I shall explain to you likewise in this chapter the proofs of the belief in unity according to the opinion of the Mutakallimūn. They say that that which is indicated by what exists as being its maker and its bringer into existence is one. Their principal methods in establishing oneness are two: the method referring to reciprocal hindering, and the method of differing from one another.
THE FIRST METHOD
Namely, the method referring to reciprocal hindering is the one preferred by the multitude [of Mutakallimūn]. Its meaning is this: he says that if the world had two gods, it would necessarily follow that a substance, which cannot be exempt from one of two contraries, could either be deprived of both contraries—which is impossible—or that two contraries could be conjoined in it at [123a] the same time and in the same substratum—which is likewise impossible. For instance, one god wishes at present to warm one or more substances, whereas the other wishes to cool them. This would have one of two consequences: [1] They would be neither warm nor cold because the two actions hinder each other; and that is impossible, for every body must receive one of these two contraries. Or [2] the body in question would be at the same time both warm and cold. Similarly if one of the two gods would wish to move a particular body, it would be admissible that the other would wish to set it at rest. Accordingly it would necessarily follow that it would be neither in motion nor at rest, or that it would be at the same time both in motion and at rest. This kind of argumentation meant to lead to a proof is founded on the doctrine of the atoms, which is the first of their premises, and on the premise concerning the creation of accidents and on the premise according to which the privations of habitus are existent things requiring an agent to bring them into existence. For if someone should maintain that the lower matter, in which there is—according to the opinion of the philosophers—a succession of generation and corruption, is not the higher matter (I mean the substrata of the heavenly spheres), which assumption has been demonstrated; and if, furthermore, someone should affirm—according to the belief of the dualists—that there exist two gods, one of whom governs the lower matter, there being no connection between his activity and the heavenly spheres, while the other governs the spheres, there being no connection between his activity and hyle: this opinion would in no way necessitate reciprocal hindering. If, however, someone would maintain that this view implies a deficiency in each of the two gods, as either of them would not be able to act freely upon the things upon which the other acts freely, he could be given the answer: this is not a deficiency in either of them if it is impossible for him to exert an action upon the thing with which his activity has no connection. Nor is it a deficiency for an artificer to have no power over what is impossible for him, just as in our opinion—that of the community of believers in unity—it is no deficiency [123b] in the One that He does not conjoin contraries in one substratum, and His power is not affected by this and by other similar impossibilities. As [the Mutakallimūn] became aware of the weakness of this method, in spite of their having some incentive to choose it, they adopted another method.
THE SECOND METHOD
They say: if there were two gods it would be necessary that one notion apply to both, while another notion would apply only to one and not to the other; this second notion would account for the difference between the two gods. Now this is a philosophic and demonstrative method, if it is followed step by step and if its premises are made clear. I shall make them clear when speaking of the opinions of the philosophers regarding this subject. However, this method too may not be applied in the doctrines of any of those who believe in the divine attributes. For according to him, the Eternal, may He be exalted, has several different notions subsisting in Him. The notion of knowledge is, in his opinion, different from that of power, and that of power is, in his opinion, different from that of will. And withal it would not be impossible1 that either of the two gods should possess several notions, some of which he would have in common with the other god, while differing from the latter through possession of others.
THE THIRD METHOD
There is a further method that is in need of one of the premises of the partisans of this method. For some of them, namely, the ancients among them, believe that God wills by a will that is not something superadded to the essence of the creator, but is a will that does not subsist in a substratum. And in accordance with [123c] this premise, which we have made clear, or rather in accordance with the conception of it, which you shall see, they maintained that there is one will that does not subsist in a substratum and cannot belong to two beings. For as they say, there cannot be a single cause that necessarily effects two statuses for two different essences. As I have let you know, this amounts to the explanation of something hidden by something even more hidden. For the will they refer to cannot be represented to oneself. According to some of them it is an impossibility. As for the others who hold to this opinion, doubts in unlimited numbers arise regarding it. And yet they have recourse to it as being a proof of unity.
THE FOURTH METHOD
They say: the existence of an act necessarily indicates an agent and does not indicate to us a number of agents. Again there is no difference between the affirmations that the deity is two or three or twenty or any other number that might occur. This is clear and manifest. If, however, you say that this proof does not prove the impossibility of multiplicity in the deity, but merely proves an ignorance of the number of the deities—it being possible that there is only one and it being possible that there are many—he would complete his demonstration by saying: there is no possibility in respect of the being of God, for it is necessary. Accordingly, the possibility of a multiplicity of gods is shown to be false. This is the way in which this prover fashioned his proof. The error in this is most clear. For in the being of Him, may He be exalted, there resides no possibility, whereas possibility resides in our knowledge of it. For what is possible in respect of knowledge is not yet possible in respect of being. Perhaps just as the Christians think that He is three, and it is not so, we think that He is one, and the matter is not so. This is clear to whoever has trained himself in the knowledge of the necessary proceeding of conclusions from their premises. [124b]
THE FIFTH METHOD
One of the later ones thought that he had found a demonstrative method for the belief in unity, namely, the method starting from need. The explanation of it is as follows. He says: if one is sufficient for making the beings, a second one is superfluous and not required. If, however, being cannot be perfected and brought into orderly arrangement except by the two of them in conjunction, then incapacity is attached to each of them, as each of them needs the other and is in consequence not self-sufficient. Now this is merely a ramification of the method concerning reciprocal hindering. This way of arguing with a view to a proof may be criticized by means of the statement that not everyone who does not do that which it is not within his substance to do is called incapable. For we do not call a human individual weak because he cannot move one thousand hundred-weights, and we do not attribute to God, may He be exalted, incapacity because He is unable to corporify His essence or to create someone like Him or to create a square whose diagonal is equal to its side. And similarly we should not say that he is incapable because he does not create alone, for it is a necessity of their being that they should be two. This is not need but a necessity, anything different from which is an impossibility. For just as we do not say that God, may He be cherished and magnified, is incapable because He is not able—according to their opinion—to bring a body into existence otherwise than through creating atoms and aggregating them by means of accidents that He creates in them; and just as we do not call this need and incapacity because anything different from it is impossible: so the associationist, for his part, maintains that it is impossible the one should act alone; this is not an incapacity in either of the two, for it belongs to their necessary being that they should be two.
One of [the Mutakallimūn] was so wearied by those tricks that he affirmed that the belief in unity was accepted in virtue of the Law. The Mutakallimūn considered this statement as very disgraceful [125a] and despised him who made it. As for me, I am of the opinion that he among them who had made this statement was a man of a most rightly directed mind, averse to the acceptance of sophistries. Accordingly, as he did not hear in their speeches anything that was in truth a demonstration and found that his soul was not at peace with what they considered a demonstration, he said that the belief in unity was a thing accepted from the Law. For these groups of people did not leave being with any permanent nature so that arguments could be adduced from it with a view to correct proof, nor did they leave the intellect with a sound, inborn disposition by means of which correct conclusions could be drawn. All this was done on purpose so that we could assume that there is an existent of such a kind that by means of it we could demonstrate what cannot be demonstrated. Accordingly the necessary consequence was that we failed to demonstrate what can be demonstrated. No complaint can be made except to God and to the equitable among the men of intellect.