ABOUT OUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES1
AUGUST 25, 1990
This visit to the United States was approved by the central government. At the invitation of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs organized a delegation of Chinese mayors to visit the United States from July 7 to July 26. After July 26, Wang Daohan2 and I stayed on for a few more days at the invitation of American business circles. The delegation visited 11 American cities; Daohan and I visited 13. These were mainly large cities, but there were also small and medium cities. According to a quick calculation, including those who came to hear our presentations, we met a total of several thousand people. We went everywhere, from east to west and from north to south.
This visit was already under consideration by the central government in April and May, and Jiang Zemin personally inquired about it. At that time, we were considering that the United States might revoke our Most Favored Nation (MFN) status—which has to be reviewed annually. If China’s MFN status were to be revoked, we would institute “countersanctions,” which would inevitably lead to a major reversal in bilateral diplomatic relations. This would affect our US$12 billion in exports to the United States and their US$8 billion in exports to us, and in total US$20 billion of business would be lost. This would have a considerable impact. That’s why we wanted to go to the United States at that time to work on this issue, to explain the stakes involved. The work primarily involved members of Congress, because the main problem lay in Congress. Jiang Zemin was personally in charge of this issue all along, and he had been discussing how to approach it with the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Around April or May, Jiang Zemin telephoned me to say he was preparing to have me go. The United States was inviting the mayor of Shanghai and other mayors to visit. This opportunity came just at the right time and it also met our needs, so we accepted the invitation.
Answering journalists’ questions as leader of the Chinese Mayors Delegation upon arrival at Kennedy Airport, New York City, July 7, 1990. On the left, David M. Lampton, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations; on the right, municipal government adviser Wang Daohan, adviser to the delegation.
Altogether six mayors went—those from Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, Hefei, Ningbo, and Taiyuan. We accepted the invitation at just the right time because before we left, President [George H. W.] Bush had already asked Congress to extend China’s MFN status, so our trip had gotten off to a good start in view of our main goal. Of course the problem wasn’t solved yet—Congress still had to approve, and there would first be a long period of debate. But we had a good start, which was helpful to our work. The goal of the trip was to solidify our MFN status so that it would ultimately be approved by Congress. Another goal was to state our position on lifting the economic “sanctions” imposed on China.
After we received our invitation, the American government expressed its warm welcome through its ambassador to China. At the present time, the United States does not allow visits by high-level Chinese, in compliance with a suspension issued by the Bush administration. By “high-level,” they mean officials of ministerial rank or higher. However, the American government expressed a special warm welcome to our delegation, which was the largest and highest-level one from China since last year’s political turmoil. We were very warmly received in all 13 of the cities we visited.
We gave presentations and had working meals in several large cities, each attended by over 100 people, with 300 coming to the largest event. Only well-known people were invited to these events, and they had to pay for their own meals. In Los Angeles, for example, each person was originally supposed to pay US$100, but the number of people wanting to come kept increasing and the venue wasn’t so large, so the ticket price was raised to US$250. That is to say, this meal cost US$250. Every event was sold out, and we met with many overseas Chinese, many Shanghainese.
Before the receptions and meals, there would be small meetings in which everyone could converse freely. Everywhere we went, we were surrounded by Shanghainese. Some were elderly, and quite a few had been to Shanghai within the past 10 years—they were all very enthusiastic. One of our goals on this trip was to have extensive contacts with Americans from all walks of life, to increase mutual understanding and dispel some misunderstandings through people-to-people contact, and to thereby improve Sino-American relations.
Among political circles, the American government was quite friendly toward us this time. National Security Adviser [Brent] Scowcroft met with us and was very friendly—he said many very friendly things and even sent greetings to Jiang Zemin on behalf of President Bush. Secretary of State [James] Baker was not in Washington, but the second-ranking State Department official, Deputy Secretary of State [Lawrence] Eagleburger and the White House chief of staff met with us. According to Zhu Qizhen, China’s ambassador to the United States, this level of reception was quite high.
We also visited the Department of Commerce. At the time, the secretary of commerce was out of town, and it was Deputy Secretary of Commerce [Thomas] Murrin who met with us. In our conversations with department members, they all expressed a desire to improve Sino-American relations.
We also met some American political leaders who are not in office. [Richard] Nixon was very friendly—he invited Daohan and me to his home, where we talked for a long time. [Henry] Kissinger attended three of our meetings. One of them was in New York, where he chaired a luncheon at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is a very important organization, and all the people present were very well-known. Speakers there are all fairly high-level people. I and the other mayors had been specially invited to this luncheon, where I gave a speech and answered questions. We later held a reception at the Chinese Consulate-General in New York. Kissinger also attended and gave a long speech. The third occasion was a breakfast meeting that he hosted and to which he invited many notables. Everyone was quite frank and friendly at this meeting.
Afterward, we went to Congress, because this trip was principally to work with its members. Because we had done a great deal of liaison work ahead of time, we were able to meet with 24 senators and representatives in a single day in Washington. We met Senate Majority Leader [Robert] Dole, who was very friendly. We invited him to visit Shanghai and China, and he accepted on the spot. Ambassador Zhu felt this was a breakthrough. Senator Dole is the leader of the Republicans in Congress; because of pressure from the Democrats, he had not dared to come to China. Ambassador Zhu said, “I’ve invited him to China many times, but he never answered positively. Today he accepted without hesitation. This is a breakthrough that shows the climate for Sino-American relations is warming.” We met mostly with leaders of the Democratic Party. On this trip we visited the United States for about 20 days, and this was the most uncomfortable day of all. It’s impossible to change the minds of these members of Congress, and it’s also impossible for them not to ask you pointed questions.
Speaking at the delegation’s press conference at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., July 12, 1990. On the right, Zhao Baojiang, mayor of Wuhan, and municipal government adviser Wang Daohan, adviser to the delegation.
Take, for example, our meeting with the most formidable members of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Before we had even arrived, they asked us to go to their office, so we went. They were quite polite on this occasion, although they raised the question of “human rights.” As soon as we arrived, they handed us a list, noting how many people we had arrested. There was a list for Beijing and one for Shanghai, and afterward they also asked many questions. I answered all of them—after all, this was tit for tat. After I finished, they didn’t refute my remarks. We didn’t yield any ground on matters of principle, but the way we discussed issues was quite strategic, so this wasn’t the sort of debate where everyone gets red in the face and leaves on an unhappy note—instead, each side stated its own views. I think we still managed to dispel many misunderstandings because after I spoke, they weren’t able to refute me, though of course it was also very hard to change their minds. Still, all these members of Congress expressed friendship toward China. No matter how anti-China a senator or representative was, I would still invite him to Shanghai. I said, just come and have a look. There are many things you don’t understand, and things aren’t the way you imagine. They all accepted the invitations.
On this trip, we met mainly with ordinary people, as well as people in political circles and in Congress. We didn’t visit too many businesses, but there were some, such as Alexander Haig’s3 United Technologies, AT&T, and 3M, as well as companies like McDonnell Douglas that have cooperative ventures in Shanghai. These companies were very hospitable to us, and the level of reception was high—we met with the top two people at each.
We were originally going to return on July 26, but President Bush’s older brother insisted that we go to Decatur, Illinois, to visit Archer Daniels Midland. This company is the largest refiner of vegetable oil in the United States, and its factory is a large one, producing 500,000 tons a year. Now they want to build a factory in Pudong with an annual capacity of 1 million tons, which would be the world’s biggest. He insisted that we have a look so we had to go. In addition, business circles in Dallas, several companies in San Francisco, and the Bank of America all invited us to stay for an extra couple of days.
The mayors of 8 of the 11 cities our delegation visited were in town and we met with them all—they were all very friendly. The people in these cities, especially the overseas Chinese, were as warm as could be. At each city, the overseas Chinese would invite us to have a meal, make a speech, and take pictures. There were many Chinese at the welcoming receptions in all these cities, though of course most of the attendees were Americans. Particularly in California, many in attendance were Chinese who ran restaurants or were employees, as well as scientists, managers, and company founders. Chinese have made large efforts and contributed greatly to California’s development, but they don’t know much about the actual situation in China, so I would say more about conditions in China at our meetings. They would say, “We’ve not heard this before. Now that you’ve explained it this way, it would be acceptable to Americans.”
A very important question is how to publicize our views adroitly in the United States. The American media are very hard to deal with and blocked news about us. I spoke a lot—they couldn’t refute me, and they couldn’t start rumors even if they wanted to, so they simply didn’t report anything. Everywhere I went, I asked, “Isn’t there supposed to be freedom of the press in the United States? I’ve said so much but you don’t report it.” I raised this issue everywhere, and after hearing about this, later in the trip some local newspapers reported what I said. The local papers at each city visited by the delegation were quite friendly and gave us coverage, but major papers like the New York Times and the Washington Post still didn’t carry any news about us.
I brought up this subject again in Washington at a gathering organized by the Ford Foundation of notable people from Fudan University. A reporter from the Los Angeles Times, one of the more influential major American papers, said, “I’ll cover you.” He then assigned an editor to interview me in Los Angeles, and they published the interview in its entirety. They even showed me the draft ahead of time so I could revise it before publication. In the end, the piece was published but in fact my revisions were not included, although of course this was not a problem.
After this, we came to feel that it would be best to do TV interviews. Without doing so, we couldn’t speak directly to the American people. When Americans ask questions, they keep asking the same ones—I had figured out most of their questions in advance and had a set of answers ready for them. That’s why we accepted a TV interview in San Francisco. The PBS network has a program called the Newshour, hosted by [Robert] MacNeil, in which public figures were interviewed. This interview had considerable impact in the United States. The feedback I received was very good. In Dallas, as we went out of the lobby of the Anatole Hotel where we were staying, an American rushed over to me and asked, “Are you the mayor of Shanghai? I saw you on TV yesterday, and you spoke very well.” Another American came over to shake hands with me. When we went to a bookstore next to our hotel in San Francisco to browse, someone else asked if I was the mayor of Shanghai. So you can see that this TV interview did have some effect.
After my return, I received many letters. Of course many were from friends, but ordinary Americans also wrote to me. Let me read you a letter from an ordinary citizen from Georgia: “Mayor Zhu, I saw you on the MacNeil Newshour last week and listened to your words. I felt very honored that you so brilliantly described the facts about the development of your great country, China.….” This is why I felt that our visit was a very successful one.
Ambassador Zhu Qizhen told me that this visit was a breakthrough, a turning point in the aftermath of last year’s political turmoil. Since assuming office last year, he had not met with any members of Congress—those who had been very friendly to China in the past would not meet with him now, and no senior American official would go to the Chinese Embassy. Many well-known scholars who had been very friendly before no longer came to the embassy after the political turmoil. But this time Ambassador Zhu was with me when we met with over 20 members of Congress, as well as with White House officials. At a reception the embassy held for us, all the officials from the State Department in charge of Chinese affairs attended, from the deputy secretary of state on down to the second, third, and fourth in command. We held a press conference that evening—Ambassador Zhu and I stood there for an hour or two shaking hands with all the guests. The reception took place after the press conference. The line of guests was several hundred people long, and stretched all the way outside the embassy. Many scholars who previously had not come to the embassy were there, including Chih-Kung Jen4 and Yu Hsiu Ku,5 who came from quite a distance. That’s why we can say that the diplomatic situation is gradually changing.
What I mean is that we shouldn’t believe those rumors. Although some conservative or skeptical statements appeared in American newspapers, overall there was no lack of friendly words. On July 17, the New York Times—a major American paper—carried an extensive report, including a color map, on the development of Pudong. This is very rare, so it seems that the United States is showing considerable interest in Pudong’s development. Of course they also expressed some reservations, such as, “We are skeptical as to whether Zhu Rongji can successfully develop Pudong. This will still depend on how much power the central government gives him.” You have to understand that it’s impossible for them not to say this. But the fact that they gave such extensive coverage to Pudong’s development shows the influence of China and of Shanghai.
1. This is part of a speech by Zhu Rongji at a meeting of Party member cadres in Shanghai.
3. Alexander Haig was a former secretary of state who was then chairperson of the Board of United Technologies.
4. C. K. Jen was a Chinese-American physicist.
5. Yu Hsiu Ku was a Chinese-American educator.