Wood experienced several near misses as he exposed himself to enemy fire, ‘I … lost all sense of danger, except momentarily, when, as on five occasions, a plank of the hoarding on which I leant was struck. This jarred my head.’⁵⁹ Wood ordered his young infantrymen to fire volley after volley into the warriors. His men responded and this attack was blunted.

Zulu riflemen now sought cover behind anthills, in ravines and in any ‘dead’ ground that would provide some degree of safety from the British fire. From their cover, the Zulus fired back into the laager. Under intensive fire, Evelyn was forced to withdraw a company of the 13th, and this encouraged a large body of warriors, who had sought refuge in a nearby ravine, to make the 100yd dash to occupy the laager. The remaining British troopers in the cattle kraal were forced to depart hastily and Wood rushed forward to try to save one British infantryman who had fallen in front of the advancing Zulus. He had to be physically restrained by three of his officers, including Lieutenant Lysons, who told his commanding officer, ‘Really it isn’t your place to pick up single men!’⁶⁰ The soldier was saved, although one of the rescuing officers was severally wounded during the sortie. This was the crucial moment of danger for the British during the battle and Wood could see that he could not let the Zulus maintain a hold on the cattle laager. Within a few moments, the number of Zulus there could have swelled to thousands, and it was only a 50yd rush to the main British redoubt.

Evelyn selected two companies of the 90th to charge the Zulus in the laager at bayonet point. In bitter fighting, the British drove the Zulus back to the ravine. Wood now became actively engaged in supporting his men. One Zulu chief, holding a red flag, was standing at the top of the ravine trying to encourage his warriors forward. Wood borrowed a rifle from a nearby trooper and, with his second shot, he hit the Zulu chief who fell back into the ravine. On three further occasions a Zulu warrior picked up the red flag and waved it in defiance and encouragement, only to be shot by Evelyn.⁶¹ Despite this success, the Zulus continued their sniping from the ravine and soon casualties began to mount. Evelyn, realising their position was untenable, ordered the withdrawal of the 90th.

Wood knew that the Zulus snipers must be silenced and he directed his artillery to pour shells into the ravine. This action nullified the enemy riflemen at a vital moment in the battle, as the warriors of the head and centre of the Zulu attack had massed for a direct attack on the main laager. Without the hindrance of sniper fire, Wood was able to repeat the tactic of the bayonet charge, so as to break the Zulu advance before it had a chance to gain momentum. A company of the 13th was sent out to engage the enemy, only to be beaten back by the rushing warriors. However, this retreat brought the now-disorganised Zulus under the British artillery guns and, loaded with case shot, they carved swathes through the warriors, who fled back down the hill. The battle had been raging for nearly 4 hours and still the Zulus had strength and reserve for two more charges, both of which were stopped by rapid and accurate infantry fire.⁶²

The day’s slaughter was not yet over. At around 1730, the Zulu army seemed, individually, to decide to retreat and Evelyn used this opportunity to unleash his mounted troops under the revengeful command of Buller. This act ensured the retreat became a bloody rout. Buller’s men gave no quarter as they pursued the Zulus for over an hour, until darkness ended the mayhem. Over 800 dead Zulus were found within 800yd of the camp. However, the pursuit is estimated to have cost a further 1,500 lives. British casualties, killed and wounded, numbered 83.

Edited copies of Wood’s official report of the events surrounding Khambula were to appear in the newspapers of Britain from around 17 April. Evelyn’s report, as published in major and many provincial newspapers, read,

DESPATCH FROM COLONEL WOOD. Kambula Camp. March 29^th 9.00pm. We assaulted the Kholobana [Hlobane] successfully yesterday and took some thousands of cattle but while on top about 20,000 Zulus coming from Ulundi attacked us, and we suffered considerable losses, the enemy retaking the captured cattle. Our natives deserted. Our camp was attacked today from 1.30pm to 5.30pm in the most courageous manner by about 20,000 men. We have lost about seven officers and seventy killed and wounded, but we have entirely defeated the enemy who were pursued for a considerable distance.⁶³

What Wood did not make clear in this initial report was that the casualty figures referred only to those that occurred at the battle of Hlobane. This ambiguity in the report continued in the press reporting of the events surrounding the two battles. For example, both The Times and the Daily News of 17 April listed Captain Ronald Campbell, Mr Lloyd and Piet Uys as among seven officers and seventy men killed at Khambula, although both men had been slain at Hlobane. Such losses could be accepted if they were linked with a crushing victory. Although the confusion as to casualty figures was finally resolved in May 1879, by then Wood was viewed as the hero of Khambula and his military reputation was assured.

It is clear that both Wood and Buller pursued a policy of ‘total war’ against the Zulus, in which Zulu civilians and property were targeted, and it is certain than many Zulus were killed in their flight from Khambula. Whether Wood could have stopped, or would have wanted to stop, this slaughter is open to doubt. Certainly, by today’s standards, the actions taken by many of his men, including Wood’s Irregulars, would be considered as war crimes, for which, if such events occurred today, he would be held ultimately responsible. On the field of battle Evelyn was a determined and clear-sighted professional soldier of his age, sure of what needed to be done to overwhelm and defeat the enemy. It is certain that he would have viewed the slaughter of fleeing Zulus as a necessary measure that would bring about the defeat of the enemy and the end of the war. There exists no concrete evidence that Evelyn knew of, or actively encouraged, the slaughter of wounded Zulus.

Bibliography

Stephen Manning, Evelyn Wood VC: Pillar of Empire (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007) is the first modern re-assessment of Wood. Previously, the principal sources for Wood were his own autobiographical writings: Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, 2 vols (London: Methuen & Co., 1906) and Winnowed Memories (London: Cassell & Co., 1918). He was also the subject of a chapter in Byron Farwell, Eminent Victorian Soldiers (London: Viking, 1985). Controversial aspects of his role in the Zulu War are covered in Ron Lock, Blood on the Painted Mountain (London: Greenhill, 1995) and in the Anglo-Transvaal War by Joseph Lehmann, The First Boer War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) and John Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion – The First Boer War 1880–81 (London: Pearson/Longman, 2005).