FOURTH COMMENTARY
55 BCE
The consular year of Pompey and Crassus should have been Pompey’s great year for undivided glory.
It certainly began well, when Crassus’ son Publius, one of Caesar’s legates, brought a thousand legionaries over the Alps and down to Rome to offer whatever muscle was deemed necessary to get the right election result. Crassus was still at his father’s house in Rome in February when he met Cicero there. The soldiers were well-trained and obedient, making the winter march of nearly 2,000 miles roundtrip—many weeks on the march. Clearly the generalissimos thought them important and useful.
The most remarkable event of the year at Rome was the dedication of the senior consul’s great contribution to the cityscape, known as the Theater of Pompey. A stone theater was unprecedented at Rome, where performances had always relied instead on jerry-built wooden structures dismantled after the shows. Pompey had seen better on his eastern expeditions and correctly intuited an opportunity. The resulting building, just outside the ancient city’s pomerium in the Campus Martius near today’s Campo de’ Fiori, was a theater and more. It offered spacious gardens, shaded colonnades for the display of sculpture and other works of art, a meeting hall for the Senate’s occasional use, the immense theater itself (the stage front facing the house was about 100 yards long, and the distance from the stage to the farthest and highest seat was about 175 yards, leaving seats for perhaps 10,000 people, perhaps twice that), and finally, perched high atop the seats of the theater, a temple to the goddess Venus Victrix (“the victorious”), Pompey’s favorite. Given old prejudices about theaters, actors, and immorality, the temple’s presence in the complex mitigated the presence of a permanent theater in the eyes of traditionalists.
In sum, the building was a monument to Pompey and arguably the grandest construction in the city at that date. Caesar in a few years rejoined, as we shall see, by constructing the first of the “imperial forums,” an extension to the old forum on its northeast side, but Pompey had made his mark. The dedication was accompanied by shows and celebrations enough to mark this as a year to be remembered. Cicero heralded the event by anticipating the most elaborate and magnificent games in living memory, such as had never been seen before and could not be imagined to be seen again. When it came to the event, a performance of Accius’ play about Clytemnestra featured 600 mules on the stage, Naevius’ play about the Trojan Horse had 3,000 wine bowls on view, and all the battle scenes had soldiers fabulously armed.
The Senate would meet in its hall at Pompey’s theater complex on the Ides of March in 44.
There was still Roman business to be settled on behalf of the triumvirs, meanwhile, and so a law was passed by April 27 formally assigning Syria and Spain to the consuls for five years. The matter was still contentious and the gangs were out. Four people were killed and many wounded in the brawls, with Crassus himself personally drawing a senator’s blood. On the same day, a separate law extended Caesar’s time in Gaul by five years. Just how that five years would be counted was a matter of disagreement from then until the civil war of 49 broke out, and modern scholars are scarcely less divided. It would appear that the law, improbably, did not set an explicit end date. Our most solid indication of how the situation was read comes in Hirtius’ continuation to these commentaries, where he says that in 51 both Caesar and the Gauls knew he would have only one more summer (of the year 50) in which to campaign, and both planned their strategies accordingly. The end of 50 and the beginning of 49 then saw the outbreak of civil war as Caesar returned to Italy. So the campaigns of this summer of 55 were in effect the first steps of the new proconsular term.
Without the delays of earlier years, Caesar rejoined the army earlier than usual in response to reports that two German nations, the Usipetes and the Tencteri, had crossed the Rhine and invaded Gaul. Caesar’s story is blunt and painful. He defeated them without loss of Roman life while his men slaughtered some vast number of the enemy. Caesar is quite barefaced in asserting the intention and the achievement of slaughter, so much so that he happily exaggerates. Read his text carefully and he manages to imply without saying that the whole of the enemy force was slaughtered (with many killed, the rest threw themselves into the river and perished) and he gives a number for them of 430,000. The number certainly shocks: we just have to remember that it cannot possibly be the number of fatalities. The likelihood that Caesar had a count of the enemy that was anywhere near accurate is very slight. In battle many were killed, certainly; afterwards the rest fled, quite probably; many were seen plunging into the river to escape, very likely indeed; every last one of them drowned or was killed by hostile action on trying to leave the river—quite impossible. Forty years later, the Usipetes, Tencteri, and Sugambri crossed the Rhine again and defeated and killed a Roman general. A mighty force they must have been to lose 430,000 and recover in a generation.1
What we can take away from the episode is that Caesar had the chance to act ruthlessly and did so and wanted it known that he had acted with no limits and no leniency to destroy an enemy force. Just as with the previous year’s enslavement of Aduatuci captives, we should pause to consider with horrified astonishment the logistics and manpower requirements of slaughter on such a scale, whatever the numbers.
“Germany,” that place across the Rhine, that supreme otherwhere, was at this instant less threatening than before, with the invading army destroyed. Caesar took a chance on that estimate of safety and led his men to the Rhine and beyond. They crossed the river in good order, spent eighteen days there without seeing an enemy, lay terrorist waste to several towns, and returned to Gaul. It’s hard to evaluate a show of force for effect, but this was scarcely a great military achievement. Caesar’s narrative, however, makes the crossing itself a mighty work by recounting the building of the bridge his army used, an achievement no aficionado of military prowess who reads this book ever fails to praise.
The main thing to recall about this bridge is that Caesar didn’t need one—boats would have done just fine—, but there was ostentation to begin with in building the bridge (to impress the local population) and ostentation again in talking about it in great deal in his report of the year. The self-praise has had its desired effect.
If the story is accurate, it is impressive. In a 400-yard-wide channel, twenty-six substantial piers had to be roughed out and sunk into the riverbed over ten days’ construction. Experts observe that that kind of pile-driving required equipment and management—and boats from which to work. The resulting bridge’s roadbed would have been about 25 feet wide, so the piers, angled to support, were perhaps 40 yards apart. (Where did he cross? Somewhere on the 75-mile stretch of Rhine between Cologne and Koblenz.)
So the great mission to Germany was a bust. No enemies, no battles, no victories, no plunder. After demonstrating the strength of his presence, Caesar heard that the Sugambri had gathered a large force in woodland fastnesses and were prepared to do battle. So he turned around and marched back to Gaul looking for another adventure and put the best face he could on the crossing.
Slaughtered enemies and going boldly where no Roman had gone before were not enough for Caesar, however, and so he took one more cast at Pompey-rivaling glory this year, achieving another anticlimax. He made for Britain.
Just how much Caesar knew of Britain is hard to read, for we can barely surmise who and how reliable his sources might have been. We meet here for the first time a remarkable Gaul, Commius, leader of the Atrebates, a nation from the vicinity of Lille, easily into the “Belgic” regions where Caesar was more skeptical of native aptitude for civilization. For this trip to Britain, Commius appears as trusted partner and guide, as indeed is plausible for one coming from a territory that now hosts one portal of the modern Channel Tunnel. Commius, with a cavalry detachment, accompanied Caesar and sought to negotiate with the Britons but found himself held as prisoner or hostage, released when Caesar concluded negotiations. (The next year he would accompany Caesar to Britain again and negotiate more successfully on his behalf. For the time being, the Atrebates were untaxed by Caesar, but we will see relations with them deteriorate in 53–52. Commius joined the great revolt of 52, remaining hostile into 51, when he eventually made peace on condition that he need not deal with Romans again. A gaudy later story has him fleeing the mainland, pursued in a small boat by Caesar himself, escaping to permanent refuge in Britain.)
The crossing to Britain, both this year and in 54, was challenging for Caesar for several reasons. The tides and currents of the open ocean were hard for Romans to imagine and manage when all their sea experience came from the tideless Mediterranean. Heavy-laden rowing ships were anything but nimble in the waters of the English Channel. On both trips, Caesar’s arrival in Britain put him at some disadvantage, which he describes, both in terms of position and condition of his ships. He took two legions on this trip, the tenth and the seventh, quickly realized that he had no force with which to do anything, and made his way back to Gaul by late September.
Here again, he made more story than was strictly called for, the better to make an impression. Caesar’s success in telling the story is reflected seventy or so years later in the version told by the writer Valerius Maximus (3.2.23), who turns the brave centurion of the tenth legion we meet here into a much more dramatic hero named Cassius Scaeva. By the fourth century, when the emperor Julian recounts the lives of his predecessors he makes Caesar the first to leap from a boat and make his way ashore. Garbled glory is still glory, and it was this book, not whatever happened on that shore, that created the glory.
At the end of the campaigning season, Caesar stayed on in Gaul for a while, leaving after the first of the year with orders to his commanders to assemble a grander fleet for the next summer.
The junta of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar made it through this year at least with their hands firmly on the reins, but in the consular elections failed to keep the insurgent Ahenobarbus from victory. In a brawl in the Campus Martius the night before the election, Cato’s torch-bearer was killed and Cato wounded in the arm, while Ahenobarbus himself fled home.
Caesar was voted a thanksgiving of twenty days, to the further delight of urban working men. Cassius Dio was skeptical:
From Britain he had won nothing for himself or for the state except the glory of having conducted an expedition against its inhabitants; but on this he prided himself greatly and the Romans at home likewise magnified it to a remarkable degree. For seeing that the formerly unknown had become certain and the previously unheard-of accessible, they regarded the hope for the future inspired by these facts as already realized and exulted over their expected acquisitions as if they were already within their grasp; hence they voted to celebrate a thanksgiving for twenty days.
A year later, when his brother had joined Caesar in the hope of padding his fortune, Cicero complained that there wasn’t a speck of money or treasure to be gotten in Britain, only slaves.
Cato, winning a praetorship for 54 in the same election as Ahenobarbus, proposed handing Caesar over to the Germans in expiation for this year’s massacre but found no support for his outrage. This was a good time for Caesar to think about grander British schemes for the next year and to imagine his successes. Things would prove more complicated than he hoped.
IN THE CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS
1. The following winter, the year Gnaeus Pompey and Marcus Crassus were consuls, the German Usipetes and the Tencteri as well crossed the Rhine in a mass of people, not far from where the Rhine flows into the sea. They crossed because they were harassed and warred on for years by the Suebi and kept from farming.
The Suebi are much the greatest and most warlike of Germans. They are said to have a hundred cantons, each sending out a thousand armed men a year to fight. The others stay at home to feed themselves and the rest, then the next year they take up arms, while the first stay home. Thus neither farming nor the theory and practice of war languish. There are no private, individual farms among them, nor may they stay farming more than a year in one place. They live mostly on milk and livestock, not so much on grain, and they are big on hunting. With all this—diet, daily exercise, liberty (since from boyhood they are used to no duty or discipline and do absolutely nothing they don’t like), they grow strong and produce men of immense bodily size. They have habituated themselves in the coldest regions to having no clothing except animal skins, small enough to leave most of the body bare. They bathe in rivers.
2. Merchants are allowed access there as buyers for what’s seized in war, more than out of any desire to import anything.
Even draft animals, which the Gauls love and buy at great price, the Germans do not import, but they use native ones, small and scrawny, trained by daily use to be hard-working. In cavalry battles they often leap from horse and fight afoot, and train their horses to stay where they are so they can go back to them swiftly at need. They think nothing more shameful or feeble than using saddles. However few they are, they dare face any number of saddled horsemen. They do not let wine be imported to them, for they think it softens men for hard work and makes them womanly.
3. They count it worthy of high praise for a people to have land lying unused all around their borders, as a sign that many nations have been unable to withstand their power. So on one side of the Suebi some five or six hundred miles of land reportedly lie abandoned.2 On their other side are the Ubii, whose nation was large and flourishing by German standards. They are a little gentler than the others, though of the same race, because they border the Rhine and many merchants come selling to them and because proximity accustoms them to Gallic ways. Though the Suebi through many wars found themselves unable to drive from their borders the Ubii, because the nation was large and powerful, they made them tributaries nonetheless and rendered them far weaker and less proud.
4. The Usipetes and Tencteri we named were in the same situation, enduring Suebi violence many years, finally driven from their land, wandering three years through much of Germany, ending at the Rhine, where the Menapii live.3 These had fields, farmhouses, and settlements on both banks of the river. Frightened by the arrival of such a multitude,4 they abandoned the farmhouses they had across the river, setting garrisons this side of the Rhine to stop the Germans crossing. Trying everything, unable either to fight (having too few ships) or to pass Menapian guards secretly, the Germans feigned return to their homes and lands. After three days’ travel they turned back again, making the journey in one night on horseback, overwhelming the Menapians unwary and unawares. They had gone back across the Rhine to their settlements without fear, reassured by scouts that the Germans had left. Killing them and seizing their boats before Menapians this side of the Rhine could learn of it, the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the river, seized all the farmhouses, and lived the rest of the winter on Menapian supplies.
5. Learning of this, Caesar feared Gallic irresolution, for they are whimsical in making plans and often eager for revolutions, and so decided not to trust them. Gauls indeed by custom force travelers to stop, willing or not, and ask them what they have heard or learned about anything. Crowds in towns surround merchants to make them say where they have come from and what they have learned there. Excited by what they hear, they often form plans on important matters, then have to regret them on the spot, since they are slaves to unreliable rumors and many travelers make up stories to please them.
6. Knowing that custom, Caesar set out for the army earlier than usual, to avoid worse war. On arrival, he found his suspicions were fact. Embassies from some nations had gone to ask the Germans to leave the Rhine: everything they had asked for would be arranged. Led on by this, the Germans were roaming more widely, coming to the territory of the Eburones and Condrusi, clients of the Treveri. Summoning the Gallic chiefs, Caesar decided not to let on what he knew, but calmed and encouraged them, then raised a cavalry troop and determined to fight the Germans.
7. Gathering grain, he set out with select cavalry for where he had heard the Germans were. A few days away from them, their ambassadors arrived, making this speech: The Germans would not attack the Roman people first nor would they refrain from fighting if attacked, because this was custom with them from their ancestors: fighting, not negotiating with any attacker. This they added: they acknowledged they had come unwillingly, driven from their homes. If the Romans wanted their good will, they could be useful friends. Either Rome should assign them land or let them hold what they had won by fighting. They yielded only to the Suebi, whom not even the immortal gods could match. Otherwise there was no one anywhere they could not defeat.
8. Caesar answered appropriately, but ending thus: There could be no friendship with them if they stayed in Gaul, nor was it true they had seized others’ land because they could not protect their own. There was no unoccupied land in Gaul to give to such a crowd without doing harm, but they could settle, if they wished, among the Ubii, whose representatives were with him, complaining to him of Suebian aggression and seeking help. He would order the Ubii to do this.
9. The ambassadors said they would report this to their people, discuss, and come back to Caesar in three days—asking meanwhile that he not move camp any closer. Caesar said even this could not be granted. He knew they had sent most of their cavalry some days before across the Meuse among the Ambivariti, to plunder and forage. He thought they were delaying to wait for these cavalry.5
11. When Caesar was no more than about ten miles from the enemy, the ambassadors returned as agreed. Meeting him on the road, they asked urgently that he go no farther. Failing in this, they asked him to send to his cavalry who had gone on ahead and to forbid them from fighting, then allow them to send ambassadors to the Ubii. If their chiefs and senate gave assurance on oath, they would then obey conditions set by Caesar. Could he give three days for this? Caesar figured this all amounted to three days’ delay for their cavalry to return, but said he would go no more than three or four miles that day, to water his troops; as many of them as could should meet there again the next day so he could judge their demands. Meanwhile he sent messengers to the prefects who had gone ahead with the whole cavalry: they were not to attack the enemy and if they were attacked to endure until he came closer with the army.
12. When first the enemy spotted our cavalry—5,000 of ours, while they had barely 800 horse (because their men crossing the Meuse to forage had not returned)—, our men were unconcerned, because the ambassadors had just left Caesar, requesting a day of truce. But they attacked and quickly threw our men into confusion. As we rallied, their tactic was to dismount and go about gutting horses and unhorsing many of our men, putting the rest to flight, hounding them in terror so they did not stop until they came in sight of our infantry. Seventy-four of our cavalry were killed in that fight, notably the brave Aquitainian Piso, born of a very distinguished family. His grandfather had held the throne in their country and was called friend by our senate. When his brother was surrounded by enemy, Piso snatched him from danger, then was himself thrown down when his horse was wounded, fighting back as bravely as he could. Surrounded and wounded repeatedly, he fell. When his brother, who had left the field, saw this from afar, he spurred his horse and threw himself against the enemy and was also killed.
13. After this battle, Caesar thought he should not receive ambassadors or undertake negotiations with people who pled for peace, then waged war by treachery and ambush. He judged it crazy to wait for enemy forces to be increased and the cavalry to return. Knowing the weak Gallic character, he guessed how much prestige the enemy would gain from that one battle and decided to give them no time for consultation. Settling his plans and sharing with the legates and quaestor his intention to let no day pass without battle, it luckily happened next morning that a crowd of Germans, employing the same treachery and dishonesty, came to him in camp with all their leaders and elders. They both excused themselves, supposedly, for attacking the day before contrary to what they had promised and indeed themselves asked, and at the same time they were looking to win a truce by their dishonesty. Caesar was delighted to have them present themselves to him and ordered them detained. He led all his troops from camp and ordered the cavalry to follow the infantry, judging them spooked by the recent fight.
14. Quickly covering seven miles in triple line,6 they reached the enemy camp before the Germans realized what was happening. In sudden terror at everything, with no time for consulting or taking arms, the Germans were confused whether to lead men against their enemy, defend camp, or seek safety in flight. They showed their fear, shouting and rushing about as our soldiers, enraged by the previous day’s treachery, invaded their camp. The ones there who could reach weapons resisted our forces for a while and fought from among carts and baggage. The remaining crowd of children and women (they had left home and crossed the Rhine with all their people) began to flee every which way. Caesar sent cavalry to chase them down.
15. When the Germans heard hubbub behind and saw their people being killed, they discarded their weapons, abandoned their standards, and fled the camp. Reaching the junction of Meuse and Rhine, despairing of escape with so many killed, the rest threw themselves into the river and perished there, overcome by fear, exhaustion, and the force of the river. Every man of ours returned safe to camp, with only a few wounded, after a terrifying war with an enemy 430,000 in number. Caesar allowed those he had detained in camp to leave. Fearing punishment and torture from the Gauls whose land they had plagued, they said they wanted to stay with Caesar. He granted them this liberty.
16. After the German war, Caesar for many reasons decided he should cross the Rhine, especially because he saw how easily Germans were persuaded to come over to Gaul. He wanted them to fear for their own property, realizing that the Roman people’s army could and would cross the Rhine. Moreover, the Usipetes and Tencteri cavalry that I mentioned crossing the Meuse for plunder and forage and so missing the battle had crossed the Rhine (after their people fled) to the Sugambri, joining with them. When Caesar sent messengers to demand that those who had fought in Gaul surrender, they replied: The Roman people’s empire stopped at the Rhine. If he thought it wrong for Germans to cross to Gaul against his will, why should he claim any rule or power across the Rhine?
Meanwhile the Ubii, the only ones across the Rhine to send ambassadors to Caesar, sought friendship and gave hostages, urgently asking him to bring help, because they were hard pressed by the Suebi. If affairs of state kept him from doing so, would he at least send his army across the Rhine to help and offer hope for the future? The Roman army won such a reputation and name even among the remotest German nations in defeating Ariovistus and in this last battle that they knew they could be kept safe by the reputation and friendship of the Roman people. They promised a large fleet of boats for transporting the army.
17. Caesar decided to cross the Rhine for the reasons mentioned, but thought it neither safe nor appropriate to Roman dignity—or his—to use boats. Even if the breadth, speed, and depth of the river made bridge-building extremely difficult, he thought they had to try that or else not send the army across. He designed the bridge thus: pairs of beams a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little at the bottom and measured to the depth of the river, he tied together two feet apart. These he lowered into the river with cranes and fixed in place, pounding with mallets, not like stakes erect and perpendicular, but protruding and leaning forward following the flow of the river. He set other pairs joined the same way some forty feet from the others at the bottom, turned against the force and onrush of the river. These pairs as well were held apart at the top by beams two feet thick (the width of the joints), with braces inserted on each side. With those held apart and bound in opposite directions, the whole work was so strong and made in such a way that the more the force of water drove it, it was bound even more tightly. These stood firm, covered by material overlaid lengthways and with poles and woven mats. Piles were also driven at the downstream side at an angle, set down as buttresses and joined with the whole structure to take the force of the river, and others a little above the bridge so that if barbarians sent tree trunks or boats to knock the bridge down, their force would be lessened by these defenses and not harm the bridge.
18. Ten days after lumber began to be assembled, the job was done and the army brought over. Caesar left a strong guard at each end of the bridge and made for Sugambri country. Meanwhile, representatives from many nations came seeking peace and friendship. He replied generously, directing them to bring him hostages. But the Sugambri, once the bridge-building began, prepared to flee, encouraged by Tencteri and Usipetes who were with them. They had left their country, taken all their possessions, and hidden in waste and woods.
19. Caesar stayed a few days in their territory, burning the villages and farmhouses and hacking down their grain, then took himself to the Ubii and promised them help if they were pressed by the Suebi. He found from them that the Suebi, learning about the bridge-making from scouts, held council in their way, sending messengers in all directions, telling people to abandon their towns and leave their children, wives, and property in the woods; then all who could bear arms should gather in one place in the middle of the land the Suebi controlled. Here they decided to await Roman arrival and fight it out. When Caesar learned this, having done everything that he had brought the army across for—terrifying the Germans, punishing the Sugambri, freeing the Ubii from attack—and having spent eighteen days in all across the Rhine, he decided he had accomplished what honor and expediency demanded and so returned to Gaul, demolishing the bridge.
20. With little of summer left and though the winters here come early, Caesar still made to set out for Britain, because he knew help came from there to our enemies in just about all the Gallic wars. If there wasn’t time to fight, he still thought it would be very useful for him just to visit the island, see the people there, and learn the places, ports, and approaches—all mostly unknown to the Gauls. No one went there impulsively except merchants, and only places along the shore and regions facing Gaul are known even to them. Calling in merchants from everywhere, he could not discover how large the island was, which nations lived there or how large they were, how they waged war, what their customs were, or which ports could handle a larger number of boats.
21. Before taking a chance, he thought it good to inform himself by sending Volusenus with a warship. He ordered him to investigate everything and return at once. He set out himself with his whole force for the Morini,7 because the crossing there to Britain was shortest. He ordered boats from all the neighboring areas and the fleet he had built the last summer for war with the Veneti to gather there. Meanwhile, with news of his plan getting out and reported to Britain by merchants, representatives of numerous nations on the island came to him, promising to give hostages and accept the rule of the Roman people. Hearing this, with generous promises and encouragement to persist in their view, he sent them home and with them sent Commius, whom he had made king over the Atre-bates when he defeated them, whose courage and wisdom he had tested and thought reliable, and who had a high reputation in this region. He commanded him to visit as many nations as possible and encourage them to keep faith with the Roman people, telling them Caesar would arrive soon. Volusenus explored the whole area as best he could without daring to leave ship and trust himself to barbarians, returning to Caesar on the fifth day and reporting what he had seen.
22. While Caesar delayed there to prepare ships, representatives from most of the Morini came to him, apologizing for their former behavior, saying they had waged war on the Roman people as barbarians unaware of our ways and that they would promise to do what he commanded. Caesar thought this timely, since he wanted to leave no enemy behind his back but had no capacity—because of the season—for making war and no desire to let such minor matters come ahead of Britain, so he commanded from them a large group of hostages. When these were brought, he accepted their loyalty. With about eighty cargo boats gathered and assembled, which he thought were enough for carrying two legions, he assigned the other warships to his quaestor, legates, and prefects. There were eighteen cargo ships besides, which were held by the wind about seven miles away,8 prevented from coming to the same port: these he assigned to cavalry. The rest of his army9 he gave to the legates Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta to station among the Menapii and those districts of the Morini that had not sent him representatives. He ordered the legate Sulpicius Rufus to hold the port with guard he thought sufficient.
23. Settling these matters and seizing a good time for sailing after midnight, he ordered the cavalry to go on to the farther port and take ship there and follow him. As they did this, a little slowly, he reached Britain around mid-morning with his first ships and saw enemy forces stationed on all the cliffs.10 The lay of the land, with the sea hemmed in by cliffs close by, let a spear hurled from the heights reach the shore. Judging this no suitable place for landing, he waited at anchor until the ninth hour for the other ships to gather. Summoning then his legates and military tribunes, he reported what he had learned from Volusenus and what he wanted to happen. Then he reminded them that military strategy and especially maritime tactics demanded, when movement was rapid and unreliable, that everything be managed instantly, just at a nod. Letting them go and seizing wind and tide at a favorable moment, he gave the order, weighed anchor, and advanced about six miles from there, halting the ships on a broad and level shore.
24. But the barbarians had grasped the Roman plan and sent ahead cavalry and charioteers (whom they regularly use in battle), then followed with their remaining forces, to keep our men from leaving ship. So the difficulty was immense because the ships—for their size—could only halt in deep water, but the soldiers, in strange territory, their hands full, burdened with large, heavy weapons, had to jump from the ships, find their feet in the waves, and fight the enemy all at once, while the others had hands free to hurl weapons fearlessly and spur on their experienced horses either from dry land or going a little ways into the water, knowing the ground well. Terrified and completely inexperienced at this kind of fighting, our men did not show the enthusiasm and zeal they bring to land fighting.
25. Caesar saw this and ordered the long ships—strange to look at for barbarians and easy to handle—to pull back and row to station opposite the enemy’s open flank, from there to beat back and drive off the enemy with slings, arrows, and catapults. This was immensely useful to our side. The shape of the ships, their movement by oars, and the unfamiliar kind of catapult made the barbarians halt in fear and draw back a little. As our men hesitated, especially because of deep water, the eagle-bearer of the tenth legion, praying the gods that it would go well for the legion, said “Jump, comrades, unless you want to hand over the eagle to the enemy. I will surely have done my duty to the republic and our general!” When he had said this in a great voice, he hurled himself from the ship and began to carry the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men encouraged each another not to allow a disgraceful loss to occur and all leapt from the ship. When the first men in neighboring ships saw this, they followed and approached the enemy.
26. Both sides fought hard. Our men, unable to keep ranks or stand fast or follow their standards, assembling by whatever standards each one found from another boat, were greatly confused. The enemy on the shore, knowing all the shallows, saw individuals leaving ship. They spurred horse and made for us while we were entangled, many of them surrounding a few of ours, some hurling weapons against our force from the open flank. When Caesar realized this, he ordered skiffs from the long ships and also scout boats to be filled with soldiers and sent to help those he saw struggling. As our men made dry land and their comrades followed, they attacked the enemy and put them to flight, but were unable to go farther because the cavalry had not been able to hold course and reach the island. In this one thing his old luck failed Caesar.
27. As soon as the fleeing enemy regrouped after being overcome in battle, they sent ambassadors for peace to Caesar, promising to give hostages and do as he ordered. With these legates came Commius of the Atrebates, whom I said Caesar had sent ahead to Britain. As he left ship, bringing them Caesar’s orders as his representative, they had seized him and thrown him in chains. With battle done, they sent him back; pleading for peace, they put blame on the mob and asked their poor judgment be excused. Caesar complained that after spontaneously sending ambassadors to the continent seeking peace from him they had given battle for no reason, but said he would forgive their poor judgment and demanded hostages. They gave him some immediately and said they would summon others from a distance and hand them over in a few days. Meanwhile they ordered their people to go back home, while the chiefs came from all over and began to entrust themselves and their nations to Caesar.
28. Peace thus settled, three days after arriving in Britain the eighteen ships mentioned above as carrying cavalry had set out from the upper port in a light wind. As they approached Britain and were seen from camp, such a storm sprang up suddenly that none could hold course, but some were blown back where they came from, others were driven in great danger down to the lower part of the island, toward the setting sun. These dropped anchor but were awash with water and had to put out to sea on a hard night and make for the continent.
29. The moon happened to be full that night, which habitually makes the highest tides on the ocean, but our men did not know that. So the ships Caesar had brought ashore were filled with waves at the same time the storm pounded the ones lashed at anchor. Our men had no way of managing or helping them. Several ships were wrecked, while the rest, losing lines, anchors, and tackle, were made useless for sailing; hence a great upset—it had to happen—for the whole army.11 There were no other ships by which they could be taken back, they had nothing they needed to repair the ships, and because they were all set to winter in Gaul, grain had not been provided for the winter here.
30. Knowing this, the British chiefs who had come to Caesar after the battle talked among themselves, seeing the Romans short of cavalry, ships, and grain and knowing how few soldiers were there by how small were the camps, smaller still because Caesar had crossed the legions without their usual baggage.12 They decided it best to rebel and keep our men from grain and supplies, dragging the business out until winter. When these were defeated or prevented from returning, they were sure no one afterwards would cross to Britain to make war. So gradually they slipped out of camp and began to bring their men quietly from the farms.
31. But Caesar, without knowing their plans, still suspected what was coming from what happened to his ships and from the interruption in sending hostages, so he prepared resources for all events. He brought grain from field to camp daily and used the lumber and metal from the most seriously damaged ships to repair others and ordered what was useful for that purpose brought from the continent. Since the soldiers put themselves to work enthusiastically, though he had lost twelve ships in all, he made the rest ready to sail well enough.
32. Meanwhile, the seventh legion was sent for grain as usual, suspecting no attack then. When some of the locals were still in the fields and others were coming to camp, men stationed outside the camp gates reported to Caesar that more dust than usual could be seen in the direction where the legion had gone. Caesar suspected, rightly, some new barbarian plot. He ordered the cohorts on watch to set out with him in that direction, commanded two of the others to stand watch and the rest to arm themselves and follow quickly. A little way from camp, he saw his men hard pressed by the enemy, scarcely able to stand, the legion crowded together with weapons hurled against them from all sides. Since grain had been reaped in the other regions, the enemy suspected that our men would come here and so hid themselves in the woods by night. Then when our men laid down weapons and scattered to gather grain, they suddenly attacked, killing a few and throwing the rest into confusion, surrounding them with cavalry and chariots.
33. This is how they fight with chariots. First they ride around all sides and hurl spears, throwing the infantry ranks into confusion with fear of horses and the noise of the wheels. When they work their way among cavalry troops, they jump down and fight afoot. The charioteers pull a little way from the battle and arrange the chariots so that if their fighters are hard pressed by a mass of enemy, they would have retreat ready for them. Thus they enjoy the mobility of cavalry and the stability of infantry in battle and by experience and daily practice become able to control galloping horses even on a steep decline, steering and turning quickly, and even running out the pole to stand on the yoke, and then swiftly regain the chariot.
34. Caesar brought timely help to our side’s disorder. When he arrived, the enemy halted and ours recovered from their fear. Then, reckoning the time wrong for attacking the enemy and joining battle, he held his ground and soon led the legions to camp. While this went on, keeping our men busy, the others in the fields slipped away. Storms followed for several consecutive days, holding our troops in camp and keeping the enemy from fighting. Meanwhile the barbarians sent messengers in all directions reporting how few our soldiers were and how much booty could be gotten. Perpetual liberty was theirs if they could drive the Romans from camp. In short order a great many fighters on foot and horse were brought together and came to our camp.
35. Caesar, though he saw the same thing would happen as did days before—if the enemy were driven back they would escape danger swiftly—still, with about thirty horse that Commius of the Atrebates—mentioned before—had brought with him, set the legions in order before the camp. When battle began, the enemy couldn’t long resist the onrush of our soldiers and turned tail. Following them as far as speed and strength allowed, our men killed some of them, burning farmhouses far and wide, and returned to camp.
36. Enemy ambassadors for peace came to Caesar the same day. Caesar doubled the number of hostages he had commanded before and ordered them taken to the continent, for with the equinox near he did not think he should risk winter sailing with battered ships. Seizing on favorable weather, he slipped anchor a little after midnight and all the ships came safe to the continent. But two cargo ships were unable to reach the same ports as the others and were carried a little farther down.
37. While some 300 soldiers came ashore from those ships and made for camp, the Morini (whom Caesar had left in peace when he went to Britain), inspired by hope of booty, first surrounded them with no great number of men and ordered them to lay down arms if they did not want to be killed. When the Romans circled for defense, quickly at the shouting about 6,000 more appeared. Hearing this, Caesar sent all his cavalry from camp to help them. Meanwhile our soldiers resisted the enemy attack and fought bravely for more than four hours, losing a few wounded and killing some of them. After our cavalry came into view, the enemy threw away their weapons and turned tail. A large number of them were killed.
38. Next day Caesar sent the legate Labienus with the legions he had brought back from Britain against the Morini who had rebelled. Because the marshes were dry, they did not have the places to hide they had used the year before. Almost all surrendered to Labienus. But the legates Sabinus and Cotta, who had led legions to Menapian territory, had wasted their fields, cut down their grain, and burned their farmhouses, then returned to Caesar after the Menapii had hidden themselves in the deepest woods. Caesar made winter quarters for all the legions among the Belgae. Two British nations sent hostages there: the others failed to do so. For all this, on Caesar’s report the senate voted a supplication of twenty days.
1 In 2015, archaeologists at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam reported discovery of a probable site for this battle no longer needful, estimating 150,000 fatalities on a site at the joining of the Meuse and Waal rivers.
2 Exaggeration or error. C. may have actually written “one hundred.”
3 Around Emmerich, just at the German/Dutch border, almost the farthest point downstream where the Rhine could be readily crossed without modern technology.
4 After action, C. says (4.15) there were 430,000 of them.
5 I omit here as inauthentic a paragraph of generic description of the Meuse and Rhine.
6 In battle formation, thus ready to pounce.
7 Around Boulogne, some 400 km from his Rhine bridge, so perhaps ten days’ to two weeks’ march: we are now well on in July.
8 The coastline runs here north and south; prevailing southwesterly winds would have pushed them to the tiny river mouth of the Slack at Ambleteuse.
9 He took two legions with him to Britain and left one to guard the port and thus five more for Sabinus and Cotta.
10 The Britons had excellent information about Caesar’s plans. Caesar clearly chooses to say “hills” rather than use the word he has available for “cliffs,” but the setting is unmistakable: from a little below Folkestone to north of Dover, except for two very short stretches where those towns are, the famous cliffs come within a few yards of the water and stand 50–100 meters high. Lympne to the south and Deal to the north are generally canvassed as likely locations for the eventual landing. The crossing there, the closest from the continent to Britain, is about 20 miles.
11 In military parlance, the situation is FUBAR.
12 An oddly precise note surviving in a writer almost 300 years later: Athenaeus 6.273b: “Julius Caesar, the first person to make a crossing to the British Isles with 1,000 ships, took a total of only three slaves with him, according to Cotta, who was serving as his second-in-command at the time.”