Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is one of the most striking features of his thought. Yet although scientism and anti-scientism are strong latent themes in the voluminous scholarship devoted to his work, there are surprisingly few studies devoted to them. This collection is intended to go some way towards filling this lacuna.
Throughout Wittgenstein’s remarks we see polemical criticisms of prevailing attitudes towards the sciences. Wittgenstein was opposed to what he described as the ‘over-estimation of science’ (CV [R] 70): the ‘kind of idol worship’ of science he thought was endemic in the time in which he lived and pernicious for various areas of inquiry, including philosophy, and for culture more generally (LC 27). Wittgenstein felt that a dominance of scientistic attitudes is a source of our disenchantment with the world – that we need ‘to awaken to wonder’, but ‘Science is a way of sending [us] back to sleep again’ (CV 5). He even writes that it ‘isn’t absurd … to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity’ (CV 56). His anti-scientism appears to be a central reason for his disdainful attitude towards modern Western culture – an attitude ‘of censure and even disgust’, as G. H. von Wright recalls (von Wright 1982, 110). These views emerge in important places in his work: a critical remark by Johann Nepomuk Nestroy on the scientific conception of progress is the motto to the Philosophical Investigations; and in the preface to Philosophical Remarks he writes that the book is not written in the spirit of modern times, one which, as he explained in earlier drafts, is ‘alien and uncongenial’ to him and for which he felt ‘no sympathy’ (CV 6). Wittgenstein’s evolving anti-scientism might also function as a way to think about the relation between his earlier and later periods of thought. Ray Monk has argued that Wittgenstein’s ‘opposition to scientism was constant’ throughout his life, despite the radical changes his philosophy underwent (Monk 1999, 66). Yet neither the precise nature of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism, nor the place of anti-scientism in his philosophy, have been studied in much detail.
Partly this reflects the complexity of the term ‘scientism’, which can refer to a diverse range of different attitudes, convictions and doctrines. Scientism is perhaps a good example of a family resemblance concept – a plurality of related things differing in significant ways – and to make progress in understanding it as a theme in Wittgenstein’s philosophy we ought to take care with its use. We should not suppose that a single conception of scientism runs through his work, nor that his criticisms of scientism in different contexts are animated by some unitary set of convictions; being scientistic about philosophy, for instance, might not be the same as being scientistic about art or the understanding of religious beliefs.
Since the term ‘scientism’ is complex and contested, and the subject of a growing philosophical literature, neither the editors nor the authors have attempted to provide an authoritative definition of what it is. First, that would be a major project in its own right, albeit one that philosophers have recently pursued.1 Second, many critics of scientism have adopted the strategy of focusing on a specific topic or set of claims about some aspects of science, and, as it were, let a conception of scientism emerge from it. John Dupré, for instance, has criticised the conceptual and empirical limitations of evolutionary psychology; Mary Midgley protests the devaluation of the humanistic resources necessary for a fuller understanding of human nature; and M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker have, along Wittgensteinian lines, criticised various philosophical claims made by neuroscientists and philosophers of mind.2 In each case, the critics of scientism begin with a specific set of concerns in a particular domain and let a conception of scientism emerge, rather than starting with one, derived in the abstract. Third, our policy – as editors – has been to take Wittgenstein’s own advice to ‘look and see’ at the many things gatherable under the label ‘scientism’ – and, indeed, to get a better view of cases where it is unclear whether some idea or attitude is describable as scientistic or not. This approach does not yield a crisp, unitary definition of scientism – something that might, in any case, be a pipe dream – but does have what we think is the merit of showing the richness and complexity of ways that our cultural and intellectual relationship to science can be corrupted in various deleterious ways.
We suspect that Wittgenstein would agree with these methodological choices, for several reasons. For a start, he did not, as far as we know, ever use the term ‘scientism’ in his writings, let alone attempt to define it. Nor did he provide anything like a systematic conception of it; indeed, given his well-known hostility to systematic treatments, it would be very surprising if he had. Usually he speaks more generally in terms of a ‘spirit’ animating our culture (CV 6) or a ‘craving for generality’ that is peculiarly apparent in science and should not be mapped on to other domains, such as philosophy (BB 17). Wittgenstein explores different reasons why scientistic attitudes and convictions might be objectionable; the chapters in this volume explore these as well as other reasons. For instance, scientism can be a threat to scientific practice or to its self-understanding; or it can corrupt our attitudes towards religious forms of life; or it can erode our capacity for appreciating certain deep features of human life and experience; or it can have serious practical consequences for current world issues. Or scientism can be criticised in more specific territories.
Second, as the chapters in this volume attest, Wittgenstein’s thinking about scientism usually took place in specific contexts, such as in his later philosophy of mind, his lectures on aesthetic judgment or his remarks on anthropological practice. It is also clear from the themes discussed in these chapters that scientistic tendencies are alive and well in contemporary philosophy; for example, Wittgenstein’s criticisms resonate with the stronger varieties of naturalism prevalent today. This points to the important task of trying to expose those instances where scientism is corrupting our understanding of, say, contemporary philosophical issues or obscuring the possibility of more ‘liberal’ forms of naturalism. This will often involve interventions into the specific debates as well as ‘big picture’ reflections, each of which we find instances of in Wittgenstein’s own writings.
Sometimes Wittgenstein would indicate potential connections between many of these diverse manifestations of scientism; for instance, they might reflect a scientistic approach to philosophical methodology or a scientistic worldview. But often Wittgenstein would not indicate such connections, and we should treat his criticisms of scientism in various areas of his concern independently. Given his hostility towards scientism and his attempts to dispel philosophical confusions arising from scientism it is perhaps difficult to read Wittgenstein as a ‘quietist’ when it comes to addressing the issue of scientism. If scientism is one of the main causes and symptoms of what he perceived as the ‘darkness’ of the modern world, then our attitude towards it perhaps ought not be one of quietude (cf. PI, Preface, p. 4).
The chapters in this volume examine and critically assess the role of scientism – or, rather, anti-scientism – in various areas of Wittgenstein’s thought, including his conceptions of the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology, early and late, and, in the case of his later philosophy, in his philosophy of mind and his views on meaning. The chapters also examine the place of scientism in Wittgenstein’s views on religion and religious belief, ethics, aesthetics, in his cultural outlook and in his worldview as a whole. Some of the chapters in this volume also offer comparative studies of Wittgenstein’s views on scientism with other philosophers, such as Paul Feyerabend; some examine the place of Wittgenstein’s views on scientism within his thought or worldview as a whole; and some apply Wittgenstein’s criticisms of scientism to contemporary debates both within and outside philosophy. Certainly the sorts of scientistic tendencies that he bemoaned are still present in modern philosophy and culture, albeit often in new, evolved forms.
The chapters in this collection were all commissioned for the volume and they aim to explore and articulate Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism in its many forms, locating it within his thought and the wider history of twentieth-century philosophy. The range of issues considered reflects both the richness of Wittgenstein’s thought and the pertinence of scientism to a range of areas in contemporary philosophy. Three of the most interesting issues addressed in this volume are (1) the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; (2) how this helps us understand his central aims as a philosopher; and (3) how his views on scientism underlie his later conception of philosophy and the alternative conceptions of philosophy he attacked.
In the case of the first, Wittgenstein’s criticisms of scientism arguably arose from a worry that our understanding of certain experiences – such as beauty and religious belief – is corrupted by attempts to apply scientific methods to them. Wittgenstein argued that a ‘craving for generality’ (BB 17) misleads philosophers into conceiving of philosophical problems in a scientific manner, which he thought distorted such problems and gave rise to philosophical confusion.
In the case of the second issue, what Wittgenstein perceived as the scientistic spirit of modern times made him deeply pessimistic about being understood and about achieving his aims as a philosopher. In a famous remark to Maurice Drury, Wittgenstein said ‘My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide’ (Drury 1981, 94); and von Wright recalls that Wittgenstein ‘was of the opinion … that his ideas were usually misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his disciples’ and that [h]e doubted that he would be better understood in the future’ (Wright 1954, 3). This pessimism is most famously expressed in the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein declares that he thinks it unlikely that even one person will understand his ideas in the ‘darkness of this time’. There appear to be important links between Wittgenstein’s attitude towards the scientistic spirit of the age and his pessimism about achieving his aims as a philosopher.
In the case of the third issue, there may be important relations, for example, between Wittgenstein’s anti-scientistic attitude and his attempt to draw a strict demarcation between philosophy and the sciences, conceiving of philosophy as an a priori activity of ‘grammatical investigation’. His views on scientism may reveal interesting aspects of his view that philosophy often blurs the distinction between conceptual and empirical questions, and his view that this is a source of much philosophical confusion. Today these themes are more pertinent than ever, with the increasing dominance of naturalistic conceptions of philosophy, which see philosophy as a branch of science or an assistant to the sciences.
The chapters in this volume are ordered around three loose themes, which cross over in many cases. For a start, there is scientism as a theme in Wittgenstein’s writings. Chon Tejedor (Chapter 1) examines Wittgenstein’s views on scientism as they emerge in the Tractatus and his 1929 ‘Lecture on Ethics’. A crucial distinction is drawn between concerns about scientism as a threat from science and as a threat to science. David E. Cooper (Chapter 2) examines the place of anti-scientism in Wittgenstein’s defence of religious attitudes, drawing attention to a set of remarks in Wittgenstein’s later writings on the radical contingency and unsurveyability of the emergence and entrenchment of a ‘world picture’. Annalisa Coliva (Chapter 3) also examines Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion, focusing on his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, and argues that a form of anti-scientism unifies the central themes of those remarks. Jonathan Beale (Chapter 4) argues that an anti-scientistic worldview underlies Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy and his negative cultural outlook.
The next theme is that of applying anti-scientism. William Child (Chapter 5) explores the role of anti-scientism in the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind. Ian James Kidd (Chapter 6) compares Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism with that of Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994), and argues that they share a common conception of scientism. Severin Schroeder (Chapter 7) examines Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of a science of aesthetics, particularly as this emerges in Wittgenstein’s Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Rupert Read (Chapter 8) applies Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism to cases where we are threatened by potential devastation, in particular, dangerous anthropogenic climate change.
Finally, scientism and understanding Wittgenstein. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (Chapter 9) argues that Wittgenstein should be understood not as a ‘quietist’ philosopher, but as an ‘interventionist’ philosopher: a philosopher who wanted to change things both within philosophy and for the sciences. Genia Schönbaumsfeld (Chapter 10) argues that in Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations he sets up a paradox that undermines both Platonistic and (reductively) naturalist conceptions of what meaning is thought to consist in. James C. Klagge (Chapter 11) examines Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism as it emerges in his philosophical methodology, namely in his views on the distinction between conceptual and empirical investigations. Finally, Benedict Smith (Chapter 12) argues that Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism is consistent with a form of naturalism.
This volume seeks to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism sheds light upon and reveals connections between some of the central areas of his thinking, including the fundamental areas of his main philosophical writings and those areas that were of important concern to him but not addressed in his main writings. This volume aims to show that examining the role of scientism in Wittgenstein’s thought helps to better understand some of the principal areas of his thought, and that it is therefore an important theme of investigation for understanding Wittgenstein.
1 Some recent and forthcoming examples are de Ridder, Peels and René van Woudenberg 2017, Williams and Robinson 2015, Haack 2003 and Stenmark 2001.
2 See Dupré 2001, Midgley 2011 and Bennett and Hacker 2003. See also Hacker 2015. On Midgley, see Kidd 2015.
Bennett, M.R. and P.M.S. Hacker, 2003. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell.
de Ridder, J., R. Peels and R. van Woudenberg, 2017. Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Drury, M., 1981. ‘Notes on Conversations with Witttgenstein’ in Rush Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein – Personal Recollections. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Dupré, J., 2001. Human Nature and the Limits of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Haack, S. 2003. Defending Science within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Hacker, P.M.S., 2015. ‘Philosophy and Scientism: What Cognitive Neuroscience Can, and What It Cannot, Explain’ in Williams and Robinson 2015.
Kidd, I.J., 2015. ‘Doing Science an Injustice: Midgley on Scientism’ in Ian James Kidd and Elizabeth McKinnell (eds), Science and the Self: Animals, Evolution, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Mary Midgley. London: Routledge, 151–167.
Midgley, M., 2011. The Myths We Live By. London: Routledge.
Monk, R., 1999. ‘Wittgenstein and the Two Cultures’. Prospect Magazine, July 1999, 66–67. Available online under the title ‘Wittgenstein’s Forgotten Lesson’: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ray-monk-wittgenstein/.
Stenmark, M., 2001. Scientism: Science, Ethics, and Religion. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Williams, R.N. and Robinson, D.N. (eds), 2015. Scientism: The New Orthodoxy. London: Bloomsbury.
Wright, G.H. von, 1982. ‘Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times’ in Wittgenstein and His Times, Brian McGuinness (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
Wright, G.H. von, [1954] 2001. ‘A Biographical Sketch’, in Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Second Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.