EIGHTH COMMENTARY

51–50 BCE

From here, we leave Caesar’s words behind to conclude the story of his years in Gaul. He took up the pen and his characteristic style again himself later to tell the story of his struggle for power with Pompey and others in his commentaries on the civil war, though that work as well had to be completed by other hands. He wrote when he could and he wrote for political purpose. Was the winter of 52–51 the moment at which the seven commentaries we have from Caesar’s hand were compiled and disseminated? Those who argue that the whole work was published at once need to find a way to explain the choice to publish then. If Caesar was indeed working year-by-year, then what needs explaining is only the failure to produce commentary a year later, at the end of 51.

What we have in this eighth commentary, covering the two last years Caesar spent in Gaul, comes from the hand of Aulus Hirtius. Hirtius was a loyal Caesarean, legate with Caesar in Gaul from 58 onwards, faithful through the civil wars until Caesar’s death. He had been nominated consul by Caesar for 43 with Gaius Pansa and duly took office for that year. He interpreted his loyalty to Caesar’s memory as requiring him to pitch in with Octavian and Pansa against Mark Antony, and he lost his life in the successful battle against Antony at Modena in April 43. (Suetonius reports a series of scandalous rumors about Octavian’s youthful affairs with men, including Caesar himself—that accusation came from Mark Antony—, followed by an encounter in Spain with Hirtius, who supposedly paid him 300,000 sesterces for his favors.)

Hirtius wrote his commentary on the last years of the Gallic war and another on Caesar’s war at Alexandria after Caesar’s death. (Others probably wrote the surviving accounts in the same vein of Caesar’s fighting in Africa and Spain.) Years had elapsed since the events recounted and it is unlikely that Hirtius had intended in the moment to write such an account. Accordingly, whatever materials he had to draw on (any by Caesar himself?), his account is less precise and accurate than those of the earlier commentaries written by the greater writer closer to the time of events.

Indeed, the translator of the Gallic War is put in a perplexion by Hirtius. To read with the care a translator must makes the shift into this eighth commentary a startling moment. The lucidity, crispness, and narrative speed of Caesar’s prose have become familiar by now. Hirtius, by contrast, writes sludge. I have resisted the temptation to clean him up and have added a few notes to reassure the reader that particularly slovenly passages are in fact translated here as accurately as possible.

When Hirtius wrote, of course there would be an audience for the authorized Caesarean view of the events he describes, but it is also worth recalling that sometime not long after Caesar’s death, the newly sharpened pen of Sallust would also begin telling stories of the world Caesar lived in and made. His style was taut and effective, his perspective jaundiced even if essentially loyal to Caesar, and his method indirect. Though his mainly lost Histories ranged more widely, his famous surviving essays tell constrained stories (the revolt of Catiline, the war with Jugurtha decades earlier) in order to make their political point. Sallust was clearly idiosyncratic. Hirtius gives us the official version, the authorized Caesarean story. He owns up to his authorship, but absent a few short passages, what he has written could have been passed off as a clumsy imposture, an attempt at Caesarean style and content that might almost fool a few. Remarkably, he recounts some episodes of the preceding year that Caesar omitted in his seventh commentary, leaving us to wonder what else Caesar had omitted over the years.

He acknowledges authorship in a letter to Balbus that appears in all the manuscripts at the beginning of this commentary. We have met Cornelius Balbus before, born in Cadiz, made a Roman citizen and given a Roman name for service to Pompey, then a supporter of Caesar without losing Pompey’s friendship. He was rich and influential and envied, hence the factitious legal case in 56 BCE for which the speeches of Pompey, Crassus, and Cicero (his pro Balbo survives) got him acquitted. In the civil war and after, he was closer still to Caesar, then to Octavian, leading to his consulship (the first for a “naturalized citizen”) in 40. He kept his own account of his times (since lost) and here intervenes to ensure completion and preservation of Caesar’s commentaries.

This commentary comprises two years’ narrative. Hirtius explains: “I don’t think I need to do this, especially because the following year (the consulship of Paulus and Marcellus) has nothing of importance happening in Gaul. I’ve decided to write a bit more and attach it to this commentary so readers will know where Caesar and his army were at this time.” Hirtius also had to stitch together his ending with the beginning of Caesar’s commentaries on the civil war, but we are not quite sure how he did that because the end of this commentary seems broken off before Hirtius’ own conclusion. What we have here ends as Caesar returns to Cisalpine Gaul at the end of 50. It was there that he monitored the deteriorating situation in Rome, welcomed the fleeing tribunes Antony and Cassius Longinus, and made his decision to go to Rome. His first commentary on the civil war begins similarly in mid-narrative, in the very first days of the year 49, when Lentulus had taken office as consul, and just before the flight of the tribunes.

Gaul in 51 was exhausted but not yet at rest. The great rebellion was over, but insurgencies continued. In January, the Bituriges, though Caesar had been victorious at their capital of Avaricum only the previous spring, took up arms again, but were quickly disposed of. Caesar returned to Bibracte, a more central location, pulling together six legions, but then the Carnutes and Bellovaci revolted briefly. In the course of this spring and summer, patiently and obsessively, he brought the central and northern tiers of Gaul to sullen acceptance.

Then he turned his attention south to unrest led from the Cadurci and Senones people and laid siege to the rebel hill fortress of Uxellodunum, about two hundred miles south of the Bituriges. The siege was short and successful and many captives were taken. Caesar ordered that the fighters among the prisoners all be mutilated: their hands were cut off. This was a sentence of either painful death (infected wounds in the circumstances were likely) or burdensome life.

In what could have been a summative mood, Caesar left the site of that massacre for his first visit to Aquitaine in the southwest and to the Roman city of Narbonne inside the province borders. He then circled back north at the end of the year to winter himself at Arras among the Belgae and to be within reach of all his legions, spread in camps from two among the Haedui, then north into the familiar contested territory of the Treveri and others, in the process coming back in contact with Labienus and Antony. Antony, he found, had even captured the mercurial and impressive Commius of the Atrebates.

ROME IN 51

At Rome, the year 51 challenged Caesar and foreshadowed the contest to come. Marcellus and Rufus were consuls, Marcellus in the lead. He maintained a steady barrage of harassment designed to put Caesar in his place. He was perhaps less obstreperous than Cato would have been had he won the election for this year, but the drumbeats of opposition were growing louder. Early in the year he took steps to abrogate the citizenship Caesar had conferred on the people of Comum on Lake Como in northern Italy and as a sign of his action ordered a visitor from there to be flogged. Caesar had surely taken his authority further than was prudent, and Cicero’s best intervention claimed merely that the abused visitor was a magistrate of his city, on the idea that magistrates in towns with “Latin rights” but not automatic citizenship acquired citizenship as individuals by right of office.

More troubling was Marcellus’ argument that Caesar’s great victory in 52 over Vercingetorix showed that his job in Gaul was done and so he and his army should come home. Suppressing insurgents in this year, necessary or unnecessary for military reasons, meant Caesar was showing that he was still needed in Gaul till the end of his term.

Pompey was not unhappy to see Caesar the subject of this harassment but prudently decided to hold off until early in 50 any decision on recall. Pompey’s program through these last years of Caesar’s time in Gaul shows hesitation and deferral of decision, a desire to see Caesar constrained but an unwillingness to take active steps himself to constrain him. In light of what happened after Caesar returned, it’s fair to conclude Pompey missed his chance.

In July the consular elections for 50 brought in another Marcellus (married to the older sister of the young Octavian) and Aemilius Paulus (brother of the future triumvir Lepidus). They did not portend well for Caesar. By fall, it was clear that Caesar’s rivals, enemies, and many sometime friends were coalescing to resist his return to active Roman public life after almost a decade away.

IN THE CONSULSHIP OF SULPICIUS RUFUS AND CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS

Preface

Compelled by your continual urgings, Balbus, since my daily refusals seemed only an apology for my laziness, not an excuse based on difficulty, I have undertaken a challenging task. To our Caesar’s commentaries on his deeds in Gaul, since his earlier and later works were not linked, I have attached a final book and I have brought his last unfinished one on events at Alexandria down to the end not of civil war, to be sure—no end in sight—but of Caesar’s life. I would like readers to know how unwillingly I undertook this writing, so I can elude charges of folly and arrogance for inserting myself into the midst of Caesar’s writings. Everyone agrees there is nothing, however painstakingly finished, whose elegance is not outdone by these commentaries. They were published so writers would not lack for knowledge of great events, but they are so universally praised that they seem to have deprived authors of material, not supplied it.

We are more amazed by this than anyone. For others know how well and correctly they were composed, but we know how quickly and easily. Caesar possessed immense ease and elegance in writing, along with extremely precise skill at explaining his plans. I did not even participate in the Alexandrian and African wars. Though I know something of them from Caesar’s conversation, we pay attention differently to fresh and wonderful tales from how we listen to things to which we will have to testify.

But now while I gather every excuse not to be compared with Caesar, I risk the very charge of arrogance merely for thinking I could be compared with Caesar in anyone’s eyes! Farewell.

1. All Gaul was beaten. Caesar, with no break in fighting from the summer before, wanted his soldiers to recover quietly from their efforts in winter quarters, but several nations then were reported renewing war plans and framing conspiracies. A plausible explanation was advanced, that the Gauls all knew they could not resist the Romans with massed forces in one place, but if several nations made different simultaneous attacks the army of the Roman people would not have strength or time or forces to pursue all. No one nation should refuse the risk of loss if in the interval the others could assert their liberty.

2. To keep from proving the Gauls right, Caesar put quaestor Mark Antony in charge of winter quarters. With a cavalry guard he sets out from Bibracte the day before the January Kalends (31 December) for the thirteenth legion, which he had stationed not far from the Haedui in Bituriges territory, and joins it with the eleventh legion, which was nearby. Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of the army to the richest part of Bituriges country. With spreading lands and numerous towns, they could not be kept in check by a single legion in quarters from preparing for war and making conspiracies.¹

3. Caesar’s sudden arrival meant—as it had to for scattered, unready people—that farmers living free of care were run down by cavalry before they could flee to towns. For even the common signal of enemy invasion—usually inferred from burning farmhouses—was taken away by Caesar’s order, so they would not be short of grain and fodder if they wanted to go farther nor would the enemy be terrified by fires. Many thousands were captured. Those of the frightened Bituriges who could fly from the Roman arrival fled to neighboring nations, trusting in private connections or other alliances. Pointless. For Caesar by great marches appears everywhere and gives no nation room to think of others’ safety more than their own. By his speed he kept old friendships and invited those hesitating in terror to consider truce terms. When he proposed terms, the Bituriges, thinking Caesar’s mercy gave them a path back to his friendship and that neighboring nations had given hostages without being punished and were welcomed into alliance, did the same.

4. As reward for their effort and endurance, for staying diligently on post in winter days on hard roads and insufferable cold, Caesar promises two hundred sesterces each to soldiers and as many thousand to centurions, instead of plunder.² Returning the legions to quarters, he returns to Bibracte on the fortieth day. While he was hearing cases there, the Bituriges send representatives to him asking help against the Carnutes, whom they complained were waging war on them. Hearing this, although he had not been in quarters more than eighteen days, he takes the fourteenth and sixth legions from camp on the Saône—it said in the last commentary he had put them there to regulate the grain supply. So with the two legions he sets out to pursue the Carnutes.

5. When news of the army reached the enemy, the Carnutes, instructed by the sufferings of others, desert the villages and towns where they lived in small farmhouses thrown up out of need to endure the winter (for they had lost several towns in defeat) and scatter and flee. Caesar does not want his soldiers to have to suffer the terrible storms breaking out in that season, so makes camp in Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes, and protects the soldiers, quartering some in Gallic houses, some in houses built with straw roofs hastily gathered. He sends cavalry and auxiliaries in all directions wherever it was said the enemy had gone. Not a mistake, for our men usually came back with great booty. The Carnutes, overcome by the harsh winter and fear of danger, not daring—once driven from their homes—to stay in one place for long and unable to hide in protecting forests during bad storms, scatter to neighboring states, while many of them go missing.

6. Caesar thought it enough, in the toughest season of the year, to dispel the gathering forces so no war could begin. Confirming as far as possible that no great war could be gotten together that summer, he placed Gaius Trebonius in quarters at Cenabum with the two legions he had kept with him. He ascertained from regular embassies of the Remi that the Bellovaci, who lead all Gauls and Belgae in martial glory, and the nations nearby were gathering an army under Correus of the Bellovaci and Commius of the Atrebates. They collected them in one place so the whole mass could invade the Suessiones, tributaries of the Remi. Caesar thought not only his reputation but even his safety required that no disaster befall allies who had served the republic well and so he called the eleventh legion from quarters again. He sent a letter to Gaius Fabius to lead the two legions he had to Suessiones country and summoned from Labienus one of his two legions. So as the situation of camps and the needs of war allowed, by his own constant effort he imposed the burden of expeditions on the legions by turns.

7. Gathering these forces, he sets out against the Bellovaci, making camp in their country and sending cavalry squads in all directions to capture men from whom he could learn the enemy’s plans. The cavalry do their job, reporting they found few people in farmhouses. They were not left behind to farm (thorough emigration had occurred everywhere) but sent back to spy. When Caesar asked them where the mass of Bellovaci was and what was their plan, he discovered that all Bellovaci who could bear arms had gathered in one place, along with Ambiani, Aulerci, Caleti, Veliocasses, and Atrebates. They had chosen high ground for camp in a forest surrounded with marshes and had sent all their baggage deep into the woods.

Several leading citizens were responsible for the war, but the mass obeyed Correus especially, for they knew he hated the name of the Roman people intensely. A few days earlier, Commius of the Atrebates had left camp to bring support from Germans who were nearby in immense numbers. The Bellovaci had decided by agreement of all the leaders and the keen enthusiasm of the people that if, as was reported, Caesar was coming with three legions, they would give him battle rather than be forced to fight his whole army later in worse and harsher conditions. If he brought a larger force, they would stay where they were, using ambushes to prevent the Romans from finding fodder (which was scant and scattered because of the season) and grain and other supplies.

8. When Caesar learned this from many witnesses, all in agreement with each other, and saw that the plans in play were full of prudence and not just impetuous barbarism, he decided to work every way to bring the enemy to battle despising our small force. He had uniquely courageous veteran legions, the seventh, eighth, and ninth, as well as the eleventh chosen from youth of great promise, eight years in service but in comparison with the others not yet claiming a reputation for experience and courage. He summoned his council to encourage the mass of soldiers by reporting everything he had been told. To see if he could bring the enemy to fight with three legions, he arranged his line so the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions marched ahead of all the baggage, then after the line of all baggage (there was not much, as is customary on marches) he brought the eleventh, so the enemy would not be surprised by seeing a greater force than they were looking for. Thus he makes his army almost a marching square and brings it into enemy sight sooner than they expected.

9. When the Gauls—whose confident plans had been reported to Caesar—suddenly see our legions marching resolutely as if aligned for battle, they bring their force out from camp and do not leave the high ground. Perhaps they feared battle or were startled by our arrival or were just watching for our plan. Caesar, though preferring to fight, is still surprised by the great mass and pitches camp against enemy camp with a valley deeper than wide between them. He orders camp to be protected by a rampart twelve feet high, then a breastwork to be built proportionate to its height and a double trench dug fifteen feet deep with straight sides. Towers were raised three stories high, joined by connecting covered bridges, whose fronts were protected by wicker breastwork, in order to defend against the enemy with a double trench and a double row of fighters, one from the bridges, safer for their height and allowing spears to be thrown farther and more daringly, the other, set in the trench nearer the enemy, protected from falling weapons by the bridges. He put taller gates and turrets at the entrances.

10. The fortification served two purposes. He hoped the size of the works and his show of fear would raise enemy confidence, but he also saw that when we had to go farther for grain and fodder, with this fortification the camp could be defended by a small force. Meanwhile, frequent skirmishing occurred among small bands from the two camps across the marsh. Sometimes our Gallic or German allies crossed the marsh and chased the enemy fiercely, or again the enemy crossed and pushed our men farther back. It happened on the daily foraging (it had to happen), looking for fodder in the few scattered farmhouses, that foragers would be surrounded by enemy in difficult country. Even if this brought our men only modest losses of cattle and slaves, it also encouraged foolish hopes in the barbarians, the more so because Commius—I said he had gone to summon German auxiliaries—had arrived with cavalry. Even with no more than 500 of them, the barbarians were still full of themselves over the Germans’ coming.

11. Caesar observed the enemy for several days keeping to their camp, which was protected by marshes and by its site, and so unable to be attacked without a ruinous battle, in a place that could not be walled around except by a larger army. He writes to Trebonius to summon the thirteenth legion, wintering among the Bituriges with legate Titus Sextius, to come as quickly as possible with a total of three legions by forced marches. He sends by turns cavalry of the Remi, Lingones, and other nations—he had demanded a huge number—to guard the foragers, who might face sudden enemy attack.

12. Days went on and attention faded with routine, as often happens over time. The Bellovaci lay ambush in the woods with an elite infantry band, observing our cavalry’s daily patrols. Next day they send their cavalry to lure ours out into a trap and then attack when they were surrounded. This bad luck struck the Remi, to whom that day’s duty had fallen. Suddenly spotting enemy cavalry and sneering at their inferior numbers, they chased them eagerly and were surrounded by infantry on all sides. Unnerved by this, they retreated more rapidly than cavalry usually do, losing Vertiscus, a tribal chief and cavalry commander. Scarcely able to sit a horse at his age, in the Gallic way he would not excuse himself from command for age nor wish them to fight without him. The enemy’s spirits were inflamed and stirred by battle success, with a prince and commander of the Remi killed, while ours were cautioned by the loss to set their posts in more carefully scouted places and to pursue withdrawing enemies prudently.

13. Daily skirmishes in sight of both camps continued where the marsh could be forded and crossed. In this contest, the Germans Caesar had brought across the Rhine to fight alongside cavalry bravely crossed the marsh, killed a few resisters, and stubbornly pursued the remaining mass. They terrified not only the ones overcome hand-to-hand and those wounded at a distance but even those supporting from farther away—all fleeing disgracefully, making no end of their running until they had abandoned high ground and retreated to camp—and some even fled farther away in shame. Their whole army was so unsettled in this danger that one could scarcely tell whether they were more insufferable after a trivial victory or more cowardly after slight mischance.

14. After several days spent in camp, the Bellovacan leaders learned of the approach of the legions and legate Gaius Trebonius. Fearing a siege like that of Alesia they send away by night everyone up in years or weaker and unarmed, and all the remaining baggage besides. They lay out a confused and muddled line of march (even light-armed Gauls are usually followed by a swarm of wagons), then dawn overtakes them and they draw up forces in front of camp so the Romans would not begin to pursue them before the baggage train had gotten very far. Caesar did not want to attack defenders by climbing such a hill nor miss a chance to move his legions to where the barbarians could not leave safely without our soldiers harassing them. Seeing the camps separated by a marsh difficult to cross (that would slow pursuit) and again seeing a ridge across the marsh almost reaching the enemy camp—separated from it by a narrow valley—he lays bridges across the marsh, crosses the legions, and quickly comes to a plateau atop the ridge, protected on both sides by downslopes. He forms the legions and marches to the end of the ridge and sets out the army there, where catapults could hurl spears into the enemy’s formations.

15. The barbarians relied on the lay of the land and stayed at battle positions. They couldn’t refuse battle if the Romans attempted the hill but didn’t dare send out their forces in small numbers, because dispersal would produce chaos. Seeing their stubbornness, Caesar draws up twenty cohorts, surveys a camp on that site, and orders it fortified. When work is done, he lines up the legions before the rampart and sets cavalry on post with horses on tight rein. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans ready to pursue them and could not safely stay the night or longer there, they made this retreat plan: taking bundles of straw and branches (abundant in their camp), they handed them along, placing them before their line; at a signal at the end of the day, they set them ablaze all at once. The spreading flame swiftly hid their whole force from Roman sight. As this happened the barbarians fled, running flat out.

16. Caesar, even if he could not observe the enemy retreat for the fire in the way, suspected the stratagem meant flight. He advances the legions and sends cavalry squads in pursuit. Fearing ambush if the enemy stopped there and tried to lure our men into a bad place, he advances slowly. The cavalry were leery of entering smoke and thick flame and, if they ventured boldly, they could scarcely see the front ends of their own horses, so they gave the Bellovaci easy opportunity to retreat. So, cunning and fearful as they fled, the enemy advanced without losses almost ten miles and pitched camp in a well-protected place. Sending out cavalry and infantry repeatedly on ambush from there, they brought great losses to Roman foragers.

17. While this was happening too often, Caesar finds out from a captive that Correus, the Bellovacan leader, had chosen six thousand of the bravest infantry and all told a thousand cavalry to place an ambush where he thought the Romans would send men after grain and fodder. Knowing this, he brings out more legions than customary and sends cavalry ahead, the usual way he usually sent a guard for foragers.³ Among them he inserts light-armed auxiliaries and he comes as close as he can with the legions.

18. The Gauls in their ambushes had chosen for this action a plain no more than a mile each way, protected all around by thick woods and a deep river, and they surrounded it with ambushes like hunters. Scouting the enemy’s plan, our men were battle-ready in weapons and spirits, refusing no combat—they had the legions backing them. When they arrived as cavalry squads, Correus thought he had been offered his chance for action. First he showed himself with a small band and attacked the nearest squads. Ours withstand the assault from ambush firmly and do not crowd together—that often happens in cavalry battle out of fear, with losses taken just because of the crowding.

19. Our squads fight a few at a time and do not let themselves be surrounded. Then the rest of the enemy break out of the woods fighting, led by Correus. The contest was intense across the field, beginning evenly for a long time. Then gradually from the woods a full infantry line emerges, forcing our cavalry to withdraw. Light-armed infantry quickly come up to help—I said they were sent ahead of the legions—and they fight relentlessly amidst our cavalry. Fighting went on evenly a while longer, then gradually, as happens in battle, the ones who had resisted the first ambush attack become stronger just because their prudence suffered no ambush losses.

Meanwhile the legions draw closer with frequent messengers reaching our men and the enemy at the same time, saying that the general is near with forces ready for battle. Hearing this, our men fight keenly, relying on support from the cohorts. (If they acted slowly, they would appear to share victory’s glory with the legions.) Enemy morale collapses and they take flight by different routes. Pointless: wanting to trap the Romans in a tight spot, they were themselves snared by it. Beaten and routed at last, losing most of their forces, they flee in disarray, some seeking the woods, some the river—energetically chased down and killed as they fled by our men. Unvanquished meanwhile in disaster, Correus could not be made to seek the woods or accept our men’s invitation to surrender, but by fighting heroically and wounding many he forced our victorious men, roused by rage, to hurl their weapons at him.

20. Afterwards, Caesar coming upon the fresh traces of battle assumes the enemy, learning of such a disaster, would abandon their camp site, said to be no more than about seven miles from the killing field. Though he sees the river crossing obstructed, still he crosses his army and goes on. But the Bellovaci and other nations quickly hear from a few wounded refugees, who had escaped fate in the woods, that all had gone badly: Correus was killed and the cavalry and strongest of the infantry were lost. Thinking the Romans were about to appear, they call council hastily with a trumpet blast, and ambassadors and hostages are sent to Caesar.

21. Everyone agreed to this plan, so Commius of the Atrebates fled to the Germans from whom he had drawn help in the war. The rest send ambassadors to Caesar straightaway, asking him to accept as their punishment what they were sure his mercy and kindness would never have inflicted on them if he had been able to impose it on them at full strength without battle. Bellovacan resources had been devastated in the cavalry battle, many thousands of choice infantry had died—scarcely had messengers escaped slaughter. But they had gotten this benefit out of that battle, for all the disaster, that Correus, instigator of war and rouser of rabble, had been killed. When he was alive, the senate had never had as much power as the clueless populace.

22. Caesar reminds the ambassadors in their pleading that the Bellovaci and other Gauls had undertaken war the same season last year, with the Bellovaci stubbornly persisting in their purpose most of all, not brought to their senses even by the others’ surrender. He knew and understood they could easily blame the dead for the fault. But no one was powerful enough to rouse and wage war with a feeble band of plebeians if princes were unwilling, if the senate resisted, if all good men shied away. But he would still settle for the penalty they had brought on themselves.

23. The following night the ambassadors take his answer to their people and prepare hostages. Ambassadors of other nations rush in to watch what came of the Bellovaci, giving hostages and doing Caesar’s bidding, except for Commius, whose fear kept him from trusting his safety to anyone’s oath. The year before Titus Labienus, while Caesar was hearing cases in Cisalpine Gaul, discovered Commius canvassing nations and forming a conspiracy against Caesar. Labienus thought he could punish this disloyalty without treachery.⁴ He did not think Commius would come to his camp if called and did not want to put him on guard by trying, so he sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to arrange his murder while appearing to parley. He gave him chosen centurions suitable for the task.

When they came to parley and Volusenus took Commius’ hand as agreed, a centurion was either troubled by the unusual task or quickly thwarted by Commius’ retinue and was unable to kill the man. But he struck him heavily on the head with the first blow of his sword. With swords drawn on both sides, both parties thought of flight more than fight, ours thinking Commius was fatally wounded, the Gauls fearing worse than the ambush they had seen. After this Commius is said to have decided never to come within sight of any Roman again.

24. Conquering such warrior nations, Caesar saw no nation left that could launch a war of resistance, but as some were leaving their towns and fleeing their farms to escape Roman rule he decided to send his army in several directions. He keeps with him quaestor Mark Antony and the twelfth legion. Legate Caius Fabius and twenty-five cohorts he sends to the farthest corner of Gaul, because he heard some nations were in arms there and he thought it wasn’t enough that legate Caius Caninius Rebilus, who was there, had two legions not quite at strength.⁵ He calls Titus Labienus to join him, and the fifteenth legion with him in winter quarters he sends to Gaul of the togas⁶ to protect colonies of Roman citizens, to prevent any loss from barbarian incursion such as happened the summer before to the people of Trieste, overrun by their sudden attack and brigandage.

He himself goes to waste and pillage Ambiorix’s lands. He had despaired of bringing the terrified fugitive under his control, but thought it appropriate for his reputation to leave that land so stripped of citizens, farmhouses, and livestock that Ambiorix would be unable, hated by his own people—if fortune left any there—to return to his nation after all these disasters.

25. After sending legions and auxiliaries all over Ambiorix’s territory, laying waste everywhere with slaughter, fire, and plunder, killing or capturing a huge number of people, he sends Labienus with two legions against the Treveri, a state close to Germany and thus tested by daily wars, differing little in manners and ferocity from the Germans, obeying orders only when compelled by an army.

26. Meanwhile legate Gaius Caninius heard from messages and messengers from Duratius—a constant friend of Romans though some of his people had rebelled—of a great many enemy gathering among the Pictones and so he marches to the town of Lemonum.⁷ On arriving and learning reliably from captives that Duratius was trapped and besieged in Lemonum by thousands of men led by the Andean Dumnacus, he made camp in a strong position, for he was unwilling to engage the enemy with his weakened legions. Dumnacus, realizing Caninius was near, turned all his force against the legions, setting to attack the Roman camp. Wasting several days on this siege, at great loss to his side but still unable to breach any part of the fortifications, he went back to besieging Lemonum.

27. Just then legate Caius Fabius accepts the submission of several states, sealing loyalty with hostages. From letters of Caninius he learns what is happening among the Pictones. With this knowledge he leaves to assist Duratius. Dumnacus, hearing of Fabius’ approach, loses hope of safety, having at the same time to resist a Roman army outside and watch and fear his townsmen. Suddenly he leaves the place with his army and thinks he will not be safe until he crosses his army over the Loire—needing a bridge to cross because of its size. Fabius, before he came in sight of the enemy or joined Caninius, instructed by people who knew the region, believed that the terrified enemy would most likely head where they were in fact heading. So he makes for the same bridge with his army and orders the cavalry to go as far ahead of the legions’ line as they could and still make it back to the same camp without exhausting the horses. Our cavalry pursued as ordered, breaking Dumnacus’ line and attacking frightened fugitives baggage-laden on the march. They take great plunder and kill many. The matter well settled, they return to camp.

28. Next night Fabius sent out cavalry ready to fight and delay the enemy march until his arrival. Following his orders, cavalry commander Quintus Atius Varus, a man of distinctive spirit and shrewdness, encourages his men to pursue the enemy column, setting some cavalry squads in good positions and giving battle with the rest. Enemy cavalry fight with spirit as their infantry halt in order to come to assist their cavalry against ours.⁸ The battle is hotly fought. Our men despise yesterday’s beaten enemy and know the legions are following them. Ashamed to yield and eager to finish the battle themselves, they fight the infantry bravely, while the enemy, thinking no more forces could arrive (from what they had seen the day before) seemed to have gained a chance to destroy our cavalry.

29. After a spell of intense fighting, Dumnacus arranges his line to support the cavalry, when suddenly our tight-formed legions come in view before the enemy. The barbarian squads recoil at the sight; the infantry are terrified. Breaking up the baggage train, they flee headlong and shouting in all directions. Our cavalry, fresh from fighting off their fierce resistance, rejoice in happy victory, raising shouts on all sides, and then surround the retreating forces, killing there as many as their horses had strength to chase and their right hands strength for killing. More than twelve thousand men, some still armed, some casting aside weapons out of fear, were killed and all the baggage captured.

30. After this rout, news arrives of Drappes of the Senones. When Gaul first revolted, he gathered ruined men from everywhere, incited slaves to flee, collected refugees and bandits from every state, then harassed Roman baggage and supplies. Now he collected no more than two thousand refugees from this rout to attack the province, plotting with Lucterius the Cadurcan, whom we learned in the previous commentary had wanted to attack the province at the outset of the revolt.⁹ The legate Caninius makes after them with two legions to keep the damage or just the panic in the province from turning into a great disgrace because of the pillaging of the ruined men.

31. Gaius Fabius sets out with the rest of the army¹⁰ for the Carnutes and the other states whose forces he knew were worn down in the battle with Dumnacus. He was sure they would be more submissive after their fresh disaster, but if he gave them space and time, Dumnacus could rouse them. Fabius thus achieves the greatest swift success in retaking these peoples. The Carnutes, often harassed but never speaking of peace, give hostages and surrender, while other nations by the ocean in farthest Gaul (the ones called Armoricans), influenced by the Carnutes’ prestige, immediately obey orders on the arrival of Fabius and the legions. Dumnacus, exiled from his country, alone and astray and hiding out, has to head for the most remote Gallic lands.

32. Drappes and Lucterius knew Caninius and the legions were near and thus they were unable to enter the province without certain destruction at the hands of the pursuing army. Nor could they roam free for brigandage, so they halt in the territory of the Cadurci. Since Lucterius had been powerful there once in settled times and always had considerable influence among those barbarians as the source of new schemes, with his own and Drappes’ troops he seizes the town of Uxellodunum—exceedingly well protected by its site and formerly a dependency of his. He adds the townsmen to his forces.¹¹

33. Caninius arrived soon thereafter and saw the town protected all around by sheer rocks, making it difficult for armed men to ascend, even unopposed. He also saw the townsmen had much baggage. If they tried to slip away quietly with it they could not outrun our cavalry or even our legions. He divided his cohorts three ways and made three camps on high ground, beginning to lead a rampart around the town gradually, as far as the size of his forces allowed.

34. When the townsmen noticed this, they were troubled by wretched memories of Alesia, fearing a similar outcome from the siege—Lucterius most of all. He had experienced that danger and cautioned that they had to plan for grain, so they all agree to leave some troops behind and go out light-armed to bring in grain. Approving that plan, next night they leave two thousand armed men behind while Drappes and Lucterius lead the rest out of the town. Over the next few days they collect a considerable quantity of grain in Cadurci territory, where some tried to help them with grain while others simply could not stop them taking it. Sometimes they come to our camps with night raids. So Gaius Caninius puts off surrounding the town with fortifications, worried he could not protect it all when done and might disperse weakened garrisons in too many places.

35. With a large supply of grain in hand, Drappes and Lucterius camp no more than ten miles from town, from there to take the grain little by little into town. They divided tasks between them: Drappes remains on guard in camp with some troops; Lucterius takes a line of pack animals toward town. Setting guards there, he starts about the tenth hour of night to bring grain to town by narrow woodland paths. When camp guards heard the noise and scouts who had been sent out reported what was happening, Caninius quickly attacks the grain-bearers with armed cohorts from the nearest posts just on daybreak. Frightened by sudden misfortune, they fled to their guard posts. Seeing this, our men go straight at the armed men and allow none to be taken alive. Lucterius escapes with a few men but does not return to camp.

36. Successful, Caninius learned from captives that some of Drappes’ forces were camped about ten miles away. Hearing this from several sources, he realized that with the other general put to flight, the rest would be terrified and easily overcome. He thought it great luck that no refugee from the slaughter had reached camp to report to Drappes the disaster they had suffered. Seeing no danger in trying, he sends all his cavalry and German infantry—all swift men—ahead toward the enemy camp. He divides one legion in three camps and takes another with him without its baggage. Nearing the enemy, he hears from scouts sent ahead that in camping, as is barbarian custom, they abandoned high ground and set down by the riverside; and that the Germans and the cavalry had attacked them unawares and begun battle. Hearing this, he brings his legion forward armed in formation. Suddenly then from everywhere when signal is given they take the high ground. When this happens, the Germans and the cavalry spot the legionary standards and fight vigorously. The cohorts immediately attack from all sides, killing or capturing everyone and taking immense booty. Drappes himself is captured in that battle.

37. With that successfully accomplished with hardly a wounded soldier, Caninius returns to besieging the townspeople. With the enemy outside destroyed—fear of which had kept him from dividing his forces before and surrounding the townsmen with fortification—he orders works undertaken on all sides. Next day Gaius Fabius arrives with his forces and takes up besieging part of the town himself.

38. Meanwhile, Caesar leaves quaestor Mark Antony with fifteen cohorts among the Bellovaci, to keep the Belgae from any chance of plotting anew. He visits the other states, orders numerous hostages, and calms the fears of all with his encouragement. When he got to the Carnutes, in whose state (as Caesar described in an earlier commentary) the war originated, he noticed they were particularly fearful out of consciousness of what they had done, so to free the nation quickly from fear he ordered Gutuatrus, as leader of that uprising and proponent of war, be handed over for punishment.¹² Though he did not trust himself to his own people, soon with cooperation from all he was found and brought to camp. Against his nature, Caesar is forced to punish him by a great throng of soldiers, who blamed this one for all the dangers and losses endured in the war, so he was beaten lifeless and beheaded.

39. There Caesar learned from regular letters of Caninius about what had been done with Drappes and Lucterius and what the locals were thinking. He sneered at their small numbers, but judged that their stubbornness merited a substantial punishment. Then the rest of Gaul would not think they needed only bravery and not strength to resist Rome and so would not follow their example and take advantage of their location to assert their liberty. He knew that all Gauls knew there was one summer left to his governorship, so if they could hold out that long, they would fear no further danger. He left legate Quintus Calenus to follow with two legions by normal marches while he made for Caninius with all his cavalry as fast as possible.

40. When he reached Uxellodunum ahead of all expectations, he found the town surrounded by fortification. There was no way to pull back from siege, but he knew from deserters that the townsfolk had abundant grain supply, so he began to try to keep the enemy from water. A river divided the lower valley that almost surrounded the hill, steep on all sides, on which Uxellodunum sat. The nature of the place kept him from diverting it, for it passed at the very foot of the hills in such a way that no trench-digging could lead the water off in any direction. The townsfolk’s descent to it was steep and difficult, so they could not approach the river without risk of injury and death when our men made a stand, nor could they make their way back up the difficult ascent. Seeing this difficulty, Caesar stationed archers and slingers and, at some of the easiest paths, catapults to keep them from the water of the stream.

41. Then all their water-bearers gathered in one place, under the town wall, where a sizeable spring of water broke out on the side where for about three hundred feet the river did not encircle the camp.¹³ Everyone wanted to keep them from this spring, but Caesar alone saw how. With great effort and constant fighting he began to drive forward sheds against the mountain and build an earthen ramp. The locals run down from above and fight in safety from just out of reach, wounding many of our men making their way up, but our soldiers are not stopped from pushing forward the sheds and overcoming the challenges of the position with hard work. At the same time, they worked tunnels toward the rivulets and the source of the spring, and could do this without danger and without the enemy noticing. The ramp is built up sixty feet high, and on it they place a tower of ten stories, not actually reaching the top of the wall (that could not be done by any works), but enough to be higher than the spring. When spears were hurled by catapults from there toward the approaches to the spring and the townsmen could not get water safely, then not only the cattle and beasts of burden but even a great many of the enemy were laid low by thirst.

42. Terrified by this threat, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow, pitch, and scrap lumber, set them afire, and roll them down on our works, fighting hard at the same time to use the dangers of battle to keep the Romans from putting out the fire. A great blaze erupts right in the works, for whatever they threw down the steep slope was caught by the sheds and ramp, swallowing up what got in its way. Our soldiers, on the other hand, though hard pressed in a dangerous kind of fight on uneven ground, still endured everything bravely. The action took place on high ground in plain view of our army, with great shouting on both sides. Everyone threw himself against enemy weapons and flames as visibly as he could, the better for his courage to be known and recorded.

43. When Caesar sees a number of his men wounded, he orders cohorts from all sides of town to climb the mount and raise a shout as if they were seizing the walls. The townsmen were terrified by this and unsure what was going on elsewhere, so they call their armed men back from attacking our works and deploy them on the walls. So our men, when that fight was over, quickly douse or tear down the parts of the works that were in flames. The townsmen continued to resist fiercely even after losing so many to thirst, finally the spring’s streams were cut and turned aside by our tunneling. When this happened, the ever-flowing spring dried up quickly and made the townspeople so desperate for their safety that they thought it had happened not by human cunning but by the will of the gods. They were compelled to surrender.

44. Caesar knew everyone was aware of his mild temperament and did not fear anyone thinking he acted harshly out of cruelty.¹⁴ But he could not foretell the outcome of his strategy if many people in different places joined in plans of this sort, so he decided to intimidate the rest with exemplary punishment. He cuts the hands off all who had borne arms and lets them live so the punishment for wrongdoing would be well attested. Drappes, whom I said Caninius had captured, perhaps out of grief and shame for his chains or else fearing worse punishment, fasted a few days and so perished. At the same time, Lucterius—I wrote that he fled the battle—fell into the power of the Arvernian Epasnactus. He had moved on frequently, trusting himself to the loyalty of many but feeling he could safely stay nowhere for long, as hostile as he had to think Caesar was. The Roman people’s great friend Epasnactus the Arvernian had no hesitation leading him to Caesar in chains.

45. Labienus meanwhile fights a successful cavalry battle in Treveri country, killing numerous Treveri and Germani, who refused no one help against the Romans. He takes their chiefs into his power alive, including Surus the Haeduan, exceedingly noble for ancestry and courage, the only one of the Haedui still in arms.

46. Knowing this, Caesar saw and judged that things were going well everywhere in Gaul. While Gaul had been beaten and subjugated in the preceding summers, he had never visited Aquitaine, but partially subdued it by sending Publius Crassus, so he set out with two legions to spend the summer’s end there. This he accomplished as quickly and successfully as other things. All the Aquitanian nations sent Caesar legates and gave him hostages. Once this was done, he set out for Narbo with a cavalry guard, sending legates to take the army to winter quarters. He placed four legions in Belgium with legates Mark Antony and Caius Trebonius and Publius Vatinius; two legions he sent among the Haedui—whose prestige he knew was the highest in all Gaul; two he set among the Turones on their border with the Carnutes, to control the whole region down to the ocean; the two remaining he put among the Lemovices not far from the Arverni, so there would be no part of Gaul without an army.¹⁵

He spent a few days in the province himself, reviewing all the courts, hearing public disputes, and rewarding the worthy. He had an excellent opportunity of discovering each one’s attitude toward the Roman people in the Gallic uprising, which he had endured with the loyal support of the province. With all this accomplished he took himself to the legions in Belgium and wintered at Nemetocenna.¹⁶

47. There he finds out that Commius of the Atrebates fought a battle with his cavalry. For when Antony arrived in winter quarters and the nation of the Atrebates remained loyal, Commius, after the wounding we mentioned above, was always ready to exploit every whim among his people, so the ones looking for war would not be without a guide and leader in arms, while the state was still obeying the Romans. Together with his cavalry he supported himself and his people by brig-andage, haunting the roads and intercepting much of the supplies being taken to the Roman winter quarters.

48. The cavalry commander C. Volusenus Quadratus was assigned to Antony, to winter with him. Antony sends him to pursue the enemy cavalry. Volusenus combined his singular courage with great hatred for Commius and so did as he was ordered more readily. Setting ambushes and attacking his cavalry repeatedly, he had achieved battlefield successes. Finally, when the fighting was hot and Volusenus himself pursued Commius stubbornly, taking along a few of his men, trying to cut him off, his enemy Commius in headlong flight drew Volusenus on too far, suddenly calling on the loyalty and assistance of all his men not to leave his wounds, so perfidiously inflicted, go unpunished. He turns his horse away from his men and lets himself go heedlessly after the prefect. All his cavalry do the same and cause our few men to turn in flight. Commius brings his horse, spurred to fury, alongside the horse of Quadratus and with his lance turned he drives it through the middle of Volusenus’ thigh with great force.

With the prefect injured, our men do not hesitate to make a stand, turning their horses and driving back the enemy. When this happens, many of the enemy, driven back by our side’s great onrush, are wounded. Some are run down in flight, some are cut off. The leader avoided this evil by the speed of his horse. And so the battle was a success, but the prefect was so gravely wounded that he was taken back to camp almost in peril of his life. Commius, on the other hand, either had assuaged his grievance or perhaps just lost most of his men. He sends representatives to Antony, swearing to go where he was told and do what was commanded, and he gives hostages. He asks one concession to his fears—that he not have to come within sight of any Roman.¹⁷ Antony thinks this demand arises from an understandable fear and so grants the request and accepts the hostages.

This prosperity and readiness survived the burning of more than twenty of their “cities” the year earlier at Vercingetorix’s order (7.15).

The amounts must be garbled: centurions would normally get double the share of a common soldier, not a thousand times as much.

“usual . . . usually”: an accurate rendering of Hirtius’ thoughtless repetition.

This encounter occurred about the time of the events in 7.75–76, but Caesar did not mention it.

In 7.90 Caesar said Rebilus had one legion with him—probably in the far south of Gaul bordering the Roman province. If there were now two, then the weakness arose from battle depletion of the one and the addition of a second full of raw recruits from the province.

Togas because the people south of the Po had received Roman citizenship as a result of the Social War a generation earlier; Caesar himself had not used the term in the earlier commentaries. This generosity, of course, had the effect of sending a legion closer to Rome if the occasion ever arose to intimidate, threaten, or attack Caesar’s enemies there.

Poitiers.

The Gauls were marching with infantry ahead and cavalry bringing up the rear; the real engagement begins when the infantry stop and turn to support the cavalry.

7.7; but this episode with Drappes was not mentioned by Caesar.

What rest of what army? Hirtius often forgets to mention important facts, such as the joining up of Caninius’ and Fabius’ forces implied here as they separate.

Probably Puy d’Issolu, north of Toulouse. The description is not quite right, but Hirtius is even weaker on geography than Caesar was.

Caesar in 7.3 called him Cotuatus. Some have argued that the word gutuater (attested in a few later Gallic inscriptions) denotes a kind of Gallic priest, perhaps a druid.

Hirtius is muddled again, either in his writing or in his knowledge of the site or both, and best efforts to identify the place have not been very persuasive.

This is not mere humbug: Cicero said as much of him in a letter (ad Fam. 6.6.8). The bloodthirst of combat and the massacres by his troops never diminished his reputation for mildness when presented with the opportunity to make a calm strategic choice.

By counting we infer that he took one more legion back to Cisalpine Gaul with him.

Arras.

He swore this already at 8.23 (when the wounds “so perfidiously inflicted” mentioned above were received).