At the beginning of 1970 the Lightning force was still at the peak of its power with nine first-line squadrons and the Operational Conversion Unit. The OCU at Coltishall had become an extremely large organisation and in the twelve-month period from September 1970 the unit operated a total of thirty-seven Lightnings, comprising ten F.1As, four F.3s, eleven T.4s and twelve T.5s. At Gutersloh in RAF Germany Nos.19 and 92 Squadrons were now flying the much improved F.2A, which featured the enlarged ventral fuel tank. Many pilots regarded this to be the best Lightning of the lot, especially as it retained its gun armament, unlike the F.6, which had to be modified so that two 30mm Aden cannon could be fitted in the forward section of the ventral pack at the expense of 170 gallons of fuel. The decision to remove the gun armament from the Lightning had been taken with the F.3, a move that was widely condemned at the time.
By now it had been some time since a Lightning had lost its canopy on take-off but it happened once again early in the year and, as on the last occasion, the culprits were 23 Squadron. On 26 February XR752 was halfway down the runway when the canopy started to lift. As the pilot was committed to taking off by this stage the hood was ripped off and on this occasion managed to damage the fuselage spine as well as the leading edge of the fin.
The first serious accident of the year was a particularly tragic one as the pilot managed to eject successfully but subsequently died of exposure before he was picked up from the North Sea. On 4 March Flying Officer Graham Clarke and Flight Lieutenant Tony Doidge (call signs Kilo 15 and 16 respectively) took off from Leuchars in the late afternoon to carry out low level practice interceptions. Towards the end of the sortie Flight Lieutenant Doidge in XS918 received a Reheat 1 warning and this was followed almost immediately by a Reheat 2. Flying Officer Clarke manoeuvred his aircraft to check for signs of fire and, although at first he could not see any, as he flew to the left of XS918 he could see the glow of a fire in the No.1 engine jet pipe. He advised Flight Lieutenant Doidge to eject who did so at 1900 hrs at around 10,000 feet and approximately 9 miles from the coast. Unfortunately Clarke lost sight of his No.2 as he descended on his parachute and then had to return to Leuchars as he was low on fuel.
By this time the rescue helicopter had been scrambled but in the gathering gloom it did not come into visual contact with Flight Lieutenant Doidge. As the SAR helicopter was already in the air, the pilot of another Lightning was advised to observe where XS918 crashed instead of looking for its pilot as he descended on his parachute. The search was continued but without success and it was not until 0100 hrs the following morning that the body of Flight Lieutenant Doidge was picked up by a local lifeboat. The Board of Inquiry noted a number of deficiencies in his survival equipment including the fact that his immersion suit had been modified without authority to make it more comfortable to wear. This involved removing the integral rubber boots and replacing them with wrist seals so that ordinary socks and flying boots could be worn, which allowed water into the suit. It was also noted that he had insufficient clothing underneath his immersion suit to provide adequate thermal insulation but this was rendered somewhat irrelevant by the fact that the suit was not watertight. Two other crucial lapses were that he had lost his Personal Survival Pack during his descent and had removed the battery of the Search and Rescue Beacon (SARBE) locator from the Mae West instead of the beacon itself so that there was no signal for a rescue helicopter to home onto. The Board also highlighted several other more minor failings.
As Flight Lieutenant Doidge had ejected just before dark, the helicopter had very little time to locate him and this task was made virtually impossible as his SARBE was not working. His aircraft had been seen to crash in the sea between Anstruther and the Isle of May and although the nearest lifeboat was alerted immediately this was located at Broughty Ferry, which was approximately 20 miles from the crash site. As the ejection had taken place over the Firth of Forth it is likely that Flight Lieutenant Doidge had come down somewhere not too far away. From the small amount of wreckage that was eventually recovered it was thought that the fire might have been caused by hydraulic oil from the No.1 Controls or a services system in Fire Zone 3 (the jet pipe area).
No.74 Squadron had another start-up fire on 6 April when Flying Officer Paul Adams was about to fly XS928. It appeared that a valve in the AVPIN starting system did not close and so AVPIN drained down to the starter exhaust, which was situated under the port flap where it burnt with an invisible flame. Fuel then leaked from a jammed overwing vent valve (a common problem) and, having been heated by the sun as it flowed over the upper surface of the wing, ignited when it came into contact with the AVPIN flame. The level of damage was assessed as Cat.4 and XS928 was eventually airlifted back to the UK where it joined XR758 at Warton for major repair work.
There was another case of a hot gas leak on 7 April when XP756 of 29 Squadron was climbing to altitude to begin a practice interception exercise. The first indication of trouble was a Reheat 1 warning when the aircraft was at 25,000 feet although, after the standard actions were taken, the light went out after about thirty seconds and remained off for the rest of the flight. On landing at Wattisham it was discovered that the No.1 intermediate jet pipe had split, which had allowed hot gases to damage part of the structure at the rear of the aircraft.
Another aircraft was lost to fire on 7 May when Flying Officer Stu Tulloch of 111 Squadron ejected from XP742 during an exercise involving supersonic interceptions. As he was in a starboard turn at 28,000 feet and a speed of Mach 1.0, the Standard Warning Panel lit up with Reheat 1 and 2 warnings and these were joined soon after by a Fire 1 warning. Flying Officer Tulloch throttled both engines but as the warnings stayed on he wasted no time in ejecting, his aircraft crashing into the sea off Great Yarmouth. During the ejection he sustained slight injuries and was rescued from his dinghy by helicopter after approximately twenty-five minutes in the water.
Finding the reason why an aircraft crashed was not easy when it went down into the sea as it was often difficult, if not impossible, to find the wreckage. In the case of XP742, however, sufficient evidence was found to establish that there had been a titanium fire in No.1 engine, which had then broken through the compressor casing. It was also discovered that there had been a serious fuel leak in Fire Zone 1 of the No.1 engine bay although the source of the leak could not be established as not enough wreckage was recovered. Having started in Fire Zone 1, the fire then quickly spread to Fire Zones 2 and 3 and led to the warnings that were conveyed to Flying Officer Tulloch.
No.1 engine was examined by Rolls Royce, whose task of finding the cause of the titanium fire was not helped by the severe damage that the engine had sustained as a result of the fire and also by the effects of having been immersed in sea water. It appeared, however, that a failure had occurred in a stage 7 stator blade or blades. Debris was then passed through the engine in the course of which a group of titanium stator blades ignited. The reason for the blade failure could not be established with any degree of certainty, although there was a possibility it may have been caused by Foreign Object Damage as there was evidence of FOD on rotor blades in the early stages of the compressor. It will be recalled that a titanium fire had occurred over two years before resulting in Avon Mod 3497 to replace titanium stator blades at compressor stages 5 and 6 with steel blades. This modification was still being embodied as engines were returned for overhaul.
No.74 Squadron had another AVPIN fire on 15 May when XS897 was being prepared for a sortie resulting in Cat.2 damage to the electrics in the fuselage spine. However, much worse was to follow. On the night of 26 May Flying Officers John Webster and Dave Roome were carrying out practice interceptions at low level over the Malacca Straits. Flying Officer Webster in XR767 was acting as target and after a number of successful interceptions at 5,000 feet, clearance was given to descend to 1,000 feet. Nothing more was heard from Webster and it was later assumed that he had flown into the sea. Despite an extensive search of the area only a small piece of debris from his aircraft was found.
Also on 26 May another of 29 Squadron’s F.3s had a hot gas leak when XP745 was departing Wattisham with two other Lightnings. The first sign of trouble came when the re-fuelling panel lights came on during inverted flight, although a thud was felt at the same time. Not long after the pilot became aware that his pitch control was restricted and immediately returned to base together with another aircraft. In the descent the Reheat 1 warning light came on but after the appropriate actions were taken it went out again. A safe landing was eventually made and it was discovered that once again the No.1 intermediate jet pipe had split which had led to hydraulic oil igniting. The Cat.3 damage that the aircraft had sustained took over two months to repair.
Due to the prodigious power of its Rolls Royce Avon engines, the Lightning was capable of flying some extraordinary aerobatic manoeuvres including what was termed the rotation take-off. This involved raising the undercarriage as soon as possible after becoming airborne, holding the aircraft down to gain speed and then moving the control column sharply back to bring the nose up to an angle of 60-70 degrees. Aerodynamic lift was replaced by thrust from the engines as the aircraft appeared to go up in a vertical climb. Although it was spectacular, this particular manoeuvre had to be finely judged and the minimum entry speed that was required was 260 knots IAS with no more than a 3g pull. Most Lightning pilots performed a rotation takeoff at some point in their careers but it was to lead to tragedy at Tengah on 27 July.
Flying Officer Roger Pope and Flight Lieutenant Frank Whitehouse of 74 Squadron were scheduled to fly as a pair and both decided to perform rotation take offs. Roger Pope was first away in XS927 with Frank Whitehouse following a few seconds later in XS930. Shortly after the latter rotated into the climb his aircraft was seen to enter what appeared to be a spin to the left and having attained a height of only 600 feet it crashed in the jungle just beyond the runway. Although Whitehouse attempted to eject there was insufficient time for his parachute to open and he was killed. It seemed that the pull that Whitehouse had made on the control column had been well in excess of 3g but there was another factor involved. To prevent the problem of fuel venting, ventral fuel transfer had been inhibited when on the ground and so with a lengthy taxy and hold at the end of the runway the fuel used would have come from the wing tanks. With a full ventral on take off, CG would have been further aft than it would otherwise have been, resulting in decreased stability in pitch. Although there was a funeral and cremation for Whitehouse in Singapore, his ashes were flown back to the UK and interred at Cranwell where he had been a student in September 1963.
The degree of instability that was produced by a CG that was near the aft limit was particularly hazardous when extreme manoeuvres were carried out at low level as in an aerobatic routine or a rotation take-off. Squadron Leader (later Air Commodore) Ken Goodwin, who was one of the first Lightning pilots with the AFDS and was later on the staff at LCS, came across this problem but found that it was not given due credit by some who should have known better:
One of the special qualities of the Lightning was the spectacular rotation take-off, which included a 220-knot, 60-degree climb into a wing-over. Whereas it was claimed the Lightning would not pitch up because of its notched delta configuration, I thought otherwise, and gave evidence to this effect to a Board of Inquiry into a fatal display accident. At a practice display at Wattisham I was delayed for take-off and, unbeknown to me, I was using main tank (wing) fuel without a transfer from the ventral tank. A rotation take-off left me with an aft CG and a continuing pitch up with the control column fully forward. I was able to use rudder and gentle aileron to get a wing-over going and the nose coming down laterally. I am quite certain we lost two pilots and aircraft through uncontrolled pitch up. Sadly, the Board of Inquiry was highly sceptical of my evidence.
The Tigers’ run of misfortune was to continue as another aircraft was lost the following month, although on this occasion the pilot managed to eject with only minor injuries. On the night of 12 August Flying Officer Mike Rigg was returning to Tengah in XS893 after a low level interception sortie. When downwind at 1,500 feet he selected undercarriage down but was then confronted with a port main gear red. He re-cycled the undercarriage before applying roll, yaw and ‘g’ to his aircraft but the undercarriage leg still refused to come down. The emergency system was activated but again without success and as his fuel state was becoming critical, Rigg had no alternative but to climb up to 12,000 feet and eject. Although the ejection was straightforward, his parachute descent was less so as he got the impression that he was falling out of his parachute harness. Several of the harness attachments were positioned abnormally high on his body, to the extent that he had difficulty in breathing. Only by pulling himself up in his harness was he able to breathe normally. After landing in the sea he was picked up by a SAR helicopter.
The crash investigation was again hampered by a lack of wreckage so that the findings had to be based on a certain amount of supposition. It was eventually concluded that the failure had been caused by the door locking latches not opening fully on the down selection. Of equal concern was the traumatic parachute descent that the pilot had experienced. Normally the Martin Baker Mk.4BS ejection seat had a barostat system where the main parachute opened at 10,000 feet but on Far East Air Force Lightnings the barostat had been set to 5,000 m (16,400 feet) before delivery, to allow for flight over mountainous regions en route. When Mike Rigg ejected at 12,000 feet there would have been no deceleration before the parachute opened and it was thought that the high loads generated had resulted in the failure of stitching that joined the harness crutch loops to the bottom cross strap. As a result of this accident the barostat mechanism in the ejector seats of FEAF Lightning aircraft were set to the normal setting of 10,000 feet.
On 9 September another Lightning pilot was killed in an accident that in recent years has taken on a degree of notoriety. The unfortunate pilot was Captain Bill Schaffner USAF who had joined 5 Squadron two months before on an exchange posting. He was an experienced pilot who had completed two tours of duty on the F-102 Delta Dagger and at the time of the accident had accumulated 121 flying hours on the Lightning, of which eighteen hours were at night. He also had a Green Instrument Rating and was rated as limited combat ready after his eight weeks on the squadron. This was rather a short period in which to have achieved this flying category but it reflected his previous fast jet experience. The limited aspect referred to the fact that he had not been cleared for full visual identification (visident) missions as he had not completed his training in this respect.
On the 9th a Tactical Evaluation (TACEVAL) was called in which Captain Schaffner was cleared to participate as it was understood that operations would not include the shadowing or shepherding of other aircraft operating at low level. He was ordered to his aircraft at 1834 hrs and the scramble came at 1947 hrs but as he was taxying out to the runway he was recalled. His fuel was replenished but there was a mix up as regards turn round servicing as he did not request any which was against standing instructions. The engineering officer-in-charge of the aircraft ordered a full turn round to be carried out but this was delayed and had not been completed when Schaffner was scrambled again at 2025 hrs. He took off five minutes later and climbed to 10,000 feet but at this time he was still unaware of the type of target he was about to be allocated or the height at which it was operating. In fact the task had just been changed by the TACEVAL team to a shadowing and shepherding operation, which Schaffner had not been cleared to participate in.
The targets were Shackleton aircraft that were flying at a cruising speed of 160 knots at 1,500 feet which was the minimum height authorised for this type of exercise. The minimum speed that a Lightning could be flown for visident procedures was 200 knots as referred to in the Lightning squadron training syllabus, and although shadowing and shepherding was an unusual request, it was included in the war task of Lightning squadrons and so was theoretically subject to TACEVAL. At 2039 hrs Schaffner was given a target that was 28 nautical miles away and was ordered to accelerate to Mach 0.95. He was given various heading alterations until he made a R/T call to say that he was in contact. It was noted by the controller that his voice sounded strained as though he was being affected by ‘g’. At 2041 hrs Schaffner’s aircraft was seen above and behind the Shackleton by the pilot of another Lightning who had just broken away from the target. The navigation lights of the Lightning were then picked up by the crew of the Shackleton, but by now it appeared to be quite low. A minute later a R/T call to Schaffner from control went unanswered, which prompted the implementation of emergency procedures, but despite an immediate search by the target Shackleton and an air/sea search the next day there was no sign of aircraft or pilot.
From calculations provided by the Board of Inquiry and expert sources, the general location where the Lightning had come down was ascertained and it was found nearly two months after the accident by a Royal Navy minesweeper. Despite having been flown into the sea the aircraft was substantially complete except that the port wing had broken off and some fuselage panels were missing. Having survived contact with the water the Lightning had sunk at a minimal rate of descent and had settled gently on the sea bed in a tail down attitude. Although the cockpit canopy was still attached, it was not closed and there was no sign of the pilot. Examination of the wreckage showed that the aircraft had hit the sea at low speed, in a tail down attitude and with a low rate of descent. Both throttles were in the reheat gates, there was a nose-up trim of six degrees, the undercarriage was up, flaps down and the airbrakes were out. It appeared that Schaffner had attempted to eject but the canopy had not blown off as its gun cartridge had received only a light percussion strike and had not fired. After the aircraft hit the water he had tried to manually abandon the aircraft but the conclusion was that he had drowned during or after this attempt. The light percussion strike on the canopy gun cartridge occurred because of negligent servicing in that the firing unit was incorrectly seated as a result of damaged screw threads. Although the non-release of the canopy prevented Schaffner from ejecting, it is likely that he would not have survived in any case as his use of the seat would not have been within its operating limits.
In recent years the story of this accident has been taken over by those fond of conspiracy theories and UFOs. This has mainly come about as the aircraft was recovered from the sea in a relatively complete state but with no pilot in the cockpit. For some it could only mean one thing, an alien abduction. Increasingly imaginative stories emerged of Captain Schaffner intercepting an object travelling at over 500 mph (fast for a Shackleton), which was also giving off an intense bright blue light. Radar operators had apparently then seen the two radar traces merge before separating again, one disappearing off the screens at an estimated speed of 20,000 mph. Of course, such a fanciful tale would not be complete without accusations of an official cover up and lost reports. Sadly this twisting of the truth in relation to the events of 8 September 1970 has tended to trivialise a tragic event in which a fine airman lost his life.
The seventh (and last) Lightning to be lost in 1970 was T.4 XM990 of 226 OCU which crashed near Coltishall on 19 September. This was Battle of Britain Open Day and one of the highlights of the show was to be a sixteen-aircraft formation flypast. To get sixteen aircraft in the air all at once was an ambitious target considering the Lightning’s serviceability rate and XM990 was the second of two airborne spares, also having the role of whipper-in for the formation. The aircraft was to be flown by Flight Lieutenant John Sims with Flight Lieutenant Brian Fuller in the right-hand seat. With one Lightning having dropped out before take-off, another then had an AC failure in the air so that XM990 was required to take up the vacant place in the formation. This was flown successfully but after the break for landing one of the F.1As (XM180 flown by Flight Lieutenant Eric Hopkins) burst a tyre on the runway so that some aircraft from the formation had to divert to Wattisham. They returned to Coltishall later in the day but after turning left onto the downwind leg of the circuit John Sims found that he had to move the control column to the right to prevent the port wing from dropping.
At first Sims and Fuller thought that they could get the aircraft back on the ground, but the problem then became much worse and it was soon obvious that they would have to eject. Unfortunately they were still at circuit height so Sims moved the throttles into full cold power and began to climb. However, there was a progressive worsening of lateral control to the point that he was unable to prevent the Lightning from rolling to the left. To maintain the climb he pulled on the control column when the aircraft was upright and pushed when it was inverted. In such fashion he managed to climb to about 2,000 feet before ordering Brian Fuller to eject. As the Lightning was rolling constantly this was not easy but, by initiating the ejection sequence when the aircraft was approximately 90 degrees from wings level, he timed it correctly so that he came out when it was upright. John Sims had a much more difficult job as he was now being badly affected by slipstream from the open cockpit and as soon as he released the controls the nose of the aircraft began to drop. He then had difficulty grasping the top handle but eventually managed to eject himself and came down in some trees. Although Brian Fuller was back in the air just four days later, John Sims suffered back and neck injuries that took six months to heal.
About a month before the accident XM990 had received a scheduled inspection in which work was carried out on the port and starboard aileron Powered Flying Control Units (PFCUs). The work involved the removal and replacement of life-expired PFCUs on the port wing and was completed over a period of nine days. The investigation into the accident discovered that two bolts to the valve input lever of the port aileron PFCU had been inserted head-down but that the slotted nut and split pin had not been fitted. As a result the bolts had eventually fallen out and this led to the port aileron being able to travel upwards beyond its normal range. The use of full starboard aileron and full right rudder within their normal maximum limits of deflection were not enough to counteract the rolling induced by the excessive deflection of the port aileron.
This particular incident caused much controversy at the time as XM990 had been flown twice after the servicing work had been carried out and on each occasion the pilot involved had noted various unserviceabilities, these including what he considered to be a slight problem with the aircraft’s autopilot. As nothing untoward was seen during subsequent ground inspections, the aircraft’s service and flying logbook (Form 700) was annotated that, although it was deemed to be fit to fly, it was not to be flown in formation. Unfortunately Flight Lieutenant Sims only became aware of this when he was already in the cockpit immediately before start-up (the formation leader had no idea that XM990 had a flight restriction). This put Flight Lieutenant Sims in an extremely difficult position and he only decided to continue as he was the No.2 spare and, in theory, should not have been required, but Lightning serviceability being as it was, he was soon called upon to take up a position in the formation. Had the control problem occurred when in formation it is likely that a mid-air collision would have occurred involving two or more aircraft Even though there were more Lightnings at Coltishall than anywhere else, it was still an extremely difficult task to get sixteen aircraft in the air at the same time so another factor in this accident was undoubtedly the desire to put on a good show, even if it meant cutting a few corners to have the requisite number of aircraft available.
There was another incident of fuel venting on 5 November when XN794 of 19 Squadron had completed a scramble start during an exercise. The aircraft had only taxied a few yards when the Fire 2 caption illuminated. In response the pilot shut down both engines and operated the fire extinguisher before vacating the cockpit. It was discovered that fuel from the port wing vent valve had entered the fuselage and had then been ignited by the hot No.2 starter exhaust pipe. On this occasion, however, the flash fire that resulted did not cause any damage.
The final incident of 1970 was a bird-strike to XM139 of the Wattisham TFF on 10 December. The aircraft was hit shortly after take-off and the intake duct was damaged, some debris was ingested by No.1 engine, which suffered severe indentations of the compressor blades. Although bird-strikes were an ever present hazard, the Lightning was affected rather less than other RAF types due to its predominantly medium-to-high level role. The bird-strike rate per 10,000 flying hours for the Lightning for the last three years had been 9.0, 5.5 and 6.4. In comparison the figures for the Hunter were 11.0, 21.2 and 8.2 and for the Canberra 17.0, 26.1 and 22.9. Due to its ultra-low level role the aircraft that was most prone to bird-strikes was the Buccaneer, with a strike rate of 43.1. The accident to XM139 was in fact only the fourth bird-strike to result in Cat.3 damage since the entry of the Lightning into squadron service in 1960.
During the year there had been twelve major accidents to Lightning aircraft and with a total of 39,000 flying hours the rate per 10,000 hours was 3.1. Although this compared favourably with previous years, a total of seven aircraft had been written off, which was two more than in the 1966, 1967 and 1968 when there had been five in each year. The Cat.5 accidents had resulted in four fatalities, which was double the previous highest figure of two, which had been recorded in 1966 and 1968. Unfortunately this trend towards higher losses was to be continued in the first few months of 1971.
The Lightning force did not have to wait too long for its first fright of the year when Flight Lieutenant Russ Morley of 29 Squadron had a fire warning in XP765 on 11 January. The incident took place at night as the aircraft was climbing through 18,000 feet and involved a Fire 1 warning. The standard actions of shutting down the engine, jettisoning the ventral tank and operating the fire extinguisher were taken as a return was made to Wattisham where the aircraft was landed safely. Once again the fire had been caused by a fuel leak but by Lightning standards it was of a relatively minor nature and did not cause serious damage.
A pilot of 74 Squadron had a similar experience three days later when flying XR761, but in his case it was a Reheat 1 warning. The warning flashed as he was flying at 11,000 feet and, as it stayed on after he had carried out his Fire Drills, he gave a Mayday call. On returning to base a visual inspection was made by the pilot of another aircraft who reported that he could see what appeared to be fuel leaking in the vicinity of the No.1 jet pipe. The warning light eventually went out after about ninety seconds and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. Once on the ground it was discovered that the leaking fluid was actually hydraulic oil that was covering the jet pipe area. This had come from a connection in the hydraulic line to the airbrake and had caused a flash fire in Fire Zone 3 at frame 55.
On 23 January XR727 of 23 Squadron was landing at Leuchars after an air test when a large flock of birds was seen to rise off the runway near the touch-down point. The pilot initiated overshoot action but was unable to avoid flying through the birds and he heard a slight bump on the underside of the aircraft. The undercarriage and flaps were left down and a further circuit was flown followed by a precautionary landing. Subsequent examination of the aircraft revealed that there had been two bird-strikes, one in each undercarriage bay. Although the port side was undamaged, the starboard side sustained damage to the D-door aperture amounting to a dent in the main skin and cracking on rib 15. Just before this incident the runway controller had fired a number of cartridges to scare the birds off the runway, but the birds that did the damage came from an unseen flock that rose from the undershoot area. Although seemingly innocuous, bird-strikes could cause serious damage and in this case it was assessed as Cat.3, which resulted in XR727 being out of action for nearly three months. Bird-strikes were a particularly hazard at Leuchars as the runway was so close to the sea.
The first Cat.5 accident of 1971 occurred on 25 January when Captain Bill Povilus USAF of 29 Squadron had to eject from XP756 during a night interception sortie off the coast of East Anglia. After climbing to 35,000 feet Captain Povilus was given information on his first target and had just engaged reheat when there was Reheat 1 warning. After carrying out the emergency drills and transmitting a Mayday call he was given a course to steer for Wattisham by Control, but as he turned onto the required heading he noticed that the indication on the main airspeed indicator/Mach meter was dropping to zero. There was then a dramatic deterioration in control response. At first he became aware that movement of the rudder pedals completely lacked resistance and had no effect on the aircraft’s motion. On checking the services hydraulic pressure he saw that it was reading lower than normal and was fluctuating. Then, as the nose of the aircraft began to drop, there was no response to backward movement on the control column. At this point Povilus ejected and although he received minor injuries, the ejection was successful and he was rescued by helicopter after spending two hours in his dinghy. The delay was down to the fact that a USAF helicopter had to be called as Royal Air Force SAR helicopters were not night-capable.
Unfortunately the remains of XP756 were not found so the Board of Inquiry set up to investigate the accident was unable to establish a positive cause. However, from the pilot’s evidence of the symptoms of the fire, the Board reasoned that there was a strong probability that the fire was caused either by a hydraulic leak from the services pressure or return pipelines or by failure of a fuel coupling in the fuel transfer pipe that passed through Fire Zone 3.
Another Lightning went down on 28 January when F.2A XN772 of 92 Squadron crashed near Diepholz in Germany after entering a spin during an air combat training exercise. The aircraft was being flown by Flying Officer Pete Hitchcock as No.2 to Flight Lieutenant Jim Watson in a 2 versus 1 practice combat at low supersonic speeds at 35,000 feet. When the singleton aircraft (flown by Flight Lieutenant Rich Rhodes) was picked up at a range of 5 nautical miles and closing fast, Watson called for a break to starboard, but during this turn XN772 flicked into a spin to the right that had not been recovered by the time the aircraft was passing through 15,000 feet, at which point Flying Officer Hitchcock ejected. The Lightning continued to spin until it crashed in open country and was largely destroyed in the ensuing fire. An additional hazard was the fact that a number of 30mm HE and ball shells, both exploded and unexploded, were found scattered around the crash site. The requirement to carry live ammunition during training flights by Lightnings of RAF Germany was subsequently cancelled. Hitchcock made a safe parachute descent and landed safely some distance away.
Unfortunately he came in for some adverse comment during the Board of Inquiry as regards his handling of the aircraft, some of which was unjustified. One of the greatest criticisms of the Lightning’s stall/spin characteristics was the fact that it had virtually no stall warning and, therefore, no spin warning. The moderate airframe buffet that became evident at high angles of attack occurred at speeds well above the stall (around 215 knots IAS) and changed very little right down to the stall itself, which, depending on weight and configuration, took place at about 115 knots IAS. As the aircraft would have to be flown well within the buffet boundary in order to manoeuvre effectively during air combat, it would clearly be difficult for the pilot to know precisely how close to the stall he was. Even considering the above it did appear that Pete Hitchcock’s break had been rather too aggressive. His subsequent use of rudder to assist the turn and the application of aileron to arrest the yaw that this created only served to aggravate the situation.
He was also criticised for his actions once the aircraft was in the spin, the Board stating that the most likely cause of the failure to recover from the spin was that the pilot had not maintained the correct recovery action long enough for it to have the desired effect. However, it appeared that the Lightning had entered a flat spin from which recovery was virtually impossible. This was backed up by photographs of the crashed aircraft that showed it had hit the ground in a flat attitude with virtually no forward speed. Although much of the fuselage had been destroyed by fire the fin and rudder were clearly recognisable and were level with the ground. In the remarks made by the AOC-in-C at the end of the report, although he accepted that Flying Officer Hitchcock had been negligent, he did recognise that the Lightning had to be flown in a part of the flight envelope where little margin existed between successful manoeuvre in combat and an inadvertent spin and he therefore considered the pilot’s negligence to be excusable. During the course of the investigation into this accident four cases of inadvertent spins were admitted by Lightning pilots from Gutersloh that had not previously been reported. Despite this accident, the F.2/F.2A still had the best safety record of all Lightning variants. Including XN772 there had only been two Cat.5 write-offs whereas the total for all other marks at this time amounted to thirty-nine.
The next serious incident involving a Lightning took place on 31 March and very nearly resulted in another ejection. The aircraft was XM172 of 226 OCU, which was taking part in a cine-weave exercise when a double hydraulic failure occurred. On levelling at 8,000 feet the controls seized but the pilot decided not to eject, instead he pulled back sharply on the control column and it suddenly became free again at which point the HYD 2 light went out. A return was made to Coltishall using minimum control movements and just before the aircraft was landed the HYD 1 light also went out. The cause of this incident was put down to heavy aeration of hydraulic fluid in the No.1 and 2 systems.
The next in-flight fire was not long in coming and occurred on 26 April when T.4 XM996 of 226 OCU was being flown by a student pilot. A Fire 1 warning was received during a full-power climb and the pilot shut down No.1 engine and switched off the fuel before his instructor took control of the aircraft. After the ventral tank had been jettisoned (by now these were in rather short supply) and the No.1 extinguisher was operated the warning went out after about fifteen seconds. An airborne check by the pilot of another Lightning revealed that although fuel appeared to be venting from the area where the ventral tank had been, there was no sign of fire.
On return to Coltishall an examination of Fire Zones 1 and 2 revealed the presence of hydraulic oil and tests showed that this had come from a flexible pipe that had failed. The hydraulic oil had then found its way from Zone 1 to Zone 2 where it had collected in the hottest part, adjacent to the rear fire wall. Because of the attitude of the aircraft in the climb, the drainage holes in Zone 1 had not dispersed the fluid and a lack of complete sealing between the two fire zones had allowed transfer of the fluid to take place.
Two days later another Lightning was lost when F.6 XS938 of 23 Squadron crashed shortly after taking off from Leuchars as a result of an engine fire. The aircraft was flown by Flying Officer Alistair McLean who had been tasked with carrying out practice interceptions with a Canberra. Having departed Leuchars on runway 09, Flying Officer McLean accelerated to 430 knots IAS and was passing 3,000 feet when the attention-getters came on and the Fire 2 caption illuminated. This was followed shortly afterwards by a Reheat 2 warning and McLean quickly shut down the No.2 engine and pressed the fire extinguisher button. By this time he was at 5,000 feet and during a turn back towards Leuchars the Fire 2 warning went out but was replaced instead by a Reheat 1 warning. With the situation rapidly worsening McLean made a R/T call that he was ejecting and he abandoned the aircraft at a height of 6,000 feet. As he had taken off at 2134 hrs it was almost dark by the time he parachuted into the sea – a few minutes later and he would probably have had to spend the night in his dinghy. This was due to the fact that the SAR helicopter would not have been able to make a rescue at night. As it was, the helicopter found him almost straight away and he was winched aboard before the light finally went.
Although the RAF attempted to find all Lightning aircraft that went into the sea, the level of success of these operations varied dramatically. The hunt for XS938 went better than most and the wreckage was located two days after the crash at a depth of 90 feet about 5 miles west of Bell Rock by HMS Bildeston, a Royal Navy minesweeper. In fact the search was successfully concluded only a few hours after it had begun. The main structure and both engines were then salvaged by RFA Dispenser by 4 May and these were sufficient to establish the source of the fire. The RAF was particularly keen to find the cause of the accident to XS938 as this aircraft had been through the Fire Integrity Programme that was supposed to reduce the number of Lightning in-flight fires (see Chapter Six).
From the wreckage that was recovered within the first week of the salvage operation it was ascertained that the source of the fire had been in the area of the No.2 engine fuel-draulic pump, probably as a result of a massive fuel leak. Although the fuel-draulic pumps were not brought up during the initial salvage operation, it was concluded that the flexible hose from the pump had failed. A painstaking search was continued for the next two months, during which the fuel-draulic pumps and hoses were eventually recovered from the sea bed. Examination of these components revealed that the fuel leak that caused the fire had in fact originated from a gasket fitted between the fuel-draulic pump and the flexible hose. During the course of the crash investigation it was established that the fuel leak was of the order of 25 gallons per minute. As a result of these findings action was taken to fit new gaskets to all Lightning aircraft on a top priority basis.
By now it had been nearly eight years since a Lightning had been involved in a mid-air collision but this particular hazard was about to reappear in the long list of Lightning accidents. On 26 April four Lightning F.3s of 111 Squadron flew to the French Air Force base at Colmar for a detachment that was due to last ten days. During their stay in France the Lightnings exercised with locally-based Mirage IIIs but on 3 May, when returning to Colmar, one of a pair of Mirages that had been carrying out dissimilar combat training with two of 111 Squadron’s aircraft collided with XP752 flown by Flight Lieutenant Tony Alcock. The accident occurred after the Mirage pilot had declared that he was low on fuel and had broken away from a formation comprising Alcock and the other Mirage (the second Lightning had lost contact in cloud by this stage). Having separated from the other two aircraft the Mirage then flew towards them again and the underside struck the Lightning in the cockpit area causing severe damage to the right-hand side of the nose and removing the canopy. In addition the No.1 engine seized and there was a failure of the AC electrical system so that the main instruments and radio did not function.
After the collision Flight Lieutenant Alcock attempted to eject but found that he was unable to do so. Having carried out a control check, however, he realised that his aircraft was still responding normally and on seeing the Mirages in the distance he followed the two French Air Force aircraft in to land, by which time he was extremely low on fuel (the Mirage that was involved in the collision also landed safely). The Board of Inquiry into this accident concluded that the pilot of the Mirage, having left the formation, had then failed to keep a proper distance and had thus caused the collision. It was also noted that there had been much confusion in the air due to the use of both English and French during radio calls (the pilot of the Mirage involved in the collision was French whose English was poor, although the pilot of the other Mirage was an RAF officer who was on an exchange posting and was bilingual in English and French).
A week later on 10 May yet another aircraft crashed as a result of an in-flight fire. On this occasion it was 56 Squadron that suffered the loss, although happily the pilot ejected and survived. This was Flight Lieutenant Bob Cole who was taking part in a night continuation training exercise in XP744. Having taken off from Akrotiri he was just levelling off at 15,000 feet when there was a Fire 2 warning. As Flight Lieutenant Cole was in the process of carrying out his emergency drills for an engine fire, the attention-getters went again to announce a Reheat 1 warning. At this point he gave a Mayday call and after heading back to base he jettisoned the ventral tank, at which point the Fire 2 warning went out, although the Reheat 1 remained.
As if Bob Cole’s workload was not high enough already, the attention-getters then went off again and the Fire 2 warning came back on, together with a Reheat 2 warning. Not long after he felt the fore-and-aft control column movement stiffen, which meant that he had no alternative but to eject. Having informed control of his intentions he ejected at a height of 9,000 feet and was rescued from the sea by a SAR helicopter. Unfortunately his aircraft came down in very deep water and very little wreckage was found. In view of this the investigation into the accident was not able to establish a positive cause although it concluded that the fire had probably originated and been fed by a severe fuel leak within the No.2 engine bay.
By now the number of Lightning engine fires was rapidly reaching a crisis and there was to be no let-up in the immediate future. On 21 May it was the turn of Flying Officer Graham Clarke of 29 Squadron to experience a problem shortly after taking off from Wattisham in XP708, although on this occasion use of the fire extinguisher successfully put out a fire in No.1 engine. It is interesting to note that the ventral tank that was jettisoned as part of the emergency drills travelled for some distance before landing harmlessly in a garden. Due to its shape the ventral acted like a lifting body and actually ‘flew’ quite well.
Before the end of May there was still time for another Lightning to be lost. This took place on the 26th shortly after Flight Lieutenant Ali McKay of 5 Squadron had taken off from Binbrook in XS902. This aircraft had spent the last six months at 60 MU at Leconfield undergoing a rather protracted major service, which included being snagged several times when flown by the resident test pilots after work had been carried out. On arriving back at Binbrook it was flown on an acceptance check, which was uneventful, and it was then returned to the line. On its second sortie of the day, as Flight Lieutenant McKay was turning onto the departure heading, the Fire 2 warning activated, but as he was carrying out the appropriate fire drills for this emergency the Reheat 1 and 2 captions also came on. Continuing to climb on No.1 engine only, Flight Lieutenant McKay made for the coast to avoid built-up areas and his plight was monitored by another Lightning flown by Flight Lieutenant Merv ‘Masher’ Fowler who radioed that he could see a brilliant white flame coming from the rear of his aircraft. The control column and rudder pedals then began to move without any input from the pilot, a sure sign that control was about to be lost. Once over the sea McKay wasted no time in ejecting himself by using the face blind handle to become the latest in a long line of Lightning pilots to qualify to be a member of the Caterpillar and Goldfish Clubs. Although he was quickly rescued from the sea, unfortunately he suffered major back injuries during the ejection and it would be several months before he was able to fly again.
Once again there was an unfortunate lack of evidence as no wreckage was ever found. The Board of Inquiry thus had very little to go on, other than the testimony of the pilot, but the sequence of fire warnings was virtually the same as those in the crash of XS938 four weeks before. In view of this it was assumed that the cause of the accident was a fierce fire in the rear fuselage resulting in failure of the controls. There was another similarity to the loss of XS938 in that XS902 had also been through the latest fire integrity modification programme, which was of considerable concern.
The accident statistics for 1971 up to and including the loss of XS902 showed a further worsening of the Lightning’s safety record, as in this period there had been eight major accidents that included five Cat.5 write-offs. As total flying hours up to 26 May amounted to 17,000, the overall accident rate was now up to 4.3. This was the highest figure since 1966 and was significantly above the projected figure of 3.0, which it had been assumed the Lightning would have achieved at the end of 1965 and maintained for the rest of its service life. The only bright spot was the fact that there had been no fatalities thus far in 1971. The most worrying aspect of the accident figures was the high number of aircraft that were complete losses. Since the beginning of 1970 twelve aircraft had been destroyed and of these eleven were F.2A, F.3 and F.6 machines as operated by the front-line squadrons. It was also disappointing that the trend in accidents due to fire was rising at a time when most aircraft had been modified in accordance with the Fire Integrity Programme.