By the beginning of 1975 the Lightning force was undergoing radical change with a number of squadrons having already re-equipped with the McDonnell Douglas Phantom or were shortly to do so. The first to swap their Lightnings for Phantoms was 111 Squadron at Wattisham, which had disbanded as a Lightning unit on 30 September 1974. The changeover was followed three months later by 29 Squadron which also received Phantoms at the end of the year. Although 56 Squadron was to fly the Lightning for another eighteen months before it too converted to the Phantom, the British withdrawal of forces in the Mediterranean led to it becoming part of UK air defence once again from its new base at Wattisham. At Binbrook Nos. 5 and 11 Squadrons remained, as did (for the time being at least) Nos. 19 and 92 Squadrons at Gutersloh in RAF Germany.
With the gradual transfer of the air defence task to the Phantom there was no need for the continued existence of 226 OCU and the last Lightning course commenced at Coltishall in May 1974, the unit being formally disbanded four months later. Although there was still a need to train new Lightning pilots, the numbers needed were considerably reduced and the training task was initially taken on by C Flight of 11 Squadron before the formation of the Lightning Training Flight (LTF) at Binbrook in October 1975.
In one respect the year of 1975 showed a considerable improvement in the Lightning’s safety record as only one aircraft was written off, but this accident unfortunately resulted in another fatality (the first for three years) when Squadron Leader David Hampton of 11 Squadron was killed in F.6 XR762 on 7 April. At the time the squadron was on detachment to Akrotiri from Binbrook and the aircraft came down in the sea off the coast of Cyprus. With a lack of material evidence and the death of the pilot the cause of the crash could not be established. Before serving with 11 Squadron, XR762 had flown with 5 and 23 Squadrons and had accumulated 2,273 hours in the air by the time it was lost.
As already related, Lightning aircraft had been involved in a number of mid-air collisions since entry into RAF service and there was another on the night of 15 January 1976, although on this occasion the contact was of a relatively minor nature and both aircraft were landed safely. It happened when three F.2As of 19 Squadron were engaged on a practice interception. Flight Lieutenant Dave Carden in XN777 was in the process of carrying out a visident on the Lightning flown by Flight Lieutenant Paul R. Cooper when the aerial on the top of his fin hit the port aileron of the target aircraft as he closed on it in the descent. The aerial was broken on Carden’s aircraft and although the aileron on Cooper’s machine was damaged, his aircraft was still controllable. This highlighted once again the difficulty of assessing the rate of closure of two aircraft at night, even when navigation lights were in use. Had Dave Carden’s aircraft been six inches higher, then the outcome might have been rather different.
There is a saying that things happen in threes and for Flying Officer Clive Rowley of 19 Squadron this came true in the space of three months in 1976 when he had three separate Lightning incidents. The first took place on 5 May when he was flying XN776. He had just taken off from Gutersloh when his aircraft had a complete AC electrical failure, which meant that a number of his main instruments were inoperative. However his biggest concern was the fact that the main AC-powered fuel pumps had also failed leaving only the DC pumps to feed the engines. In this condition the F2A was limited to 85 per cent power on both engines (to avoid the possibility of flame out) and with his aircraft heavy with fuel, Rowley was thus left in an extremely difficult situation. However this particular emergency had been practised in the simulator and the landing procedure called for additional height to allow for that lost during turns and for speed to be maintained at 300 knots IAS until lined up on the approach. This was due to the fact that once height had been lost it could not be regained as there was insufficient power with the engines limited to 85 per cent rpm. This also meant that once the aircraft was on the approach it was committed to land and could not overshoot. In the event Clive Rowley judged his landing to perfection and his aircraft was completely undamaged.
His second Lightning moment occurred six days later on 11 May during a practice interception sortie in XN789, in which his playmate, was Flight Lieutenant Phil Owen. The exercise called for supersonic interceptions with Rowley acting as the fighter. Having climbed to 38,000 feet, and as he was accelerating through Mach 1.25 prior to intercepting the target aircraft of Flight Lieutenant Owen, he noticed a flicker in the engine instruments and then the No.2 Reheat auto-cancelled. Assuming that it was just a temporary malfunction Rowley re-selected the No.2 reheat but thirty seconds later the attention-getter operated and the Reheat 2 warning illuminated. He immediately carried out his emergency drills, which included shutting down No.2 engine, declared a Mayday and made for the Dummersee Lake, approximately 30 miles north of Gutersloh, which was the designated area in case he needed to eject. By now the Reheat 2 warning light had gone out leaving Rowley with no idea whether it had been real, or spurious like so many others had been. However, he had now been joined by Flight Lieutenant Owen who was able to report that he could see a hole that was about a foot in diameter in the rear fuselage just below the fin on the starboard side. From this it appeared as though some form of fluid was escaping.
The emergency procedures for a reheat fire in the Lightning now included the requirement to wait for five minutes before attempting a recovery to base. This was in view of the distinct possibility that tailplane control could be lost in a fire situation as had happened on many occasions in the past. It was assumed that if anything untoward was to happen it would occur within this five-minute period. As there was no apparent alteration in his aircraft’s control responses, Rowley commenced his letdown into Gutersloh, although by now his fuel state was becoming a cause for concern. His approach and landing was without further incident, but the gravity of the situation soon became apparent after he had turned off the runway and had shut down the remaining engine. It was discovered that part of the structure in the jet pipe had broken away and had become jammed in the burner ring of the reheat, thereby deflecting part of the flame so that it damaged the airframe. The fluid that Flight Lieutenant Owen had commented upon turned out to be hydraulic oil that was leaking from the No.1 system (the other system was inoperative as No.2 engine had been shut down). It was later calculated that at the rate that it was escaping, Rowley would have only had another two minutes in the air before the flying controls seized up.
The aircraft that Rowley had been flying on 11 May had belonged to Squadron Leader John Spencer (O.C. B Flight) and on 4 August he had a similar situation in XN786, which was the personal aircraft of Squadron Leader John May who was in charge of A Flight. He was the leader of a pair (the other aircraft was flown by 19 Squadron’s commander Wing Commander Bob Barcilon), but shortly after take off at around 2,000 feet a loud bang reverberated through the aircraft and this was accompanied by a sudden deceleration. Not long afterwards the Reheat 1 caption lit up on the warning panel and once more Rowley was into the ritual of emergency procedures with which he was rather more familiar than most. There was an ominous development when fore-and-aft control column movements became extremely stiff, requiring a two-handed pull to obtain any response, although lateral control was unaffected. As well as being very difficult to move, control in pitch also became rather jerky so that it was not easy to maintain the correct attitude. Wing Commander Barcilon carried out a visual inspection of the aircraft but could see no real sign of damage except that the fin appeared to be bulged around its mid point when seen from behind.
At the time that the emergency started the cloud base was around 3,000 feet, but it was clearer to the south so Rowley headed in this direction, which at least allowed him to climb to 9,000 feet. At this relatively safe height he carried out an assessment of the aircraft’s handling characteristics in the landing configuration. Although he had shut down No.1 engine it was still indicating 30 per cent rpm, which was unusually high, and this had the effect of creating considerable drag so that with undercarriage and flaps down it was impossible to maintain height even with full cold power selected on No.2 engine. Despite this it was decided to attempt a landing, but as the aircraft was still heavy with fuel the approach speed was higher than normal at 195 knots IAS. At least control in pitch did not get any worse and once again Rowley flew an immaculate approach and was able to land in one piece. As the braking parachute was operated by a system that worked from No.1 engine he was expecting it to fail so lowered his arrestor hook to engage the upwind RHAG. However, the parachute deployed satisfactorily, which was due mainly to the engine’s high windmilling speed.
On inspection it was found that XN786 had suffered major internal damage, far worse than had occurred in Clive Rowley’s previous incident with XN789. The emergency had begun when the intermediate jet pipe casing had fractured and split into two pieces. The general carnage in this area led to the burner assembly for the reheat being torn out and a huge hot gas leak that caused considerable damage to the rear section of the airframe. Part of the jet pipe had fallen away somewhere south of Osnabruck, but most of the remainder was blocking the airflow through No.1 engine at the rear which was the reason for the relatively high rpm reading. The stiffness in the elevator controls had been caused by part of the jet pipe material being forced up against the elevator control linkage and the bulge in the fin that had first been noticed by Wing Commander Barcilon had been caused by internal pressure build up. The damage to XN786 was considerable and although initially assessed as Cat.4, it was not flown again and was eventually used as a decoy aircraft at Gutersloh having flown a total of 2,659 hours from its first flight on 12 February 1963.
Clive Rowley’s third, and last, incident occurred a week after another Lightning was lost. This was F.6 XS937 of 11 Squadron, which was abandoned over the North Sea off Spurn Head on 30 July. The aircraft was being flown by Flying Officer Simon Manning and a problem was apparent immediately after take off from Leconfield when undercarriage retraction produced two greens and a red (No.11 Squadron was operating from Leconfield at the time due to runway resurfacing at Binbrook). The red light signified that a main undercarriage leg had not retracted and so the usual repertoire of manoeuvres was flown in an attempt to assist the retraction process. This was unsuccessful, however, and several low level flypasts of the Tower at Leconfield confirmed that the leg was roughly in the halfway position. Indeed it appeared to be swinging as though it was not connected to its jack.
After a period of time it was decided that the only course of action was for Flying Officer Manning to eject over the sea and he did so from a height of 7,000 feet. In one sense he was fortunate as Leconfield was the home of B Flight of 202 (Search and Rescue) Squadron and so a Whirlwind HAR.10 helicopter was ready and waiting for him when he ejected. In fact his rescue was so swift that he had to endure jibes in the bar that he had ejected over the sea and had hardly got wet. A salvage operation was attempted but as a Phantom of 29 Squadron had crashed into the sea off Mablethorpe the week before, the RAF was more concerned to find the reason for this accident than to look for a Lightning that had apparently succumbed to an old problem. With no wreckage forthcoming the Board of Inquiry reasoned that the undercarriage malfunction had probably been caused by failure of the jack attachment lugs at the top of the main leg. The ejection had been watched closely by the operators of a local radar station who could clearly see the aircraft’s blip split into two when Simon Manning ejected. As the first blip disappeared as the aircraft crashed into the sea, the remaining blip representing Manning was followed so that an accurate position fix could be given.
Before the imminent demise of the Lightning in RAF Germany there was still time for two more incidents. The first involved XM968 of 92 Squadron, which crashed near Gutersloh on 24 February 1977. The crew comprised Squadron Leader Mike Lawrance with Squadron Leader Granville-White (a Harrier pilot with No.4 Squadron) in the right-hand seat. The sortie was straightforward until the aircraft returned to base when Squadron Leader Lawrance realised that the airbrakes had not extended when they had been selected and he had also lost tailplane feel. Shortly afterwards he noticed that the port main undercarriage was showing red (although the aircraft was downwind in the circuit, the undercarriage had not been selected down at this stage) and that there had been a failure of the services hydraulic system.
Operation of the emergency system led to the nose-wheel coming down and locking, but the starboard undercarriage leg was now showing a red light as well as the port leg. A flypast of the Tower for a visual inspection brought the unwelcome news that although both main legs were visible, they were only partially lowered. Not long after the situation went from bad to worse when there was a HYD 1 warning so Squadron Leader Lawrance climbed to 2,500 feet in case he and Squadron Leader Granville-White needed to eject. Although lack of fuel was also becoming a worry he was still keen to find a way of recovering the aircraft if at all possible and was advised to apply positive ‘g’ to try to make the undercarriage lock down. He lowered the nose of the aircraft to pick up speed and then pulled into a climb, but as he did so the controls stiffened and so he ordered his passenger to eject, before ejecting himself. Although they landed safely, both men suffered back injuries. In the meantime the pilotless aircraft had caused a certain amount of consternation on the ground. As it had been abandoned in a climb it carried on upwards for a few more seconds before executing a stall turn and diving back towards the ground. However, instead of diving straight into the ground it pulled out and turned towards the airfield, eventually coming down in open countryside about half a mile from the airfield boundary and disintegrating on impact.
The other incident occurred shortly before 92 Squadron disbanded as a Lightning unit and it bore a number of similarities to the loss of XM968. As part of the disbandment ceremonies a diamond-nine flypast was made over a number of airfields in Germany on 30 March but on return to Gutersloh Flight Lieutenant Phil Owen in XN793 was unable to get his starboard undercarriage leg to lower. His aircraft was checked from the air by Flight Lieutenant Roger McGowan and the leg was only just visible having come down about 10 degrees. At the time fuel was not a problem and Flight Lieutenant Owen shut down No.2 engine before making a concerted attempt to coax the leg into the down position. All his efforts were in vain, however, and permission was finally granted to use the emergency system. This also had no effect so Flight Lieutenant Owen headed for the Dummersee Lake and prepared himself for ejection. Shortly before he arrived in the area his aircraft shuddered violently and the red undercarriage light suddenly turned to green. By now fuel (or lack of it) was a big problem but he elected to return to Gutersloh and landed safely, although as he was on the runway the flying controls seized. It transpired that the undercarriage leg had been prevented from coming down by the D-door but eventually this had given way allowing the leg to extend. Unfortunately, as the D-door had broken away it had hit a hydraulic pipe from the No.1 system and this had led to a gradual loss of hydraulic oil and the eventual seizing of the flying controls. As the No.2 engine had already been shut down, only the No.1 system was operating.
No.92 Squadron was officially disbanded on 31 March and was reformed the next day as a Phantom unit based at Wildenrath. With 19 Squadron having already disbanded at the end of 1975 (it also converted onto the Phantom at Wildenrath) the era of the Lightning in RAF Germany came to an end. From the safety aspect the F.2/F.2A had had the best record of any Lightning variant and of the three that had been written off since entry into squadron service in December 1962, only two (XN785 and XN786) had been the result of a technical defect and these two accidents were separated by twelve years. XN772 was lost as a result of a spin.
Over the next twenty-one months no further Lightnings were lost although there were several incidents. On 16 May 1977 XS899 of 5 Squadron was damaged Cat.2 when the nose-wheel leg collapsed on landing, but a potentially more serious incident occurred on 29 September involving XR752 (also of 5 Squadron), which was landed with the undercarriage up. At the time the aircraft was being flown by an extremely experienced pilot but having flown several circuits with the wheels down, on his final approach he inexplicably selected wheels up instead of flaps down. This was not quite a unique occurrence for the Lightning as one had been landed before with the gear up when the pilot also forgot to lower it. In addition, as has already been noted, a total of four aircraft had also been involved in failed take-offs that led to them sinking back onto the runway at high speed. On this occasion the aircraft slid for nearly the whole length of the runway at Binbrook before coming to a halt. Although there was the possibility that it could have cartwheeled if a wing tip had dug in, it remained upright and, as the ventral tank was empty, at least there was no fuel fire. The Cat.3 damage that was caused was subsequently repaired. In other incidents Lightning T.5 XS420 of the LTF was damaged Cat.3 as a result of a tail scrape on 20 March 1978 and XS459 (also LTF) had a Fire 2 warning on 4 April during an air test. On 18 July 1978 F.6 XS931 of 5 Squadron became the next Lightning to lose its rudder in flight and it was quickly followed by F.3 XR718, also of 5 Squadron, which also lost its rudder on 21 August.