WHERE DOES CANADA
STAND IN THE ARCTIC?
“Sovereignty Begins at Home.”
– MARY SIMON,
President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2007
The Arctic Ice in Retreat
Only a fool would try to predict where Canada will stand in the Arctic in 2028. Twenty years from now, Canada could have an expanded military presence in the North, major research facilities in the High Arctic, a renewed national commitment to things northern, the icebreaker capacity to patrol the now-open Northwest Passage, vigorous territorial governments in Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut that have expanded their activities in and along the Arctic Ocean. Canada could finally emerge as a truly northern nation, committed to the region and determined to assert and preserve Arctic sovereignty in the area.
Or not. We’ve been through much of this before. Canada has spouted the rhetoric of Arctic engagement in the past and then done nothing. The current crisis could quickly pass. Two cold winters could dampen interest in the Arctic and slow the panic about global warming. Southern Canadians could once again lose interest, for the national attention span about things northern in this country tends to be very limited. The highly touted oil and gas exploration activity in the Far North could produce dry wells or inconsequential returns. Ships going through the Northwest Passage could hit ice and sink, scaring off repeat usage of the route. Rogue nations or terrorists might try to use the Arctic. In other words, no one knows what lies ahead.
Although Canadian sovereignty is not on thinning ice,1 the country has neglected the North and has failed to integrate the region into the broader national society. For many Canadians, the Arctic is out of sight, out of mind, a place to enjoy vicariously if at all, a marginal part of the nation to the vast majority of citizens. Put simply, Canadian nation-building is incomplete, with the provincial and territorial North still outside the Canadian family. Canada has made efforts over the past thirty years and some, particularly land claims, aboriginal self-government, and the creation of Nunavut, have begun to transform the region. But compared to our circumpolar neighbours, we have started the race in last place. And so, in contrast to the Nordic countries, Russia, and the United States, we have exercised little oversight over the High Arctic and have developed little capacity to control our lands and waters in the region. The Arctic sovereignty debate keeps reappearing precisely because of misperception and ignorance, born of tentative and reactionary measures in the North that reach back over a century and a quarter. If this country is going to defend its interests in the Arctic, it will have to rethink the very fundamentals of its approach to the region. In the final pages of this book, let’s give our country a northern report card:
Canada’s Arctic Track Record: F
Giving a failing grade is a harsh assessment—especially in a country that hates to give this mark in its school system. No grade inflation here, however, for this is the real world. The reason for the failing grade is simple:
• Of all the polar countries, Canada has been the weakest in developing the potential of its Arctic regions and in responding to its full range of responsibilities there. While the case can be made that Canada has preserved its sovereignty in the North—for its control of the land and sea has not been seriously or successfully challenged—it is abundantly clear that the overall Canadian presence in the area has fallen far short of circumpolar norms.
• Canada is the weakest of all polar countries in integrating the northern regions into the nation as a whole. While there have been major improvements over the past quarter century, the long delays in responding to the needs and aspirations of the North have put the region far back in its evolution compared to other northern regions.
• Previous governments, both Liberal and Conservative, placed their emphasis on improving regional social, economic, and political developments. We have territorial governments that increasingly are powerful and creative; the commitment to local control and forward-looking development is impressive, and improvements over the past twenty years have been more dramatic and important than most Canadians appreciate. This is the most impressive area of Canadian policy towards the North, but it remains a work very much in progress. For the most part, the emphasis has been on resolving social, cultural and economic crises within aboriginal communities and not on developing a stronger north-centred approach to infrastructure and regional integration.
• There have been occasional positive steps from the government of Canada, from Diefenbaker’s Roads to Resources program to the Chrétien government’s early-stage commitment to circumpolar collaboration, but these have never been fully implemented nor followed up properly.
• There are, sadly, few connections between northern and southern Canada, and little commitment from the south towards the North. Our science is not where it should be. Canada’s military presence and capacity is limited, and our ability to exercise our sovereignty over more than one-quarter of our land mass and surrounding water is woefully inadequate.
• We are not properly situated to monitor the effects of global warming and Arctic climate change. Because of inadequate research funding, we rely more on anecdote than hard scientific fact. What little we do focuses on monitoring and identifying changes, not problem alleviation.
• Canadians talk a good talk—our poets, novelists, artists, and filmmakers have done a better job than our politicians and business leaders in responding to the Far North. But image-making and symbolism mask the shallowness of the Canadian commitment to the Arctic.
• Despite the recent rhetoric, Canadians are not much interested in the Arctic. Go back five years and see what people were saying about the Far North before the current debates started—not much. Recognize, too, that a large percentage of the population has little experience with the region, no historical or cultural connections to it, and thus very little interest in the North. Our national commitment to diversity, to doing your own thing, means that young Canadians and new Canadians are not required to absorb our history into their culture. Incredibly, in some provinces, Canadian history is not taught in high schools. It’s possible that a younger generation will read “The Shooting of Dan McGrew,” but if it chooses not to, that seems to be fine with Canadians.
• The Canadian Arctic often disappoints its boosters, with heightened expectations of resource wealth and opportunities often disappointed. This helps explain the country’s divided response to the area, for Canadians know that it will cost a great deal, at great risk, to develop resources in the region. There is no consensus that the effort can be justified on sovereignty grounds alone.
• The idea that Canada needs to possess exclusive control of the Northwest Passage (translated as being able to do everything ourselves to defend the region militarily) to uphold our Arctic sovereignty is unrealistic and should be replaced by an ideal of practical co-operation—an ideal which, historically, we have done well at realizing. Canada has successfully controlled navigation in the Northwest Passage, and our laws are respected by foreign countries, including the United States. We need to develop more Canadian capabilities, but cannot lose sight of the practical and financial benefits of working with our allies. The proposal to link with the United States on matters of regulation and control, so quickly dismissed at the national level, is the only sensible solution. We have precedent in “agreeing to disagree” with the Americans, thus safeguarding our essential interest. In turn, the United States has not sought to steal our North from us. Failure to negotiate and work with the Americans may lead other countries to use the route with impunity. The hasty rejection of this option is a classic example of rhetoric and symbolism overcoming good sense. The Americans have strategic interests in the region, and so do we.
The Government of Canada’s Current Response: B-The
Harper government has made significant progress—at least in terms of defence commitments—to improve Canada’s defence capabilities in the Arctic. Although the Mulroney government made significant steps towards an Arctic strategy, the Harper administration appears far more serious than most in responding to both the threats and the opportunities in the Far North.
• The construction of smaller ice-strengthened frigates lacks the dramatic and symbolic flair that the construction of a major icebreaker would have had, but it is a reasonable response to the challenges and opportunities facing the country. They are versatile and flexible and, moreover, they reflect the government’s willingness to follow the recommendations of the Canadian Forces, which have many other military needs to address.
• The idea of a major research station and a major mapping exercise gives Canada a chance to get the science right, but the timing is very tight. This is a case of the right thing started a decade too late; only a concerted effort by the country’s Arctic scientists and government officials will produce the desired result.
• The military response, overriding frantic calls for the creation of a stronger Arctic defence capability, actually meets national needs rather well. The Canadian Rangers, well placed across the North, provide precisely the kind of regional surveillance capacity that Canada requires in the Far North. It is true that Canada currently has greater capacity for working in desert environments than Arctic ones, but this is a situation that reflects the country’s global strategic interests and commitments.
• Canada, unlike the other Arctic states, has taken strong regulatory steps to control shipping. The civilian Coast Guard, not the navy, enforces these regulations. The government’s commitment to replace one of its two heavy icebreakers by 2017 is therefore a positive step towards maintaining Canada’s Arctic presence. Designing the ship to accommodate a Canadian Forces helicopter (rather than the light helicopters that can operate with the current icebreakers) will expand its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.2
• The Conservative approach, so far, is lopsided, emphasizing military initiatives over the integration of the territories into the country at large. These two elements—making the North more Canadian—and Canada more northern—and improving our strategic capacity in the region—are required in equal measure if the country is to take the North more seriously in the future. Just as the NDP is too quick to reject strategic concerns in favour of improved housing, the Conservatives have bet heavily on the military side while providing less emphasis on the need to improve living conditions and opportunities for northern residents. The government’s Arctic strategy will provide greater attention to social and economic development, however. The regional development strategies of the Liberal and Conservative governments of recent times are moving in the right direction and provide a substantial amount of federal funding to assist the North. The region has long since learned that money is not a replacement for attention and dedication to the internal development of the North. The North needs the money, but it requires commitment and vision even more.
• The current stance on the Northwest Passage and sovereignty “crisis” is more bluster than substance. Other countries have better resources and more of a presence, and Canadian officials know it. They must be praying that nobody tests the national resolve. More to the point, it is very likely that two other routes—across the North Pole and along the Russian coast—will open for reliable navigation well before the Northwest Passage is routinely clear of ice. A lot of the anguish about Canadian internal waters is likely to be superseded by developments elsewhere in the Arctic. The Russians, incidentally, are embracing the prospects of Arctic shipping and work very hard to promote the northeast route as the most logical connection between Asia and Europe.
• The Conservative plan is government focused, not nation centred. It lacks the transformative elements needed to convince and remind Canadians that they are an Arctic nation. Our current capabilities in the North lag well behind other countries. It takes decades, if not generations, to convince a country to make a full and lasting commitment to a new national agenda. Canada has, at best, a few years to discover its legacy and its responsibility in the Far North. Despite the rhetoric and issues of the present, the sense of national urgency is limited. The government’s response is measured not against the need and the concerns, but against the country’s capacity to care for the Far North. In the end, Canadians will devote more energy and debate to the question of where to put the shipyards to build icebreakers (Quebec? Not in Quebec? Why not New Brunswick? And what about British Columbia? Thankfully, Saskatchewan will make few claims to a share of the icebreaker contracts. We hope!) than they will to the question of whether the country is properly positioned in the Arctic.
With the current government’s approach as a starting point, it remains clear that a great deal remains to be done. Truth be told, Canada has few options. The basic problem is that, at the most fundamental level, Canada lacks the northern outlook of other polar nations. The nation is becoming more southern and more urban all the time; a great deal of the professional and skilled work under way in the North is being done by people who do not live there and who commute to work from southern homes. Large numbers of Canadians have little connection to the region and feel little responsibility for its past and future. Other polar nations have a solid, modern, and substantial presence in the North. Canada has a region that is isolated, impoverished, but nonetheless proudly Canadian; the Inuit commitment to the country should not be underestimated.
Ideally, all Canadians would rally around the North. The country can certainly become energized in the right circumstances, which typically involve the discovery of major resources, and therefore national economic opportunity. But this really works only for gold, diamonds, oil and gas. Other minerals, like lead, zinc, iron ore, tungsten, and the like are less compelling; witness the systematic neglect of the Voisey Bay development after the initial euphoria and debate about the discovery and mine opening. The country can also get agitated when there is a perceived threat to national sovereignty, as the debates in the past two years have demonstrated. Realistically, however, Canada has difficulty maintaining its enthusiasm, first because the resources are hard-won and rarely as glorious and dramatic as promoters would have us believe, and second because the threats to sovereignty have all proven to be either imaginary, in which case interest quickly fades, or subject to American intervention and control, as with the installations during the Cold War. In either case, Canadians have no choice but to agree to the requests of the powerful nation and eat humble sovereignty pie.
On the resource front, it is hard to believe that the North will not once again disappoint its promoters, at least in the next two generations. There may well be a great deal of oil under the Arctic, most of it in Russian and Norwegian waters, but it will be difficult to extract. Developing safe technologies, overcoming severe climates, and coping with the climatic realities of the Arctic will take time. Some scientists are sounding cautionary notes about the prospects for sizable quantities of Arctic oil—and remember that rigs have been active in the Canadian Arctic islands for several decades with disappointing results. But the speculators and politicians are gripped with twenty-first-century oil fever, driven by skyrocketing prices, growing demand, and a desperate optimism that the energy foundations of the western industrial world can be sustained for a few generations more. There may be huge quantities of fossil fuels in the Arctic (most of it gas), but it is at least as likely that economic prospects in the Far North will not match the excitement and assumptions of our times.
Canada’s role in the Arctic, dire forecasts predict, will be challenged—and very soon. If the Northwest Passage remains open in the summer—and signs point strongly in this direction—test ships will start working their way through the Arctic islands. Canada’s legal position is untested, and we lack the independent capacity to enforce our regulations and preferences in the region. Expect to see several ships, likely American and Asian, testing the waterway in the next two years, and expect to see Canada change its strategy from asserting control over the Northwest Passage to collaborating with the United States on the monitoring, environmental supervision, and servicing of the commercial shipping through the Arctic. The most pressing sovereignty issue, from the Canadian perspective, is defining the limits to the continental shelf, and not northern shipping, because other Arctic routes between Asia and Europe will open sooner and with less risk, and because the long-term economic benefits rest more with ensuring an extension of territorial control than limited Arctic shipping. The pace and extent of Arctic shipping rests to a considerable extent on the climate, though also on uncharted waters, reefs, and nervous insurance providers. The smaller the ice pack, the lower the risk, and the greater the number of ships going through the Passage and over the polar route.
At a certain level, Canada’s approach to the Arctic reflects basic geographic realities. Canada’s northern regions are not like those of other countries. Alaska, for example, has a much more temperate climate in its south, and most of the state’s 670,000 people live in the southern quarter of the state, with Anchorage accounting for 270,000 alone. Those parts of Alaska that are like Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are as sparsely populated and underdeveloped as the Canadian regions, with two exceptions. The North Slope has been developed extensively, based on a substantial Inuit community at Point Barrow and a largely transient non-aboriginal population. The other exception relates to the scale of American military operations in Alaska. The U.S. maintains major air and army posts near Fairbanks and Anchorage and many smaller installations. Norway’s warm ocean currents mean that coastal communities like Tromso and Alta, although northern by any test of latitude, have gentler climates and richer economies than Cambridge Bay or Gjoa Haven. Most of the northern reaches of Norway, Finland, and Sweden share more in common with the northern parts of our provinces than they do with the Arctic regions, including climate, resources, large non-indigenous populations, more advanced civic institutions, and a stronger economic base. Greenland matches closely, in climate and geography, the circumstances facing the people of Baffin and the Arctic Islands. Like Nunavut and the NWT, it subsists on generous subsidies from its southern guardian, in this case Denmark. Unlike the Canadian territories, however, Greenland has a strong history of literacy and academic attainment, extensive biculturalism, and a more diverse economy, one that is potentially being strengthened by global warming.
Russia’s Far North shares a lot in common with the Canadian Arctic—bitterly cold winters, a previously unnavigable Arctic coastline, large but scattered indigenous populations, and an uncertain economic base. Russia also has a long history of Arctic engagement, particularly through the construction of plants during the Second World War, notorious use of the Siberian labour camps, the milita6/9/2011rization of the region during the Cold War, and accelerated (and uncontrolled) resource development. As a consequence, Russia has a formidable presence in the Far North. There are 35.5 million people in Siberia, more than in all of Canada, with many of them in large urban and industrial centres. Yakutsk, in the middle of the Sakha Republic, is a fast-growing city of more than 210,000 people—or twice the entire population of the three Canadian territories. The marginal areas in Russia, however, are much like those in northern Canada. Chukotka, in the far northeast corner of the country, has only 55,000 people in an area of 770,000 square kilometres (297,297 square miles) (the NWT is 110,000 square kilometres [42,471 square miles]). The largest city, Anadyr, had slightly more than 11,000 people in 2002, a sharp decline from the more than 17,000 living in the area in 1989. The drop in population is emblematic of the rapid out-migration of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians from the region, following the collapse of the subsidized economy in Siberia.
There are some good reasons why the Canadian approach to the North lags far behind that of Scandinavia, Alaska, and Russia—and not all of them point to southern neglect or the colonial mindset of old. The imperative of real and potential armed conflict has driven the other Arctic states (with the exception of Iceland) to integrate— economically, socially, militarily—their northern regions into the body politic. Their northern regions are not merely frontier, politically, economically, and socially; their northern regions exist within the constitutional and social borders of the nation.
Canada, by contrast, has not faced similar historical politico-military challenges to its sovereignty in its North in the same way as Russia, the United States, or the Nordic countries. Sweden has lived with the threat of the Russian bear for centuries. Norway confronted hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops only a few kilometres from its border—in the North. Finland was invaded by the Soviet Red Army in the Second World War and many of its towns and cities were razed by the retreating German army. The United States feared first a Japanese invasion of Alaska, and later, a potential Soviet threat only a few kilometres across the Bering Strait. Russia is surrounded by states that have invaded it at one point or another in its history, including western armies that invaded through the Russian North to try to topple the Bolshevik government established after the 1917 revolution. Even neutral Sweden has developed its own state-of-the-art military forces, including Saab fighter aircraft, to defend its sovereignty.
Canada has not faced serious territorial threats on its northern flank, and in response to what threats have existed, our country has relied heavily on the United States for its defence. In many ways, our North is treated like many countries in Africa. Stability in the international system and the protection of borders of states has meant that many African states have not had to fight major international conflicts. As a consequence, many African states have weak governments and frontier areas. When Chad was invaded by Libya in 1983, France sent troops to help counter the offensive and protect Chadian sovereignty. Like Chad, and countries like it, we never completed nation-building. The threat of the United States to our southern border helped prompt the construction of a railway linking Canada from sea to sea and the constitutional and political development of the western provinces, transforming them from colonial territories into equal partners in a federal state. Without a comparable threat to the North, Canada has been able to neglect the region, leaving it politically, constitutionally, economically, and socially on the periphery. Canada needs to complete the mission of nation-building from sea to sea to sea.
Canada’s meagre northern military presence prevented the country from artificially propping up its northern economy, as the Russians and the Americans have done with theirs. However, our approach to economic development, focusing on the free mobility of labour, has created a skilled workforce much like that on Alaska’s North Slope and radically different than the forced and massively subsidized labour that sustained the mines and industrial plants in Russia’s Arctic until glasnost and the collapse of the USSR.
Canada’s Arctic trajectory, therefore, is closer to that of Greenland, albeit a little less successful, and that of Arctic Alaska.
Northern Nation-Building:
Completing Canada through the Arctic
Canada clearly needs to do more to solidify its presence in the Far North and must become a serious player in the long-term management of the Arctic. The country remains oddly incomplete, a northern nation more in physical geography and symbol. Current sovereignty concerns are a product of both rapidly changing circumstances and Canada’s long-standing indifference to a major portion of the country. If, as politicians now assert, our future once again lies to the north, then significant steps are required to move Canada in the right direction. Movement is required on all fronts if the country is to assume its full responsibilities in the North and become a true and active member of the circumpolar world. Canada’s options and requirements fall into six general categories. There are strong connections between these initiatives; should Canada move aggressively and competently on them, the North would assume its rightful place within Canada and, equally, Canada would assume its rightful place within the circumpolar world:
1. Knowing and Defending the North: In order to protect Canadian sovereignty, Canada must know the region better and extend its military capacity in the area.
• Military Strategy: In general, the Harper government’s military strategy is moving in the right direction, strengthening practical capabilities without militarizing the North.
• Northern Research: The scientific initiatives, particularly the Arctic research station, are too small (and way too late). Canada needs the capacity to understand the Arctic better, requiring a truly national effort to know the North. This will require a much stronger research capacity in the region.
• Arctic Waters: Canada needs an open debate about the nature of the Arctic waters. While much of the discussion has focused on whether the Northwest Passage is internal waters or an international strait, Inuit, including Paul Okalik, premier of Nunavut, have argued that the waters in the Arctic Archipelago are best understood and protected as internal waters to Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, subject to local control and local use.
• Opening the Northwest Passage: Canada had best prepare for the rapid expansion of Arctic shipping. Attention must be paid, immediately, to the development of shipping facilities, monitoring networks, rescue capabilities, and environmental-cleanup systems. In all likelihood, the ships are coming. Pretending that they are not will only delay the country’s ability to protect the region, capture economic benefits for the North, and ensure that an appropriate level of control is exercised over navigation in the area.
• Canada-American Arctic Strategy: In the final analysis, Canada will not be able to overcome American designs on the Arctic. We can pontificate about this endlessly, but the reality is that the United States has the will and resources needed to secure access to the Northwest Passage. Americans’ longstanding belief in the need for their navy to have unfettered rights to navigate international straits around the world means that they will not concede on the status of the Passage for fear that it will set a precedent elsewhere. Canada can head off an unseemly contretemps by working with the United States to develop a shared strategy for the control, regulation, and use of the Northwest Passage.
• The Canadian Rangers: The Rangers are a national success story and need to be enhanced. They provide an excellent opportunity for northern capacity-building, with participants provided with training in first aid, search and rescue, and emergency response, as well as increasing opportunities to operate outside of their local areas in “enhanced sovereignty patrols.”
2. Removing Irritants to Regional Development: The North has been a political, legal, and constitutional battleground since the mid-1970s. It is high time that the basic conflicts in the region are resolved, and the North permitted to get on with the business of responding to the challenges and opportunities that lie before it.
• The Subsidy Claim: The North is constantly told that it is massively subsidized and that it already costs the country too much. But the North is expensive and always will be. We should drop the language of subsidy (how much of a subsidy is required to maintain Ottawa or the Atlantic provinces?) and focus instead on the legitimate costs of building a national presence in the North.
• Settling Outstanding Claims: The remaining northern land claims must be settled as soon as possible. That the task is almost complete is a wonderful testament to the efforts of aboriginal groups, federal authorities, and the territorial governments.
• Implementing Settlements: Settling land claims is only part of the story, for Canada does not do particularly well implementing them once they are signed. Success stories, like the Inuvialuit, are offset by the tangled history of the James Bay agreement in northern Quebec. The country needs a rapid and reliable dispute resolution system, likely through an arm’s-length authority, that has the capacity deal with the complex and often controversial issues arising out of land claims settlements.
• Regional Aboriginal Self-Government: The 2007 Nunavik (Arctic Quebec) agreement on regional self-government may well prove to be the most important development in aboriginal autonomy in recent decades. This approach should be replicated across the provincial Norths and in the territories. The current pattern of aboriginal groups seeking to concentrate decision-making at the community level is rife with problems and will not provide viable and sustainable solutions. Nunavik holds great potential for aboriginal groups wrestling with the difficult administrative challenges in their regions.
• Northern Provinces?: The idea of the territories becoming provinces has largely been taken off the table in recent decades, and northern demands have receded. The territories do need province-like authority—an arrangement that is already in place for the Yukon. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut need to move in this direction as well. There is a current tendency in the south to criticize Nunavut, in particular, for its widely decentralized administrative structure, which is enormously expensive, and its political shortcomings. Few people remember that the new jurisdiction, poor and with monumental administrative challenges, is less than a decade old. The pace of innovation and change in the Arctic has been nothing short of remarkable, and this must be allowed to continue in the coming years.
3. Being Circumpolar: Canada has a growing reputation for being a circumpolar nation in word rather than deed. This has to change.
• Canadian Follow-through: Canada needs to put its money where its mouth is on circumpolar issues, including initiatives such as the working groups of the Arctic Council and the University of the Arctic. Here our per capita commitment pales in comparison to the funds devoted to this enterprise by Norway or Finland—under the Liberal government Canada’s investment in UArctic was 25 cents per northern resident, whereas Norway’s was $1.58, even though Canada has no university in its North, whereas Norway has at least six. Canada has been strong on the rhetoric and weak on delivery, but this must end. The country needs to make firm and clear commitments to Arctic initiatives.
• Increased Multilateral Engagement: Canada has placed a great deal of emphasis on unilateral planning, with occasional forays into bilateral discussions and negotiations. The future of the circumpolar world rests in multilateral engagement, through circumpolar associations and organizations. This country should be a world leader in multinational partnerships and collaborations relating to the circumpolar world, but this will require a marked change in direction and emphasis.
• Regional Circumpolar Engagement: Para-diplomacy—the engagement of sub-national jurisdictions and organizations in international affairs—has a crucial role to play in the North. Indigenous organizations, like the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, are of fundamental importance in charting the future of the region. Nordic countries support regional participation in northern forums and organizations; Canada generally leaves this up to the small and cash-starved regional governments. The future of the Arctic will largely be defined in the Arctic— and Canada must have the territories, municipalities, indigenous groups, and other organizations engage across national boundaries.
4. Completing the Nation: Aboriginal leaders complain that many northern settlements have Third World living conditions. They are right. The North needs to be integrated into the country as a whole and brought up to the standards that are taken as a given in the rest of Canada.
• Building Northern Cities: The North requires permanent, substantial cities in the region, with sufficient social infrastructure and other resources, that will compete with comparable communities in the circumpolar world. Whitehorse, Yukon, a delightful community, falls far short of Fairbanks, Alaska, in size, activity, and complexity. Similarly, Inuvik is not Alta, Norway, and Iqaluit is not Akureyri, Iceland. Canada does not have a northern Tromso as yet. Whitehorse and Yellowknife both have growth potential, as do Inuvik, Iqaluit, Baker Lake, and Rankin Inlet, but growth depends on long-term, serious southern commitment to developing strong regional centres, with the capacity, opportunity, and resources to sustain prosperous, active cities.
• Making the North Attractive: Northern living has to be attractive if it is to sustain population growth and provide the level of stability and opportunity that Canadians take for granted. Oddly, places like Alaska, northern Finland, and the like are viewed more positively as places to live than are northern Canadian communities. The country should not, as it does at present, focus on salaries—which leaves the impression of bribing people to come North. Instead, effort should focus on ensuring a comparable level of basic services (broadband Internet, health care, education) with roughly comparable prices. Canada does this in some areas—northern post office and telephone services, for example; the concept needs to be broadened and entrenched within government and private sector operations.
• Solving the Housing Crisis: Housing remains of fundamental importance for the Canadian North. The shortage of suitable accommodation is unacceptable, and the slow and incremental manner in which the issue is being addressed remains a major brake on social and community development. Canada needs, as a matter of high urgency, a new approach to Arctic housing, one that capitalizes on architectural innovations, new approaches to home ownership for indigenous peoples, and a commitment to meeting demonstrated need in the area.
• Northern Research Capacity: Canada desperately needs a university physically located in the North. Post-secondary education in Canada has always been driven by real or perceived student demand. That is not sufficient. Canada should build off the partnerships created through institutions like the University of the Arctic, calling on its major members to create a collectively owned university centred in the North. The emphasis would be on building research capacity related to the Arctic but with strong ties to southern expertise. The university could include a focus on graduate studies and research that would enable the country to become, once again, a world leader in Arctic research.
There is a great irony in the urgency of the scientific research around the continental shelf project. Cuts in funding to the Polar Continental Shelf Project, a body advising the government on Arctic-research matters, resulted in substantial cutbacks in Arctic research—precisely the kind of science that Canada now urgently needs. Canada needs to recommit to northern science, beyond the Arctic Research Station proposed in the budget. The Arctic matters, and it matters in the long, as well as the short, term. Steps must be taken to create a substantial northern research capacity, related to both the natural and human science aspects of life in the North. While the current climate change agenda and sovereignty debates create an opportunity to expand our northern presence, much more has to be done to make Canada truly credible in Arctic research. This involves facilities, support for faculty and students, and extensive engagement of the private sector and government agencies in the research and dissemination of results.
• Northern Capacity: Two issues—capacity building and migration—represent the greatest barrier to sustainable northern development. Aboriginal groups are acutely aware that they need additional administrative and organizational strength; non-aboriginal groups, including territorial governments, speak less often about this safe issue. The rapid turnover of personnel, largely because of the poor facilities and service challenges in the region, compounds the difficulties. The North requires a sustained and purposeful program of capacity building, designed to ensure that the region has the leadership and support personnel necessary to handle the multitude of tasks being assigned to the region. This holds equally for the private sector, incidentally, where northern capacity is noticeably deficient.
5. Building an Identity as a Northern Nation: For the vast majority of Canadians, Franklin is a cartoon turtle, not an important historical figure representing the best and the worst of the Arctic experience. Vancouver, the least northern city in Canada (after Victoria), took the Inukshuk as a symbol for the 2010 Olympics. Canada is not now a northern nation, and it is rapidly becoming more southerly and urban in orientation. It is a fantasy to imagine that substantial numbers of people will move into our Arctic, but the current approach of wrapping ourselves in northern symbols while rarely venturing into the region needs to stop.
• Accepting Winter: One of the hardest things for Canadians to contemplate is the need to embrace winter. Compared to other northern nations, Canada has an inadequate northern architecture, little enthusiasm for cold and snow, and a bunker mentality about the most dominant season of the world. Like it or not, though, Canada, even with global warming, will be cold, snow covered and therefore quite beautiful for large portions of the year. It is time to recognize this basic reality and start to celebrate this central fact of national life.
• Towards a Canadian Architecture: Architecture is a great place to start. Take two of our northernmost universities—the University of Northern British Columbia, designed specifically and successfully for a northern environment, and the University of Alberta, a wonderful institution that is making a belated attempt to recognize its climatic setting. Canada needs more of these. The country requires urban places that reflect their setting, not a strong desire to be southern in appearance and structure. A major initiative of the country’s architecture schools and a commitment by governments to rethink their architectural investments in northern settings is essential.
• Taking Canadians North: Canada urgently needs an increased presence in the North—and not just of government organizations and the military. The region is fascinating and magnificent—few areas in the world match its beauty and uniqueness. But very few Canadians go there. Canadians need to connect with their North. We have done the symbolism part well, but we need to go the next step. Where is the Canadian interest in Arctic tourism? The Germans, Americans, and Japanese appear more interested in our North than we do. For every Canadian who has visited the national parks in Nunavut, there must be tens of thousands who have visited Walt Disney World. Efforts must be made to get Canadians, particularly new Canadians, to see the Arctic as part of their country and their future—and not just as a potential source of wealth or security threats.
The country needs mechanisms—north-to-south student exchanges, special vacation packages—designed to bring thousands more southern Canadians into the region. Imagine the impact if Canadian lotteries used just a small portion of their prize pot to award holiday excursions to the North— within a few years, thousands of Canadians could have a personal experience of the North. Canadians need to know their North to be proud of it, and they need to experience the North to understand in full the costs and issues associated with defending, protecting, and improving the region.
• Arctic Journalism: Canadian journalism about the North— like national journalism generally—tends to be Ottawa and Toronto focused, with a crisis orientation towards understanding the rest of the country. The tragic murder of two police officers in 2007, one in Hay River, NWT, and the other in Kimmrut, Nunavut, attracted more attention to the North than a decade’s worth of aboriginal self-government and improvements in northern educational achievement. Global climate change has really captured the southern imagination—images of polar bears trapped on ice floes and Inuit hunters falling through the ice have proven much more intriguing than stories about commercial joint ventures, land claims implementations, and new approaches to resource management. Canadian news authorities, particularly the CBC and the two national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post, need to upgrade their routine coverage of northern issues and get away from the current crisis and conflict orientation towards Arctic issues. Northern media outlets, including aboriginal broadcasters and publications, provide ready access to northern stories that will likely attract a great deal of attention in the country.
6. Planning for the Twenty-first Century: The dynamics of northern life are changing rapidly. Even as Canada catches up for decades of neglect, it needs to look forward to a world dominated by global climate change, the resource stampede to the Arctic, and the dynamics of the new world economy.
• Arctic Climate Strategy: The Canadian Arctic has become the bellwether for global climate change. The country should capitalize on this international attention immediately, using global interest to draw attention to the urgent need for collective action. To do this properly requires extensive baseline research so that change can be monitored effectively. It requires on-the-ground capacity, both scientific and local, to chart the impact of global warming. The Arctic Climate Strategy requires forward-looking planning to address potential social, cultural, and economic changes associated with environmental realities. And the whole initiative requires high-profile coverage so that the world understands that the full effects of global environmental abuse are being felt first and hardest in the Canadian North.
• Resource Development: The country has a test run at Arctic development within its grasp. The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline is still on the drawing board, and construction could be under way within a year or two. Lest there be too much concern about environmental questions, it is crucial to remember that a northern oil pipeline, stretching from Norman Wells, in the Northwest Territories, to the Alberta pipeline grid, has been in operation since the mid-1980s; this installation has, by existing accounts, been well managed in terms of environmental and socio-economic impacts. The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline will bring the North into national prominence, spur development of the Beaufort Sea deposits, provide a cash flow to the government of the Northwest Territories and the government of Canada (subject to revenue-sharing agreements), and provide evidence of the Arctic’s potential. The timely and properly managed implementation of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline could help transform the country’s view of Arctic resources and the value of holding on to the Far North.
• Resource Realism: The country needs to be realistic about the economic potential of the Far North. The costs and risks associated with exploiting Arctic resources are considerable— and there is more than a little air of desperation about the effort to find the very last drop of gas and oil on the planet. We should realize that the North will produce disappointments as well as happy surprises, and will often fail to meet the expectations placed upon it. Canada could go in a different direction, create the world’s largest ecological park and development-free zone and challenge other nations to establish an Antarctic-type zone of protection over the area. Copying and competing with other nations in a “hell-bent for icebergs” approach to Arctic development will produce far less than people expect. Instead of fighting over potential economic crumbs, Canada might take the world lead in tipping the balance away from the exploitation of the final frontier into the creation of a new environmentalism that places preservation over short-term economic gain.
• Arctic New Economy Strategy: The new approaches to the economy, based on fly-in, fly-out resource camps, Internet-based commerce, and global competition, have been dramatically changing northern economic options. At present, the North remains resource dependent, hoping for diamonds, oil, gas, and minerals (and a few tourists) to sustain the economy. The region is vulnerable at all levels. Even Inuit art, the formidable cultural foundation of many Arctic communities, could be displaced by growing global interest in other indigenous cultures and their artistic production. The North urgently needs a creative, forward-looking economic strategy that sees beyond the standard five-year horizon and that determines the real options for the heavily resource- and government-dependent region.
Canada has choices, but they will be difficult ones. The largely symbolic approach to sovereignty and security that Canada pursued through the twentieth century suited the purposes of the Second World War and the Cold War. It is unlikely that they will suffice in the twenty-first century. If we want to truly exercise our sovereignty over the North, rather than simply try to “possess” it through symbols and rhetoric, we need to engage in a national discussion—with northerners at the centre. And we must rethink our national commitment and goals. We are not truly an Arctic nation, but we could become one. Getting there will not be easy, particularly with the media glare that now attends every step and misstep we take on the Arctic stage.
There is another, more simple, way of understanding Canada’s dilemma in the North. Throughout much of our history, northern policy has been largely reactive, responding to intrusions, claims, threats, and challenges to Canadian control over the Arctic. Canada has not addressed the opportunities and needs of the North in a sufficiently systematic manner to neutralize foreign claims on the region. The sovereignty issue in the North is not inherently strategic, military, or diplomatic, although it is playing out that way at present. The manner in which the nation occupies and governs its northern regions determines much of the international understanding about a country’s interest in its northern region. Incorporation of the North into the country at large—land claims settlements, aboriginal self-government, improvements to regional infrastructure, stabilization of northern communities, long-term economic development, protection of the vulnerable Arctic environment, and scientific research—are acts of sovereignty, demonstrating in tangible and powerful ways that Canada is committed to the North. It is wrong to assume that sovereignty is entirely a matter of national defence and not one of regional development.
Circumpolar co-operation provides a critical second solution, one where Canada is well placed to play a substantial role. The questions of Arctic sovereignty and northern security are not inherently Canadian or national issues. Protecting the integrity of Canada’s place in the North does not automatically require the prime minister to stand up for Canada, or for the military to wave the flag over isolated Arctic islands. We could, in league with other circumpolar nations, develop a co-operative response to the contemporary struggles over the Arctic. Co-operation—not unilateral action—might well hold the key to the preservation of national and collective interests in the Far North, for it could transform the debate about the Arctic into a pan-northern dilemma, with broad international support for Canadian interests in the region.
Canada has made critical first steps in this regard, stretching back through both Liberal and Conservative administrations. The Mulroney and Chrétien governments took crucial steps towards empowering the North and improving circumpolar contacts. The current government’s “Stand Up for Canada” approach, while as pleasing to Canadians as Newfoundland premier Brian Tobin’s famous “Turbot War” with the Spaniards, may not advance the cause anywhere near as fast and as far as improved circumpolar co-operation. In the past, Canadian rhetoric has been considerably stronger than its actions; we made noise about the Arctic Council, the University of the Arctic and other pan-Arctic initiatives, but have not followed through properly. Solidifying ties with Russia, Scandinavia, Alaska, Greenland, and Iceland may not grab as many headlines as icebreakers and Arctic surveillance flights, but may actually be much more effective in defending national interests in the region.
High-profile Canadian steps to reinvigorate and broaden its commitment to circumpolar co-operation are urgently required. It is vital that Canada put more than words behind the country’s Arctic strategies and commitments. We need to take a more prominent role in the Arctic Council but, more importantly, we need to deliver on the promises that are made. Canada needs to be assertive, active, and committed to circumpolar affairs, and needs to capitalize on the opportunities that exist for collaborative action. Diplomacy matters, and can be more effective, and re-establishing a strong political presence among the nations of the circumpolar world is an important first step. Placing Canada at the forefront of circumpolar cooperation, this time with political rhetoric matched by resources, would go a long way towards quelling the idea that the country is not committed to the North. A web of collaborative programs, properly supported and sustained, would integrate Canada more fully into the fabric of the circumpolar world and would thereby create a global understanding of the country’s commitment to the region. Co-operation and the integration of science, education, economic development, and cultural exchanges tend to mitigate conflict. As Russian assertiveness returns—Putin is no Gorbachev, to be sure—it is critically important that Canada improve its collaborative ties with that country, a process that could well avoid or temper future confrontations.
An Arctic strategy based on current headlines will not work. Today’s threats relate to boundaries and resources. Tomorrow, environmental considerations will likely dominate the news, followed by accounts of further difficulties in indigenous communities. Canada and the Canadian government need to step back from the rhetoric of militarization and strategic approaches to the Arctic. The Far North is not going anywhere, the Russians aren’t coming, and the real threats to Canadian sovereignty are much less dramatic than current rhetoric would have the country believe. Canada needs a two-pronged approach to the North, a model that this country uses in its approach to fragile states around the world. In Afghanistan, for example, Canada is endeavouring to blend defence and development, military and civil action. The government of Canada should approach the North in a comparable fashion. By all means, bring Arctic defence up to international standards. Improve surveillance, expand scientific research, and develop better response capabilities. Add deep-water ports and expand the military presence. At the same time, Canada needs to continue its efforts to improve the lives of northern residents, complete the land claims and self-government processes, bring Arctic infrastructure up to national standards— even if it costs a lot of money—and through these processes learn how to be a truly northern nation. A colonized, disempowered, and isolated North is vulnerable, difficult to defend, and disconnected from the country at large. An integrated, confident, and properly supported North would be, instead, a well-known and highly regarded part of the country, distinctively aboriginal and clearly Canadian. Sovereignty starts at home. A proper Arctic strategy requires the completion of nation-building within Canada.
A fearless prediction is in order, based not on hope but on the experience of the last century and more, and on the knowledge of what kind of country this is. In the end, Canada will do the smallest amount possible. The Conservative government’s commitment to Arctic sovereignty and northern defence will be watered down by the priorities of a minority Parliament and the lack of true passion for the region in the country at large. Any immediate crisis will fade, either because of a short-term turn in the weather or because either other Arctic shipping routes eclipse the need to use the Northwest Passage, or a few ships will sail successfully through the route and Canadians will realize that the world did not end. National concern will abate—it always has in the past—and we will count on the government to make some quiet and peaceful settlements with our partners and rivals. We will continue to pay lip service to circumpolar co-operation and will underestimate the utility of multilateral actions as a means of avoiding conflict.
Canada has long ignored the North. We have gone southern as a country, moving into cities, turning our backs on the North and seeking a future focused on the global economy rather than our backyard. This is a shame. The Arctic is a remarkable place, full of natural wonders, spectacular beauty, and the unique ability to transform the human spirit. But the region has never really penetrated the national consciousness in this country, and we are the lesser for it. Over the generations, visionaries have promoted the idea of a resource-rich northland fuelling Canadian expansion, and we now see elements of this northern dream arising yet again. Yet perhaps the time has come to do something different. Canada should do more with the Arctic regions and for the Arctic people and environment. The current questions about sovereignty, climate change, indigenous peoples, and economic opportunity create a possible foundation for a very different North and a very different Canada. While the weight of history makes it difficult to imagine real change, the opportunity for a dramatically new approach stands before us. Canada has to rediscover its North, with the territories and aboriginal peoples as full partners. It must defend its northern flank from challenges far more significant and real than those of the past. In this process, Canada has a unique opportunity to rise above its history, to remove the mental shackles of the past, and to define a new role for the North in Canada. The next decade promises to be the most important ten years in the evolution of Canada’s Arctic. With the right will and with the full realization of the costs and consequences of neglect and apathy, Canadians can redefine the North’s place in Confederation and in the process vault this country into a position of global leadership in the circumpolar world.