Victoria’s Generals

The second son of James Wentworth Buller, a distinguished Member of Parliament and wealthy landowner, and his wife Charlotte, Redvers Buller was born at the family seat of Downes, Crediton, on 7 December 1839. After graduating from Eton, he chose not to follow his father into politics but instead opted for a career in the military, something most Bullers had traditionally shunned. In May 1858, James Buller purchased for his son a commission in the 60th (King’s Own Rifles) Regiment. In 1859, Ensign Buller joined the 2nd Battalion of his regiment for a brief stint in Benares where the Indian Mutiny was winding down. The following year he joined an Anglo-French expeditionary force sent to Hong Kong and took part in the actions at Taku (Peiho) Forts and Peking (Beijing). Some have described the young Buller during this period as an unlikable figure, known to argue with his fellow officers, whose speech and appearance were altered for the worse by an unfortunate run-in with a horse in China.² All agree, whether they liked him or not, that Buller, even as a young man, was full of conviction. After returning to England, he refused to wear his China medal because he viewed the campaign as unjust.

It was in Canada, where he had been posted as a lieutenant in the 4th Battalion, that the young Buller was transformed into a talented officer under the aegis of his commanding officer, Colonel R B Hawley. Hawley was a great believer in cultivating the qualities of junior officers; delegating responsibility, emphasising the importance of staff duties, making each take charge of the training and leading of his own men. It was also Hawley who gave Buller a great appreciation for the need to maintain the welfare of the rank and file. Buller thrived in this environment for seven years and Hawley’s impact was lasting. To the end of his service, Buller continued Hawley’s practices of always treating the men with respect and providing them with adequate food, shelter and rest. As a result, even in the most difficult times, Buller always retained the warm feelings of his troops. A young (later Lieutenant General) William Francis Butler, whose career for nearly forty years paralleled Buller’s own, described Buller as ‘the best type of regimental officer possible to be found. Young, active, daring, as keen for service as he was ready to take the fullest advantage of it, he stood even then in the front rank of those young and ardent spirits who might be described as the ruck of army life which is waiting to get through.’³

Chronology

7 December 1839	Redvers Henry Buller born at Downes, Crediton, Devon Educated at Harrow and Eton
23 May 1858	Purchased commission as Ensign, 60th Rifles
1859–60	Service in India and China
9 December 1862	Purchased Lieutenancy
1862–70	Service in Canada including Red River Expedition (1870)
28 May 1870	Purchased Captaincy
1871–73	Attended Staff College without completing course
1873–74	Service on Gold Coast
1873	Appointed DAAQMG, Gold Coast
1 April 1874	Promoted Brevet Major
1 April 1874	Appointed DAAG, Horse Guards
30 January 1878	Appointed Special Service Officer, South Africa
22 April 1878	Took command of Frontier Light Horse
11 November 1878	Promoted Brevet Lieutenant Colonel
28 March 1879	Won VC at Hlobane
27 September 1879	Promoted Brevet Colonel
13 March 1880	Promoted Substantive Major
29 March 1880	Appointed Local Major General, South Africa
April 1880	Appointed AAQMG, Scotland
July 1880	Appointed AAQMG, Aldershot
10 August 1882	Married Lady Audrey Jane Charlotte Howard
1 September 1882	Appointed DAQMG, Intelligence Department, Egypt
22 July 1883	Appointed AAG, Horse Guards
1884	Service at Suakin as Chief of Staff
21 May 1884	Promoted Major General
26 August 1884	Appointed Chief of Staff, Gordon Relief Expedition
1 November 1885	Appointed DAG, Horse Guards
16 August 1886	Appointed Special Commissioner for Clare and Kerry, Ireland
15 October 1887	Appointed Quartermaster General
1 October 1890	Appointed Adjutant General
1 April 1891	Promoted Lieutenant General
24 June 1896	Promoted General
9 October 1898	Appointed GOC, Aldershot
9 October 1899	Formally appointed C in C, South Africa
14 October 1899	Sailed for South Africa
25 November 1899	Assumed personal command in Natal
18 December 1899	Superseded as C in C by Roberts
24 October 1900	Departed South Africa after requesting he be relieved
January 1901	Resumed as GOC, Aldershot
21 October 1901	Dismissed from Aldershot Command
2 June 1908	Died at Downes

Appointed CB, 1874; CMG, 1879; KCMG, 1882; KCB, 1885; GCB, 1894; GCMG, 1900

In 1870, Buller returned briefly to Canada to rejoin his regiment for what would be his last service with it. The 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment, along with militia raised in Quebec and Ontario, was assigned the daunting task of traversing some of North America’s most difficult terrain to restore authority over Fort Garry, the former chief outpost of the Hudson Bay Company in Prince Rupert’s Land, which had just been transferred over to the Canadian government. By rail, steamer, canoe and foot, the Red River Expedition would cover some 1,200 miles. Captain Buller quickly caught the eyes of his commander, Colonel Garnet Wolseley, who described him as ‘full of resource, and personally fearless, those serving under him always trusted him fully’.⁴ When the campaign was over, Wolseley put Buller in for a promotion. Although nothing came of it, Buller had won himself a powerful supporter.

Shortly after his return to England, Buller entered the Staff College. He opted out early, however, to tour the Franco-Prussian War battlefields and never returned to take his exams. While busy on the continent, trouble brewed in West Africa. The Ashanti (Asante) King had rejected the Dutch transfer of the fort at Elmina on the Gold Coast (Ghana) to British control. An Asante advance toward Cape Coast Castle led to a general panic among the Fante Confederation and a flood of refugees. Commander John Glover, RN, a former administrator in West Africa, proposed a counter-march on the Asante capital of Kumase and requested Buller’s services. The British government accepted Glover’s recommendations in part but supplemented his plan with an army operation commanded by Wolseley. Buller was appointed Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General and arrived at Cape Coast Castle in October 1873. During the Second Asante War 1873–74, he was primarily responsible for intelligence and ‘from the beginning, show[ed] a skill and judgement worthy of a trained detective’.⁵ He enlisted interpreters, met with local traders, examined prisoners and organised a corps of scouts. He also assisted Wolseley in choosing the path of advance into the interior. It was in this campaign that Buller honed his logistical skills and became a full member of Wolseley’s ‘Ring’.⁶

After convalescing from a fever that sent him home early from the expedition, Buller was promoted to major and took a position as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General at the War Office.⁷ There he remained until 1878. In that year, Lieutenant General Frederic Thesiger, later Lord Chelmsford, was dispatched to the Cape Colony as Commander in Chief, and took Buller with him. Buller participated in the Ninth Frontier War against the Ngqika-Gcaleka as a staff officer and also commanded the Frontier Light Horse, an amalgamation of locally recruited Britons, Boers and others. The Frontier Light Horse was his first independent command. Upon the conclusion of the war, Buller did not return to the Cape with his men but instead was ordered up country where trouble was brewing with the Mpondo. It was against the Zulu, however, that recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Buller would next command his men in battle.

By late 1878, Sir Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, had come to the conclusion that the Zulu needed to be eliminated as an independent people capable of threatening British influence in the region. Border violations provided Frere with the ammunition he needed, and despite resistance from London, he issued an ultimatum in December to Cetshwayo, the Zulu chief. Unable to meet the demands that would have disbanded the Zulu army and seriously curtailed his authority over his people, Cetshwayo had no choice but to allow the ultimatum to lapse and accept the inevitability of war. The Anglo-Zulu War began in January 1879.

Even before the start of the conflict, Buller and the Frontier Light Horse, as part of the more than 2,200-man column commanded by Brigadier General Evelyn Wood, had crossed the Ncome River and moved into north-west Zululand. Buller had developed a close relationship with Wood in the Asante campaign and the two would remain on good terms throughout their careers. Buller’s primary responsibilities were patrolling and leading the irregular horse in reconnaissance operations. While Chelmsford’s centre column was being surprised at Isandlwana, Wood’s column operated without major obstacles through most of January. With Buller’s able assistance, Wood was able to advance on the White Mfolozi gathering livestock, clearing the area and inducing lesser Zulu chiefs to surrender. Buller led the mounted forces in a number of successful skirmishes during this movement. After Isandlwana, however, Wood cautiously took his forces back across the Mfolozi River.

With the ruin of the centre column and the inability of another column to move forward from Eshowe, Wood provided the only offensive operations for the British in early February. Chelmsford relied on Wood and Buller to turn the war around. ‘You two will have to pull me out of the mire,’ he optimistically heliographed to Wood.⁸ And, indeed, they did. Throughout February and into mid-March, Wood continued to press the Zulu by authorising Buller to conduct several successful punitive raids around Hlobane. Seizing cattle hurt Cetshwayo’s ability to conduct operations and weakened his people’s resolve, which led to a number of defections. Buller assisted in the movement and protection of these growing refugees.

In late March, Wood decided to strike at Hlobane, a site where the Qulusi chief had taken up a defensive position. If he could not directly engage the Qulusi, he would still satisfy himself by taking the hundreds of cattle grazing on Hlobane’s two plateaux. Buller and Lieutenant Colonel J C Russell were put in charge of the two advancing parties. On 28 March, at 0330, under the cover of a thick mist, Buller began his ascent of the eastern slope of the mountain, while Russell, shortly afterwards, moved on the western slope.⁹ The terrain, sheer cliffs, crevices and a narrow winding foot path, was difficult to traverse to say the least, but to make things worse for the British, it also allowed for as many as 3,000 Zulu to keep their positions well hidden.¹⁰ Buller was able to reach the summit and, after a brief attack led by Piet Uys and Captain Robert Barton, the Zulu fled. Most of Buller’s men immediately began gathering cattle on the higher plateau, while Barton was ordered to take a few men down the hill and bury the dead. Russell, likewise, was able to make it up the western slope, although with greater difficulty, and he too gave orders to seize the Zulu cattle. Neither Buller nor Russell had realised that they had walked into a trap.

Although the Zulu on the summit had been surprised by the timing of the British advance, they had expected that an eventual attack would come and had prepared for it. The terrain atop Hlobane provided perfect cover for them. Increasing pressure was put on Buller’s party as the morning went on. To make matters worse, Cetshwayo had also prepared for a British attack and had ordered an army from Ulundi (oNdini) to move against Wood’s column. He had expected to meet Wood at Khambula. Some of Wood’s irregulars had seen Zulu campfires the night before but had not alerted their officers.¹¹ That army had now caught up with the British having been redirected to Hlobane. Wood spotted the advancing Zulu in force, perhaps as many as 20,000 strong, moving in from the south and sent runners up the mountain to warn Buller and Russell.¹² Buller and Russell did not need to read Wood’s message. They both spotted the approaching Zulu and ordered their men to descend the mountain. The Qulusi had also seen the Zulu and more came out of their hiding places to engage the British, sometimes coming within a hundred yards.¹³ Russell was ordered to position his men to cover Buller’s retreat. He misinterpreted those orders, however, and moved westward toward Zungwini Nek.¹⁴ Buller would eventually reach the same position but not until after coming close to utter disaster. He had gathered most of his men together and had retreated across the long plateau. As difficult as the ascent had been, the descent was much worse. The narrow cattle track that he and his men followed often had jumps downward of 5ft at a time. Barton, with his burial party, was ordered to retreat down the right side of the mountain.¹⁵ He and most of his men were killed.

Buller was one of the last to come down Hlobane. Piet Uys was with him, but returned to the mountain when he learned his son had yet to make it. Uys was killed. Buller also returned at least twice and was credited for personally saving the lives of four of his men, acts of supreme bravery that earned him the VC. Wood learned of the details of the rescues only with great difficulty because Buller refused to discuss them.¹⁶ The British retreat was only salvaged by the Zulu decision to regain their cattle and rest rather than pursue them. In all, 15 British officers and about 80 men were killed, in addition to as many as 100 auxiliaries.

As the bulk of the British force escaped to Khambula, Buller was put in charge of the evacuation of the wounded. Even after that was accomplished, he still could not rest. At 2100, he learned that there were still some soldiers trying to find their way to the camp. He and some volunteers from the Frontier Light Horse rode out at once to meet them and brought in the last survivors from Hlobane. It may be true, as Waller Ashe and E V Wyatt-Edgell wrote in their 1880 account of the Anglo-Zulu War, that Buller ‘did all that a skilled general could effect to bring off his men with small loss’, and, as Wood’s report details, that because of Buller’s ‘grand courage and cool head that nearly all the dismounted men were saved’.¹⁷ Yet, if it were not for the events of the next day Buller’s actions would only be remembered as one bright spot in a dismal battle and Wood and Buller’s decision to attack Hlobane would have met with serious scrutiny at the top levels.

Wood had anticipated that the Zulu would move on Khambula and had ordered his 2,000 men and 6 guns inside the camp’s perimeter. With a fort already situated on the high ground, Wood took decisive defensive measures: a laager was thrown up and reinforced with bags of mealies, an earthwork redoubt was hastily built, the cattle were secured, ammunition boxes were distributed and opened and range-markers were placed all around the approaches to the camp. In his report on the battle of Khambula on 29 March, Buller wrote ‘as we were sadly musing over the events of the day before, our scouts came in to say that the Zulu army we had left in the valley below were on the move, and about 10 they came in sight, moving in five very heavy columns. We at once commenced preparations for defence’.¹⁸ For his part, Buller was happy to encourage the attack, riding out to meet the Zulu as they arrived, pulling them towards the British defences, and then retreating to the safety of the laager. Buller wrote,

Khambula is a battle that should never have taken place; Cetshwayo had given clear directions to his commander, Chief Mnyamana, to avoid it. Why the Chief defied his King is not known for sure, but as John Laband has argued, it probably occurred as a result of the competition among young Zulu warriors who eagerly sought glory on the battlefield. They probably forced their general into making the change in plans.²⁰ Buller was also right in stating that his tactic had upset the Zulu plans. A traditional Zulu formation on the battlefield took the shape of a bull’s horns. The bulk of the attacking warriors would walk in tight formation, several ranks deep. Once they came into contact with the enemy, smaller groups of men on both sides would extend around and gradually close in. At Khambula, Buller provoked the right horn into attacking prematurely. As it chased him back to camp across open ground, it was hit by overwhelming British firepower without any cover to seek. Within 45 minutes, before the Zulu centre and left horn could be brought into the fight, the right horn was annihilated.

Despite this setback, Zulu morale remained high and the remaining troops moved on the British right and centre. This attack was better co-ordinated and sustained. Armed with many Martini-Henrys, the Zulu unleashed a devastating firepower of their own. Although it required two sorties, the British managed to repulse the left horn’s attack on their cattle laager and kept the Zulu centre from reaching their trenches. Canister fire was particularly effective against the densely packed advancing Zulu. Wave after wave of assaults was checked and after more than three hours, this attack ended in defeat as well.

As the sun was setting, Wood sensed victory and prepared Buller and his mounted troops for pursuit. What followed next was a massacre. Buller was ‘like a tiger drunk with blood’, wrote the commander of the Kaffrarian Rifles, F X Schermbrucker.²¹ Commandant Cecil D’Arcy, Frontier Light Horse, one of the men Buller had saved at Hlobane, reputedly yelled to his men, ‘No quarter, boys, and remember yesterday!’²² The retreating Zulu were in no condition to offer any organised resistance. Many were too tired even to raise their rifles. Although a few prisoners were taken, true to D’Arcy’s exclamation, most of the Zulu did not receive quarter. The pursuit continued all the way back to Hlobane. Nearly 800 bodies were found the next day, but perhaps as many as 2,000 Zulu were killed in the onslaught. The British lost just eighteen men and suffered sixty-five additional casualties at the battle of Khambula.

For the next two-and-a-half months, Wood’s column remained in and around Khambula. Wood’s success in late March, thanks in part to Buller’s role, allowed Chelmsford to renew his offensive. However, it was not until mid-June that the reconstituted column began its advance toward the Zulu capital of Ulundi. During this period of relative inactivity, Buller’s responsibilities included overseeing daily patrols, seizing Zulu cattle and keeping the Zulu occupied. He was also assigned, for a time, the task of keeping a celebrity visitor out of harm’s way. Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial, had made his way to South Africa in a British uniform thanks to his family’s connections. Chelmsford did what he could to keep him out of any real danger. Buller allowed the Prince Imperial to accompany him on several patrols. However, during one such reconnaissance mission with the Frontier Light Horse, he found him to be too reckless and refused to take responsibility for his safety again.²³ A few days later, on 1 June, while on patrol with Lieutenant J B Carey, the Prince Imperial was killed by the Zulu. Buller and Wood were riding ahead of the column when they were approached and told the news by Carey. Buller was furious with Carey and accused him of abandoning the Prince Imperial. Carey was later court-martialled and found guilty, but, thanks to the intervention of Empress Eugénie and Queen Victoria, the sentence was never ratified.

With his impending supercession by Wolseley, Chelmsford was determined to move quickly and finish the campaign. Upon receiving no reply from his 30 June ultimatum, he put Buller in charge of reconnaissance and ordered him to advance as far as he could toward Ulundi, selecting the best ground from which to attack, and determining the location and size of the Zulu force. Not only did Buller gather all the information requested but he wisely avoided a Zulu trap. Chelmsford later called Buller’s operations, ‘one of the finest episodes in this eventful war’.²⁴

Confident from the day’s activity and aware of the Zulu force, its position and the likely strategy that it would employ, Chelmsford ordered an attack the next morning, 3 July, at 0645. Buller’s mounted troops would be the first to cross the White Mfolozi before holding up to take their place near the front of the forming square. As at Khambula, Buller provoked the Zulu to come within firing range by engaging them in two ranks and retiring alternately. Once his force had returned to the safety of the square, Chelmsford left it to the infantry’s volley fire to finish off the Zulu. For most of the battle, the Zulu failed to come within 65m of the British force. And, as at Khambula, once the attack had faltered, orders were given for pursuit. ‘Buller had posted the mounted infantry so as to fire within the flank of the retiring enemy, and the remainder of his mounted men, making for the country beyond, killed some 450 in the pursuit.’²⁵ All fleeing Zulu were hunted down and killed or left to die from their wounds. Only two prisoners were taken.²⁶ Ulundi was burned to the ground before noon.

It was left to Wolseley to hunt down Cetshwayo and to develop a strategy that would prevent future Zulu challenges to British authority. Wolseley wanted Buller to remain in South Africa, but he simply was too tired and veldt sores had crippled his hands.²⁷ He returned home with a CMG, was promoted to Colonel, and was appointed aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria. Buller refused to join the celebrations that followed the end of the war, even snubbing an invitation by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli because Chelmsford was not offered the same.

In 1880, his battalion was ordered to Afghanistan, but Buller was sent to Scotland as Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General of the Northern British District. After just a few months he was transferred to Aldershot to take up the same post. His stay there was also brief. The First Anglo-Boer War had erupted and Buller was ordered to return to South Africa. He arrived in Cape Town on 27 February 1881, the same day that British forces were defeated at Majuba Hill and the British commanding officer, George Colley, was killed. Reuniting with Wood, the new commanding officer, Buller pressed for an immediate offensive against the Boers. The British government, however, wanted peace not a prolonged war and Wood and Buller were made negotiators. Buller was furious: ‘I like the Boers,’ he wrote, ‘and am glad to see them get their country back, but I do not think that either the time or manner of the settlement arrived at was fortunate.’²⁸ He remained in South Africa for much of the rest of the year, taking up an administrative position in Natal.

In 1882, after marrying Lady Audrey Howard, Buller had to cut his honeymoon short to take up an appointment as Chief of Intelligence in Wolseley’s expedition to Egypt to put down the Arabi revolt. Buller was the ‘brain of Wolseley’s little army’ and most notably carried out the reconnaissance of Tel-el-Kebir on the day before that decisive battle.²⁹ Although British artillery could not locate Buller’s chosen point for the attack, Wolseley achieved victory nonetheless with little loss of British life.³⁰ Wolseley’s expedition, thanks in part to his efficient staff, secured British objectives in Egypt. For his part in the campaign, Buller was given a KCMG and shortly after his return to Great Britain was made Assistant Adjutant General at the War Office.

Once again, however, Buller’s administrative responsibilities at home were interrupted by conflict in Africa. The failure of an Anglo-Egyptian army under William Hicks (Hicks Pasha) to deal with Mahdist forces in the Sudan at the end of 1883 led to direct British army intervention. Buller was sent to Suakin as Chief of Staff and second in command to Major General Sir Gerald Graham. In addition to staff duties, Buller also commanded the 1st Infantry Brigade. After concentrating near the coast at Trinkitat, Graham led his forces into battle against Osman Digna’s followers at El Teb on 29 February 1884. Buller employed his brigade in a traditional square, and although the enemy was able to penetrate it, the formation held fast. At Tamai, two weeks later, Buller repeated the tactic. Although his square held once again, a second square, commanded by Colonel Davis, fell apart. Buller was able to support Davis and to overcome desperate hand-to-hand combat. After this more difficult victory, Graham’s force returned to Suakin where it was given instructions not to press further. In April, the force was withdrawn to Cairo and Buller was sent back to the War Office, where he was promoted Major General.

A little over a month after the withdrawal, Mahdist forces seized the town of Berber, cutting off Khartoum, the Egyptian administrative capital of the Sudan, from all British support. In August, Parliament authorised and provided funds for a relief expedition. Well before that, Wolseley had already mounted his campaign to lead it. He proposed an advance up the Nile River rather than a desert march along the Suakin–Berber route. This plan was highly contested by most of the officers who had genuine experience in the region. But Wolseley wanted to repeat the successful strategy of the Red River campaign, relying on small boats to carry his force some 600 miles. Buller loyally supported his chief and wrote letters to the War Office asserting the feasibility of the strategy. When Wolseley was chosen to lead the expedition, Buller was appointed his Chief of Staff.

Wolseley brought with him to Egypt almost his entire surviving ring. But these men were no longer eager junior officers willing to perform their tasks obediently. They were some of the leading minds and most ambitious men in the late Victorian army, and they clashed with one another and with their chief. Buller rarely saw Wolseley during the entire campaign and received messages from him that often alternated between support and scorn. Buller’s failure to acquire enough coal for the Nile steamers that caused a delay in the advance, in particular, upset Wolseley. ‘What an odd man is Buller,’ Wolseley wrote in his diary, ‘I should never again have him as Chief of Staff.’³¹ Buller never seems to have been too interested in the campaign. Perhaps this was a result of his indifference to the fate of Charles Gordon, the popular Victorian ‘hero’ who commanded the post in Khartoum. Buller even questioned whether Gordon was ‘worth the camels’.³²

As preparations were being made for the advance up the river, a desert column under Sir Herbert Stewart had repulsed the enemy at Abu Klea on 17 January 1885, and was moving towards Metemmeh. At Abu Kru, a few days later, Stewart was mortally wounded in a brief skirmish. Command of the column devolved to Sir Charles Wilson, an officer who inspired little confidence in his men, and more importantly, was an outsider to Wolseley’s Ring.³³ As soon as he learned the news, a dejected Wolseley dispatched Buller to take command. ‘Above all,’ Wolseley wrote caringly, ‘don’t get wounded; I can’t afford to lose you.’³⁴

‘The minds of all now turned to Redvers Buller, the fighting Buller’, the future Lord Dundonald wrote: ‘Let us have Buller here, every one said, and then reinforced we will march to Khartoum and smash the Mahdi. Alas! It was not to be. Buller came, not to avenge as we hoped, but to lead our retirement, the first step in the abandonment of the Soudan.’³⁵ Dundonald was right. Buller could have pressed the enemy, but he doubted the capability of his troops to fend off further attacks from an enemy whose numbers were increasing daily and he worried about his sick and wounded and his growing lack of supplies. Wolseley sent Buller often contradictory orders, and Buller replied in kind. He considered attacking Metemma, then Berber, and then thought about a decisive strike at Abu Klea. But his actions were anything but decisive. Most likely, Buller had made his mind up after the fall of Khartoum. He complained to Wolseley that his troops were worn out both physically and morally and he was not going to risk an offensive. Wolseley was far from confident in his subordinate’s appraisal of the desert column’s situation, but the river column was experiencing troubles of its own.³⁶ The British advance ground to a halt. When Prime Minister Gladstone ordered the expedition’s recall, Buller stayed behind to oversee the evacuation. He finally returned home in August with a KCB and was made Deputy Adjutant General of the forces, serving again under Wolseley. This appointment was followed in 1886 with a very controversial fourteen-month tenure spent in Ireland trying to restore order and ending up earning the wrath of both the government and the Irish landlords.

After the Gordon relief expedition, Buller did not see battle again until he was sent to South Africa in 1899, but he remained very busy for the next decade and a half working to reform the British army. In 1887, Buller returned to the War Office first as Quartermaster General and then, in 1890, as Adjutant General. These were very productive years and he thrived as an administrator. Buller can be credited with accomplishing four major tasks during these years. First, he improved the service conditions for the enlisted as regards to food, quarters and uniforms. Secondly, he revised the Manual of Military Law. Thirdly, he drafted a new Drill Book. And fourthly, and most significantly, he created the Army Service Corps.³⁷ The creation of a special corps, like the Royal Engineers, to deal with issues related to supply and transport, brought a high level of professionalism to these neglected areas of staff service, raised the importance of logistics and, at the same time, provided flexibility to deal with local concerns. Since every unit would be given Army Service Corps officers and its own allotment of transport and supply, commanders would have more control over their movement, making them less dependent on any central command. This system, which proved effective during the first months of the South African War, was dismantled by Lord Roberts upon his arrival.

Buller developed a good working relationship with Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal Secretary of War from 1892–95, and when the 76-year-old Commander in Chief of the British army, the Duke of Cambridge, was forced to resign in 1895, Campbell-Bannerman pushed for Buller over Wolseley as his replacement. Buller was very uncomfortable with this decision.³⁸ He saw the move as an act of disloyalty to his old chief. But many Liberals were upset with Wolseley over his position on Home Rule, the Queen was pushing for her son, the Duke of Connaught, and Buller appeared to be a good compromise candidate. However, on the day of the appointment, 21 June 1895, the government fell over a vote on ammunition reserves. The new Conservative government appointed Wolseley as Cambridge’s successor.

When Buller’s appointment ended as Adjutant General he was placed on half pay for a year and then was promoted to full general, succeeding the Duke of Connaught in the command at Aldershot. There, in 1898, Buller conducted six days of manoeuvres. He did a poor job. ‘I have been making a fool of myself all day,’ he was overheard saying.³⁹ Buller had not handled men in many years and sitting behind a desk no doubt had taken away his edge. It was this older Buller, out of shape, with a strong penchant for good food and wine, who had come to doubt his abilities, who was appointed the Commander in Chief of the British army in South Africa a year later when hostilities broke out between the British and the Boers.

As early as April 1899, many in Lord Salisbury’s Cabinet had come to accept that war with the Boers for the control of South Africa was likely. In that month, Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Milner, the High Commissioner in South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony, Lord Wolseley, Buller and others sat down to discuss strategy. The group was very divided and remained so into the summer. With the failure of direct negotiations between Milner and Paul Kruger, the President of the South African Republic, however, it became imperative to prepare for the inevitable. Despite reservations, Wolseley recommended the appointment of Buller as the commander of the expedition. Buller had his own reservations about accepting the offer. ‘I said that I always considered that I was better as second in a complex military affair then as the officer in chief command,’ Buller wrote.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he accepted the most difficult challenge of his military career.

South Africa, 1899–1900

Planning for the war was haphazard because the government was still reluctant to commit itself. According to Buller, during the summer and into the autumn, he had very little influence on some of the most basic yet crucial decisions that shaped the direction of the war. For example, Buller later claimed that he had no control over the appointment of his commanders and senior staff officers, he was not invited to attend meetings of the Army Mobilisation Board, his recommendations regarding the size and composition of the Field Force were ignored, and perhaps, most stunningly, he had little control over strategy.⁴¹ Buller had relied upon the advice and the information presented by his old friend, William Butler, who until July 1899 and his forced resignation had served as the Commander in Chief of British forces in South Africa. Butler had warned that the Cape Colony and Natal, in particular, were open to invasion and Britain did not have enough troops in South Africa to defend their frontiers adequately. Butler encouraged a defensive strategy until reinforcements could arrive, and this incorporated a retreat from any currently held forward positions, including the garrison town of Ladysmith.⁴² This strategy, which Buller endorsed, was rejected by politicians and subverted by officers in the field. Also, for the actual route of the British advance into the Boer Republics, Buller favoured a concentration of forces in the Cape Colony followed by a movement through the Orange Free State, a plan Lord Roberts later implemented. Buller promoted this plan of action even before the Orange Free State’s intentions were known. However, Lansdowne thought differently. Lansdowne did not want to do anything to upset the Free State and was also concerned about the political ramifications of a Boer occupation of the northern Natal, a sentiment that Natal politicians echoed.⁴³ In the end, Buller was pressured to comply with political needs and popular demands and altered his original intentions. That Buller felt frustrated with the sometimes indifferent planning and political obstruction can be seen clearly by his decision to go directly to Salisbury in early September.⁴⁴

The Boer ultimatum and Britain’s refusal to comply with its demands led to the declaration of war on 11 October 1899. Buller sailed for Cape Town a few days later and arrived on 30 October. Assessing the situation, he was filled with immediate anxiety and pessimism as he wrote to his brother, Tremayne, on 3 November: ‘I am in the tightest place I have ever been in, and the worst of it is that it is I think none of my creating. I don’t know if I can … get out of it alright, and I think if I fail that [it] is fair my family should know afterwards what at any rate I had to say in my own defence.’⁴⁵ There was certainly reason to despair. Despite Buller’s opposition, British forces had gone on the offensive in Natal, had pushed their way to Dundee and Talana Hill, and were now forced to abandon these forward positions because of the enemy’s advances. Similarly, Lieutenant General Sir George White had failed at Nicholson’s Nek and, despite Buller’s warnings, had allowed his troops to get entrapped in Ladysmith. Two other Boer sieges had been laid at Kimberley and Mafeking and there were not yet enough troops in the Cape Colony to stop a Boer advance at the frontier which only aggravated the general fear that a sizeable portion of the Cape’s Dutch population would rise up and join their Free State and Transvaal brethren. Buller may have had good reasons to be concerned but his letter gives credence to the comments later made by Leo Amery, one of Buller’s fiercest critics, that Buller was more than just concerned; he ‘had completely lost heart’.⁴⁶

Buller’s actions, however, did not betray his doubts. His decision to head to Natal and personally lead the operations to relieve Ladysmith, something for which he came under much attack, was decisive as was his order to break up the Army Corps.⁴⁷ ‘I therefore decided upon every ground that the deliverance of South Natal must be my first object,’ Buller wrote, ‘But at the same time I felt it impossible to ignore Kimberley. That town represented to the Native the symbol of British power and property in South Africa; and I feared the effect of its fall.’⁴⁸ If all went well, the Boers would be forced out of Natal, Ladysmith would be relieved, and Buller could then return to his original plan of moving on Bloemfontein via Kimberley. Things, however, did not go well.

On 7 December, Major General William Gatacre’s force suffered a serious setback at Stormberg. Two days later, Lieutenant General Lord Methuen’s 1st Division was stopped at Magersfontein. To relieve Ladysmith, Buller had originally selected a route that crossed the Tugela River at Potgeiter’s Drift. From there, he hoped to move through open country across the enemy’s flank. The two failures, however, made him choose a new plan, one that he had initially ruled out because of the great risks posed by a massed enemy force well entrenched in extremely difficult terrain. ‘With an enemy disheartened by failure I thought myself justified, in the peculiar circumstance, in risking a flank march of fifty miles with an enormous wagon-train, even though it might involve the uncovering of my communications,’ Buller wrote. ‘With an enemy elated by success this was no longer justified. I therefore determined to try to force the direct road to Ladysmith.’⁴⁹ After a two-day bombardment, Buller ordered a general assault of the enemy’s positions at Colenso.

Buller was not optimistic on the morning of 15 December. Lansdowne had notified him that no reinforcements were forthcoming. White felt that he could not risk any attempt to break out and offer support. The mounted force he had, Buller believed, was insufficient to threaten the enemy’s flanks or its lines of communication. He had poor maps and little information on the Boer position. And, as many of his contemporaries have noted, Buller disliked losing life, and certainly a success at Colenso was going to require a heavy sacrifice of men.⁵⁰

The Boer position at Colenso was indeed strong but not impossible to breach. The capture of Hlangwane Hill would have dangerously exposed their flank to British artillery and rifle fire. Whether Buller recognised this and thought that the risks were too great to attempt to capture the position – Dundonald was sent there but was eventually ordered to retreat – or whether he failed truly to appreciate Hlangwane’s importance is contested.⁵¹ The written orders of Clery, the general nominally in charge of the attack at Colenso, do suggest that Buller saw some importance in taking the position but his actions the day of the battle indicate that the movement against Hlangwane was nothing more than a sideshow.⁵²

Chapter 3

Redvers Buller

Stephen M Miller

Chronology

South Africa, 1899–1900