous, and his observations are worth quoting at length:
I found the munitions factory in the basement of a small bicycle shop. It was a small room, sixteen feet by twelve feet. In the right-hand corner, as you entered, was a furnace; in the centre of the floor, moulds for grenades, and the heads or necks of the grenades, which were of brass; direct in front of the mould was a lathe for doing machine work. In the right-hand corner opposite, there was a man taking out gunpowder’ from Morris tube cartridges the powder from it scattering over the floor. The empty cartridge cases were handed to a man in the left-hand corner, who put the empty case on the end of two inches of fuse. A man on his right put a detonator on the other end of the fuse, and left it down, opposite him; and a left-hand corner (back) loaded gelignite, and packed the fuse, the gelignite lying in bars.
In all, there were eight or nine people working in a little room, in which there were a furnace, lathe, gelignite, scattered gunpowder, a revolver for each man, very close to his hand, one especially large grenade resting on the bench to which the lathe was attached, and a box of gelignite lying in the middle of the floor, in front of the lathe. The bomb on the bench vas about ten inches long by seven inches thick, egg-shaped, and weighed about ten pounds. Clouds of steam mounted, filling the room, and pushing its way through the skylight on to the footpath outside. The temperature of the room was oven-heat.
When I stepped into this room and saw the appearance of the place, and knowing what gelignite could do, and the careless manner in which everything was being handled, for the first time in my life, I really knew what terror was.43
This and the preceding examples demonstrate that safety was secondary to production. Although these men took terrible risks to produce munitions for the IRA, some of these were unnecessary, and some of the injuries and deaths were probably preventable. There were other dangers beyond the work itself.
Arrest
An additional, equally dangerous, and constant possibility was that a factory located on the premise of a legal business could be inspected or raided by the police. Detectives of G Division, DMP, raided Heron & Lawless Bicycle Shop, with the factory in its basement, at the end of May 1919. The men were working in the basement toward the end of the day when they heard the tramping of many feet above them on the ground floor. Guessing it was a raid, they began to hide or destroy incriminating evidence even before the warning light went on. When the detectives came down, they found the workers focusing on innocuous projects. In the case of Tom Young, he was working on grenade necks meant to house some of the firing mechanisms, but he explained them away as plumbing valves. When the police found a bag of Verey light flares taken during the Collinstown raid, they took proprietor Joseph Lawless to the Castle for questioning, but they released him shortly afterward without charge.44 Satisfied the police had found nothing, foreman Michael Lynch set the shop back to work.
The second raid came at 0100 hours on 11 December 1920 when Auxiliaries of F Company, ADRIC, under platoon commander DI Third Class B. W. Pearce Florey, found the shop while supposedly searching some flats next door. Florey stated he found five pistols in the shop before they went to the cellar. There they found the machinery and grenade components. The F Company commander, Capt.
W. L. King, left Section Leader B. J. L. Beard and some men in the shop, hoping to catch the workers. Two men, John Purcell and Joseph Lynam, approached the shop but turned and ran when they saw Beard and his men. The Auxiliaries fired two shots, grazing Lynam’s leg. Of course, this also gave away their position. They then took “the whole of the contents of the shop” in lorries to be inspected elsewhere.45 This was a considerable loss to the republicans. Fortunately for the IRA, the Munitions Directorate had at least maintained an ample supply of grenades, typically about one thousand, throughout the war.46
At the time of the capture, and when McHugh and Lynch made their witness statements, the accepted story was the ADRIC had found the factory by happenstance. Lawless, the last of the four men mentioning the capture in their statements, claimed in his 1954 statement that he found “in recent years” evidence that the factory was found by intelligence from a comment to an Englishman in County Clare named Captain Henry of the Royal Sussex Club, who reported the information to someone in government in London. It was then passed to Dublin and then to the Auxiliaries. The raid reports from F Company, ADRIC, confirm this.47
Testing, Evaluation, Repair, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance
Another, more mundane aspect of the IRA arms workers’ lives fell into the realm of ensuring these weapons would work. This section discusses measures that are essential to this study because they speak directly to the manufacturing process. The IRA had to know its designs, methods, and manufacturing were sufficiently effective. The effectiveness of munitions ultimately leads to the quality of IRA munitions, which, in turn, was one of the determiners of success and failure in combat.
The last part of the manufacturing process was testing. O’Donovan’s assistant, John Tallon, performed carpentry work and built a lean-to with a corrugated iron roof at Bottle Tower in Churchtown, Dublin. There, O’Donovan and Sean Russell detonated a fragmentation grenade by setting it off inside the lean-to and counting the holes made by the fragments.48 This was a simple and effective method of confirming the weapon’s capabilities. Not only did it reveal the level of fragmentation; it also provided a baseline for explosive yield.
There were numerous instances when the arms centers in Britain rejected weapons due to their poor condition, yet some managed to slip through, giving rise to complaints from the brigades. Even more embarrassing, some of the complaints about defective weapons referred to those manufactured by the QMG Department, especially grenades. For instance, on 20 June 1920, the Kerry Second Brigade complained to Geróid O’Sullivan, GHQ adjutant-general, saying,
I beg to report that 5 Mills bombs supplied by G.H.Q. to our brigade [illegible] Feb 5th 1920 @ 12/.6 each failed to work when used in the attack on the Gortatlea R.I.C. barracks on March 24th. The attributed failure to explode to the possibility of the strikers being faulty. As these bombs were quite useless to us in fact they were more dangerous to ourselves than to the enemy as they were in the burning building while we were removing etc—we expect that you will replace them with fresh ones.49
GHQ took these complaints seriously. The next day, O’Sullivan responded expressing his regret at the incident and asked the brigade commandant to forward samples of the grenades so that the Directorate of Munitions could examine them. O’Sullivan also said the grenades would be replaced. This was not an isolated incident; in September 1920, eleven GHQ grenades failed during an East Clare Brigade attack on the Scariff RIC Barracks. One or two failures could be explained away, but eleven is more difficult, especially in September, when they could not have frozen. O’Donovan’s biography mentioned an incident in which North Dublin Volunteer Sean Clancy (B Company, Second Battalion, Dublin Brigade) said, “‘After letting fly at a passing lorry, we might miss it or often or sometimes the old grenades might not explode at all.’” Still, with the scarcity of other sources of grenades and the vast numbers being manufactured, one would expect such problems.50 Considering this difficulty with grenades manufactured by the QMG, one must also wonder about the reliability of the grenades produced by the brigades and battalions throughout Ireland. These units did not always have the professional-grade machinery of the QMG. Only when units or commentators gave the provenance of the grenades in question is it possible to know. Furthermore, the only evidence available is anecdotal, so it is not possible to establish failure rates.
For his part, McHugh rejected any criticism of the GHQ grenades, saying that ignorance of their use, improper storage, and poor maintenance were the more likely reasons for failures. He did, however, accept responsibility in his statement “Any officer who blamed the failure of mine for failure in operation should really blame myself for not sending or making sure that his equipment was in proper condition.” After this, he again blamed the operators for the problem, saying that training was vital.51 There appears to have been no report about the defective grenades.
IRA Firearms Maintenance and Repair
Firearms, like all machines, require various levels of maintenance and repair. These activities may range from periodic cleaning and oiling to replacing worn or broken parts. While the former level of these tasks generally does not require highly specialized training, the latter tasks were beyond the untrained capabilities of the ordinary Irish Volunteer. The necessity was clear; after all, his weapon endured the same climatic and environmental conditions he did. Even under the best of these conditions, rifles need cleaning and oiling for the rounds to feed properly and the bolt to move smoothly. Of course, those climatic and environmental conditions in Ireland are less than ideal for optimal weapon function in the field. Worse yet, combat tends to increase wear and tear. Cold, damp, and dirt conspire to cause rust and buildup of grime, either of which could cause problems. Modern propellants do not foul weapons as badly as gunpowder, but they still cause buildup that can lead to malfunction. Due to these problems, modern armies tend to focus on the cleanliness of their weapons to a degree that would shock outsiders, which is why they tend to teach their soldiers to clean their weapons before they even teach them to shoot. Thus, as the IRA transitioned in 1920 to more offensively minded operations, maintenance and repair became more important.
Soldiers are taught to “field strip,” or break down to nominal parts, their weapons for both cleaning and to clear basic malfunctions. During this process, one frequently may replace simple parts that are worn or damaged. Repairs requiring deeper-level disassembly would normally need an armorer or a gunsmith. The armorer has the skills and tools to disassemble the weapon down to its basic parts, while the gunsmith has the knowledge, skills, and facilities to make new parts. The armorer is a highly skilled technician, while the gunsmith is a similarly skilled artisan.
While the quartermasters, their assistants, armorers, and ordinary Volunteers all helped with the routine maintenance of the rifles, pistols, and ammunition, so did many Cumann na mBan members. For instance, Sheila Canty (née Delaney) and her sister Kate not only stored arms at her farm at Dublin Hill, County Cork, they also cleaned the weapons and handed over any that need repairs to the Cork First Brigade armory in their shed. After the RIC killed her two brothers in December 1920, the sisters Delaney continued their service to the brigade.52 Eily O’Reilly (née O’Hanrahan) continued in the arms field after her brother’s execution in 1916, using her house at 384 North Circular Road, Dublin, to store and “care” for the weapons and ammunition.53 Mary Healy and her brother used their house in Manchester to store and repair weapons before shipping them to Ireland.54 Winifred Murphy of Enniscorthy, County Wexford, was “cleaning ammunition and made bags to hold same” in 1919.55 Ellen Keegan “was responsible for the care of all kinds of warlike stores.”56 Annie Luddy, of County Limerick, had arms repaired in her home, where she also performed regular maintenance on them.57 For the more invasive or intricate repairs, the rebels used their armorers.
Armorers
Frank Henderson provided a wonderful synopsis of the armorer’s job while writing on behalf of one named William Brennan of Dublin, who was applying for a pension: “The armourer’s duties were to repair and keep in order all of the arms of the Battalion. This was done in their workshop in the evenings. They were required to inspect all the Battalion and Company dumps and to train other men for this service. They had a well-equipped shop and were kept very busy.”58
The Irish Volunteers trained many of its armorers, first through the headquarters before the Rising, then through GHQ after the reorganization in 1918. The headquarters, as early as 1914, established a training program for armorers at 2 Dawson Street, Dublin, where Sean Derrington, probably the senior-most armorer in the IRA, trained armorers in a multiday course. He started as an armorer in de Valera’s battalion and quickly became an instructor. On release from prison after the Rising, he continued his instruction at Blackhall Street for the brigade and then under the newly established GHQ. He also had armorers working for him, such as Joseph Kennedy, Patrick Brady, Thomas Meldon, and W. J. Maher. Derrington built an armory shop at his own expense at Stanley Street, which was probably the shop to which Henderson referred. It was in locations like these that the IRA’s armorers repaired as much as they could.59
Gunsmiths and the Like
A qualified gunsmith could make a firearm with the right tools and supplies, but this was not what the IRA needed.60 The rebels needed spare parts for their broken weapons, and obtaining these was almost as difficult as getting the weapons. Gunsmiths would have helped with this, but while the IRA did not have sufficient gunsmiths, it did have fair numbers of machinists and others with similar skills, such as blacksmiths, fitters, carpenters, certain types of engineers, and even some plumbers. Really, anyone who had great skills with his hands was useful. Many of these individuals, such as the carpenters, mechanics, and cobblers, were better suited to the armoring work; the machinists, fitters, blacksmiths, molders, and even some of the mechanics could, and did, make the spare parts the IRA needed. Whenever he could get away with doing it, Derrington used clock springs and anything he could salvage from rubbish to repair firearms.61
Table 8.5. Incomplete List of IRA Armorers
| Surname | First name | Duty title | Company | Battalion | Brigade | Civilian occupation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Barnes | Thomas | Armorer | E | 2nd | 1st Cork | Fitter, munitions |
| Bird | Edward | Armorer | Longwood | 2nd | 1st Meath | Carpenter |
| Bould | George | Armorer | C | 1st | Dublin | Storeman |
| Brady | Patrick | Armorer | C | 2nd | Dublin | Fitter |
| Brennan | John | Armorer | — | 1st | Dublin | — |
| Brennan | William | Coy armorer | C | 2nd | Dublin | Fitter |
| Burke | Patrick | Armorer | A | 5th | 3rd Tipperary | Mechanic |
| Carty | Martin | Armorer | A | 1st | North Wexford | Bicycle salesman |
| Coughlin | James | Armorer | — | — | Dublin/Munster | Engineer, fitter |
| Cullen | Thomas | Armorer | B | 4th | Dublin | — |
| Curtin | Owen | Armorer | A | 1st | 2nd Cork | Motor driver |
| Daly | Seamus | Staff officer | — | 2nd | Dublin | Fitter |
| Derrington | Sean | Bde armorer | — | 1st | Dublin | Machinist |
| Doyle | William | Armorer | D | 3rd | Dublin | Machinist |
| Fagan | James | Armorer | D | 3rd | Dublin | Plumber |
| Farrell | Patrick | Armorer | A | 1st | Wexford | Munitions worker |
| Fitzgerald | Seamus | Armorer | Dublin | Machinist | ||
| Fitzgerald | Thomas | Armorer | B | 3rd | Dublin | Housepainter |
| Gannon | Henry | Armorer | E | 4th | Dublin | Hardware store owner |
| Gavan | James | Armorer | B | 4th | Dublin | Fitter |
| Higgins | Michael | Armorer | H | 1st | Dublin | Student |
| Hogan | Patrick | Bn armorer | — | 4th | 1st Tipperary | — |
| Hunt | William | Armorer | D | 2nd | Dublin | Fitter |
| Kelly | Michael | Armorer | Clarinbridge | 3rd | South Galway | Mechanic |
| Kennedy | Joseph | Armorer | B | 1st | Dublin | Fitter |
| Kennedy | Luke | Armorer | — | — | Dublin/Munster | Electrician, fitter |
| Kililea | Mark | Armorer | — | 1st | West Mayo | Mechanic |
| Lee | Edward | Bn armorer | F | 8th | Kilkenny | Blacksmith |
| Maher | William | Armorer | — | — | Dublin/Munster | Iron molder |
| McEvoy | Christopher | Armorer | F | 4th | Dublin | RR employee |
| Moloney | Edward | Armorer | E | 4th | 1st Cork | Blacksmith |
| Mooney | William | Armorer | B | 4th | Dublin | Machinist |
| Norton | James | Bn Armorer | F | 1st | Dublin | Motor driver |
| O’Brien | Denis | Armorer | Bansha | 4th | 3rd Tipperary | Mechanic |
| O’Connell | Michael | Armorer | C | 7th | 1st Kerry | Farmer |
| O’Connor | James | Armorer | — | Engineers | 1st Kerry | Mechanic |
| O’Connor | David | Coy QM | Scartaglin | 1st | 2nd Kerry | — |
| O’Donnell | John | Coy armorer | K | 3rd | Dublin | Stationary engine driver |
| O’Higgins | Thomas | Armorer | L | — | 1st Cork | Electrical fitter |
| O’Keeffe | Charles | Armorer | F | 1st | 3rd Cork | — |
| O’Neill | Jeremiah | Armorer | Kilbrittain | 1st | 3rd Cork | — |
| Savage | Joseph | Bde armorer | — | — | Belfast | Ship’s fireman |
| Sheehan | Patrick | Coy armorer | H | 7th | 1st Cork | Cobbler |
| Sugrue | Robert | Coy armorer | D | 1st | 1st Kerry | Blacksmith |
| Torphy | Sean | Armorer | H | 1st | Dublin | Fitter |
The most common repairs that armorers mentioned in their various statements appear to have been the simplest: “internal mechanisms,” “triggers,” “springs,” hammers, and so forth.62 All of these items could be manufactured by the skilled machinists and other metal workers easily enough. Cork Volunteer Seamus Fitzgerald worked in the Haulbowline Shipyard, which was infamous with British authorities as being a haven for “Sinn Feiners,” repaired weapons and equipment and made replacement parts in the machine shops there.63 Jack Healy fabricated spare pistol parts in his engineering shop in Dublin from 1920 to the end of the war. Likewise, the Volunteers at Rushbrooke Dockyard, County Cork, had a similar operation established where they cast metal bomb cases in sand molds in the yard.64 Although Fitzgerald and his compatriots were fired in late 1919, they continued to repair weapons and construct bombs elsewhere.65 Further, Purchases bought broken and incomplete weapons, which it listed as “duds.” It is likely that these inoperative weapons were either repaired or cannibalized for spare parts to repair other weapons.66
Table 8.6. Some Arms Repair Locations Identified in the Records
| Location | City/Town | Type |
|---|---|---|
| Boyle St. | Dublin | House |
| Cadogan Rd. | Dublin | House |
| “Cluny” | Clontarf, Dublin | House |
| Dorset St. | Dublin | Shop |
| Great Southern and Northern Railway | Inchicore, Dublin | Rail yard |
| 40 Lower Ormond Quay (cellar) | Dublin | Shop |
| 41 Parnell Sq. | Dublin | House |
| 98 Parnell St. (cellar) | Dublin Bicycle | shop |
| Talbot Pl. | Dublin | Shop |
| Twynam’s, South Circular Rd. | Dublin | Shop |
| Haulbowline Shipyard | Cork | Shipyard |
| Rushbrooke Dockyard | Cork | Dockyard |
| Mount St. Joseph Abbey | Roscrea, Co. Offaly | Monastery |
| Mount Melleray Abbey | Co. Waterford | Monastery |
Workload
Another indicator of their importance is that when questioned about the amount of their time they spent repairing arms, the armorers reported that this work took up most of their time for the entirety of the periods they were active Volunteers. When asking about armorer John Bannon’s workload in 1918, the MSPB inquired, “Sure he wouldn’t have much work in that year—1918—repairing arms?” Patrick Houlihan replied, “He would, because in the training of recruits arms were injured.” All of the armorers, or those speaking or writing on their behalf, reported being constantly busy working on arms.67
Other Components and Supplies
As already mentioned, these underground manufacturers had difficulty obtaining other necessary items for the foundry such as coke and crucibles for smelting both brass and iron. These items were difficult to acquire surreptitiously in Ireland and had to be ordered through the IRA arms center in Liverpool (see Chapter 5), although they stole some of these items locally. In May 1920, Collins asked Lanigan to obtain coke. When asked how much he wanted, Collins replied, “We will take this in any quantities in which it can be supplied, small or large.” Just four months later, the source of coke was inexplicably cut off. So, Collins asked the head of the IRB in Liverpool, Neill Kerr, who found a source but could not ship it for lack of a British transit permit. Just as he got the permit, the coal strike of 1920 began, and none of the colliers would transport it regardless of permits. Then, in November, when Liverpool was finally ready to ship the coke, there was the mass arrest of the Manchester and Liverpool arms personnel. This fuel was so important that as soon as Patrick O’Daly took over in Liverpool in late 1920, Collins wrote to him asking, “Do you know of the old arrangement regarding coke? . . . [Kerr] had arranged to get it by the half ton. Half a ton keeps us going for about a fortnight.” In the same communication, Collins asked for crucibles as well, which were seemingly always in short supply. This was partly due to their smelting iron in brass crucibles, which were not designed for the heat required for iron. Fortunately for the Volunteers, this shortage occurred at the same time that their foundry in Dublin was raided and all production had ceased. O’Daly, a medical student, quickly found sources and began his shipments of coke and crucibles in January 1921, so the QMG Department had plenty of coke on hand when it restarted its foundry work again in March.68 This demonstrates the precarious nature of these operations: small matters could arise at any time.
Internal Irish Arms Traffic
The system of messengers and couriers Collins established was where the “average” Irish man or woman, especially the members of the Cumann na mBan, participated in the war since it required no special skills or abilities. One merely had to agree to do it and summon the courage to risk one’s life to take the assigned charge from one point to another. The risk was real. The cost could be life, limb, liberty, property, or fortune; several men were executed for possession of firearms and ammunition, while many more men and women were sentenced to long periods of penal servitude.69
The risks, then, were real. Men and women in Ireland and Britain risked all to transport matériel into the country and then to get it into the hands of the men in the fighting units. Each person along the way risked something. Agnes O’Boyle, for example, described her service, working in London and Belfast, as “storage and transport of arms in enemy territory” and “storage of military material in territory under enemy occupation.” Eamonn and Annie Moonie, he onetime OC of First Battalion, Scottish Brigade, described Alice Coogan’s courier work from Glasgow to Dublin as “continuous and done successfully at great personal risk under difficulties,” moving “large quantities of munitions from my house . . . at great risk to her life.”70
Much has been written about the “extra-legal” penalties meted out at the whim of the perpetrators. It is not the author’s intent to prove or disprove alleged atrocities and actions of British forces, as this is outside the purview of this work. However, it is unlikely the British would lose their well-deserved reputation for being implacable foes so quickly. More importantly, the veracity was entirely unimportant thanks to Piaras Beaslai, the head of IRA publicity, along with Robert Brennan, Desmond Fitzgerald in the Dáil publicity office, and Art O’Brien the senior republican in London; the people of Ireland believed they would be tortured and perhaps murdered if captured and still chose to risk it nonetheless.71 This is an excellent definition of courage. Without this courage, the IRA supply mechanisms would have failed, regardless of design.
The Volunteer supply and logistical system was an enterprise more suited to a conventional army, and this leads naturally to the issue of why the IRA organized in traditional military structures: companies, battalions, brigades, and eventually divisions. The first and most straightforward answer to this has already been discussed in the introduction: it had to be legitimate in the eyes of the Irish people, the Irish diaspora, and ultimately the rest of the world. To be legitimate, a government must have the functions of a government; in most cases, this includes a military force. Furthermore, this must be recognizable as a “proper” military.72 In Ireland, this meant traditional military organizations, regardless of their military effectiveness in a revolutionary conflict. This was one reason the IRA established ASUs and flying columns: mostly to fight the guerrilla war that the rest of the “conventional” Volunteer units either could not or would not. This conventional force structure, with its conventional-style supply and logistical system, was what the Volunteers leadership wanted and what the Dáil needed.