Victoria’s Generals

Chronology

9 February 1838	Henry Evelyn Wood born at Cressing, Essex Educated at Marlborough
15 April 1852	Appointed Midshipman in Royal Navy
1 January 1855	Appointed ADC to Naval Brigade, Crimea
18 June 1855	Severely wounded in assault on the Redan, Sebastopol
7 September 1855	Commissioned Cornet, 13th Light Dragoons
1 February 1856	Promoted Lieutenant
9 October 1857	Exchanged into 17th Lancers
1858–60	Service in India
1 November 1858	Appointed Brigade Major, Central India Flying Column
19 October 1858	Won VC at Sindwaha
16 April 1861	Purchased Captaincy
19 August 1862	Promoted Brevet Major
21 October 1862	Exchanged into 73rd Foot
1862–64	Attended Staff College
10 January 1865	Exchanged into 17th Foot
31 July 1866	Appointed Brigade Major, Aldershot
1867	Married the Hon. Paulina Southwell
22 June 1870	Purchased Substantive Majority
28 October 1871	Exchanged into 90th Foot
19 January 1873	Promoted Brevet Lieutenant Colonel
1873–74	Service on Gold Coast
1 April 1874	Promoted Brevet Colonel
10 September 1874	Appointed Superintending Officer of Garrison Instruction
23 March 1876	Appointed AQMG, Aldershot
1878–79	Service in South Africa
3 November 1878	Promoted Substantive Lieutenant Colonel
3 April 1879	Appointed Brigadier General, South Africa
15 December 1879	Appointed Brigadier General, Belfast
1881	Service in South Africa
12 August 1881	Promoted Major General
14 February 1882	Appointed GOC, Chatham
1882	Service in Egypt
21 December 1882	Appointed Sirdar of Egyptian Army
1 April 1886	Appointed GOC, Eastern District
1 January 1889	Appointed GOC, Aldershot
1 April 1890	Promoted Lieutenant General
9 October 1893	Appointed Quartermaster General
26 March 1895	Promoted General
1 October 1897	Appointed Adjutant General
1 October 1901	Appointed GOC, I Corps
8 April 1903	Promoted Field Marshal
2 December 1919	Died at Harlow, Essex

Appointed CB, 1874; GCMG, 1879; GCB, 1901

Wood also possessed a love of money, which was no doubt encouraged by his wife, Paulina, the daughter of a Viscount, who had somewhat expensive tastes. His passion for fox-hunting and horses saw him incur the expense of his own stables and his constant need for money made Wood sometimes behave in a rather mercenary manner. This was certainly the case when he contested the will of his Aunt ‘Ben’ and schemed during the divorce proceedings surrounding his youngest sister, Kitty O’Shea. Yet all who served under him thought him kind, considerate and possessed of the ability to smile and make a joke even in the most demanding of circumstances. On his death, General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had served under Wood in South Africa, Egypt and at home, wrote ‘Sir Evelyn’s vitality was so intense, his spirit so dauntless and so bright … I have never known Evelyn give expression to a selfish, vindictive, or jealous thought. His heart was young, and it was his constant endeavour to give youth a chance.’³ This last characteristic was clearly seen in Wood’s skill and ability as a trainer of troops. This was given free rein when he commanded at Aldershot and in the Southern Command. He had a foresight that many in the upper echelons of the army of the late nineteenth century did not possess, and with this he recognised the flaws in the army.

It must not be forgotten that Wood was attempting to reform a system that was highly suspicious of change. This was particularly true during the leadership of the Commander in Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, with whom Wood and Wolseley often clashed. Wood’s reforms and innovations began from a very low base of knowledge and experience within the army. For example, until Wood introduced the concept of night-time manoeuvres in the Eastern Command, based at Colchester, the British army had never considered such exercises important or worthwhile.⁴ His legacy was much more than his evident bravery and his ability to inspire and organise; he allowed those who served under him to consider deeply their profession and this, perhaps, alone ensured that these officers, such as Kitchener, French and Smith-Dorrien, were later to shine in their army careers.

Henry Evelyn Wood was born in Cressing, Essex on 9 February 1838, the youngest son of John Wood, a vicar, and one of thirteen children, of whom only seven would survive to reach adulthood. It was his mother, Emma, who was the major early influence on his life and they remained extremely close. Indeed it was to be Emma’s intervention that saved Evelyn from the barbaric care he received from Florence Nightingale’s nurses during the Crimean War. During the Victorian period two of his sisters would also gain some fame, or notoriety. His eccentric sister Anna Steele achieved success as a novelist, while his youngest sister, Katharine, better known as Kitty O’Shea, became notorious for her affair with, and subsequent marriage to, the Irish Nationalist Leader, Charles Stewart Parnell. The divorce case that centred on their affair caused a sensation in Victorian Britain.

After an unhappy time at Marlborough, Wood managed to persuade his mother that his career lay in the Navy. Through the influence of his uncle, Captain Frederick Michell, Evelyn joined the crew of HMS Queen in July 1852, aged just 14 years. Within two years Wood had been promoted to the rank of midshipman and had already displayed a willingness to accept responsibility and take risks. He was to first experience the sounds of battle when his ship was assigned to a flotilla, which had been ordered to bombard the Russian port of Odessa as part of the opening salvoes of the Crimean War. HMS Queen was later to support the British and French landings at Kalamita Bay and, from the high rigging of the ship, Wood was able to watch as a spectator as the Allies and the Russians fought at the battle of the Alma.⁵ The subsequent retreat of Russian forces into Sebastopol was to lead to the Allied siege of that city.

The need for heavy siege guns to bombard the Russian defences resulted in the formation of the Naval Brigade, under the command of Captain Peel, and, with his uncle’s encouragement, Wood became part of the initial deployment of men and guns. This was to be the beginning of eight months of continuous service, during which Wood struggled to survive not only the Russian guns, but also the appalling weather and living conditions that the Allies suffered over the winter of 1854–55. During this time he was to receive his first of two recommendations for the Victoria Cross when, under constant Russian fire, he put out a blaze that was threatening his guns’ ammunition magazine. After the failed Russian attempts to break the siege at the battle of Inkerman, both sides focussed their aggressive activities on exchanges of shells, in which Wood’s batteries were heavily engaged. By June 1855, the Allies planned a massed combined assault upon the Russian Redan, but the attacks of 18 June were ill-timed and both the British and the French forces were beaten back. The Naval Brigade joined the assault and Wood was the only officer to reach the base of the enemy defences. However, he was seriously wounded in the assault. Although Wood was successful in managing to persuade the army doctors not to amputate his injured arm, he was forced to return to England to recover. The bravery that the 17-year-old Wood had shown gained him much recognition in the Crimea, and the Allied Commander, Lord Raglan, wrote him a glowing testimonial, and even provided his own carriage and physician to convey Wood back to HMS Queen.⁶

Despite the notoriety he had gained while serving in the Navy, it is clear that Wood did not see a future in this service. It seems that he considered that there was not much fame left for him to earn there and that he yearned for something more active than keeping harbour watch or any of the daily duties on board a warship. Having obtained his parents consent to join the army, Wood wrote to the Commander in Chief, asking for a commission in any light cavalry regiment, and enclosed a copy of Lord Raglan’s letter. It only took one week for Wood to receive the news that he had been accepted as a cornet in the 13th Light Dragoons, and the speed of the decision, together with the fact that Evelyn was not obliged, as others were at that time, to purchase his commission, suggests that his fame, and the support given by Raglan’s letter, had allowed him an easy transfer. This move, however, does seem to have cost Evelyn his VC, for despite the support given to him by Raglan and others, and the fact that his name was third on the list of recommendations, he was turned down for the award.⁷

Wood returned to the Crimea as a cavalry officer in January 1856. He was soon struck down with a combination of typhoid and pneumonia and was delivered to Scutari hospital, and into the hands of Florence Nightingale and her team. He seems to have been particularly unfortunate in that much of his care was left to a sadistic nurse, who would deliberately inflict pain on the ailing dragoon. Wood lost so much weight that the bones of both hips had pierced his skin. When changing his bandages, the nurse, rather than wetting them first, would tear off the lint roughly, ripping off skin and drawing blood. She would also slap and hit Wood when left alone with him. Of course, this did nothing to aid his recovery and on more than one occasion the doctors considered him close to death and informed Wood’s parents of the seriousness of the situation. His parents travelled to the Crimea, where Wood’s mother soon established that her son was being mistreated and, in a confrontational meeting with the doctors, and Nightingale, she insisted that she be allowed to take her son back home. Despite protestations from the hospital staff, and claims that Wood would not survive the journey, Lady Wood safely extracted her beloved son, who made a slow return to health in England.⁸ Her actions almost certainly saved Wood’s life.

Wood’s recovery coincided with news of the Indian Mutiny and, desperate for active service, he negotiated a transfer to the 17th Lancers, and in October 1857 sailed for India. During the voyage, he busied himself by learning Hindustani and his endeavours were rewarded when he was given the position of company interpreter. Although Wood arrived after the last of the large set-piece battles of the Mutiny, he was actively involved in the pursuit of many of the prominent leaders of the mutineers, including Tatya Tope. Thus, as part of the Central India Force, Wood spent many months in the saddle, in extremely trying conditions of oppressive heat, in, mostly, futile attempts to corner the rebels. This is not to say that he was not involved in a number of skirmishes. In September 1858, at a place called Rajghur, a troop of cavalry, commanded by Wood, made contact with the rearguard of Tatya Tope’s army, and Wood successfully led his troopers against the fleeing rebel artillery. This action forced the rebels to abandon many of their artillery pieces. The following month Wood, leading a reconnaissance patrol, first engaged the rebels at Sindwaha. This was to be the largest engagement Wood was to witness while in India and he would receive much praise for his action in the pursuit of the fleeing rebels after the battle. With only his orderly by his side, Wood charged a party of sepoys, who had turned to make a stand. In the resulting clash, Wood killed one of the rebels with his sword, and, following his example, he was then joined by the remainder of his command, who quickly dispatched and dispersed the remaining mutineers.⁹

A brief rest in the pursuit saw Wood trying to ride a giraffe! He was staying with the Prince of Jaora, who possessed a menagerie of animals in his palace grounds. One of Wood’s fellow officers waged with him that he could not ride a giraffe, which was being led around by a string through its nostrils. Never one to turn down a challenge, Wood gamely jumped on the animal’s back and initially had some success riding the beast, until it, unfortunately, bolted for its stable door. Wood decided that he should lower himself off the giraffe’s back, but, in doing so, he was hit by the animal’s knee, which knocked Wood underneath its hind legs, where the hooves mangled Wood’s face and nose. He regained consciousness three days later, but was able to rejoin the pursuit of the rebels the following week.¹⁰

Although Wood and his comrades were unsuccessful in their attempts to corner Tatya Tope, who was later captured as a result of the treachery of one of his followers, Wood received much praise from his commanding officers for his conduct throughout the lengthy pursuit. General Michel wrote to the Commander in Chief of the British army that Wood had, ‘highly distinguished himself’,¹¹ while Brigadier General Somerset commented on Wood’s ‘unwearied zeal’.¹² Such praise allowed Wood to assume the position of Brigade Major of Beatson’s Horse, an irregular cavalry unit of native troops, which was headquartered at Arangabad. Wood was later to complain that his new command showed all the imperfections of a unit raised in haste to meet the threat of the Mutiny. Most of the native officers were illiterate, the majority of the men were poor riders, and little time had been given over to drill to improve this situation. Wood set about transforming the unit, although his direct, energetic approach upset several of his native officers, who were used to an easier pace of army life. Indeed, the situation became so severe that Wood faced a mutiny and feared for his life. It was only with the arrival of reinforcements, from a nearby army base, that the potential for rebellion diminished and he was able to restore his authority.

Within a month of taking command, Wood had transformed the regiment and he could at least put several squadrons into the field. This was timely, for Wood received intelligence from the town of Sindwaha that a band of rebels, under Madhoo Singh, were in the vicinity and that they had kidnapped an influential landowner called Chemmun Singh, who had offered active support to the government in the suppression of the Mutiny. Wood knew he had to act quickly if the man’s life was to be saved and, with the help of a former mutineer, he set out to find the rebels. Still wary of some of his men’s loyalty, Wood elected to take with him only fifteen troopers, unaware that his command was to face a band in excess of eighty men.¹³

A slow, cautious approach brought Wood’s party to the edge of the sleeping rebels and it was then that he realised he faced overwhelming odds. Retreat was briefly considered, but aware that the kidnapped victim would surely be hung, Wood instead ordered a surprise attack. As Wood charged, he realised that only two of his men had joined him, but in the noise and confusion, the rebels assumed that they were being attacked by a large force and fled, leaving their victim alive, tied to a tree. The remainder of the detachment, who had held back, made up for their lack of activity by shouting to the fleeing rebels ‘Bring up the artillery, bring up the Cavalry’, and Evelyn later admitted that this action was perhaps more effective in dispersing the rebels than any bayonet charge might have been.¹⁴ The final act was when Wood was forced to knock out a private who became ‘idiotic’ at the sight of blood. News of the daring rescue was conveyed to the Viceroy of India, who did not hesitate to recommend Evelyn’s actions to the Queen for the award of the VC.

Wood was to receive reports that he had indeed been awarded the VC in September 1860. By the time of this news, Wood was back in England, his promising career in India cut short. It appears that, in pursuing his orders to arrest rebels who were known to be sheltering in the palace of the Prince of Naringhgarh, Wood overstepped the mark and insulted the elderly Prince, and even threatened to arrest him. When news of this reached the local political agent, Wood was severely reprimanded and he felt compelled to offer his resignation and return to England.¹⁵

Wood was now destined for a considerable period of home service and in this time he was to find love and marriage, to the Hon. Paulina Southwell, as well as to continue his increasingly successful army career. He passed through the Staff College at Camberley, his natural ability at languages ensuring that he passed out in the top 10 per cent of candidates. An unhappy period in Ireland followed, during which time the wet climate there severely affected his health. He was to much enjoy his next posting to Aldershot, which was to become his second home. Here, Wood experienced his first role as a staff officer, when he served under General Horsford, and he gained a real appreciation of what was required to enhance the training of the British soldier, as well as the need to expand upon the number and quality of army manoeuvres. This experience was to cement his future thinking on army reform.

Wood’s continuing health problems, combined with ongoing financial concerns, led him to consider his long-term future in the army. In his position as Brigade Major, Wood had acquired some interest and knowledge in military law, and this seems to have made him consider becoming a barrister. Thus, while serving at Aldershot, he studied to pass his entrance examinations to the Middle Temple. He, somehow, managed to balance his responsibilities at Aldershot with study in London and an ever-growing family. After years of study, in which Wood would rise at 0400 and study until 0730, he passed his final exams in 1874 and became a Barrister-at-Law in that year.¹⁶ However, sudden army advancement, from the middle of the 1870s, ensured that he would never be obliged to earn his living at the Bar.

Wood’s return to active service came as a result of a supposedly chance encounter with Wolseley, who was to command an expedition to Ashanti (Asante) in 1873. The Asante, led by the aggressive King Kofi Karikari, had invaded the British Protectorate on the Gold Coast of West Africa, and had the affront to attack, unsuccessfully, the British coastal fort at Elmina. The British government clearly felt that the Asante needed to be taught a lesson and, if Wolseley’s force was unable to secure adequate peace terms and assurances, it was then tasked with travelling from the coastal region into the very heart of Asante to destroy the capital at Kumase. Wolseley was able to obtain the services of a number of promising officers including Buller, Brackenbury and Wood, and these men, and others, were to be become central figures in what became known as the ‘Ashanti Ring’. Wolseley later showered his patronage on these like-minded officers and they served alongside him throughout his career.

With around thirty officers, a West India Regiment and the assistance of a number of marines, Wolseley planned his campaign. Wood was tasked with moulding a number of separate friendly tribes, which included the Hausas and the local Fante, into a fighting force, to be known as ‘Wood’s Irregulars’. Yet the material he was forced to work with was not promising. The Fante were later described as the ‘most cowardly of mankind’¹⁷ and Wood described one tribe, the Bonny, as very clever at basket work, but with no aptitude for war!¹⁸

Wolseley’s first action was to plan a raid along the coast, to attack those villages that had been supplying the Asante army. Wood was given command of this mixed force, although in a crucial moment during a fire-fight, Wolseley stepped in and started giving orders, much to Wood’s annoyance. Although the raid had been a success, it demonstrated to Wolseley that he would not be able to rely on the fighting abilities of the friendly tribes and he was forced to request that two battalions be sent from England. To pacify a somewhat disgruntled Wood, Wolseley wrote to him to state, ‘I have to congratulate you upon the very able manner in which you did everything yesterday. I am very much obliged to you. The operations were well carried out, and all your previous arrangements were admirable.’¹⁹

Activity now centred on preparing for the arrival of the British troops. ‘Wood’s Irregulars’ were used to clear a path through the dense jungle, to the banks of the River Pra, the boundary of Asante proper, and here build a camp large enough to accommodate 5,000 men. While engaged in this activity, Wood’s men had a number of encounters with Asante picquets and, much to Wood’s fury, they again did not distinguish themselves. Indeed, on one occasion Wolseley was to write of their actions that: ‘Their duplicity and cowardice surpasses all description.’²⁰ While at the Pra River camp, Wood received a delegation of officials from the Asante King, who had come to seek peace terms. During the time it took for Wood to receive Wolseley’s response to the terms, he showed the Asante the latest British weapon, the Gatling Gun. This demonstration so overwhelmed the chiefs that one of the party committed suicide. Wolseley was furious that Wood had behaved so childishly and he severely reprimanded his second in command.²¹ Although this was the first campaign in which the British had the ability to use this new weapon of mass destruction, the Gatling Gun proved too unreliable for battlefield operations. It was be five years, during the Zulu War, before the Gatling was to overcome the initial technical problems. Here the weapon caused high numbers of casualties, particularly at the battle of Ulundi, and it was to serve effectively in many of the colonial campaigns of the later Victorian period.

With the British troops in place by the end of January 1874, Wolseley marched in force across the River Pra. The main Asante army was met in battle at Amoaful on 31 January and, in a hard-fought, 12-hour long engagement, a British victory was only secured by the use of an artillery piece, firing case shot at point-blank range into the Asante warriors. Wood was prominent throughout the battle, as he tried to encourage his reluctant force forward, in what Brackenbury was later to describe as a ‘rare example of bravery and fortitude to his men’.²² It was thus not surprising that Wood was finally shot, in the chest just above his heart, by a rusty nail fired from one of the Asante antique firearms. He was forced to withdraw from the battlefield and the location of the wound meant that the doctors were unable to extract all of the nail. When it became clear that his life was not in danger, all that Evelyn was prescribed was rest and Brand’s essence of beef and brandy.²³

When Wolseley was informed of Wood’s injury, he joked that he expected to see Wood back leading the advance within a week, and indeed this was the case. Wood managed, somehow, to persuade his doctor that he was fit to return to service and Wolseley gave him the honour of leading his Irregulars against the Asante army, which had massed to make a last stand before Kumase, at Ordasu. Again, Wood was to experience frustration, as his men would simply not advance against the firepower of the Asante, and he was forced to retire, while British regulars achieved battlefield success against their formidable enemy. Wolseley was able to enter Kumase on 4 February, and the following day the capital was burnt to the ground. Although the King was never captured, peace terms were agreed and the expedition was considered a great success. Wolseley was to earn much praise, and his officers, including Wood, received much reflected glory. Wood had, perhaps, been unfortunate in that he had been given an impossible task, that of trying to turn the local tribes into an effective fighting force. However, the expedition gave him much valuable experience of handling troops in the field.

Back in England, Wood was promoted to full Colonel of the 90th and he again returned to Aldershot. Here he was able to continue to introduce new ideas in field exercises and manoeuvres and he began to acquire a reputation as a reformist and innovator. In 1877 he was offered the position of Commandant at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, although he declined this, in the hope of active service.²⁴ His patience was finally rewarded when he received the news that he was to accompany General Thesiger, later Lord Chelmsford, to South Africa to quell a rising of the Gaika tribes, which was to become known as the Ninth Frontier War. The conflict was centred on the Amatola Mountains and the Perie Bush, outside of King William’s Town in the Eastern Cape. Although of only a short duration, the conflict was particularly bitter and exhausting. The British played a ‘cat and mouse’ game with the rebels, who used the cover of the bush superbly and frustrated the British repeatedly. It took four months for Thesiger and Wood to perfect their tactics for such warfare and achieve the capture and surrender of the rebel tribes. Wood had, once more, gained useful experience of handling friendly natives, as well as an understanding of how to deal with colonial troops, which would be of much use in the future conflict with the Zulus. Thesiger was later to report to the War Office that ‘I cannot speak too highly of the good service rendered by this officer [Wood]. He has exercised his command with marked ability and great tact. I am of opinion that his indefatigable exertions and personal influence have been mainly instrumental in bringing the war to a speedy close.’²⁵

The two men now journeyed to Natal, where both planned the likely invasion of Zululand. Wood was heavily involved in the logistics of acquiring suitable and sufficient wagons to transport stores for three British columns as they advanced on the Zulu capital of Ulundi. After his success at Khambula in March 1879, Wood maintained his independent command and his Number 4 Column was renamed ‘Wood’s Flying Column’, and was at the vanguard of the advance on Ulundi during the Second Invasion. Wolseley, who replaced Chelmsford after Ulundi, firmly believed that if it was not for Wood’s drive and determination, Chelmsford would never have had the energy to advance on the Zulu capital. Throughout the final battle, Evelyn stayed by the side of Lord Chelmsford, as both mounted men exposed themselves to Zulu fire. Archibald Forbes, the special correspondent of the Daily News, was to write of Wood at Ulundi, ‘Evelyn Wood’s face was radiant with the rapture of the fray as he rode up and down behind his regiment exposed to a storm of missiles.’²⁶

To express his thanks to Wood, Wolseley issued the following order: ‘Sir Garnet Wolseley desires to place on record his high appreciation of the services they [Wood and Buller] have rendered during the war…. The success which has attended the operations of the Flying Column is largely due to General Wood’s genius for war, to the admirable system he has established in his command, and to the zeal and energy with which his ably conceived plans have been carried out.’²⁷ Privately, Wolseley informed Evelyn that, ‘you and Buller have been the bright spots in this miserable war, and all through I have felt proud that I numbered you among my friends and companions in arms’.²⁸

Wood was to return to England as a ‘conquering hero’, with his reputation enhanced. Queen Victoria was very keen to meet the Empire’s latest saviour, and Wood was invited to Balmoral. Here he clearly impressed the Queen, who wrote in her journal that, ‘Sir Evelyn is wonderfully lively and hardly ceases talking, which no doubt comes from his deafness and inability to hear any general conversation. He is clever and amusing, and all he says is very interesting.’²⁹ The monarch also wrote to Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, that she had found Wood a remarkable man and an admirable general with, ‘plenty of dash as well as prudence’, and a man of ‘Imperial views, loyal and devoted to Sovereign and country’.³⁰ A real friendship developed between Wood and Victoria, which was to last to her death.

The Boers of the Transvaal region of South Africa had been recently annexed into the Confederation of South Africa. There was real discontent among the Boers over British rule and this was to spill over into open warfare in 1880. The Boers achieved three crushing victories against the British, commanded by Sir George Colley. Gladstone’s government decided to send reinforcements to bolster Colley, and Wood was chosen to accompany the troops. On his departure, Wood wrote to his doctor and physician, Norman Moore, and he displayed a complete ignorance of the difficulties he was to face when he stated, ‘I scarcely expect to see a fight this time and anticipate the rebellion will collapse as soon as the British reinforcements arrive, if not sooner.’³¹ His political naivety was to cost Wood dear.

On his arrival, Wood wasted no time in bringing up a column of reinforcements to support Colley and both men set about planning the next British action against the Boers, who had taken position on Laing’s Nek, which transversed the border of Transvaal and Natal. Wood returned to Pietermaritzburg to encourage the remaining reinforcements forward, and he received a promise from Colley that no further military action would be taken until his return.³² It appears that Colley wished for one last engagement to try to regain his battered reputation and he also believed that the Boers might soon accept British peace overtures, while still in possession of Natal territory. Colley seems to have considered that peace on such terms would have been disreputable and he thus wanted to clear the Boers from Laing’s Nek before peace could be agreed. To this end, on the night of 26/27 February 1881, Colley led a force of 300 troops to occupy the extinct volcano of Majuba, which looked down upon the Boers at Laing’s Nek. Once in place, Colley thought the British occupation of Majuba would make the Boer position untenable and force their retreat. Colley underestimated the resilience of the Boers, and their determination to throw the British off Majuba. The small British force was insufficient to hold the position against a determined attack. The Boers routed the British and in the resulting confusion Colley was killed.³³

On hearing of the defeat, Wood immediately had himself sworn in as Acting Governor of Natal and Administrator of the Transvaal, and rode to Laing’s Nek in an attempt to restore order and moral. While it is clear that Wood’s first concern was for his troops, particularly those besieged in their Transvaal garrisons, he also began planning a fresh action against the Boers. He felt that he needed to buy some time to allow for the arrival of reinforcements and decided to again enter into negotiations with the Boers, with the apparent aim of reaching a settlement. On 5 March, the day before he met Joubert in peace talks, Evelyn telegraphed the Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, and stated: ‘My constant endeavour shall be to carry out the spirit of your orders but considering the disasters we have sustained I think the happiest result will be that after a successful action which I hope to fight in about 14 days, the Boers should disperse without any guarantees, and the many now undoubtedly coerced will readily settle down.’³⁴ Evelyn also confirmed to the Queen that his intention had been to fight before entering into peace negotiations.³⁵

Wood, by agreeing to a truce, had entered the world of politics, and any freedom to negotiate with the Boers he might have possessed was taken out of his hands by the British government. He was even compelled to become one of the Special Commissioners tasked with agreeing peace terms with the Boers. Although Wood was to express privately to the government his dissatisfaction at his position, he felt that he could not resign and carried out the government’s instructions as to the peace negotiations. Many found his actions inexplicable, and one of his sternest critics was the Queen herself. She wrote, ‘Oh! Why have you [Wood] made peace after them [the 3 British defeats] and a peace giving up the Transvaal? It is so unlike Sir E. Wood’s character that the Queen looks for some explanation to what (she is bound to tell him) has produced a very painful impression here and we hear at the Cape too. To give up the Transvaal when the Government maintained they would retain it is very humiliating. The Queen has such faith in Sir E. Wood that she trusts he can explain that this is not so – but she feels anxious and unhappy about it all.’³⁶ Wood was stunned by this criticism and responded by stating, ‘Sir Evelyn Wood is unfortunate in being the instrument of a policy which is condemned as he anticipated it would be by a great majority of the educated classes in England. He is unfortunate in that his proceedings have made his Sovereign anxious and unhappy but he would consider himself as still more unfortunate if the Queen should cease to trust him.’³⁷

Although, after a series of exchanges, Wood was able to explain his actions to the Queen, and regained her trust to the extent that she asked him to name his latest daughter after her, he had little success in pacifying certain sections of the army. Officers in South Africa openly denounced the ‘abject surrender’, and even one of Wood’s own colonels offered his resignation, so disgusted was he by the peace agreement. Even Wolseley bitterly claimed that, if Colley had had 10,000 men at his command, as Evelyn had, he would never have made such a peace, and he furiously declared that by signing the peace treaty Wood ‘has injured our national renown most seriously abroad’.³⁸ Wolseley could not bring himself to forgive Wood for not driving the Boers out of Natal before agreeing a settlement, and his patronage lessened for a number of years, and as a consequence Wood’s career suffered.

Wood was next to see active service in Egypt. Wolseley was given command of a British expedition that was designed to defeat the Egyptian forces commanded by Arabi Pasha, who had led a populist nationalist uprising against the government of Khedive Tewfik. It appears that, following his decision to agree peace terms with the Boers, Wood was a reluctant choice for a command on this expeditionary force, and he was thus forced to seek the support of the Queen to secure a position.³⁹ Despite this patronage, Wolseley appointed Wood to the rather unsatisfactory role of commander of the British forces guarding the lines of communication around Alexandria. Wood’s force also acted in a diversionary manner, while Wolseley led the main British assault on the Egyptian entrenched position of Tel-el-Kebir. To add to Wood’s dissatisfaction, Wolseley took with him Major General Gerald Graham, who was junior to Wood. Graham would later see action at the battles of Magfar, Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir, which must have further angered the ambitious Wood and he wrote to Victoria to express to her how ‘aggrieved’ he was that he had been overlooked and that Graham had been favoured.⁴⁰

With Wolseley’s victory at Tel-el-Kebir, the war was effectively won, and Wood returned to England to resume his command at Chatham. Within a few months he was back in Egypt, following an approach from Lord Granville to accept the position of head, or Sirdar, of the re-commissioned Egyptian army. Granville played upon Wood’s vanity and Wood accepted this new role, although he was to later tell Victoria that he had reluctantly taken the post.⁴¹ The backbone of the training of the new 6,000-strong army fell upon 25 specially selected officers, who were recommended to Wood by the War Office. Wood was blessed with the quality of men he received; thirteen would later rise to the rank of at least Major General in the British army, and many, such as Lord Kitchener, Smith-Dorrien and Sir Archibald Hunter, would become the more enlightened leaders of men in future conflicts.

Wood and his officers made astonishing progress with the Egyptian troops and Wood was later to express his delight at their achievements to the Queen. He candidly stated, ‘The soldiers marched past in a manner which astonished Everyone but none perhaps more than Sir Evelyn himself!’⁴² Despite his delight, Wood was well aware of his men’s limitations. In an openly frank letter to the Duke of Cambridge, in December 1883, Wood stated; ‘these four battalions are as good as Egyptians can be made in ten months and I think will stand up well until their English officers are knocked down, when they would become sheep. I regard the other four battalions as practically useless for Field work.’⁴³

It was thus no surprise to Wood that his Egyptian force was not sent to clear rebels from the Red Sea coast area around Suakin, but that British regulars, under Graham, were chosen. However, when the British government finally agreed to send a force to relieve Gordon in Khartoum, Wolseley was happy to use 2,000 of Wood’s Egyptian army as porters along the lines of communication, with Wood as commander of this force. The futile attempts to rescue Gordon placed extreme stress upon all those involved, but perhaps no more so than Wolseley and his immediate subordinates. Wolseley’s feelings towards Wood, in particular, became more virulent and he stated in his journal that,

There is no doubt that Wood’s Egyptian forces made a positive contribution to the efforts to reach Khartoum and although Wood did make mistakes as Director of Lines of Communication, for example, in his decision to purchase cheap, inferior camels, his usual drive carried the force forward and success was almost achieved. His last task, after resigning his position as Sirdar and resuming his rank in the British forces, was to supervise the withdrawal of troops, from their advanced position at Gakdul back to Korti. This ten-day march, although superbly controlled and handled by Wood, was extremely testing, and Wood’s health suffered to such an extent that on his return Wolseley ordered him to travel back to England to seek rest and medical treatment.⁴⁵

This was to be Wood’s last period of foreign service and, for the rest of his career, he was based in England, where he was at the forefront of army reform. Despite Wolseley’s loathing of Wood’s personality, he did recognise that Wood had an inherent ability as a trainer of men and the zeal of a reformer, and Wolseley thus secured for Wood a number of appointments in which he could demonstrate his skills. The first one of these was as commander of the Eastern District, based at Colchester, but Wood was also to gain command of Aldershot, the army’s main training base, and here he at last had the open space to expand fully his ideas on field training. From 1891, Wood held regular manoeuvres, and he was the first to introduce large-scale manoeuvres, in which all branches of the armed forces were actively engaged. In his official report to the War Office on the lessons learnt from the various exercises, Evelyn clearly outlined that the services had demonstrated a clear lack of understanding of each other and how each unit worked and interacted. Continued exercises soon demonstrated to Evelyn how important it was to educate all men with an understanding of all branches, and he was, for example, keen to teach infantry and cavalry officers the importance of effective artillery fire on the battlefield. On his departure from Aldershot, The Times stated that Wood:

Wood later rose to the rank of Quartermaster General and finally Adjutant General, the second most senior position in the army. Both were secured with the patronage of Wolseley, although the Queen had to take some persuading to support Wood’s candidature for the position of Adjutant General, as she felt that he was a better commander than administrator.⁴⁷ Wood was greatly aided in his new role as Adjutant General by the passing of the Manoeuvres Act of 1898, which he had earlier advocated. This Act allowed greater access to land for exercises, which had always been a hindrance to Wood’s plans for large-scale manoeuvres. His plans were further enhanced when the government purchased 41,000 acres of Salisbury Plain. Here the army was able to assemble two army corps for field manoeuvres. In the months before the mobilisation of forces for South Africa, Wood ensured that this land was utilised for both cavalry and artillery exercises. He was also able to develop and expand the School of Musketry at Hythe, in Kent, and Wood was able to persuade Ian Hamilton to be its new commandant. Both men worked well together and much credit should be given to them for the foresight that resulted in improvements in musketry skills in the British army, which would reap dividends on the fields of France in 1914.⁴⁸

With the outbreak of war with the Boers in 1899, Wood was responsible for the mobilisation of British forces and for their dispatch to South Africa. The efficient manner in which this took place received much praise.⁴⁹ However, Wood was, to a lesser extent than many of his contemporaries such as Wolseley and Buller, criticised for the performance of the British army in its first engagements. Although he managed to avoid most of the criticism directed at the War Office at this time, any ambitions he may have had of active service were dashed. Furthermore, Wolseley bluntly informed Wood that, ‘This Ministry will never employ you in South Africa with the remembrance of the Laing’s Nek Treaty [1881 Peace Treaty].’⁵⁰ There is no doubt that, by signing this treaty, Wood’s active field career was ruined.

Wood’s last task for his friend and patron, Queen Victoria, was to co-ordinate the plans for her funeral. The Queen passed away on 22 January 1901 and, as Adjutant General, Wood worked alongside the Lord Chamberlain and Viscount Esher to ensure that the funeral of 2 February went well. Wood, displaying the same level of military precision he had displayed at army manoeuvres, came away from the day with credit for all his hard work. He had been one of Victoria’s generals and a friend for over twenty years. He would continue to serve his country until his death in 1919. After the Boer War he commanded the Southern District where, with the encouragement of the Commander in Chief, Lord Roberts, Wood furthered his plans for army reform. It was left to the Queen’s son, Edward, to appoint Wood to the rank of Field Marshal in 1903 and he retired from the army the following year. In his retirement he still served the cause of the army; he argued strongly for national conscription and, when this was not forthcoming, supported Haldane’s attempts to raise a Territorial Force. During the First World War he served in an informal capacity and Wood was always ready to make a speech or present a medal if he felt he could benefit the war effort. He outlived all his senior contemporaries and lived to have the satisfaction of seeing British arms victorious against their German foe. On his death, The Times concluded its obituary by stating that Evelyn was a ‘magnificent if not very great man, who lived a magnificent life and did his country service such as it has been given to few to do’.⁵¹ A plaque was erected in St Paul’s Cathedral, the words of which epitomised Wood’s service to his Queen and Empire. It states ‘INTREPID IN ACTION, UNTIRING IN DUTY FOR QUEEN AND COUNTRY.’

Hlobane and Khambula, 1879

Following the crushing Zulu victory at the battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879, the commander of British troops, Lord Chelmsford, was forced to withdraw his remaining forces back across the Thukela River, the physical boundary into Zululand. From his base in Natal, Chelmsford awaited reinforcements and planned the next stage of the campaign, which was centred on relieving the British troops, under Colonel Charles Pearson, who were besieged by the Zulus in the town of Eshowe. At the start of the campaign Colonel Evelyn Wood had been given independent command of Number 4 Column, which comprised approximately 1,500 men of the 1/13th Foot and Wood’s own Regiment, the 90th. He also had a number of native and colonial troops, who were given the names of Wood’s Irregulars and the Frontier Light Horse (FLH), with the latter under the command of Redvers Buller. With news of Isandlwana, Wood realised that any further advance into Zululand was now impractical and he decided to consolidate his forces in a strong defensive position on the slopes of the Khambula Hill.

Over the next few weeks, Wood did not remain idle, and the war now entered a much more brutal phase in which Wood’s men focussed on the need to destroy the Zulus’ homes and economy, in an effort to wear down their resistance. Wood ordered Buller to conduct a number of harrying raids and reconnaissances towards the Hlobane mountain. This activity led the Zulus to fortify further their sanctuary on this mountain by the construction of stone walls, and their vast herds of cattle were moved to graze on the plateau of the mountain. Also, Prince Mbilini, the local Zulu commander, who loyally supported the Zulu King, Cetshwayo, led a series of retaliatory, marauding parties into the neighbourhood of Luneberg and the next weeks were characterised by a series of brutal raids and exchanges between Wood’s forces and the Zulus.

Wood soon earned the fear and respect of the Zulus. Indeed he learnt that they named him Lakuni, which was the native word for the particularly hard wood that was used to make the Zulu’s smashing weapon, the knobkerrie.⁵² Chelmsford was delighted by Wood’s aggressive approach, as well as his coup in enticing a local chief, Prince Hamu, Cetshwayo’s eldest brother, to come over to the British with all his followers. Chelmsford showed his appreciation by appointing Wood as Brigadier General and, when he planned his rescue of Pearson’s men from Eshowe, he turned to Wood for assistance. Chelmsford requested that Wood use his forces to mount a diversionary attack so as to relieve some of the pressure from the British advance on Eshowe.⁵³

The obvious target for Wood was the Zulu mountain stronghold of Hlobane, from which local Zulus had been staging their raids, yet Evelyn had no idea of the number of Zulus on the summit, or of the terrain. His desire to assist Chelmsford seems to have blinded him as to the difficulties of attempting such an operation without proper intelligence. Furthermore, his Zulu spies had already informed him that the main Zulu army had been directed to attack his command. Although correct that Evelyn was to face the main Zulu assault, his spies incorrectly reported that the army had left Ulundi on 27 March and would not be in the vicinity of Hlobane until 30 March at the earliest. In fact the Zulu army had left on 24 March and would reach the mountain on the same morning as Wood’s men were attacking it, on 28 March.⁵⁴

Wood devised a two-pronged assault on Hlobane, with mounted troops under the command of Buller and Cecil Russell. This plan soon met with difficulty as the terrain did not facilitate the easy passage of horses. Indeed Russell’s men were unable even to reach the summit. To compound these difficulties, Wood had no idea that the main Zulu army was rapidly approaching his position. While at Khambula, Wood always insisted that mounted scouts were placed at least 6 miles out from the camp to learn of any impending Zulu attack, yet on the morning of 28 March he took no such precautions, despite the fact that he was aware that the Zulu army was on the move. This must be considered a serious failing on Wood’s part.

When colonial forces, under the command of Colonel Weatherley, sighted the approaching Zulu impi of 20,000 men and reported the fact to Wood, he would not believe them, so sure was he of his own intelligence sources. One of Hamu’s scouts finally convinced Wood that the Zulu impi was on a collision course with his escort party and he immediately dispatched a staff officer to Russell with the following order: ‘There is a large army coming this way from the South. Get into position on the Zunguin [Zungwini] Nek.’⁵⁵ It was apparently Evelyn’s intention that Russell’s force assume a defensive position on the neck of land between the lower plateau of Hlobane and the Zungwini Mountain and from where he would be able to support Buller’s retreat.

Russell had seen the approaching Zulu army, and his men had already withdrawn off the mountain to the position where Wood had intended them to be. However, when giving his order, Wood had confused the place names; he had actually wanted Russell to move to the Zunguin range, where he was now located, not the Zungwini Nek, which was to be found 6 miles to the north-west. Russell decided to accept Evelyn’s instruction without question and moved his force to where it could be of no conceivable help to Buller and his men, whose retreat was soon to become a rout.⁵⁶

Wood made no further contribution to the defeat at Hlobane. In his official report, written two days later, he stated that he and his escort had assumed a position on Zunguin Nek – that being his incorrect version of the nek’s location. However, it is now considered that he occupied an elevated position at the southeastern end of the range, about 2½ miles from the bottom of the plateau. From here he could view the dramatic life-and-death struggles of Buller and his men as they tried to make their escape down the slopes of Hlobane, via what was to become known as the ‘Devil’s Pass’. Wood claimed that he remained in his position until 1900 hours, when he then returned to Khambula.⁵⁷

Hlobane was a disaster for Wood: 15 officers were dead and a further 80 men out of a total European force of 404 were killed. Further losses included well over 100 Hamu warriors and Wood’s Irregulars. However, the fight had delayed the main Zulu army from their attack on Khambula, and Evelyn had thus been given vital time to prepare his defences for the imminent attack. Khambula allowed Wood the opportunity to redeem his failures at Hlobane, as well as conveniently to hide the true scale of the defeat.

The overwhelming threat from the 20,000-strong Zulu army to the entrenched position at Khambula certainly inspired Wood. The Zulus had spent the night just 10 miles from Khambula and in the morning they marched steadily, in five separate columns, towards the camp. Around midday, the Zulu commander, Chief Mnyamana, reminded his warriors of the King’s instruction not to attack the British behind their entrenched position, but to seize the camp cattle, which, it was hoped, would lure the soldiers away from their defences. The attack began at around 1300, with the Zulu army in its customary ‘horns of the buffalo’ formation. The simple plan was for the right and left horns of the army to surround the camp and join forces to raid the cattle kraal. However, the left horn was stalled by the need to cross swampy ground and Wood made a brave and inspired tactical decision to provoke the right horn into an attack before the left horn could join them.

Wood ordered Buller, and 100 of his mounted men, to ride out from the protection of the camp to within 100yd of the right horn and pour volley fire into the mass of warriors, before retreating back to the safety of their laager. This action had the desired result, and the right horn lost its discipline and charged forward into a killing ground of rifle and artillery fire. Evelyn had earlier positioned range-markers, so this British fire was particularly effective.

The survivors of the right horn were in retreat before the left horn could muster its attack. Eventually the left horn managed to mass within 100yd of the cattle laager and Zulu snipers, using British rifles captured at Isandlwana, began to pour a persistent, if somewhat inaccurate, fire into the camp, which forced the British to seek cover. It was at this crucial moment that Private Banks of the 90th saw Evelyn among his men and he described Wood’s actions,

Chapter 2

Evelyn Wood

Stephen Manning

Chronology

Hlobane and Khambula, 1879