NOTES

Introduction. Citizenship and Belonging

1. Donald Trump, quoted in Sabrina Tavernise, “One Country, Two Tribes,” New York Times, January 28, 2017, Review, 4.

2. Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 375.

3. Pierre Rosanvallon, La société des égaux (Paris: Seuil, 2011), 12, 13.

4. Over a decade ago, Seyla Benhabib concluded that the category of “national citizenship” was “no longer adequate to regulate membership.” The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

5. On the need for national institutions to enforce rights deemed to be universal—but in the context of pressures from international networks and discourses—see Steve Stern and Scott Straus, “Embracing Paradox: Human Rights in the Global Age,” in Stern and Straus, eds., The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 3–28.

6. Elizabeth F. Cohen suggests that rather than see citizenship as an all-or-nothing proposition, “numerous configurations are conceivable. Because rights create political relationships it is crucial to states that they be able to disaggregate bundles of rights. The unbundling of the braid of citizenship rights has the effect of shaping and managing populations whose diverse elements could not all be governed by a single set of rules.” Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

7. The intensity of these debates is emphasized in Ayelet Shachar, “Introduction: Citizenship and the ‘Right to Have Rights,’ ” Citizenship Studies 18 (2014): 114–24, and the other articles in this issue. See also Leslie Holmes and Philomena Murray, eds., Citizenship and Identity in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

8. Citizenship has been the object of thought and study for a long time. As a subject of inquiry, it received a special cachet when it got its own journal, Citizenship Studies, founded in 1997. The Center for the Study of Citizenship, headquartered at Wayne State University, holds an annual conference. Important compilations of studies of citizenship continue to come forth, including Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad, and Maarten Vink, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), a tome of 880 pages that arrived too recently to be taken into account in these pages. Routledge, however, has also published a handbook of citizenship studies that is cited below.

9. Engin Isin and Peter Nyers, “Introduction: Globalizing Citizenship Studies,” in Isin and Nyers, eds., Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), 1–2. Kathleen Canning and Sonya Rose define citizenship as “a political status assigned to individuals by states, as a relation of belonging to specific communities, or as a set of social practices that define the relationships between peoples and states and among peoples within communities.” The last clause opens the door to all sorts of relationships, which might or might not be usefully considered citizenship. Nevertheless, their relational approach has the virtue of looking beyond legal definitions toward understanding the significance of a wide range of social practices and ideas—gender prominent among them—that shape the connection of the citizen to the polity. “Gender, Citizenship and Subjectivity: Some Historical and Theoretical Considerations,” Gender and History 13 (2001): 427–443, 427 quoted.

10. As J.G.A. Pocock writes, to think of the citizenship story as an “account of human equality excludes the greater part of the human species from access to it.” “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times,” in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 31.

11. Benhabib (Rights of Others) argues against delineating lists of rights that citizenship is supposed to entail. Instead, she emphasizes that citizenship implies openness to discussion and debate over what citizenship and democracy should signify.

12. Examples of the citizen-subject controversy will be discussed later in this chapter.

13. Ralph W. Mathisen, “Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire,” American Historical Review 111 (2006): 1040.

14. Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). The British Nationality Act of 1948 also conferred a form of imperial citizenship on all inhabitants of the dominions and colonies of Great Britain, in parallel to the French law and constitution of 1946. Long before that date, many subjects of the king or queen were claiming imperial citizenship within the British Empire. Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). Lara Putnam refers to “a vernacular theory of imperial citizenship articulated by colonials from the margins.” “Citizenship from the Margins: Vernacular Theories of Rights and the State from the Interwar Caribbean,” Journal of British Studies 53 (2014): 183.

15. Engseng Ho writes, “The coming-of-age of the new nations out of imperial tutelage in the past century can also be told as one of evictions.” He is concerned with Arabs originating in the Hadramaut whose diaspora took them to many places with complex relations with many sovereigns, not just the territory that became the state of Yemen. As he describes the recent past, “Diasporas were now anomalous; everyone had to become a citizen of a state.” Many were literally evicted from states—Uganda, Zanzibar, India, and others—that did not consider Hadrami residents as their citizens. The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 295, 306. Even earlier, the creation of nation-states out of the Habsburg, German, and Ottoman empires in the aftermath of World War I produced an immense “unmixing of peoples.” Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

16. For some of the concepts listed here, see Luis Cabrera, The Practice of Global Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999; Willem Maas, ed., Multilevel Citizenship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2013); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). One could add to the adjectives that have been placed before “citizenship”: urban, alternative, cultural, workplace, cosmopolitan, supply-chain, therapeutic. Kristine Krause and Katharina Schramm offer this list while noting arguments for a narrower conception of citizenship as a relationship of individual and state. “Thinking Through Political Subjectivity,” African Diaspora 4 (2011): 115–34, 125 cited.

17. Both the importance and the risks of putting multiple conceptions in play—as well as an historical record of varied and contested conceptions—are emphasized in John Clarke, Kathleen Coll, Evelina Dagnino, and Catherine Neveu, Disputing Citizenship (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), esp. 10–12.

18. Holmes and Murray, Citizenship and Identity in Europe; Etienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, trans. James Swenson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Patricia Mindus, “Dimensions of Citizenship,” German Law Journal 15 (2014): 735–49.

19. The expression “right to have rights” comes from Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace 1979 [1951]), 296.

20. Cohen, Semi-Citizenship, 47. Samuel Moyn makes a case for the 1970s as the starting point for a worldwide discourse on “human rights,” but if one takes a less present-day view of what constitutes “human rights” it becomes possible to examine arguments over many years about the relationship between humanity and rights. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

21. Margaret Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6–7. For other critiques of the Marshall thesis, see Michael Mann, “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship,” and Bryan Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship,” both in Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton, eds., Citizenship: Critical Concepts (London: Routledge, 1994), 63–79, 199–226.

22. Nira Yuval-Davis asserts that “citizenship should not be seen as limited to state citizenship alone but should be understood as the participatory dimension of membership in all political communities.” Her focus, to be sure, is on political community. The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011), 201.

23. Ong, Flexible Citizenship; Luicy Pedroza, “Denizen Enfranchisement and Flexible Citizenship: National Passports or Local Ballots?” in Maas, Multilevel Citizenship, 25–42. Citizenship questions in contemporary Africa will be discussed in chapter 3.

24. The ongoing controversy in the United States over the possible denial of admission or readmission of people from certain predominantly Muslim countries exemplifies the vulnerability of noncitizens anywhere to the vagaries of stereotyping and political gamesmanship. For another example, and not an unusual one, see Kristy Belton’s discussion of children born of Haitian parents in other Caribbean countries, who lack citizenship—or at least papers—in either their place of birth or of residence. “Exclusion, Island Style: Citizenship Deprivation and Denial in the Caribbean,” in Richard Marback and Marc W. Kruman, eds., The Meaning of Citizenship (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015), 125–48.

25. Victoria Bernal, Nation as Network: Diaspora, Cyberspace & Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 12. Bernal notes that Eritreans in the diaspora provided material and moral support to their brethren during the struggle for independence from Ethiopia and a subsequent border war with Ethiopia, but more recently many of them have turned web sites that they created into an “offshore platform for civil society,” something that government repression would not permit at home. Ibid., 21, 90.

26. Steven Robins, Andrea Cornwall and Bettina von Lieres, “Rethinking ‘Citizenship’ in the Postcolony,” Third World Quarterly 29 (2008): 1069–86. Critiques of the citizenship concept are analyzed in Cohen, Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics, 4, and Elizabeth Jelin, “Citizenship Revisited: Solidarity, Responsibility, and Rights,” in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, eds., Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 106. A related critique focuses not on citizenship per se, but on the nation-state as an imposed container of political aspirations. Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York: Times Books, 1992); Mwayila Tshiyembe, “La science politique africaniste et le statut theorique de l’État africain: Un bilan négatif,” Politique Africaine 71 (1998): 109–32.

27. Rogers Smith, “Paths to a More Cosmopolitan Human Condition,” Daedalus 137 (2008): 42. Krause and Schramm write, “citizenship is not everything when it comes to inclusion, voices and rights. Other forms of incorporation may coexist with (or be in conflict with) citizenship regimes.” “Thinking Through Political Subjectivity,” 119.

28. T. K. Oommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity: Reconciling Competing Identities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 28, 234 quoted. Oommen is using “nationality” in one of two commonly employed meanings, as a sense of nationness, of being a coherent people. It is also used in a legalistic sense, as the quality of membership in a state recognized by other states. In the legalistic meaning, citizenship refers to the rights and duties that follow from such a status. Nationality is a basis for making claims to the rights of the citizen. But neither nationality nor citizenship—and especially their relationship—have fixed meanings. They are shaped and reshaped in political processes.

29. Jürgen Habermas sees civic citizenship as “constitutional patriotism.” “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 255–82, 264 quoted.

30. One factor behind the embrace of jus sanguinis by such nationally minded states as India is the desire of ruling elites to keep ties to their diasporas, a font of material resources as well as sentiment. Recognizing dual nationality, a pattern that became common in recent decades, reflects similar goals. Seyla Benhabib, “Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times,” Citizenship Studies 11 (2007): 19–36, esp. 24.

31. For these reasons, some states in Europe that once emphasized jus sanguinis policies have injected jus soli principles. Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, “Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices,” in Joppke and Morawska, eds., Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 18.

32. Education as a mode of turning people from many milieus within the territory into a homogeneous body of citizens was in the case of France a project of the late nineteenth century. Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).

33. Rainer Bauböck, National Community, Citizenship and Cultural Diversity (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 1999); Patrick Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris: Grasset, 2002); Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Stefano Giubboni, “European Citizenship and Social Rights in Times of Crisis,” German Law Journal 15 (2014): 935–64.

34. Gal Levy, “Contested Citizenship of the Arab Spring and Beyond,” in Isin and Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, 23–37. On the enduring tension between belonging to a particular polity and more general conceptions of rights, see Bo Stråth and Quentin Skinner, “Introduction,” in Quentin Skinner and Bo Stråth, eds., States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–8.

35. The need for continual discussion and the balancing of conflicting imperatives is emphasized in Benhabib, The Rights of Others.

36. Charles Taylor “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994 [1992]), 25–74; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 188. One can argue that a liberal politics of inclusion, by emphasizing the singularity of the body politic, entails a forced assimilation of minority cultures to the dominant one. See Marilyn Lake, “Citizenship as Non-Discrimination: Acceptance or Assimilationism? Political Logic and Emotional Investment in Campaigns for Aboriginal Rights in Australia, 1940 to 1970,” Gender and History 13 (2001), 566–92.

37. On recognition, see also the work of Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser. Young bases her argument for group recognition on the presumption that “Social groups are comprehensive identities and ways of life.” She wants to restrict such recognition to groups “which are oppressed or disadvantaged,” but doesn’t tell us who is to decide. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of Universal Citizenship,” in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 195; Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” New Left Review 212 (1995): 68–93.

38. Yuval-Davis worries that the argument for multicultural citizenship presumes “homogeneous communities with fixed boundaries which, more often as not, are defined by particular cultural agents which have been picked by the state as ‘authentic’ representatives.” Politics of Belonging, 56. Similarly, Rogers Brubaker is critical of the notion of “groupism.” Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

39. Rachel Giraudo and Noah Tamarkin remark, “It is not self-evident who or what ‘indigenous’ describes.” “African Indigenous Citizenship,” in Engin Insin and Peters Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), 545. Bjørn Bertelsen points out that communities, defined ethnically or otherwise, are “messy,” riven by competition for power within them and interacting, borrowing, and reshaping each other. “ ‘It Will Rain Until We Are in Power!’ Floods, Elections and Memory in Mozambique,” in Harri Englund and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, eds., Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa (London: Zed, 2004), 171. Two pioneering texts on the construction of ethnicity in Africa are Leroy Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) and Jean-Loup Amselle and Elikia M’Bokolo, eds., Au coeur de l’ethnie: Ethnies, tribalisme et État en Afrique (Paris: La Découverte, 1985).

40. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 101. As Saskia Sassen points out, Kymlicka and others making similar arguments look only at groups within nation-states and so “continue to use the nation-state as the normative frame and to understand the social groups involved as parts of national civil society.” “Toward Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship,” in Engin Isin and Bryan Turner, eds., Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 2002), 281. Yuval-Davis (Politics of Belonging, 65) also warns of the danger of naturalizing the nation-state at the same time as reifying minority cultures.

41. Lucien Jaume, “Citizen and State under the French Revolution,” in Skinner and Stråth, States and Citizens, 131–44. As Dominique Colas points out, the idea of an “indivisible” republic that dates to the French Revolution counters not so much spatial or territorial divisions as “social groups.” Citoyenneté et nationalité (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 60.

42. Atul Kohli, “India: Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Nationalism,” in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 281–99.

43. “Haryana State in India Proposes New Caste Status in Bid to Quell Protests,” New York Times, February 22, 2016. Sudipta Kaviraj argues that “Most major radical demands in Indian politics are now for group equality rather than income equality between individuals.” “A State of Contradictions: The Post-colonial State in India,” in Skinner and Stråth, States and Citizens, 145–63, 160 quoted.

44. The insistence on a singular civic culture rooted in the French Revolution, which one still sees even in progressive circles, reminds me of a remark of an opponent of extending citizenship to people in the colonies in 1946: to be French, his argument went, meant “to participate in the blood, the spirit, the soul of Joan of Arc, Sully, Richelieu, Louis XIV, Colbert, Napoleon, Clemenceau.” A rather tall order for a colonial subject or an immigrant. “Projet d’une Constitution de l’Empire Français,” annex to transcript of meeting of 14 November 1944 of Conseil Consultative de l’Empire Français, 100APOM/898, Archives d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence. As distinguished a political scientist as Dominique Schnapper presents a vision of the historical roots of the citizenry of the nation that—while it doesn’t go back to Joan of Arc—defines a singularity of community that many people in today’s France would find hard to identify with. La Communauté des citoyens: Sur l’idée moderne de nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994). In seeing this history as the basis of the community of citizens, she not only affirms her opposition to an ethnic conception of “Frenchness” but denies the relevance of any other sort of attachment that people might bring with them to France: “It is the effort of tearing away identities and affinities that are lived as natural by the abstraction of citizenship that characterizes in itself the national project. There exists only one idea of the nation.” Ibid., 24 (emphasis in original).

45. An extensive literature on immigration and citizenship in France includes Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006) and Mary Dewhurst Lewis, The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). Local communities in past and present, not just states, have worried about the influx of the poor and the rootless. See Beate Althammer, Lutz Raphael, and Tamara Stazic-Wendt, eds., Rescuing the Vulnerable: Poverty, Welfare and Social Ties in Modern Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016).

46. Yuval-Davis, Politics of Belonging, 57; Leslie Holmes and Philomena Murray, “Introduction,” in Holmes and Murray, eds., Citizenship and Identity in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 2.

47. Yuval-Davis (Politics of Belonging, 47) writes, “the notion of ‘the citizen’, unlike that of ‘the subject’, is usually marked by at least a certain sense of entitlement, an important public emotion which is crucial in various political projects of belonging.”

48. Rogers Smith points out that citizenship has rarely been unitary, but that “the struggle against second-class citizenship” in the United States has focused on claims for “unitary or uniform citizenship,” in which each individual had “exactly the same bundle of rights and duties, especially voting rights, property rights, and due process rights.” Some of the most important social movements in American history have insisted that “Separate could not be equal citizenship, for the races, for the genders, for any subgroup of citizens.” “The Questions Facing Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century,” in Richard Marback and Marc Kruman, eds., The Meaning of Citizenship (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015), 14; Isin and Nyers, “Introduction,” in Isin and Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, 8.

49. On women citizens as both subjects and objects of politics in India, see Mrinalini Sinha, Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

50. Willem Maas, “Varieties of Multilevel Citizenship,” in Maas, Multilevel Citizenship, 2.

51. The category of “dhimmi” marked the place—recognized but not equal—of non-Muslim communities within an Islamic polity.

52. Gianluca Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009); Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

53. Benhabib, The Rights of Others; Smith, “Paths to a More Cosmopolitan Human Condition.” The Universal Declaration of 1948 provided a starting point, and subsequent conventions and the creation of international courts, however limited their purview, provide a framework for extending the notion of rights to a global level.

54. Yasemin Nuhoǧlu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Sassen, “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship,” 277–91, distinguishes forms of citizenship that modify current forms of national citizenship from those that posit alternative conceptions. Both she and Soysal see these developments as a reflection of increased mobility and communication of recent decades and do not explore the much older roots of citizenship beyond nationstates. For a critique of the concept of post-national citizenship, see Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 141–46, 268–71.

55. Niraja Gopal Jayal, “Indian Citizenship: A Century of Disagreement,” in Isin and Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, 401.

56. As Rosanvallon puts it, in the act of voting the individual “finds himself stripped of his determinations and belongings.” This abstraction is the “basis of the development of the idea of political equality.” Société des égaux, 57. But he notes that at first French citizens voted in assemblies in each canton, and it was only in 1913 that the secret ballot (isoloir) was introduced; up to then the vote itself, not just queuing to vote, was a social act. Ibid., 59–60.

57. On the Russian model, see Jane Burbank, “An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire,” Kritika 7 (2006): 397–431.

58. Silyane Larcher, L’autre citoyen: L’idéal républicain et les Antilles après l’esclavage (Paris: Colin, 2014); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

59. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). For a critique and alternative concepts from the French side, see Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? On the German side see Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008) and Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Nationalism (Oxford: Berg, 2004).

60. Engin Isin and Bryan Turner, “Citizenship Studies: An Introduction,” in Isin and Turner, eds., Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 2002), 2, 8; Bauböck, National Community, 5–6; Frances Hagopian, “Latin American Citizenship and Democratic Theory,” in Joseph Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, eds., Citizenship in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 14. The thin-thick distinction is more useful than one from the political philosopher James Tully that has received a certain amount of attention: between “modern” and “diverse” citizenship. As should be clear by now, “modern”—in the chronological sense—conceptions of citizenship are quite diverse. And while it is worthwhile to draw attention to the many ways in which people conceptualize belonging and political community that are distinct from “modern” states’ emphasis on legal categories (Tully’s main point), aggregating them as “diverse” is a contemporary scholar’s conceit, since taken individually, each form of citizenship might be as monolithic as the one Tully is criticizing. On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

61. Sassen refers to a “thinning” of social citizenship in Marshall’s sense of the term. “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship,” 280. Bryan Turner sees the distinction between a “denizen”—a legal resident without citizenship rights—and a citizen being diminished as social benefits are reduced. “We Are All Denizens Now: On the Erosion of Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 20 (2016): 679–92.

62. Schnapper, Communauté des citoyens, 197–98; Stéphane Caporal, “L’Europe et le Citoyen,” in Association Française des Historiens des Idées Politiques, Sujet et Citoyen: Actes du Colloque de Lyon (11–12 septembre 2003) (Aixen-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2004), 450.

63. Yuval-Davis (Politics of Belonging, 54) emphasizes that the idea of citizenship in a nation-state presumes “a closed society in a reality which does not fully correspond to this.”

64. Clarke et al., Disputing Citizenship, 11–12. Balibar stresses “the continued creation of citizenship (dēmos) through collective action and the acquisition of fundamental rights to existence, work, and expression, as well as civic equality and the equal dignity of languages, classes, and sexes.” We, the People of Europe, 9.

Chapter 1. Imperial Citizenship from the Roman Republic to the Edict of Caracalla

1. Emma Dench warns against mythmaking in the backward projections onto Roman citizenship of today’s concerns with multicultural or cosmopolitan societies, rejection of racism, and open societies. She points out that the Roman example has been used as a model for fascism as well as for multicultural citizenship. Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20, 25, 95–96.

2. The reference is to Diogenes. A. A. Long, “The Concept of the Cosmopolitan in Greek and Roman Thoughts,” Daedalus 137 (2008): 50–58, esp. 50; Ralph W. Mathisen, “Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire,” American Historical Review 111 (2006): 1012. More generally, see the chapter “Citizenship” in Melissa Lane, The Birth of Politics: Eight Greek and Roman Political Ideas and Why They Matter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). Derek Heater argues that the idea of world citizen, looking beyond the state, was transmitted from Greece to Rome, was then taken up by scholars in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and resurfaced in certain quarters after 1945. World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought (Houndsmill, UK: Macmillan, 1996), 170–76.

3. Lane, 291, citing Aelius Aristides in AD 155. Tacitus asserted that Rome enfranchised people they conquered whereas Athens treated them as foreigners. Romans made much of their apparent openness; the story of Aeneas can be read as a myth underscoring the immigrant origins of the Roman elite. Dench, however, warns against exaggerating the differences with Athens: “Mobility, and elite mobility in particular, was a normal state of affairs in the archaic Mediterranean world as families exercised social and economic networks in a world within which ethnic and state boundaries were still fluid.” Romulus’ Asylum, 98, 102–4, 121–22, 121 quoted.

4. Claude Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome, trans. P. S. Falla (London: Batsford, 1980 [1976]), 22–23.

5. Clifford Ando, Roman Social Imaginaries: Language and Thought in Contexts of Empire (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 12, 23.

6. Nigel Pollard, “The Roman Army,” in David Potter, ed., A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 211, 222–23.

7. Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 124.

8. Jean-Michel David, “Rome: Citoyenneté et espace politique,” in Claude Fiévet, ed., Invention et réinvention de la citoyenneté (Pau: Editions Joëlle Sampy, 2000), 81–93, 89 quoted; Mathisen, “Peregrini,” 1016.

9. J.G.A. Pocock looks at Roman citizenship through the eyes of the jurist Gaius, who focused on the relationship of persons, actions, and things—not just relations among persons or political ideals (the more Aristotelian approach). A person’s control of and access to things was regulated under law. The person became the citizen, Pocock writes, “through the possession of things and the practice of jurisprudence.” “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times,” in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 34–35.

10. Another category was that of the freed slave, freed that is by the decision of his or her owner. Since the act of manumission was considered a fictive filial bond, slaves who were freed were in effect reborn and acquired the civic status of the master, although they would be excluded from political and military roles by virtue of their lack of resources. The emperor Augustus apparently feared that the category of citizen was being diluted, and perhaps endangered, by the entry of too many freemen into it, and he put in place restrictions on manumission, but it is unclear how much of an impact these measures had. Henrik Mouritsen, The Freedman in the Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),70, 79–90.

11. Jonathan Edmondson, “Cities and Urban Life in the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire, 30 BCE–250 CE,” in David Potter, ed., A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 255–58, 273–74, 274 quoted.

12. Nicolet, World of the Citizen, 215 quoted, 311, 320.

13. Mary Beard, SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome (New York: Liveright/Norton, 2015), 237–40; Nicolet, World of the Citizen, 23.

14. Nicolet, World of the Citizen, 44.

15. Greg Woolf, Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39–40.

16. Nicolet, World of the Citizen, 317.

17. Clifford Ando, “The Administration of the Provinces,” in Potter, 187.

18. Peter Garnsey, “Roman Citizenship and Roman Law in the Late Empire,” in Simon Swain and Mark Edwards, eds., Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire, Oxford Scholarship on Line (www.oxfordscholarship.com), 2010 [2006], 5. On the place of colonies in relation to Roman citizenship, see A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 76–94. He notes the distinction between a “Latin colony”—an incorporative institution to bring in Latins—and a “citizen colony”—an outpost of Roman citizenship. The former, he asserts, were “supplementary” to the latter (77).

19. Joy Connolly, The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 13.

20. Ibid., 19.

21. Ibid., 32, 47, 52, 55. Dench (Romulus’ Asylum, 111) glosses Cicero as arguing that citizenship was an ideal “from which contemporary Rome has fallen short.”

22. Connolly, The Life of Roman Republicanism, 76, 93.

23. Ibid., 155.

24. Pocock suggests that “the growth of jurisprudence decentres and may marginalize the assembly of citizens by the enormous diversity of answers it brings to the questions of where and by whom law is made.” “Ideal of Citizenship,” 39–40.

25. Nicolet, World of the Citizen, 21; Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship,” 38–39. Dench (Romulus’ Asylum, 133) suggests that Caesar’s granting of citizenship to many people in Gaul was a sign of incipient monarchy—lining up supporters for the leader.

26. Greg Rowe, “The Emergence of Monarchy: 44 BCE–96 CE,” in David Potter, ed., A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 114; Connolly, 200.

27. Rowe, 120, 123.

28. Clifford Ando, “The Administration of the Provinces,” in David Potter, ed., A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 182, 189–90; Maud W. Gleason, “Greek Cities under Roman Rule,” in ibid., 228–29.

29. Paul Fontaine, “De Lyon à Rome—Africains et Syriens en Europe de l’Ouest sous l’Empire romain,” paper presented to conference on “Empire, Labour, Citizenship,” Vrije Universiteit Brussel, November 18, 2015; Beard, SPQR, 521.

30. Clifford Ando, “Sovereignty, Territoriality, and Universalism in the Aftermath of Caracalla,” in Clifford Ando, ed., Citizenship and Empire in Europe 200–1900: The Antonine Constitution after 1800 Years (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016), 7–28.

31. Garnsey, “Roman Citizenship and Roman Law,” 2–3; Myles Lavan, “The Spread of Roman Citizenship, 14–212 CE: Quantification in the Face of High Uncertainty,” Past and Present 230 (2016): 3–46. On rapid implementation of the edict in Asia Minor, see Georgy Kantor, “Local Law in Asia Minor after the Constitutio Antoniniana,” in Clifford Ando, ed., Citizenship and Empire in Europe 200–1900: The Antonine Constitution after 1800 Years (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016), 49–52.

32. Beard, SPQR, 527. Beard adds, “After a thousand years, Rome’s ‘citizenship project’ had been completed and a new era had begun. It was not an era of peaceful, multicultural equality, though.” Ibid., 529.

33. Mathisen, “Peregrini,” 1015.

34. Ibid., 1016, 1019–25, 1035.

35. Garnsey, “Roman Citizenship and Roman Law,” 7–8, Nicolet, World of the Citizen, 47. Mathisen, “Peregrini,” 1017, claims that with the Christianization of the Roman Empire, full citizenship came to be based on Christian status, narrowing the concept in relation to the empire but giving rise to the metaphorical notion of citizenship in a broader community, the “city of God.”

36. Lane sees that the tension in classical times between the principle of citizens’ voice in politics and the practical limits of their control exhibits an “uncomfortable closeness to predicaments of our own.” Birth of Politics, 290.

Chapter 2. Citizenship and Empire—Europe and Beyond

1. As Ralph Mathisen writes, “As the Roman afterglow petered out, Roman concepts of citizenship, whether of a world, a nation, a province, or a city, did likewise, to be replaced in the Middle Ages by models of subjugation to bishops and kings.” “Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire,” American Historical Review 111 (2006): 1039. Cities were the biggest exception to this generalization.

2. The other German formula used is Staatangehörigkeit, whose root is in the word for belonging and is often translated as nationality, minus the urban connotation.

3. Max Weber, “Citizenship in Ancient and Medieval Cities,” in Gershon Shafir, ed., The Citizenship Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 43–49.

4. Neither “Spain” nor “Portugal” was a “predefined entity” before, during, and after the period in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when a single monarch presided over both kingdoms. Many people hesitated between loyalty to the unified monarchy and desire for a distinctly Portuguese kingdom. Tamar Herzog’s arguments are developed in Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); “Communities Becoming a Nation: Spain and Spanish America in the Wake of Modernity (and Thereafter),” Citizenship Studies 11 (2007): 151–72; and Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 252 quoted.

5. At first, some argued that only Castilians had the right to settle or trade with the Americas, but the people of Aragon and then Navarre pressed, with some success, to be included. Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 56–60.

6. Tamar Herzog, “The Appropriation of Native Status: Forming and Reforming Insiders and Outsiders in the Spanish Colonial World,” Rechtsgeschichte/Legal History 22 (2014): 140–49, esp. 143.

7. On the relationship between natural law and citizens’ rights in earlymodern European empires, see Annabel S. Brett, “The Development of the Idea of Citizens’ Rights,” in Quentin Skinner and Bo Stråth, eds., States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 97–114.

8. Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 116–27; Herzog, “Communities,” 157–59.

9. Matthew C. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions: The Constitution of Cádiz and Its Legacy in Spanish America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2, 4.

10. Jeremy Adelman points out that merchants “stopped short of a fullblown critique” of the empire’s mercantilist system of trade. In terms of politics, “They did not want a new regime so much as a restored old one.” Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 140, 144.

11. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions, 38, 77. Mirow claims that the American deputies asserted both equality with the Peninsular Spanish and the distinctiveness of their experience. Ibid, 78, 90. Brian Hamnett points out that constitutional alternatives were set forth in some Spanish American territories between 1811 and 1816 independent of the Cádiz process. The End of Iberian Rule on the American Continent, 1770–1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 176–77.

12. Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). Adelman situates the Spanish case in a broader context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, emphasizing struggles within and among empires rather than a general trajectory from empire to nation-state. “An Age of Imperial Revolutions,” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 319–40.

13. Some in the Cortes argued, unsuccessfully, for giving constitutional recognition to multiple communities or nations within the empire. Herzog, “Communities becoming a Nation,” 156–57; Hamnett, End of Iberian Rule, 182.

14. Josep M. Fradera, “Tainted Citizenship and Imperial Constitutions: The Case of the Spanish Constitution of 1812,” in Clifford Ando, ed., Citizenship and Empire in Europe 200–1900: The Antonine Constitution after 1800 Years (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016), 223, 232; Herzog, “Communities,” 157; Hamnett, End of Iberian Rule, 194–95; Marixa Lasso, “A Republican Myth of Racial Harmony: Race and Patriotism in Colombia, 1810–12,” Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 29 (2003): 43–63. After the loss of the mainland American colonies, Spain continued to use the notion of “special” laws for what remained, an increasingly sharp point of conflict with the citizens of the Spanish islands. Josep M. Fradera, “L’esclavage et la logique constitutionnelle des empires,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 63 (2008): 533–62, esp. 537–40, 548–49. See also Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).

15. Herzog, “Communities,” 157–60. Mirow (Latin American Constitutions, 63) sees the distinction between “Spaniards”—a category inclusive of the peoples of American territory controlled by Spain—and “citizens”—who possessed political as well as civil rights—as stemming from the French model that separated active and passive citizens. Women, like people of African descent and servants, were regarded as lacking the autonomy necessary to make political decisions.

16. Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution, esp. 188–89, 194–96; Hamnett, End of Iberian Rule, 183. On the often intense debates over numbers and criteria for representations, see Mirow, Latin American Constitutions, 91–99. Some argued that Indians were not culturally qualified to vote, others insisted that they were integral parts of the political community, drawing on arguments about preconquest civilizations, the writings of las Casas, and doctrines of Catholic monarchy emphasizing the King’s authority over Indian subjects. Ibid., 92. The issue of overseas citizens possibly outnumbering those of the metropole would surface in the debates over the French Constitution of 1946, in a warning that France might become “the colony of its former colonies.” That debate is discussed briefly in chapter 3 and at length in Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

17. Fradera, “Tainted Citizenship and Imperial Constitutions,” 226; Josep M. Fradera, “Empires in Retreat: Spain and Portugal after the Napoleonic Wars,” in Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson, eds., Endless Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 59–61.

18. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions, 31, 41–42, 48, 58, 61, 93. The Cortes made some attempts to recognize the rights of certain Indian communities to land, but the process soon ran into vested interests. Ibid., 93.

19. Hamnett, End of Iberian Rule, 4.

20. Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution, 264, 366.

21. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 16; Adelman, esp. 271, 277–81, 360–67. The Cádiz constitution was reinstated in Spain and parts of the Americas still controlled by Spain in 1820. Mirow, 113.

22. Rebecca Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860–1899 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Rebecca Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999).

23. Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution, 396. The new constitutions usually excluded people from Iberian Spain from the new citizenries, consistent with the revolutionary separation from Spain. But many Spaniards had their place in local communities in the Americas and the lines were not so easy to draw. The old tradition of defining “belonging” by specific social relations with specific communities continued. Herzog, “Communities,” 162.

24. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions, 66, 141–43.

25. Marcela Echeverri, “Race, Citizenship, and the Cádiz Constitution in Popayán (New Granada),” in Natalia Sobrevilla Perea and Scott Eastman, eds., The Rise of Constitutional Government in the Iberian Atlantic World: The Impact of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2015), 91–110; The Portuguese constitution of 1820 was more inclusive of the free colored population, but other actions limited their voting rights. Fradera, “Empires in Retreat,” 62–63.

26. James Sanders, Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 193. Sanders sees the openings that “subalterns” were able to forge closing down later in the century, especially in the 1880s. See also Aline Helg, Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770–1835 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), and Jason McGraw, The Work of Recognition: Caribbean Colombia and the Postemancipation Struggle for Citizenship (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). McGraw argues that Colombian slaves wanted not only freedom but recognition as a collectivity that had gone through a particular experience, and that they sought to articulate a “vernacular citizenship” in many aspects of daily life. Formalized equality combined with extreme inequality in access to property and conceptions of cultural hierarchy made for long-term struggles over inclusion and exclusion in a Colombian nation.

27. Hilda Sabato, “Review Essay: On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America,” American Historical Review 106 (2001): 1290–1315, esp. 1295, 1297, 1301. See also her “Citizenship, Political Participation and the Formation of the Public Sphere in Buenos Aires 1850s–1880s,” Past and Present 136 (1992): 139–63. As Mirow notes (Latin American Constitutions, 124), indigenous communities gained citizenship and the vote alongside everybody else, but lost the use of institutions (Indian councils and caciques) that had afforded them a certain kind of representation.

28. Clément Thibaud, “Race et citoyenneté dans les Amériques (1770–1910), Le Mouvement Social 252 (2015): 5–19, 14 quoted.

29. Frances Hagopian, “Latin American Citizenship and Democratic Theory,” in Joseph Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, eds., Citizenship in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 21, 36–37. See also James Holston, “Citizenship in Disjunctive Democracies,” in Tulchin and Ruthenburg, Citizenship in Latin America, 75–94.

30. Evalina Dagnino, “Citizenship in Latin America: An Introduction,” Latin American Perspectives 30, 2 (2003): 5.

31. James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7 quoted.

32. Hagopian, “Latin American Citizenship and Democratic Theory,” 43–44.

33. Dagnino, “Citizenship in Latin America,” 216.

34. David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Eliga Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

35. Michelle Everson suggests that the lack of clarity of what constituted Britishness and where exactly the British state was located was both problematic and potentially useful to claims for inclusion. Instead of specifying an indivisible sovereignty on a clearly defined body of people, British law left space for “a far more complex scheme of fragmented and interlocking sovereignties with far smaller, self-defining communities forming the basis for true community, and thus for sustainable substantive equality.” “ ‘Subjects,’ or ‘Citizens of Erewhon’? Law and Non-Law in the Development of a ‘British Citizenship,’” Citizenship Studies 7 (2003), 57–84, 83 quoted.

36. The quoted phrase is from a British law journal from 1902, cited in Rieko Karatani, British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth and Modern Britain (London: Cass, 2003), 3–4. Karatani (3) emphasizes the “fuzzy,” “vague,” and “malleable” nature of Britishness and the ambiguous relationship of such notions to legal status.

37. Margaret Somers, “Rights, Relationality, and Membership: Rethinking the Making and Meaning of Citizenship,” Law and Social Inquiry 19 (1994): 63–112.

38. Christopher Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

39. P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, c. 1750–1783 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

40. Gould, The Persistence of Empire. On indigenous peoples’—including Native Americans’—use of imperial law, courts, and other institutions, see Saliha Belmessous, ed., Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). On the complexity of settler power and legal jurisdiction, see Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788–1836 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

41. David C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).

42. Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

43. Douglas Bradburn, “ ‘True Americans’ and ‘Hordes of Foreigners’: Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Problem of Citizenship in the United States, 1789–1800,” Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 29 (2003): 19–41, esp. 21–22.

44. Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

45. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

46. In discussing citizenship over the sweep of US history, Judith Shklar emphasizes the “exclusions and inclusions, in which xenophobia, racism, religious bigotry, and fear of alien conspiracies have played their part,” but she emphasizes above all the problem of slavery. She makes clear that citizenship concepts were not static but were rooted in social and political contexts and in political struggle. American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 4 quoted, 13, 15.

47. Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Daniel Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). New Zealanders and others sometimes referred to themselves as “neo-Britains,” claiming two kinds of belonging at the same time. J.G.A. Pocock, The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 187.

48. Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

49. Fradera (“L’esclavage et logique constitutionnelle,” 550–60) makes this contrast. He notes as well that the rebellion of 1865 occurred only a few years after the “Mutiny” in India, an event that also underscored the distinctiveness of certain colonized peoples and the need for special regimes to govern each of them.

50. The subject in question was a Jew of Spanish ancestry who could claim to be a British subject by virtue of his birth in Gibraltar. The case is described in Karatani, Defining British Citizenship, 59.

51. Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 17.

52. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents: An Indian History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 29, 30. Activists could appeal to authorities to make good on the proclamation of Queen Victoria of 1858, “We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects.…” Cited in ibid., 37. Political demands came to focus both on the empire and on India as a whole, the latter a reaction to the British effort to tie its complex South Asian domain together into a single, although highly differentiated, spatial unit. Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

53. Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents, 28.

54. Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed, The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer of Empire (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). Desai and Vahed puncture the myth of common cause of Africans and Indians in pre-1914 South Africa, arguing that Gandhi at this time identified his people as “Aryan” and closer to Europeans than to Africans and making little effort to make common cause with the Africans suffering oppression in South Africa. Ibid., 45, 119. Some British officials in India gave mild support to the claims of Indians in South Africa. Ibid., 242–43.

55. J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions with Thoughts upon a Healthy Imperial Policy for the Gold Coast and Ashanti (London: Cass, 1970 [1903]).

56. Lara Putnam, “Citizenship from the Margins: Vernacular Theories of Rights and the State from the Interwar Caribbean,” Journal of British Studies 53 (2014): 162–91, 171 quoted, 181.

57. Dominique Colas points out that democracy “attributes sovereignty to the people, which presumes that the people is defined.” That would be a big presumption in the case of the French Empire in 1789. Citoyenneté et nationalité (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 11.

58. Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

59. David Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 51. Bell makes clear the importance of developments in the 1740s and 1750 in articulating a sense of the nation that would then be seized upon and refashioned in the Revolution. Ibid., 10–11, 15. In putting the nation first, the good citizen was distinguishing “citizen” from “man,” for the citizen might have to give up some of what he cared about as a person in order to focus loyalty on the nation. Ibid., 154.

60. See Cécile Vidal, ed., Français? La nation en débat entre colonies et métropole, XVIe-XIXe siècle (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 2014), especially the chapters of Thomas Wien and Gilles Havard; Saliha Belmessous, “Être français en Nouvelle-France: Identité française et identité coloniale aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles,” French Historical Studies 27 (2004): 507–40.

61. Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

62. Malick Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

63. This conflation of the normative and the historical is a problem, for example, in Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens: Sur l’idée moderne de nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).

64. Michael Mann, “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship,” in Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton, eds., Citizenship: Critical Concepts (London: Routledge, 1994), 63–79.

65. The linkage of property and citizenship goes back to Roman times, particularly, according the J.G.A. Pocock, in the writing of the jurist Gaius. “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times,” in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 34–45.

66. Robert Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question, trans. Richard Boyd (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003); Mann, “Ruling Class Strategies.”

67. Partha Chatterjee distinguishes the notion of citizenship from that of “population,” which he considers the object of government action, producing, “a heterogeneous social, consisting of multiple population groups to be addressed through multiple and flexible policies. This was in sharp contrast with the conception of citizenship in which the insistence on the homogeneous national was both fundamental and relentless.” If citizens act to defend the social and if the imperial is considered alongside the national, the dichotomy isn’t so neat. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 136.

68. On the passive-active distinction, see Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 269–74.

69. Pierre Rosanvallon, La société des égaux (Paris: Seuil, 2011), 15, 22–23; Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 80–81. Rosanvallon sees the demand for universal suffrage surfacing during the July Monarchy—and opening a large debate. Universal male suffrage dates to 1848. Ibid., 253, 286.

70. Overly unitary notions of citizenship are related to excessively unitary notions of sovereignty. See the thoughtful analysis in James J. Sheehan, “The Problem of Sovereignty in European History,” American Historical Review 111 (2006): 1–15. Sheehan (3–4) conceptualizes sovereignty as a “basket” of different rights, powers, and aspirations, all components of which are the subject of claims and counterclaims.

71. The early republicans were actually rather open about welcoming their neighbors into the category of citizen. What counted, for a time, was revolutionary fervor and demonstrated loyalty. Bell, Cult of the Nation, 204–05.

72. On the debate over whether Saint Domingue could be considered a separate entity or as an integral part of France, and hence subject to its laws, see Maleck Ghachem, “The ‘Trap’ of Representation: Sovereignty, Slavery and the Road to the Haitian Revolution,” Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 29 (2003): 123–44. More generally, see the classic text of C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1963 [1938]), and the more recent book of Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). Some of the best historians and political theorists writing on France manage to exclude these issues from their consideration of the revolution’s impact on citizenship.

73. Edwige Liliane Lefebvre, “Republicanism and Universalism: Factors of Inclusion or Exclusion in the French Concept of Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 7 (2003): 15–36, 20 quoted. Lorelle Semley provides a broad view of the relationship of citizenship to slavery, race, and colonization in French history. To Be Free and French: Citizenship in France’s Atlantic Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

74. Gérard Noiriel, “The Identification of the Citizen: The Birth of Republican Civil Status in France,” in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 29–30. Noiriel points out that in practice it wasn’t so easy to implement the individual-state relationship, because many local officials charged with maintaining the état civil were illiterate or otherwise incompetent and because changing registration from a religious to a state institution was not as simple for Protestants and Jews as it was for Catholics. Under Napoleon, the état civil became more clearly an administrative device, less a statement of civic belonging. Ibid., 28–48.

75. Paul-André Rosental, “Civil Status and Identification in 19th Century France: A Matter of State Control?” in Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter, eds., Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 137–65.

76. Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 254–62. The process was reversed after Napoleon reinstated slavery; slaves were now recorded only as property. While Dubois emphasizes ex-slaves use of the new category of citizen, Ghachem (Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution) puts more emphasis on their use of the legal categories of the old regime in order to make claims.

77. Rebecca Scott and Michael Zeuske also demonstrate in the case of Cuba that ex-slaves often used notaries and courts to advance and to document their claims to the rights of the citizen. “Le ‘droit d’avoir des droits’. Les revendications des ex-esclaves à Cuba (1872–1909),” Annales: Histoire, Science Sociales 59 (2004): 519–45.

78. The Civil Code, also known as the Code Napoléon, was “surely not that of political liberty,” but a mechanism of authoritative regulation of the life of people worthy of “civil equality,” but not of “full political and democratic citizenship.” Jean-François Niort, “Sujet, citoyen et politique dans l’esprit du Code Napoléon,” in Association Française des Historiens des Idées Politiques, Sujet et Citoyen: Actes du Colloque de Lyon (11–12 septembre 2003) (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2004), 279–95, 285 and 294 cited.

79. There was a long debate between advocates of jus soli and jus sanguinis during the formulation of the Civil Code, eventually won (despite Napoleon’s own predilections) by advocates of the latter, but with an opening to citizenship of someone born on French soil of foreign parents who remained resident and reached his majority. Luigi Lacchè, “Expanding Citizenship? The French Experience surrounding the Code Napoléon,” in Clifford Ando, ed., Citizenship and Empire in Europe 200–1900: The Antonine Constitution after 1800 Years (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016), 177–98.

80. The most comprehensive study is Patrick Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris: Grasset, 2002), available in English as How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789, trans. Catherine Porter (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

81. Silyane Larcher, L’autre citoyen: L’idéal républicain et les Antilles après l’esclavage (Paris: Colin, 2014), 20 quoted, 188–89, 202. Larcher notes an ambivalence on the part of ex-slaves about use of the état civil after the final abolition of slavery. See also Myriam Cottias, “Le silence de la nation: Les ‘vieilles colonies’ comme lieu de définition des dogmes républicains (1848–1905),” Outre-Mers: Revue d’Histoire 90, 338–39 (2003): 21–45, and Elizabeth Heath, Wine, Sugar, and the Making of Modern France: Global Economic Crisis and the Racialization of French Citizenship, 1870–1910 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

82. Naomi Andrews and Jennifer Sessions refer to the need to look beyond the “longstanding tyranny of republicanism in the historiography on France and its empire” in the nineteenth century. Amidst the ups and downs of monarchies, republics, and empires is a continuity in attempts to maintain and extend the imperial resources that France possessed. “Introduction: The Politics of Empire in Post-Revolutionary France,” French Politics, Culture and Society, 33 (2015): 3.

83. The quotation is from Napoléon III’s letter to his Governor General, 1863, http://musee.sitemestre.fr/6001/html/histoire/texte_lettre_a_pelissier.html. On status and citizenship in Algeria, see Laure Blévis, “Sociologie d’un droit colonial: Citoyenneté et nationalité en Algérie (1865–1947): une exception républicaine?” Doctoral thesis, Institut d’Études Politiques, Université d’Aix-en-Provence-Marseille, 2004; and M’hamed Oualdi and Noureddine Amara, eds., special dossier on “La nationalité dans le monde arabe des années 1830 aux années 1960: négocier les appartenances et le droit,” Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 137 (2015): 13–131.

84. Philip Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 252 quoted; Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); James Lehning, To Be a Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Republic (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

85. Emmanuelle Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). Focusing on people of mixed origins, Saada provides an insightful analysis of law, culture, status, and citizenship in the broad sweep of French history.

86. Jennifer Sessions, By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Yerri Urban, L’indigène dans le droit colonial français (1865–1955) (Paris: Fondation Varenne, 2011); Noureddine Amara, ed., Sous l’empire de la nationalité (1830–1960), special issue of Maghreb et Sciences Sociales 2012.

87. The constitution of the Third Republic barely mentioned colonies and did not define their place in the political structure of France or the status of the people who lived there. As Emmanuelle Saada points out, “a constitutional text from the regime of Napoleon III shaped the legal framework of the colonial possessions.” Colonies, as they had been before 1789 and except for a brief period after the Revolution, were ruled by special laws or decrees. “The Absent Empire: The Colonies in French Constitutions,” in Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson, eds., Endless Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 205–15, 212 quoted.

88. Blévis, “Sociologie d’un droit colonial”; Saada, Empire’s Children.

89. Like the denial of citizenship, the indigénat provoked anxiety among some legislators and instead of having a solid statutory basis, the rules were regarded as provisional, although regularly renewed. Against the argument that a republic couldn’t treat its people this way came the argument, in effect, that this is how empires were governed. Alix Héricord-Gorre, “Eléments pour une histoire de l’administration des colonisés de l’Empire français: Le ‘régime de l’indigénat’ et son fonctionnement depuis sa matrice algérienne (1881–c. 1920),” Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2008

90. Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976); Fanny Colonna, Instituteurs algériens, 1883–1939 (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationales des Sciences Politiques, 1975). In general on Algeria, see Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine: 1830–1999 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999) and Benjamin Stora, Histoire de l’Algérie coloniale (1830–1954) (Paris: La Découverte, 1991); and Daniel Rivet, Le Maghreb à l’épreuve de la colonisation (Paris: Fayard, 2002). Implicitly, citizenship should have opened up as subjects were acculturated through the Republic’s “civilizing mission.” Alice Conklin, focusing on West Africa, makes clear that republican politicians and administrators took the idea of a civilizing mission seriously, but neither devoted the resources necessary to get very far in that direction nor renounced the ideas and practices intrinsic to an imperial order. A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

91. Mamadou Diouf, “The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the Originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project,” Development and Change 29 (1998): 671–96; Hilary Jones, The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Larissa Kopytoff, “French Citizens and Muslim Law: The Tensions of Citizenship in Early Twentieth-Century Senegal,” in Richard Marback and Marc W. Kruman, eds., The Meaning of Citizenship (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015), 320–37.

92. Rebecca Shereikis writes of efforts of small communities of originaires from the Quatre Communes who had settled in the interior of Africa to retain their special status. But by 1913, the French government was putting them into the categories of tribe, custom, and subjecthood through which they were ruling the interior. “From Law to Custom: The Shifting Legal Status of Muslim Originaires in Kayes and Medine, 1903–13,” Journal of African History 42 (2001): 261–83.

93. Elisa Camiscioli, “Producing Citizens, Reproducing the ‘French Race’: Immigration, Demography, and Pronatalism in Early Twentieth-Century France,” Gender and History 13 (2001), 593–621.

94. Conklin, Mission to Civilize; Gregory Mann, Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). Citizens from the Antilles also argued, eventually with success, that they should be allowed to serve France during World War I as regular soldiers. Jacques Dumont, “Conscription antillaise et citoyenneté revendiquée au tournant de la première guerre mondiale,” Vingtième Siècle 92 (2006): 101–16. In the small French enclaves in India, there were still other variants on the relationship between status and citizenship, and they too were the basis for claimmaking on the part of their original inhabitants. As people from the Indian or African enclaves moved to different parts of the empire, they took questions about their status—and the claims they could make on that basis—along with them. Natasha Pairaudeau, Mobile Citizens: French Indians in Indochina, 1858–1954 (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2015); Damien Deschamps, “Une citoyenneté différée: Sens civique et assimilation des indigènes dans les Établissements français de l’Inde,” Revue Française de Science Politique 47 (1997): 49–69.

95. The trajectory of citizenship in the Portuguese Empire in the nineteenth century is distinct from that of the Spanish, British, and French empires. Indigenous peoples were initially excluded from citizenship, in contrast to the post-1812 Spanish pattern, but some leaders pushed a more inclusive approach, which was put in place in some colonies in the face of objections to awarding citizenship to “peoples of castes and civilizations very different from our own.” In the accelerating pace of colonization at the end of the century, the citizenship debate took an exclusionary turn. The indigenato, like the French indigénat, defined the subordinate place of colonized peoples in the empire. Ana Cristina Nogueira da Silva, “Universalism, Legal Pluralism and Citizenship: Portuguese Imperial Policies on Citizenship and Law (1820–1914),” in Clifford Ando, ed., Citizenship and Empire in Europe 200–1900: The Antonine Constitution after 1800 Years (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016), 199–220, esp. 206–17. The quotation is from a legislative debate in 1835, from ibid., 215. See also Cristina Nogueira da Silva, “Natives Who Were ‘Citizens’ and Natives Who Were indígenas in the Portuguese Empire, 1900–1926,” in Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson, Endless Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 295–305.

96. Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Nationalism (Oxford: Berg, 2004); Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

97. Dieter Gosewinkel, “Citizenship in Germany and France at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Some New Observations on an Old Comparison,” in Eley and Palmowski, Citizenship and National Identity, 30.

98. The population of Germany in 1871 was 41 million. Nathans, Politics of Citizenship in Germany, 2, 146–54. See also Annemarie Sammartino, “Culture, Belonging, and the Law: Naturalization in the Weimar Republic,” in Eley and Palmowski, Citizenship and National Identity, 57–72.

99. Gosewinkel, 27–39; Kathleen Canning, “Reflections on the Vocabulary of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Germany,” in Eley and Palmowski, Citizenship and National Identity, 214–32.

100. Nathans, 201–4.

101. John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905–1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

102. Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire, 1884–1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

103. George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

104. Birthe Kundrus, “Colonialism, Imperialism, National Socialism: How Imperial Was the Third Reich?” in Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, eds., German Colonialism in a Global Age (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 330–46; Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pascal Grosse, “What Does German Colonialism Have to Do with National Socialism? A Conceptual Framework,” in Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal, eds., Germany’s Colonial Pasts (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 115–34; Isabelle Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

105. Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontier of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

106. Gérard Noiriel, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Le “vivre ensemble” à la française: Réflexions d’un historien (Montrouge: Bayard, 2015), 33; Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013)

107. For studies that look at the “old” multinational empires and the “new” colonial empires in relation to each other, see Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen, eds., Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011). The longterm but complex trajectories of imperial polities into the twentieth century is stressed in Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

108. Engin Isin, “Citizenship after Orientalism: Ottoman Citizenship,” in E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Içduygu, eds., Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences (London: Routledge, 2005), 31–51.

109. Gianluca Parolin sees the origins of a particular citizenship doctrine in the granting of “capitulations” to foreign merchant groups in Ottoman towns, recognizing them as communities and giving them jurisdiction over legal disputes within the community. Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 72.

110. Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Leslie Peirce, Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Leslie Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

111. Eunjeong Yi, Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 239–40. Leslie Peirce’s study of city taken over by the Ottomans suggests that local actors—some more than others—cooperated to the extent that they could gain by incorporation into the empire’s structures and networks. “Becoming Ottoman in Sixteenth-Century Aintab,” in Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull, Eds., Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 108–22.

112. Baki Tezcan argues that the complexity of the governing structure of the Ottoman Empire, including the role of jurists, the corporate consciousness of Janissaries (and the possibility of their deposing a sultan), and the empowerment of economically successful local notables provided in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a check on sultanic power and an opening toward limited monarchy and some kind of civic order. The “free Muslim male” could aspire to a measure of mobility and influence. The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 236 quoted.

113. Nora Lafi and Ulrike Freitag, eds., Urban Governance under the Ottomans: Between Cosmopolitanism and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2014); Sarah Abrevaya Stein, Extraterritorial Dreams: European Citizenship, Sephardi Jews, and the Ottoman Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

114. Will Hanley makes the case that neither the Tanzimat reforms of the 1830s nor the nationality law of 1869 defined an Ottoman citizenship. Citizenship was intended, he argues, to distinguish Ottoman subjects from foreigners and force people to choose between the protection of a foreign government and Ottoman subjecthood. He has a point—especially in that the texts in question did not provide for a set of political rights—but he limits himself to considering citizenship as a legal status (inflected by western norms concerning the political rights that citizenship should entail) and not as a basis of the claim-making that could stem from common membership in an Ottoman polity. “What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 3 (2016): 277–98.

115. Adam Mestyan finds in poetry, theater, and other creative writing from Egypt evidence of patriotic attachment to both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. He sees patriotism as a convergence of Muslim ideas of just rule, European notions of homeland, and principles of the Ottoman imperial system. After the tendency toward autonomy in Egypt under Mehmet Ali, he sees a tendency toward “re-Ottomization.” Arab Patriotism: The Ideology and Culture of Power in Late Ottoman Egypt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

116. Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Barkey, Empire of Difference; Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London: Tauris, 1998); Darin Stephanov, “Ruler Visibility, Modernity, and Ethnonationalism in the Late Ottoman Empire,” in Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull, eds., Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 259–71.

117. Lâle Can points to the tension between the Ottoman emperor as sultan, ruler of a territorial and multi-faith empire that existed among other territorial empires, and as caliph, leader of the faithful wherever they were. The tension was strong near the edges of the empire and among people who moved across those edges, notably people from Central Asia who fell between the imperial jurisdictions of the Ottoman and Russian empires. “The Protection Question: Central Asians and Extraterritoriality in the Late Ottoman Empire,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 48 (2016): 679–99, esp. 692. On sectarian tensions in Ottoman Lebanon, see Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

118. Ali Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 2–4.

119. Ottoman attempts to make governing practices more standard for the different religions—at a time when coreligionists from other empires were meddling—exacerbated sectarian tendencies in mid-nineteenth-century Lebanon. Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism.

120. Thomas Kuehn, “Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–1919,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 27 (2007): 315–31, 317 quoted. Thomas Kuehn, Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849–1919 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). Kuehn compares Ottoman rule in Yemen—but not in more central provinces of the empire—to British practices of indirect rule. Ibid., 251.

121. Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Julia Phillips Cohen, Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Will Hanley, “When Did Egyptians Stop Being Ottomans? An Imperial Citizenship Case Study,” in Willem Maas, ed. Multilevel Citizenship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 89–109; Ariel Salzmann, “Citizens in Search of the State: The Limits of Political Participation in the Late Ottoman Empire,” in Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 37–66.

122. Nicholas Doumanis, Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and Its Destruction in Late-Ottoman Anatolia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). The Greek nationalists who fought for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s got considerable help from European powers that wanted to limit the power of the Ottomans, and the first king of Greece was actually a Bavarian prince. If Britain and France wanted to weaken the Ottomans, they didn’t want to weaken them too much, and later tried to play the Ottomans off against the Russians. The conflicts of the Mediterranean world in the nineteenth century are not simply struggles of nations against empires, but inter-empire conflict and intrigue.

123. Laura Robson, States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), 21–24.

124. See Doumanis, Before the Nation, 132–69.

125. Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M Naimark, eds., A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Philipp Ther, The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe (London: Berghahn, 2014). Christopher Bayly stresses the importance of the war itself in pushing the governing elite into a nationalist mode. Up to that point, he writes citing Engin Akarli and Hasan Kayali, “Young Turks were essentially Ottoman patriots, not harbingers of a Turkish ethnic state.” “Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780–1916,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 27 (2007): 332–34, 334 quoted.

126. Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Jürgen Osterhammel points out that in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, the challenge “did not come from disgruntled minority elites or oppressed peasantries but from the margins of the military establishment.” He makes much the same point about the other “old” empires in the early twentieth century. “Commentary: Measuring Imperial ‘Success’ and ‘Failure,’” in Leonhard and von Hirschhausen, Comparing Empires, 472–76, 473 quoted.

127. Like citizenship in the Ottoman Empire, the question of forms of political belonging in China—in relation to the long history of empire and to European intrusion—has received scholarly attention and deserves more. See Merle Goldman and Elizabeth Perry, eds., Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Joshua Fogel and Peter Zarrow, eds., Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890–1920 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Vanessa Fong and Rachel Murphy, eds., Chinese Citizenship: Views from the Margins (London: Routledge, 2006); “Symposium: ‘Public Sphere’/’Civil Society’ in China?,” Modern China 19, 2 (1993); R. Bin Wong, “Citizenship in Chinese History,” in Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 97–122. Citizenship in African polities will be discussed in chapter 3.

128. Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers.

129. John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

130. Paul-André Rosental, “National Citizenship and Migrants’ Social Rights in Twentieth-Century Europe,” in Steven King and Anne Winter, eds., Migration, Settlement and Belonging in Europe, 1500–1930s (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), 269–80; Mary Dewhurst Lewis, The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). McKeown makes a related point regarding Chinese immigrants to the United States: many found that there were ways, legal and otherwise, to evade the restrictions. Melancholy Order, 273.

131. Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

132. Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

Chapter 3. Empires, Nations, and Citizenship in the Twentieth Century

1. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace 1979 [1948]), 290–302. On contemporary anxieties about apatrides, see for example Nicolas Weill, “L’apatridie, l’envers du droit,” Le Monde 14 January 2016.

2. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Philipp Ther, The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe (London: Berghahn, 2014); Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White, eds., The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Postwar Europe, 1944–49 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

3. Laura Robson, States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017); Eric Weitz, “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right,” American Historical Review 120 (2015): 462–96.

4. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents: An Indian History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 31–32.

5. Jayal sees imperial citizenship as differentiated by racial hierarchy, while the colonial framework—within India—was differentiated both by race and by class. Ibid., 29.

6. The tensions between gender, community, and nation are emphasized in Mrinalini Sinha, Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

7. Sandip Hazareesingh, “The Quest for Urban Citizenship: Civic Rights, Public Opinion, and Colonial Resistance in Early Twentieth-Century Bombay,” Modern Asian Studies 34 (2000): 797–829.

8. Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents, 41, 44.

9. Smuts, 1921, quoted in Mrinalini Sinha, “Whatever Happened to the Third British Empire? Empire, Nation Redux,” in Andrew Thompson, ed., Writing Imperial Histories (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 180.

10. Sunil Amrith, “Empires, Diasporas and Cultural Circulation,” in Andrew Thompson, ed., Writing Imperial Histories (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 232.

11. Sinha, Specters of Mother India.

12. Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents, 19, 22, 162 quoted.

13. Md. Mahbubar Rahman and Willem Van Schendel argue that crossborder refugee movements at partition were of different types and not all migrants were refugees. “ ‘I Am Not a Refugee’: Rethinking Partition Migration,” Modern Asian Studies 37 (2003): 551–84.

14. Joya Chatterji, “South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946–1970,” The Historical Journal 55 (2012): 1049–71, 1070 quoted. Chatterji’s characterization is a response to Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1999). Chatterji also notes that “Today South Asia’s borders are among the most violently policed frontiers in the world.” That other former colonies around the Indian Ocean became independent in the postwar period led to exclusionary tendencies toward the many South Asians living there, while India’s desire to retain ties with its diaspora were mitigated by concerns that closet Pakistanis might infiltrate the mother country. “From Subject to Citizen: Migration, Nationality, and the Post-imperial Global Order,” in Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson, eds., Endless Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 311–12.

15. Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

16. In the 1930s, the convergence of critical intellectuals and activists on London from around the British Empire led to a considerable range of anticolonial activities, not least among them a demand for a meaningful form of imperial citizenship. Marc Matera, Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015).

17. A. G. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” Past and Present 200 (2008): 211–47.

18. Randall Hansen, “The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act,” Twentieth Century British History 10 (1999): 67–95.

19. Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 245–47, 251.

20. Matthew Grant, “Historicizing Citizenship in Post-War Britain,” The Historical Journal 59 (2016): 1187–1206. As Hansen (Citizenship and Immigration, 252) points out, even earlier the Nationality Act’s original purpose of maintaining the cohesion of the Commonwealth through an inclusive citizenship regime was undermined not only by the attitudes of some of Britain’s “white” citizens, but by both ends of the overseas spectrum—by old dominions that wanted to restrict nonwhite immigration and by newly independent states that wanted to assert their autonomy and define their own citizenships. See also Sarah Ansari, “Subjects or Citizens? India, Pakistan and the 1948 British Nationality Act,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 41 (2013): 285–312; Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Chatterji, “From Subject to Citizen,” 315.

21. Jane Burbank, “Eurasian Sovereignty: The Case of Kazan,” Problems of Post-Communism 62 (2015): 8.

22. Valerie Kivelson, “ ‘Muscovite Citizenship’: Rights without Freedom,” Journal of Modern History 74 (2002): 465–89.

23. Charles Steinwedel, “Making Social Groups, One Person at a Time: The Identification of Individuals, by Estate, Religious Confession, and Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russia,” in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 67–82. Registers and internal passports were used to control residence and movement (whether to encourage or discourage it depending on the needs of the state). Steinwedel points out the “nationality” was considered more of a long-term attribute than religion or estate, but was neither racial nor rigid. Ibid., 82.

24. Eric Lohr, Russian Citizenship from Empire to Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 32; Paul Werth, the Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). There was nothing unusual about the fact that with the incorporation of Finland into the empire, Finns retained their own form of citizenship with a fuller range of rights than enjoyed by most Russians. Such were the imperatives of incorporative imperialism. Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 30–31. For a debate on Lohr’s arguments, see Andrey Shlyakhter, “Russian Citizenship: Borders, Numbers and Intentions,” Russian History Blog, http://russianhistoryblog.org/2013/07/russian-citizenship-borders-numbers-and-intentions-3/, accessed January 12, 2016, plus comments, including Lohr’s reply. The arguments cited in these passages are not fundamentally challenged by Shlyakhter’s critique.

25. Lohr (Russian Citizenship, 5) refers to this policy as “attract and hold.” The exception to low rates of emigration were Jews. The government did not discourage them from leaving and made it hard for Jews who left ever to return. Ibid., 113.

26. Jane Burbank, “An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7 (2006): 397–431; Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 3.

27. Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 72, 79–80.

28. Ibid., 130.

29. Ibid., 131–34.

30. The Soviet model of national republics was influential beyond its borders. It was cited in 1946 as a precedent for turning the French Empire into a federation and in 1995 for turning the unitary state of Ethiopia into a federal state—cases to be discussed later in this chapter. Christopher Clapham, “Afterword,” in David Turton, ed., Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 237.

31. Lohr (Russian Citizenship, 156) cites a statute from 1924: “The citizen of one of the union republics within the composition of the USSR is at the same time a citizen of the USSR and possesses all the rights and carries all the obligations established by the constitution and laws of the USSR as well as by the constitution and laws of the Soviet republic in which he resides.” See also Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

32. The internal passport became an instrument of control, used against individuals or communities whose actions or attitudes were suspect, confining some to exile or labor camps, but also doling out access to resources depending on social position. Marc Garcelon, “Colonizing the Subject: The Genealogy and Legacy of the Soviet Internal Passport,” in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 83–100.

33. Vanessa Ruget, “Citizenship in Central Asia,” in Peter Nyers and Engin Isin, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (London: Routledge, 2015), 335–43.

34. Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 186.

35. Sally Cummings and Raymond Hinnebusch, “Introduction,” in Cummings and Hinnebusch, eds., Sovereignty after Empire: Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2011), 4. They argue that the Middle East was fragmented by the imposed borders but harked back to memories of Islamic unity under the Ottoman Empire and earlier Islamic empires (“Conclusions,” 335). The twentieth century brought in new forms of social fragmentation—old and new urban elites, rural landowners, military elites of more modest origin, wage workers, peasants with marginal access to resources—as well as a variety of Islamic beliefs and networks. The consequence was governing classes with little legitimacy, and governed classes with high levels of resentment against both outsiders and rulers.

36. Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press; Natasha Wheatley, “Mandatory Interpretation: Legal Hermeneutics and the New International Order in Arab and Jewish Petitions to the League of Nations,” Past and Present, 227 (2015): 205–48.

37. Cummings and Hinnebusch, “Introduction,” 1–22, and “Conclusion,” 337 cited, in Cummings and Hinnebusch, Sovereignty after Empire.

38. Emmanuelle Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

39. Emir Khaled’s real name was Khaled El-Hassani Ben El-Hachem, and he was the grandson of the resistance leader Abd El-Khader and an officer in the French Army during World War I.

40. Dónal Hassett, “Defining Imperial Citizenship in the Shadow of World War I: Equality and Difference in the Debates around Post-Colonial Reform in Algeria,” in Gearóid Barry, Enrico Dal Lago, and Róisín Healy, eds., Small Nations and Colonial Peripheries in World War I (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 263–80. Other French politicians argued (also to no avail) for creating a “demicitoyenneté” that allowed Muslims to exercise certain rights, or that limited political rights could be extended to noncitizens, kept carefully segregated from the citizen-electorate. Florence Renucci, “L’accession des indigènes à la citoyenneté entre assimilation et réformisme: Les mesures légales prises par l’Italie et la France en 1919,” in Association Française des Historiens des Idées Politiques, Sujet et Citoyen: Actes du Colloque de Lyon (11–12 septembre 2003) (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2004), 393–420.

41. James McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Yet another pattern prevailed in the mandates that France acquired over the former Ottoman provinces of Syria and Lebanon. Elizabeth Thompson points to the grey area between the status of subject and citizen, and to the tensions over social relations, including gender and class—in short, the specific nature of citizenship—that emerged as claims to rights were made. Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

42. Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015). Like London, Paris was where intellectuals and activists from around the empire converged, underscoring the shared anger at the exclusions of French citizenship. Whether such trends can be fit into a narrative of nationalism or whether the other threads deserve full consideration in their own right is a matter of controversy among historians. For two points of view, see Michael Goebel, Anti-imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third-world Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), and Jennifer Boittin, Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).

43. This and the following paragraphs are based on a more detailed discussion of the 1946 constitution and the reconfiguration of citizenship in Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

44. According to French officials, some men in the French Sudan complained that women’s equal access to courts under the citizenship clauses had undermined their marital authority. In 1947 the administration of that territory issued a decree that reinstated the former practice of imposing criminal sanctions on women who had deserted the marital home, but applied the decree only to women married under customary law, not the French civil code. Marie Rodet, “Continuum of Gendered Violence: The Colonial Invention of Female Desertion as a Customary Criminal Offense, French Soudan, 1900–1949,” in Emily Burrill, Richard Roberts, and Elizabeth Thornberry, eds., Domestic Violence and the Law in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 86.

45. Technically, citizenship of the French Union embraced everybody, but it meant little for citizens of the French Republic, including overseas territories and Algeria, because they had something better. Union citizenship was thus meaningful for inhabitants of protectorates and to a lesser extent mandates, because the government, following League of Nations precedents, accepted that the inhabitants of mandated territories had to be treated at least as well as those of colonies or overseas territories. Just what Union citizenship provided was not so clear, since implementation presumably went through the individual governments, and the monarchs who nominally ruled Morocco, Tunisia, or Vietnam did not necessarily accept republican notions of citizenship. For a leading jurist’s take on citizenship of the French Union, see Pierre Lampué, “L’Union Française d’après la Constitution,” Revue Juridique et Parlementaire de l’Union Française, 1 (1947), 1–39, 145–94.

46. Kristen Stromberg Childers, Seeking Imperialism’s Embrace: National Identity, Decolonization, and Assimilation in the French Caribbean (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

47. Much too late, the French government—alongside its brutal repression of the Algerian revolt—tried to play the “integration” card to Muslim Algerians, including a program of what Americans would call affirmative action, guaranteeing “French Muslim Algerians” a percentage of civil service jobs in the metropole as well as in Algeria itself. The premise of the failed campaign was that France was an inclusive and differentiated polity and could act—or should be seen to act—for the benefit of particular categories of its citizens. Todd Shepard, “Thinking between Metropole and Colony: The French Republic, ‘Exceptional Promotion,’ and the ‘Integration’ of Algerians, 1955–1962,” in Martin Thomas, ed., The French Colonial Mind, vol. 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 298–323.

48. For the different pattern of making citizenship claims in the context of the welfare state in 1940s Lebanon and Syria, see Thompson, Colonial Citizens.

49. Sékou Touré and Houphouët-Boigny both wanted Africa to remain in the “Franco-African Community,” but the former favored an African federation, the latter opposed it.

50. Willem Maas, ed., Multilevel Citizenship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2013).

51. The French overseas territory of the Sudan—now the Republic of Mali—should not be confused with the state that now bears the name of Sudan.

52. Benhabib writes that “Not having one’s papers in order in our societies is a form of civil death.” Rights of Others, 215.

53. The distinguished Franco-Iranian sociologist Farhad Khosrokhovar points out that France promised its Muslim citizens equal opportunity and delivered stigmatization, leading to a higher level of bitterness than is found in Germany or England. “Laicité,” he writes, “France’s staunch version of secularism, is so inflexible that it can appear to rob them of dignity.” “Jihad and the French Exception,” New York Times, July 19, 2016.

54. The possibility of being a citizen with a particular civil status still exists, for now at least, in New Caledonia. See among a growing body of work Isabelle Merle and Elsa Faugère, eds., La Nouvelle-Calédonie: Vers un destin commun (Paris: Karthala, 2010).

55. On the complexities of laws on citizenship and nationality in past and present, see Patrick Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris: Grasset, 2005).

56. Some places to begin are Sara Dorman, “Citizenship in Africa: The Politics of Belonging,” in Engin Isin and Peter Nyers, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (London: Routledge, 2015), 161–71; Emma Hunter, ed., Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues between Past and Present (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016); and Edmond Keller, Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014). On how African states developed nationality laws after independence, see Roger Decottignies and Marc de Biéville, Les nationalités africaines (Paris: Pedone, 1963).

57. Mamadou Diouf and Rosalind Fredericks, eds., The Arts of Citizenship in African Cities: Infrastructures and Spaces of Belonging (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

58. Sten Hagberg, “ ‘Thousands of New Sankaras’: Resistance and Struggle in Burkina Faso,” Africa Spectrum 3 (2015): 109–21.

59. Richard Banégas, Florence Brisset-Foucault, and Armando Cutolo, “Espaces publics de la parole et pratiques de la citoyenneté en Afrique,” Politique africaine 127 (2012): 5–20.

60. Blair Rutherford, “On the Promise and Perils of Citizenship: Heuristic Concepts, Zimbabwean Example,” Citizenship Studies 15 (2011): 499–512.

61. Laurent Fourchard and Aurelia Segatti, “Of Xenophobia and Citizenship: The Everyday Politics of Exclusion and Inclusion in Africa,” Africa 85 (2015): 2–12; Jonathan Klaaren, “Citizenship, Xenophobic Violence, and Law’s Dark Side,” in Loren Landau, ed., Exorcising The Demon Within: Xenophobia, Violence, and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2010), 135–49; Audie Klotz, Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 1860–2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Tamlyn Monson, “Everyday Politics and Collective Mobilization against Foreigners in a South African Shack Settlement,” Africa 85 (2015): 131–53. The South African government has stated that all South Africans, regardless of race, are full citizens. That has not been the case everywhere in post-independence Africa. In much of East Africa, for instance, not just people of European origin but those with South Asian roots were the target of efforts to define them as less than full citizens of Tanganyika, Uganda, or (to a lesser extent) Kenya. Many had to leave a country in which they had been brought up. On race and citizenship in the case of Tanganyika (later Tanzania), see Ronald Aminzade, “The Politics of Race and Nation: Citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika,” Political Power and Social Theory 14 (2000): 53–90; and James Brennan, Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012).

62. The following paragraphs are based on Henri-Michel Yéré, “Citizenship, Nationality and History in Côte d’Ivoire, 1929–1999,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Basel, 2010; Peter Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Ruth Marshall-Fratani, “The War of ‘Who Is Who’: Autochthony, Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivorian Crisis,” African Studies Review 49 (2006): 9–43; as well as Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation.

63. Political scientist Lauren MacLean found that citizenship structures make considerable difference at a local level. Comparing villages of similar ethnic composition on both sides of the Côte d’Ivoire-Ghana border, she found that the strong notion of citizenship inherited from post-1946 France, and which continued to shape electoral politics and service delivery under Houphouët-Boigny fostered among Ivorians a more “individualized, entitlement-based sense of citizenship” and greater focus on the nuclear family than their Ghanaian cousins, who had developed a wider sense of their local community in the face of the state’s failure since the 1960s to provide much of anything in the way of social services to its citizens. Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and Reciprocity in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 6 quoted.

64. A similar situation prevailed in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s: government edicts purging from citizenship roles people with connections (usually as migrant workers) to another state and questioning the status of urban dwellers on the grounds that the true Zimbabwe citizen was attached to the land. In effect, the true Zimbabwean citizen was someone who supported the government party. Dorman, “Citizenship in Africa”; Shannon Morreira, Rights after Wrongs: Local Knowledge and Human Rights in Zimbabwe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 17–19.

65. Thandika Mkandawire, “African Intellectuals and Nationalism,” in Mkandawire, ed., African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development (Dakar: CODESRIA; London: Zed, 2005), 12. See also Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett, and Paul Nugent, “Introduction: Citizenship and Its Casualties in Africa,” in Dorman, Hammet, and Nugent, eds., Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 3–26, and Beth Elise Whitaker, “Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in Africa” African Studies Review 48 (2005): 109–26.

66. Carola Lentz, Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 2. See also Paul Bjerk, “The Allocation of Land as a Historical Discourse of Political Authority in Tanzania,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 46 (2013): 255–82; Bjerk notes the changing levels of authority—from kinship group to chiefs to the Tanzanian state—that intervene in the allocation of land.

67. Catherine Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 313.

68. Christian Lund, “Proprieté et citoyenneté: Dynamiques de reconnaissance dans l’Afrique des villes,” Politique africaine 132 (2013): 5–25. For a study of status and gender oppression in parts of rural Africa, see Benedetta Rossi, From Slavery to Aid: Politics, Labour, and Ecology in the Nigerien Sahel, 1800–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). One response to government hostility in rural Guinea has been migration to Senegal. John Straussberger, “The ‘Particular Situation’ in the Futa Jallon: Ethnicity, Region, and Nation in Twentieth-Century Guinea,” PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2015.

69. Vasco Martins, “Politics of Power and Hierarchies of Citizenship in Angola,” Citizenship Studies 21 (2017): 100–15; Justin Pearce, Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 1975–2002 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

70. Aninka Claassens, “Denying Ownership and Equal Citizenship: Continuities in the State’s Use of Law and ‘Custom”, 1913–2013,” Journal of Southern African Studies 40 (2014): 761–779, 774 quoted; Deborah James, “Citzenship and Land in South Africa: From Rights to Responsibilities,” Critique of Anthropology 33 (2013): 26–46. To take a quite different African example, among the countries of the Chad Basin people act not only in relation to those states, but in relation to transborder networks of different sorts—smuggling arms, drugs, and household goods—each of which offers a sense of belonging as well as material—often violent—support, regulates commercial interaction, and “taxes” resources. People have to operate in this complex field of state and non-state institutions that are not entirely distinct from each other. Janet Roitman, “The Right to Tax: Economic Citizenship in the Chad Basin,” Citizenship Studies 11 (2007): 187–209.

71. Long ago, Aristide Zolberg pointed out that African political parties were less mass organizations than assemblages put together by leaders working through vertical linkages to brokers in each of the ethnic communities, religious groupings, or associations of various sorts that constituted society, more like the political structures of political bosses in Chicago than the mass party of Leninist imagination. Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966). My (and Zolberg’s) perspective differs from arguments that posit a sharp bifurcation between a world of cities, formal political organization, and citizenship versus a rural world of kinship and kin-like ties and, in the colonial era, subjecthood. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), and Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1975): 91–112.

72. For a study of how extreme differentiation—in relation to people of slave status—in an earlier time period plays out in the context of both urbanization and the development of a state-defined national citizenship, see Éric Hahonou, “Propriété, citoyennetés et héritage de l’esclavage au Nord Bénin,” Politique Africaine 132 (2013): 73–93.

73. These tendencies are emphasized in John Lonsdale, “Unhelpful Pasts and a Provisional Present,” in Hunter, Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa, chapter 2. Movement to cities created possibilities for people to claim human and material resources in new ways, but also the possibility of control of such resources by elites. That urban societies are “plural” in many senses—different origins, different notions of law and property, different relations to political parties and state institutions—makes the question of urban citizenship all the more complex. See Lund, “Proprieté et citoyenneté,” 5–25.

74. Juan Obarrio, The Spirit of the Laws in Mozambique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 6 quoted; Elisio Macamo, “Power, Conflict, and Citizenship: Mozambique’s Contemporary Struggles,” Citizenship Studies 21 (2017): 196–209, 198 quoted; Jason Hickel, Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 23 quoted.

75. Steven Robins, Andrea Cornwall and Bettina von Lieres, “Rethinking ‘Citizenship’ in the Postcolony,” Third World Quarterly 29 (2008): 1069–86. A related, equally problematic, argument appears in Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Deloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

76. Harri Englund, “Introduction: Recognizing Identities, Imagining Alternatives,” in Englund and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, eds., Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa (London: Zed, 2004), 23. “Groups” are to differing degrees constituted out of long-standing patterns of belonging, but also from the efforts of political elites and entrepreneurs of cultural particularity. For an example of “top-down” group-based citizenship, see Helene Maria Kyed, “New Sites of Citizenship: Recognition of Traditional Authority and Group-based Citizenship in Mozambique,” Journal of Southern African Studies 32 (2006): 563–81.

77. Remittances from Africans abroad to African countries were around $35–36 billion in 2015. “Remittances to Developing Countries Edge Up Slightly in 2015,” worldbank.org, accessed November 22, 2016. The concept of diasporic citizenship is discussed in the introduction.

78. Lahra Smith, Making Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender and National Identity in Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6, 204 quoted; David Turton, “Introduction,” in Turton, ed., Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 14, 18; Assefa Fiseha, “Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism,” in Turton, Ethnic Federalism, 131–64. Solomon M. Gofie argues that the state used pluralistic notion of a community of citizens to cement its monolithic approach to political power. “The State and the ‘Peoples’: Citizenship and the Future of Political Community in Ethiopia,” in Emma Hunter, ed., Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues between Past and Present (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 240–55. A mixed picture of postcolonial federalism also emerges in Nigeria. Following the British-constructed division of Nigeria into three units was a predictable disaster, as each risked domination by an alliance of the other two, and the largest ethnic group in each was in a position to make the entire region conform to its dictates. After the Biafran war of 1967–70, the country was divided into a larger number of federated states (later increased again), complicating the quest for ethnic domination both within and among the states. There has been no repeat of the Biafran war, although the central control of oil revenue—with attendant struggles for its distribution—has been among the most serious of Nigeria’s problems. See Rotimi T. Suberu, “Nigeria; Dilemmas of Federalism,” in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 350–51; V. Adefemi Isumonah, “The Ethnic Language of Rights and the Nigerian Political Community,” in Hunter, Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa, 211–39.

79. A leading figure in the administration of the British Empire, Sir Bartle Frere, thought that Africans could be made into “the subject races of an Imperial mistress, races strong enough to labour and capable of development into worthy integral sections of population in vast and growing empires.” Such was one concept of imperial belonging. Lecture from 1878 cited in Saul Dubow, “South Africa and South Africans: Nationality, Belonging, Citizenship,” in Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson, eds., The Cambridge History of South Africa Volume 2 1885–1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 25.

80. Klotz, Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 150–67; Dubow, “South Africa and South Africans,” 17–65. Dubow points to the tensions, most acute since the 1940s, among opponents of white domination in South Africa between those who favored a unitary, nonracial polity, advocates of a multiracial polity that explicitly recognized the collective character of the different communities within South Africa, and an “Africanist” viewpoint that insisted that black Africans should rule Africa. Group-differentiated citizenship was thus one possibility, but since 1994, South African citizenship is in constitutional terms unitary (with relatively strong provincial governments), although the practice of politics has both Africanist and multiracialist aspects.

81. On the politics of basic income support in South Africa and elsewhere, see James Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); statistic from p. 5. The literature on politics, inequality, and citizenship in South Africa is now vast. See for example Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005); Franco Barchiesi, Precarious Liberation: Workers, the State, and Contested Social Citizenship in Postapartheid South Africa (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011); Adam Habib, South Africa’s Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013); Steven Robins, ed., Limits to Liberation after Apartheid: Citizenship, Governance and Culture in South Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005).

82. Tom Lodge, “Neo-Patrimonial Politics in the ANC,” African Affairs 113 (2014): 1–23. Before 1994, one response to the politics of white domination was that “blacks responded with their own racially embedded ideals.” C.R.D. Halisi, Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 4. This response stood in tension with the ANC’s long-standing nonracialism, a tension that is still evident within as well as beyond the party.

83. On citizenship in Eritrea and its diaspora, see Victoria Bernal, Nation as Network: Diaspora, Cyberspace, and Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). For a recent installment of the South Sudan debacle, see Jacey Fortin, “Power Struggles Stall South Sudan’s Recovery from War,” New York Times, May 30, 2016. More generally, see Geschiere, Perils of Belonging; Morten Bøas and Kevin Dunn, Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict (London: Zed, 2013); and Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

84. One country often cited for maintaining democratic political structures and a reasonable level of public services is Botswana. Its government has evoked the citizenship concept to justify the focusing of resources—in the notable case of the provision on a large scale of drugs for the treatment of AIDS—on its own citizens, not on residents who might be from other countries. Fanny Chabrol, “Soigner les siens: Citoyenneté et imagination nationale au Botswana au temps du SIDA,” Politique Africaine 136 (2014): 157–77. See also Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Reconciling ‘the Rhetoric of Rights’ with Competing Notions of Personhood and Agency in Botswana,” in Harri Englund and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, eds., Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa (London: Zed, 2004), 33–63.

85. Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

86. “Conférence de Presse du 23 Août 1960 par Léopold-Sédar Senghor, Sécrétaire Général de UPS,” published by Ministère de l’information, de la Presse et de la Radiodiffusion de la République du Sénégal. For discussion, see Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation.

87. Since even non-EU migrants legally in a Union country have certain rights, some people argue that European citizenship doesn’t add much to an already fragmented notion. But legal—let alone illegal—status is vulnerable to the whims of politics, while European courts have produced a substantial jurisprudence of citizenship that offers protection to European citizens. The courts’ role, especially in specifying the contours of social citizenship, is emphasized in Christian Joppke, “The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship,” European Journal of Sociology 51 (2010): 9–32, esp. 22.

88. Ulrich Preuss, Michelle Everson, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Edwige Lefebvre, “Traditions of Citizenship in the European Union,” Citizenship Studies 7 (2003): 3–14, esp. 4.

89. Stefano Giubboni, “European Citizenship and Social Rights in Times of Crisis,” German Law Journal 15 (2014): 957; Patricia Mindus, “Dimensions of Citizenship,” German Law Journal 15 (2014): 745. Joppke worries that the process of Europeanizing social citizenship through courts and administration weakens the subjective impact of citizenship. Flexibility and multiple citizenships lessen citizenship’s sacral qualities. “Inevitable Lightening,” 9–32. Bryan Turner goes further in seeing a diminishment of the citizen’s social position relative to that of the legal resident. “We Are All Denizens Now: On the Erosion of Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 20 (2016): 679–92.

90. Turkuler Isiksel, Europe’s Functional Constitution: A Theory of Constitutionalism beyond the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 222; Stéphane Caporal, “L’Europe et le citoyen,” in Association Française des Historiens des Idées Politiques, Sujet and citoyen: Actes du colloque de Lyon (11–12 septembre 2003) (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2004), 441–63, esp. 446–47, 450–51. Peo Hansen and Sandy Brian Hager note the lack of social citizenship at the European level and see instead an “individualized market citizen.” In the absence of a social conception, they argue, European leaders have tried to define Europe through a supposed “rootedness in a shared European culture, heritage, history, and civilization.” That leaves many people out. The Politics of European Citizenship: Deepening Contradictions in Social Rights and Migration Policy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 75.

91. Gregory Mann, From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

92. Despite high degrees of internal inequality, rich countries redistribute a considerable portion of their revenues to citizens through their social programs, but, overall, they consign only .35 per cent of national revenue to aid to poor countries. François Bourguignon, La mondialisation de l’inégalité (Paris: Seuil, 2012), 79.

93. Weitz, in tracing the history of the concept of self-determination, points to the impossibility of defining conclusively what a people is. The consequences of definitional politics could be emancipatory or the reverse. “Self-Determination,” 462–96.

Conclusion: Citizenship in an Unequal World

1. Melissa Lane, The Birth of Politics: Eight Greek and Roman Political Ideas and Why They Matter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 185. The image of Janus is also invoked in John Clarke, Kathleen Coll, Evelina Dagnino, and Catherine Neveu, Disputing Citizenship (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 176.

2. The need to work with these tensions is stressed by two of today’s thoughtful political theorists. Seyla Benhabib, “Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times,” Citizenship Studies 11 (2007), 19–36, and The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Jean Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

3. Engin Isin, “Theorizing Acts of Citizenship,” in Isin and Greg Nielsen, eds., Acts of Citizenship (London: Zed, 2008), 15–43. Lest one romanticize movements of civil society, it is important to note that they can be demagogic, exclusionary, and violent as well as emancipatory, a point made in regard to Latin America by Joseph Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, “Citizens: Made, Not Born,” in Tulchin and Ruthenburg, eds., Citizenship in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 281–84.

4. “Citizenship is more than a simple system of inclusion and exclusion, it is powerfully connective.” Because it is not inherently tied to ethnicity, religion, race, or class, it contains the possibility of linkages across such divisions—if people have the will to act accordingly. Clarke et al., Disputing Citizenship, 164.

5. Rainer Bauböck asks, “Wouldn’t it be plausible to assign primary responsibility for ‘diversity management’ to cities, for social welfare entitlements to states, and for migration policies to the European Union or similar unions of states in other global regions, such as South America?” “Why Liberal Nationalism Does Not Resolve the Progressive’s Trilemma: Comment on Will Kymlicka’s article “Solidarity in Diverse Societies,” Comparative Migration Studies 4, 10 (2016), 4.

6. Engin Isin and Peter Nyers see citizenship as vitally needed to struggle against the impositions of global capitalism and “statism.” “Introduction: Globalizing Citizenship Studies,” in Engin Isin and Peter Nyers, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), 6.

7. Evelina Dagnino, “Citizenship in Latin America: An Introduction,” Latin American Perspectives 30, 2 (2003): 8.

8. On the inconsistent commitment of European institutions to social rights and social protections, see Willem Maas, “European Union Citizenship in Retrospect and Prospect,” in Isin and Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, 409–17, esp. 415–16. Alain Supiot sees a global trajectory that goes toward the extension of social rights after World War II, followed by a move in recent decades in the opposite direction, toward treating European citizens as individuals in relation to the market. The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market, trans. Saskia Brown (London: Verso, 2012).

9. Türküler Isiksel, “Citizens of a New Agora: Postnational Citizenship and International Economic Institutions,” in Willem Maas, ed., Multilevel Citizenship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 184–202.

10. As Jean Cohen points out, sovereignty is a relational concept, involving mutual recognition and “membership in an international society and/or community of states”—so that there is no inherent contradiction between agreed-upon international standards enforced by international institutions and sovereign states. Globalization and Sovereignty, 201. See Patrick Macklem, “Global Poverty and the Right to Development,” in The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 185–223.

11. A high official of the French employers’ association (Medef), not noted for its generosity toward the working class, has recently called for a “social Bretton Woods”—that is, for international institutions to respond to people’s worry about their social security in parallel to the way international financial institutions protect the economic order. Bernard Spitz, “Le temps est venu d’un nouveau Bretton Woods social,” Le Monde Économie, 13 January 2017, 7.

12. Simon Turner, “Dans l’oeil du cyclone: Les réfugiés, l’aide et la communautė internationale en Tanzanie,” Politique Africaine 85 (2002): 29–44, 37 quoted.