The ambush and the raid were two key techniques employed by resistance fighters and partisans, and sabotage devices and booby traps could be employed during the execution of either of these.
The detailed and sophisticated ambush and raiding techniques developed since the 1950s during wars of insurgency and counterinsurgency did not exist during World War II; tactics were very basic, and groups developed their own preferred methods through trial and error. These were tailored to local conditions of terrain, weather, civilian activity, enemy tactics and capabilities, availability and types of weapons, and other factors. Partisans were adept at harassing actions, a form of economy-of-force tactics intended to keep the enemy off balance, create confusion and uncertainty, hamper rear-area activities, degrade morale, force the deployment of security forces that could otherwise be used at the front, and divert and expend resources.
Such actions might also reinforce the morale of the civilian population, but they could easily become counterproductive when the enemy undertook harsh reprisals against the innocent and helpless. They also needed careful timing; to coincide with the Normandy landings in June 1944, Maquis groups behind the front were ordered to carry out a program of road ambushes (Plan Tortue), usually orchestrated by Allied “Jedburgh” liaison teams and supported by heavily armed British SAS detachments or American OSS Operational Groups. While successes were achieved in areas that could expect rapid liberation by the Allied armies, three premature all-out confrontations with German forces launched at their own initiative by thousands of maquisards deeper inside the country resulted in defeats and very high losses.
SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich’s Mercedes 320 convertible after the ambush in Prague on May 27, 1942. The damage caused by Jan Kubis’ thrown Hawkins grenade is evident, though not dramatic. It was enough, however: Heydrich’s deep fragment wounds, and the horsehair seat-stuffing driven into his internal organs, killed him from septicemia a week later. (IWM HU47379)
An ambush is a surprise attack from a position against a moving enemy force. Ambushes might take place on a forest path or mountain trail, a country road, a city street, a railroad track or a barge canal – any place the enemy might travel on foot or by vehicles. Booby traps and sabotage devices might be incorporated into an ambush – set on the route, to initiate the ambush, or left behind among bodies and damaged vehicles, to inflict casualties among a relief force.
The basic idea of an ambush is to achieve complete surprise, destroy or drive away the enemy, capture and/or destroy material, and withdraw safely. Ambushes need to have a specific object: to target particular individuals, or to harass, kill or capture personnel; to destroy equipment, and capture weapons and supplies; to disrupt or delay enemy movements and actions; and, always, to create confusion and degrade enemy morale. Partisan ambushes on convoys had the triple benefits of destroying transport, denying supplies to the enemy, and capturing supplies for the partisans’ own use.
An ambush could be launched against any size of force the ambushers felt capable of tackling; even a small party might attack a larger force simply as a hit-and-run harassing attack. The size of the ambush party depended on the strength of the column to be ambushed and its escorting force and armament, its size and length (number of vehicles, length of train, etc), the terrain, and the exact object of the ambush. Repeated small-scale ambushes executed by handfuls of men against “easy” targets such as small groups of soldiers or one or two vehicles proved very effective in wearing down enemy morale.
The most important aspect of the ambush force, regardless of its strength, was its organization and assignment of responsibilities – there is much more to an ambush than simply lining everyone up along a road, and opening fire on signal. An attack group was specified, and each man was assigned a sector of fire, to ensure that no part of the “kill zone” was left uncovered. Teams had to be assigned to knock out the lead and tail vehicles, as well as combat or security vehicles. An assault or recovery group might also be designated, to enter the kill zone to destroy vehicles, take prisoners, finish off the wounded (partisan warfare was vicious), and recover weapons, equipment and supplies; specific individuals might be designated to recover documents, other special items, or prisoners. Ideally there would be an overall ambush commander responsible for all aspects of the operation, as well as an attack group commander concerned only with the main attack on the target.
Security was critical, and several security teams might be formed. One would be placed on either flank to provide early warning of the target’s approach, to protect the flanks of the ambush party, and to engage enemy fleeing from the kill zone. At least one security team was necessary to secure the ambush party’s rear, and others might be employed to watch other routes leading into the area. As the ambush force withdrew, these teams would protect its withdrawal.
A successful ambush depended upon surprise and firepower. Simultaneous and immediate opening of fire was essential to overwhelm and neutralize the enemy; this fire could not be reduced until the enemy was destroyed or withdrew, especially since the ambush force was usually smaller than the enemy force. As little time as possible was spent at the ambush site. The withdrawal had to be rapid and orderly, and the partisans would quickly disperse and hide their weapons and any loot.
One famous example of a tightly focused and successful ambush – although at dreadful cost – was the attack on SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in May 1942, when hand-picked Czech agents trained by the SOE were parachuted in with the specific mission of assassinating him. General Heydrich, the Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia and second only to Heinrich Himmler in the SS hierarchy, was the symbol of the Nazi occupation. He was also so arrogantly sure of his domination over the Czech people that he travelled between his country home and his Prague offices by a regular route, alone but for his driver in an unescorted Mercedes touring car. On May 27, two volunteers waited at a suburban site where the road made a hairpin turn that forced the open-topped car to slow to about 12mph. At the critical moment Josef Gabcik’s Sten gun jammed, but Jan Kubis threw an early example of the No.75 “Hawkins” grenade which detonated against the car’s side. The badly wounded Heydrich leapt out and attempted to pursue (it is debatable whether or not he actually fired his pistol), but he soon collapsed. His wound proved mortal, and he died on June 6. By June 20 – when the attackers and their back-up party were cornered in the Karl Borromeus Church, and shot themselves after a long, fierce defense of the crypt – mass arrests and reprisals had already been carried out. In total it is estimated that up to 5,000 men, women and children were murdered in revenge for Heydrich’s assassination – most notoriously, the population of the small village of Lidice, near Kladno, which was surrounded by Security Police on June 9. Next day 199 men and boys were shot, 195 women were shipped off to Ravensbrück concentration camp, and 90 children were deported elsewhere. At least another 1,330 Czech civilians were executed by military courts; of 500 Berlin Jews arrested on May 29, 150 were executed by June 6; and by June 12 trains had taken some 3,000 Czech Jews from the Theresienstadt ghetto eastwards to extermination camps.
The propaganda war was waged by both sides. Here a Vichy poster illustrates condemned saboteurs and their deeds, asking sarcastically: “The Liberators? Liberation by the Army of Crime!” (© Leonard de Selva/Corbis)
This was only one of the best-known instances of the Nazis’ policy of mass reprisals against civilians in occupied Europe – a practice that naturally discouraged many resistance groups from taking the usually pointless risks of direct action until the Allied landings and advances of 1944 made it feasible. (Even so, it is estimated that in occupied France alone the Germans executed at least 70,000 Resistance members and hostages; a typical ratio was 50 hostages shot for each German killed.)
August 1944: in the streets of Paris, a French Resistance fighter armed with an SOE-supplied 9mm Sten Mk II submachine gun is photographed along with a US Army lieutenant. Watching in the background, unimpressed, are a couple of metropolitan policemen; not long beforehand, they might as easily have been pursuing the résistants as supporting them. (ARC 531322)
Across vast areas of only partly and temporarily occupied territory in the Soviet Union, villagers often had little choice over whether or not to take up arms. Preyed upon by the German occupiers and the Soviet partisans alike, they took to the forests when their communities were destroyed. This mother and son team are posed as if about to plant explosives on a railroad line, having carried the demolition charges in a burlap bag. (Nik Cornish Collection)
A raid is a surprise attack usually on a fixed objective, characterized by rapid, violent action followed almost at once by withdrawal – there is no intention of occupying the objective for any longer than necessary to accomplish the mission. As opposed to an ambush party, the raiding force usually had to be larger than the defending force in order to overwhelm it quickly, accomplish their mission, and fight their way out. Nevertheless, there were instances in which smaller raiding parties succeeded in neutralizing the enemy and accomplishing their mission; this required complete surprise, a superior plan and tactics, excellent control of forces and support, and the effective use of diversions. A raid might be conducted to destroy a critical facility or capability, to capture weapons, supplies, intelligence materials or key individuals, or to liberate prisoners. Whatever the primary goal, the aim would also be to kill as many of the enemy as possible and destroy their facilities and equipment.
Again, the organization of the raiding force was critical. The assault party might have to be broken down into groups and teams to attack or occupy particular objectives within the target area, and to accomplish specific tasks. Not all the raiders might be required to enter the target area – in most cases, the fewer the better, so as to maintain control, prevent confusion and friendly-fire casualties, and to manage a more organized withdrawal. Security teams were just as essential as they were for ambushes, in order to secure any approach routes that enemy reinforcements might use, warn of and delay such reinforcements, and cover the assault party’s withdrawal.
Another important element of the raid was the support force, comprising riflemen and the crews of any machine guns and mortars, to place suppressive fire on the objective and any adjacent targets they might be assigned. It was essential that their fires were tightly controlled, ceasing or shifting to other targets when the assault party launched its attack. The supporting weapons might then be repositioned to engage any approaching enemy, or to cover the assault party’s withdrawal; sometimes, however, it was better to withdraw the heavy weapons early, since they were slower to move.
Most raids by partisans were on a small scale and relatively simple in plan and organization, owing to their limited military experience, training, and discipline. Booby traps were sometimes left behind, but there was usually little time available to set them before the raiders had to withdraw.
Harassment of the enemy was a main goal of partisans and saboteurs, and a role in which they were quite adept. While small-scale ambushes and raids come under this heading, booby traps and sabotage devices were also ideal for such purposes. The ultimate goals were, as always, to keep the enemy off balance and wear down his morale, to force him to commit men to escort and guard convoys and facilities, and to remind both the occupied civilian population and the enemy of the latter’s vulnerabilities. Indirect harassing actions could also improve the morale and will to resist of the repressed population, while minimizing the risk of the occupiers shooting hostages in reprisal. In this regard the ideal was “invisible destruction” – incidents where damage appeared to be due to naturally occurring equipment malfunctions, breakage, and wear and tear. More usually the responsibility of saboteurs was obvious, but the acts were not significant enough to justify major efforts to track down the culprits. Nevertheless, the cumulative damage inflicted might be considerable, and the whole contributed to the war effort.
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USE OF EXPLOSIVES FOR SABOTAGE 1: Explosive coal. SOE put some effort into developing explosive charges made to look like lumps of coal (the concept of the “coal torpedo” had in fact been developed by the Confederacy during the American Civil War.) These consisted of a cast shell that separated into two halves, each with a small hole in which an igniter match, short delay fuse, and a blasting cap were inserted prior to use. The color of coal varied greatly by region, from brown to deep black, so a small “coal camouflage kit” was provided to enable agents to match the charge to local colors; this contained paints, thinner, putty plugs, brushes, and spatula, but it took a good eye to make the coal look natural. Bulk coal stocks were seldom guarded, and the explosive lumps would be tossed into coal tenders and trucks, dumps, and bins. With any luck the booby-trapped coal might be shoveled into a boiler firebox on a locomotive or ship, or into a factory furnace; it would not blow up the boiler, but would damage the firebox and hopefully the water tubes. Similar chunks of explosive-filled wood were also provided. 2: Explosive rat. Dead rats filled with PE were prepared by taxidermists; they incorporated a Mk II 1oz guncotton primer, a short length of time fuse, and a No.10 time pencil. The idea was that a dead rat left near a boiler or furnace might be shoveled into it for disposal. In that case no activation of the delay fusing was necessary, but it could also be activated and left where it would inflict damage. 3: Explosive oiler. There was also an explosive-filled railroad engineer’s oiler can. In the middle of the PE charge was a cavity containing actual oil around the primer and time pencil, allowing some to be poured out to satisfy inspectors or even to fool the locomotive crew. The spout was removed to activate the time pencil, and refitted. If activated and left aboard a German-manned locomotive, its detonation would disable the crew in the confined cab. 4: Tin can grenade. SOE and OSS agents parachuted in to assist resistance groups taught them how to make simple grenades using tins filled with a few ounces of PE, and fitted with a blasting cap and a very short time fuse. Nails and gravel could be pressed into the PE for fragmentation. Larger tins could be used, but their throwing range was reduced. 5: Molded PE. The most basic munition of all – a molded ball of plastic explosive with a knotted length of detcord embedded in it. “Pearl necklaces” made in this way and fitted with time pencils were handy for bringing down telegraph poles. 6a–6e: Attachment of blasting caps and fuse. These examples show how blasting caps, time-delay safety fuse, and detcord were attached to US and British fuse adapters. (6a) US firing device adapter; (6b) US firing device adapter with aluminum No.8 blasting cap crimped on; (6c) British fuse adapter with safety fuse inserted; (6d) British fuse adapter with copper blasting cap inserted and cordtex beside it; and (6e), the same, after wrapping with cloth friction tape. |
Harassment ran the gamut from painting protest slogans on walls, spreading propaganda leaflets, damaging vehicles and machinery, cutting telephone and power lines, disrupting utilities and services, mining roads and placing booby traps, and so on (hopefully) ad nauseam. The Germans obliged many businesses and factories in occupied countries to shift to manufacturing war materials, producing food for the occupation forces, or providing a wide range of other services. Workers and managers could accomplish much in the way of work slowdowns, deliberately poor production techniques and workmanship, use of inferior materials, lost paperwork, late delivery, or misdirected shipments of materials and components. More directly, sniper attacks on convoys, individual vehicles, troop columns, facilities and installations could be very disruptive, as could random drive-by attacks and selective assassinations – both by gunfire, and by grenades, explosive charges, or incendiaries.