CHAPTER 9
The Rescue That Wasn’t
The funeral of Ty Woods was silent, sobering, and sadly moving. At Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery, on a hill overlooking San Diego Bay and the Pacific Ocean, the afternoon sun falling on the bagpipers and Navy men in crisp white uniforms. Admirals stood side by side with enlisted SEALs, took their SEAL tridents off their chests, and pounded them in the top of the fallen SEAL’s casket with their fists. A traditional SEAL farewell, sending another teammate, warrior, and friend to Valhalla. Glen Doherty was put to rest in a similar service in western Massachusetts.
There was no distinction, to the men in the teams, that Woods and Doherty were no longer active-duty SEALs when they had fallen. They were SEALs, and they died fighting to save American lives.
As the shock of the loss of two respected veteran SEALs reverberated across the secret brotherhood, a series of private calls, e-mails, and texts made it clear that many SEALs were angry with the president, the defense secretary, and the entire chain of command. Their rage was incandescent and inconsolable. Nothing had been done to try to save these two men after an eight-hour firefight?
Then the tone changed. The SEALs debated a series of options—steps that could have saved the lives of Woods and Doherty. We spoke with a number of SEALs as well as other fighter pilots and senior military officers to examine these options and to answer the two biggest unanswered questions: Could they have been saved? If so, how?
We combed publicly available records, congressional testimony, and State Department and Defense Department reports, and we reached out to Navy SEALs, mission planners, and veteran fighter pilots. We talked to witnesses and attorneys for witnesses who had been threatened to stay silent by their government supervisors. In the course of our investigation, we discovered five realistic scenarios—based on the presence of military assets, standard mission parameters, and capabilities—that reveal how the Americans encircled in Benghazi could have been saved.
* * *
The Obama administration offers two technical military defenses for its apparent inaction: There were no military assets that could be brought to bear in time to make a difference, and that there were no tankers available to support fighter aircraft if the fighters had been sent in to help. As we shall see, both statements are false and tactically irrelevant.
There were military assets available. There were options.
The following scenarios have been prepared based upon assets known to have been available to the United States at the time, as well as information provided to us by several career officers from different branches of the military. We provide realistic rescue scenarios to rebut the argument by President Obama and his senior officials: that there was nothing that could have been done to save American lives.1
The reason this story cuts so deep with Americans is because we, as a people, know that everything the government could have done was not done. A U.S. ambassador, a senior official, and two brave former Navy SEALs were killed as a result of the inability of those in power to protect our own. These rescue scenarios are consistent with the theme of this book—that SEAL culture matters—and the creed of the SEAL teams:
We expect to lead and be led. In the absence of orders I will take charge, lead my teammates, and accomplish the mission. I lead by example in all situations.
I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity. My Nation expects me to be physically harder and mentally stronger than my enemies. If knocked down, I will get back up, every time. I will draw on every remaining ounce of strength to protect my teammates and to accomplish our mission. I am never out of the fight.
We demand discipline. We expect innovation. The lives of my teammates and the success of our mission depend on me—my technical skill, tactical proficiency, and attention to detail. My training is never complete.
We train for war and fight to win. I stand ready to bring the full spectrum of combat power to bear in order to achieve my mission and the goals established by my country. The execution of my duties will be swift and violent when required yet guided by the very principles that I serve to defend.
Brave men have fought and died building the proud tradition and feared reputation that I am bound to uphold. In the worst of conditions, the legacy of my teammates steadies my resolve and silently guides my every deed. I will not fail.
* * *
These scenarios are dedicated to the memory of Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty and to the Ty Woodses and Glen Dohertys of this nation’s future. Without them, this great nation will not survive. Remember, they may have been ordered not to go and they went anyway. As a result of their unique and heroic efforts, dozens of American lives were saved. Woods and Doherty are already passing into legend. Doherty and Woods were not “bumps in the road.” They were soldiers and heroes of this nation, and they should be honored as such.2
Rescue Scenario One
Date: September 11, 2012
Aviano Air Base
Mission Complete Time: 1:30 A.M.
Aviano Air Base is a NATO base located in northeastern Italy, in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region. It lies at the foot of the Italian Alps, about ten miles from Pordenone, Italy.
Aviano is home to the United States Air Force’s Thirty-First Fighter Wing. The Thirty-First is the only U.S. fighter wing south of the Alps, and it is critical to operations in NATO’s southern region. It maintains two fighter squadrons, the 555th Fighter Squadron (Triple Nickel), and the 510th Fighter Squadron (Buzzards).3
The Thirty-First Fighter Wing Operations Group ensures the combat readiness of two F-16CG squadrons, one air control squadron, and one operational support squadron conducting and supporting worldwide air operations. Each F-16 squadron maintains approximately twenty operational fighter jets.4 The Thirty-First is the first permanently based fighter aircraft wing south of the Alps since World War II.
The Air Force defines the job of the Thirty-First as “expeditionary air combat in support of the Global War on Terrorism.” Arguably, exactly the mission necessary for the job at hand: saving American lives under attack in Benghazi.
These fighter jets could easily have made it to Benghazi, with a single fuel stop at Naval Air Station Sigonella hours before the final battle that killed Glen Doherty and Ty Woods. The fighters would have arrived hours before Doherty and Woods died.
At a minimum, scrambling these jets toward Benghazi would have been consistent with the imperative expressed by SEAL Team Six assault leader Ryan Zinke: “immediately move assets forward to the theatre where needed.”
In reality, assets were not ordered forward until six hours after the ambassador was killed. Secretary of Defense Panetta later testified before Congress that he did not have any direct conversations with President Obama after 6:00 p.m. (Washington time) on the night of the atrocities that killed the ambassador and three other Americans. This means that the president had either disconnected from the discussion or he had simply moved on after the news of the ambassador’s death had reached him. Either way, Panetta was very clear on his timeline of discussions.
While these jets can be configured to hold a vast array of precision bombing ordnance—from Hellfire missiles to grenade bomblets—it is likely that flying them “naked” with only their 20 mm cannons loaded would have been more than sufficient to disperse or dispatch the mob outside the CIA compound being defended by Glen Doherty and Ty Woods and others in Benghazi.
The effective range of an F-16C, with external fuel tanks, is over 1,700 nautical miles. However, even assuming less range was possible here, due to the “need for speed” to the target (faster travel burns more fuel); the jets stationed at Aviano Air Base had plenty of range to get there, with a single hot refueling at any base en route, including Naval Air Station Sigonella, located on the island of Sicily 845 nautical miles south.
Dan Hampton is a recently retired Air Force pilot, a decorated veteran of both Gulf wars with over 4,500 hours of flight time in an F-16, and he is familiar with the flight wings based in Aviano. He has flown out of Aviano many times. He has more than seven hundred combat hours in the F-16 alone and author of the New York Times bestseller Viper Pilot. “The Air Force could have done the job from there, if they had been called upon,” Hampton said. The problem is that the Air Force, and all other branches of the Department of Defense, were never called upon to mount a rescue. The president did not speak to the Secretary of Defense to order or allow military action.
The distance between Aviano Air Base and Benghazi is 1,050 nautical miles. F-16s have a range-fuel supply for approximately 1,700 nautical miles.
Based upon our discussions with current and former military officers, including Commander Zinke and Dan Hampton, the following basic plan could have and, more important, should have been put in place.
All times noted herein are local (Benghazi).
9:40 P.M.
Ambassador Stevens makes the initial call reporting the attack was taking place at 9:40 p.m. Stevens reports to Hicks in Tripoli: “Greg, we are under attack.”
All other agencies, both local to Libya and worldwide, were then immediately informed that a U.S. ambassador was under attack in one of the most dangerous places on Earth. This call should have prompted the immediate initiation of an Emergency Response Plan.
9:40 P.M.–10:00 P.M.
General Ham (commander at Africa Command, or AFRICOM) is given notice that a U.S. diplomatic outpost facility in Benghazi is under attack and needs help. He is also informed that the U.S. ambassador to Libya and his related staff are at risk of capture or death, and that a U.S. facility is in danger of being overrun, or has already been overrun, by enemy militants. Instead of being told to “stand down,”5 along with others in Tripoli, the order is given for him to immediately mount and execute a rescue operation.
General Ham and his commanders are aware that the closest permanently stationed air fighter assets in the theater are located at Aviano Air Base in Italy. It is very possible, if not likely, that other assets were also located in the Mediterranean (including the entire Sixth Fleet carrier group, a flotilla of more than a dozen ships and a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with over seventy-five planes) that were even closer than the permanent assets at Aviano.
10:00 P.M., Aviano Air Base
The jets stationed in Italy should have immediately been called in to action no later than 10 p.m. Had the F-16s scrambled from Aviano, then hot-refueled at Naval Air Station Sigonella, they could have easily been on-site in time to save Woods and Doherty. While there may not have been fighter jets already at Sigonella, there were certainly fighters located at Aviano, which could have been at Sigonella in approximately one hour and fifteen minutes.
The distance between Aviano and Sigonella is 845 nautical miles. A commercial flight between Aviano and Sigonella can cover the distance in approximately two hours, including takeoff and approach time. Hence, to estimate that an advanced fighter jet travelling at just under Mach 1 can cover the same distance in 1.25 hours is conservative.
According to Dan Hampton, who has flown into both Aviano and Sigonella on multiple occasions, 1.5 hours from Aviano to Sigonella is imminently achievable, even with a wide array of ground attack ordnance hanging from the fighter. Different ordnance packages dictate different flight speeds and fuel consumptions. While the speed achievable by the fighter, and gas consumption used is a factor, it certainly would have been achievable here, he said.
The American jets could have arrived in time to save the encircled diplomats and contractors. In fact, given the undisputed fact that Glen and Ty were alive until at least 5:15 a.m., at least four hours after help could have and should have been there.
11 30 P.M., Arrive NAS Sigonella, Hot Refuel F-16
12:30 A.M., Wheels up en route to Benghazi
Allowing the F-16 pilots one hour at Sigonella to refuel and replenish is more than sufficient time, according to veteran pilots, including Dan Hampton. A hot refuel of an F-16 can be done in 30 minutes or less. Essentially, a hot refuel is similar to refueling a NASCAR car during a race. The aircraft’s engine is not shut off, and the fuel pump is attached to the aircraft. This allows the refilling procedure to begin immediately after the aircraft is wheeled off the runway. Practiced refueling crews have been known to accomplish the procedure in ten minutes.6
Given that the Navy personnel on the ground at Sigonella would have nearly certainly known what was taking place in Benghazi, and that there were two former Navy SEALs in a firefight with more than one hundred terrorist attackers, you can bet your last United States dollar the refueling crew at Sigonella would have been working like a NASCAR team at Daytona getting those birds fueled and ready to bring the fight to the enemy. Allowing one hour to achieve this task is more than reasonable.
Sigonella to Benghazi
Distance: 468 miles
Time to Target: (Speed 0.9 Mach) 45 minutes
Arrival Time: 1:15–1:30 A.M.
With refueled jets and less than five hundred miles to the fight, the F-16s would have had a variety of options upon arrival in Benghazi. One thing is certain: while it is difficult, even by the U.S. State Department’s timeline, Glen Doherty and Ty Woods were alive and fighting until at least 5:15 a.m.
Benghazi is located on the Mediterranean shore and would have been easily visible on the night of September 11, which was clear with no overcast conditions.
On their approach, the F-16 pilots would have had two distinct advantages in accessing and planning their attack. The first was that they would have been in constant contact with the Air Force personnel operating the drone over the battle since 11:10 p.m., according to the Department of Defense timeline. The cockpit of the F-16C has the capability to get real-time images from the drone shown on their equipment, not dissimilar to watching a live TV report on one’s television in your living room.
From these images, the pilots would have had the capability to assess the number of attackers, potential antiaircraft capability, and the correct approach. The second advantage the pilots had was two battle-trained and hardened Navy SEALs on the ground who had experience with forward air controlling of aircraft, and also had working laser designators to highlight the targets at night.
According to Dan Hampton, he could have deposited ordnance on board the F-16s within feet of the target: “Especially with two ex-SEALs, because they’re all qualified in forward controlling of aircraft. And they had laser pointers, which kind of takes all the error out of it. Normal weapons aside, we’ve always got the cannons, which I’ve used in a pinch myself, and in an absolute environment, the cannon might have been the best.”
Even if the Rules of Engagement (ROE) allowed by the Defense Department for the pilots did not include use of missiles or cannons, still the effect of a low-altitude afterburner “blast” of two F-16s would have bought the Americans valuable time.
When asked whether he had an opinion as to what effect a low-altitude pass over the scene with afterburners engaged might have had on the attackers in Benghazi, Dan Hampton responded: “Well, the same effect it has on most people. These weren’t trained soldiers. These were just basically insurgents. I think it would definitely make them pause. I think they might rethink their attack if they thought there was heavy overhead support from the Air Force or Navy.”
The roar of deep-diving American jets literally might have scattered the enemy permanently without firing a shot.
The former top diplomat in Libya, Greg Hicks, told congressional investigators that more could have been done by the military on the night of September 11 and morning of September 12 to spare the lives of those being attacked in Benghazi. He wondered why the military did not send a plane as a show of force into Libyan airspace: “The Libyans that I talked to, and the Libyans and other Americans who were involved in the war, have told me also that Libyan revolutionaries were very cognizant of the impact that American and NATO airpower had with respect to their victory,” in the war against Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi.
Hicks, then the U.S. deputy chief of mission in Libya, told investigators on April 11, 2013: “They are under no illusions that American and NATO airpower won that war for them. And so, in my personal opinion, a fast mover flying over Benghazi at some point, you know, as soon as possible might very well have prevented some of the bad things that happened that night.” Hicks went on to say he believed “if we had been able to scramble a fighter or aircraft or two over Benghazi as quickly as possible after the attack commenced”—after being reported around 9:40 p.m. that night—“I believe there would not have been a mortar attack on the Annex in the morning because I believe the Libyans would have split. They would have been scared to death that we would have gotten a laser on them and killed them.”
Hicks also suggested that he believed the Libyan government would have granted the U.S. permission to fly the planes. “I believe that the Libyans were hoping that we were going to come bail them out of this mess,” Hicks said. “And, you know, they were as surprised as we were that American—the military forces that did arrive only arrived on the evening of September 12.”
Hicks said at approximately 10 p.m. in Tripoli on the night of the first attack, he was at the U.S. embassy in Tripoli talking to State Department officials in Washington, D.C., regional security officer John Martinec at the U.S. Embassy, defense attaché Lt. Col. Keith Phillips, and others. Phillips was reaching out to officials with the Libyan Ministry of Defense and to the chief of staff of the Libyan Armed Forces, as well as officials with the Joint Staff and the United States Africa Command.
Hicks recalled asking Phillips, “Is there anything coming?”
Phillips told Hicks that the nearest fighter planes were at Aviano Air Base, in Italy—“that he had been told that it would take two to three hours to get them airborne, but that there were no tanker assets near enough to support a flight from Aviano.” The preflight checks can be time-consuming, but three hours is probably an exaggeration meant to let Hicks know that no one in Washington wanted to take the perceived political risk of mounting a rescue. The refueling issue is, likewise, a nonissue. If the jets didn’t have enough fuel to return to Italy, they could land on a nearby carrier or at an allied landing strip in Libya itself.
In February 2013, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was also asked why F-16s at Aviano Air Base in Italy were not deployed to Benghazi that night. “This is the middle of the night now, these are not aircraft on strip alert,” Dempsey said. “They’re there as part of our commitment to NATO and Europe. And so, as we looked at the timeline, it was pretty clear that it would take up to twenty hours or so to get them there.” Again, it could take several hours to put jets in the air and several more to put them in the skies over Benghazi—but twenty hours is an outrageous political exaggeration. It is even more outrageous when coming from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. A man who should know better and expect better from the men and women he commands.
“Twenty hours?” Why twenty hours? Possibly of greater importance, given the array of issues that had been going on in Benghazi for the last several weeks, why were the planes not on alert, as was suggested should have been the case by Dan Hampton and others? Officials from the Obama administration have testified that the military assets were not in place to conduct a rescue of the besieged U.S. officials in Benghazi.
“This is not 9/11,” Panetta said in a February interview on CNN’s State of the Union. “You cannot just simply call and expect within two minutes to have a team in place. It takes time. That’s the nature of it. Our people are there, they’re in position to move, but we’ve got to have good intelligence that gives us a heads-up that something’s going to happen.”7
Excuse us, Mr. Panetta—it was 9/11, just a different year and a different group of terrorists killing Americans. The United States spends more money on its military than the next ten largest militaries in the world. It is hard to believe that a fighter response couldn’t be managed within six hours.
Rescue Scenario Two
Date: September 11, 2012
10:00 P.M.
Gaeta, Italy
As the call came in from the commander-in-chief of AFRICOM, the U.S. Navy pilots in Gaeta knew the situation was dire. They didn’t wait for orders but were already getting ready as the orders came in. They immediately jumped into their G-suits and headed for the planes being readied for takeoff. America’s diplomatic outpost in Benghazi was under attack.
Knowing the powder keg where the call was made from, it caught none of the pilots by surprise that a 911 call could be made from this part of Africa on 9/11.
The pilots knew that the closest facility that could potentially have any firepower ready was Sigonella. Although Sigonella was a Naval Air Station, it had no permanently stationed attack aircraft based there. There might have been helicopters in Sigonella, but not the type needed for an armed assault. The wing commanders were already debating options for what might be needed in the newly formed Republic of Libya, when the flight crews were told to “light the fires” on the FA-18E Super Hornets. Takeoff was imminent.
As chance would have it, all but one of the four flight crews selected had already been involved in battles in the skies over Libya, during the overthrow of Col. Moammar Gadhafi in 2011. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy were instrumental in driving the Arab world’s longest-serving dictator from power through strategic air strikes and close air support of the Libyan rebels, usually with the help of SEALs on the ground acting as forward air controllers.
The flight leaders knew what ordnance to load on the fighters. They chose the new stealth, air-to-ground missiles, primarily for their precision and ability to cause the least amount of collateral damage in the concrete-walled neighborhood where snipers hid and mortar crews worked. Collateral damage was clearly not in the “game plan” for the brass setting the mission parameters. No one wanted another Stalingrad or Dresden; they wanted a carefully calibrated attack that spared civilians.
As was generally the case, even in war zones, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) could change on an hourly basis. Given the political sensitivity—the U.S. was less than eight weeks from a presidential election—the pilots knew that the ROEs might change several times while they were en route to the target. What they did know was that Americans were trapped, that some Americans were already dead, and that the survivors desperately needed close air support to save the diplomats, spies, and contractors caught on the ground. That was enough for them. After a very brief rundown of the limited information available, the orders were then given: “Go!”
Here was what they knew for sure: the U.S. ambassador’s last words were: “Greg, we’re under attack.” They were also aware that as many as forty-two other American lives hung in the balance.
Of equal importance, there were an unknown number of attackers. Some estimates put the number of attackers in the hundreds. Further, the pilots had no idea of what type of antiaircraft capability the attackers may have. Enemy rockets that could threaten aircraft, such as the Soviet-made SA-7, were as common as camels in Libya. Did the attackers also have captured antiaircraft artillery from the Gadhafi days? It was unlikely, but the sobering possibility could not be ruled out.
Gaeta is a sprawling U.S. Navy base on Italy’s west coast, south of Rome and north of Naples—near the ankle of Italy’s boot. It is just under six hundred nautical miles from Gaeta to Benghazi. In fact, enforcement of the no-fly zone (Operation Odyssey Dawn) was routinely done from Gaeta during the overthrow of Gadhafi.8
Given their strategic location in Gaeta, the FA-18 jets on the deck of a carrier were launch ready. The amount of time to takeoff depended on command orders to light the fires and stretch the catapults. The twin General Electric F414 turbofan engines were “lit” and ready for takeoff on the deck of the nuclear-powered carrier.
There is good reason why a president’s first question in a crisis is “Where are the carriers?” They are still the preeminent and undisputed master of force projection on the face of the planet. The United States maintains eleven carrier strike groups (CSGs): each consists of one aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, two antiaircraft warships, and one to two antisubmarine destroyers or frigates. The United States Sixth Fleet is based in Gaeta, Italy. On September 11, 2012, the flagship for the Sixth Fleet, the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) had just finished commemoration services for the 9/11 victims.9
As the fighters were catapulted down the deck of the nuclear-powered carrier, the flight leader and his wingman would have already been running through the contingencies during the fifty-minute flight time to Libya.
Takeoff went down without a hitch, and the two planes leveled off at ten thousand feet. The night was calm with very little wind, and there was virtually no air traffic. The communications with the ground forces were now patched into the coms for the aircraft. The individuals on the ground were not identified by name or military branch, but they were clearly either current or former special forces personnel, responding coolly and professionally to the questions being posed to them by naval command. They were also clearly well versed in the terminology of forward aircraft control, and their need to direct fire “danger close” in the area in front of them. They were giving exact GPS coordinates of the attackers’ positions and had indicated their ability to use their laser designators for guidance of precision ordinance onboard the approaching aircraft. They had clearly directed aircraft to targets while under fire before.
Approximately halfway into the flight, the pilots were told that the ground troops conducting the defense were former Navy SEALs and that the information given by them should be considered accurate and reliable in directing their fire. Neither of the pilots were surprised by this revelation. Both had had the honor of working with SEALs previously. Knowing they had naval brothers on the ground in need of help merely raised their resolve to get it done right.
The pilots were now also able to view the video being transmitted by the aerial drone circling over the scene of the attack in Benghazi. The images showed dozens of terrorists surrounding the position held by the SEALs and CIA officers.
The SEALs were now asking for immediate air support as soon as they could get it. They had their laser designators prepared to light up the targets as soon as the American aircraft arrived. The pilots directly radioed the SEALs on the ground. They said that they were “ten minutes out and hot.”
The acknowledging voices of the SEALs on the ground seemed uplifted by this news, as the crackle of small arms fire erupted in the background.
The Heads Up Display (HUD) on the FA-18s illuminated the inside of the cockpit as the planes approached Libya’s eastern coast. Clear, with very little cloud cover, the conditions presented no visibility issues from a pilot’s perspective.
Now the ROE meant everything—their orders determined what the pilots had to do and not do. They had been given the green light to use precision-guided munitions as long as the offending individuals were clearly identified as “hostile” by the personnel on the ground. The approximate number of bad guys was one hundred, and they were concentrated fifty to one hundred yards from the compound where the Americans were sheltered. Dropping bombs with friendlies this close was difficult and required exact planning both in the approach and drop of the ordnance. While collateral damage was to be avoided if at all possible, dropping their bombs on the Americans that they were trying to save was their worst nightmare.
The two experienced naval aviators elected to do a single high-altitude pass before starting their bombing run. This approach had two advantages: It could provide a warning to those civilians who are not affiliated with the bad guys to flee immediately, as the roar of passing fighters was hard to mistake for anything else. It would also give the pilots a chance to do a final recon of the drop zone.
During the flyby, the pilots asked the Navy SEAL located on the roof of the CIA compound to activate the laser designator for identification and targeting. Ty Woods did so, just as he had many times in the past. The guidance systems immediately locked on the position “painted” by the laser.
Time to get final clearance to engage the enemy.
The lead pilot radioed the Tactical Air Command center and requested clearance to use Hellfire missiles to engage trucks and personnel that have been identified as firing mortars and rockets on the trapped Americans.
Clearance given, the pilots did a 180-degree, three-G turn, leveled off at approximately 3,000 feet, and requested that the position of the mortar crews again be painted by the SEAL on the ground through his laser designator. The SEAL lit up the bad guys for the final time, and he watched as the missiles left the FA-18s at almost identical times.
The missile blast was sudden and sun-hot. The blinding explosions were quickly followed by multiple secondary explosions, where the gas tanks of the trucks explode, as well as the mortars and other ammunition being carried in enemy vehicles.
The images from the overhead drones confirmed two direct hits on the vehicles and crews operating the mortars, with the immediate killing of over two dozen jihadis. Dozens more were injured, and they attempted to crawl away from the carnage.
Believing another bombing run imminent, the remainder of the attacking force dispersed. Some broke out in a wild run down Benghazi’s serpentine streets. Others cowered in doorways or hid under burned trucks.
The pilots hit their afterburners as they turned in for another run, purposely identifying their intentions to hit the enemy again. Their ambassador had just been killed, and his body was still unrecovered and being dragged through the streets. They were far from exacting the payback this group of terrorists deserved.
There was no doubt left in the minds of the surviving attackers: the Americans intended on exacting some revenge, and the superpower’s wrath was measured in precision-guided munitions. Forgetting the reasons they were there in the first place, several more attackers desperately tried to flee and were killed by the SEALs and other diplomatic security personnel sniping from the rooftops.
The overhead drone identified the area of escape of the greatest mass of the attackers. The fighter pilots requested permission to clean up the rest of the mob by using their 20 mm cannons.
They were asked if the attackers appeared to be dispersing or were still moving toward the compound.
The pilots and SEALs responded almost simultaneously that the attackers appeared to be melting away.
The order was then given for the FA-18s to return to base. There was no need to make the rubble bounce.
The next wave of FA-18s would remain at altitude to confirm there would be no more attacks on the American diplomatic personnel.
The SEALs responded to the planes with a heartfelt “Thank you, Bravo Zulu.”
The leaders of the attacking party were identified through several of the people wounded on the night of the incident. Their camps east of Benghazi were also identified. The next day a single cruise missile was launched and detonated over the camps. The camps disappeared in a blinding blast.
The Libyan government in power was grateful for the extermination of the individuals who had attacked the American consular facility and killed the American ambassador, as these armed radicals were a threat to their government as well.
Since the fighter jets arrived within a few hours of the initial attacks, Woods and Doherty were not killed. (It cannot be forgotten that Woods and Doherty did not die until the mortar attack on the CIA facility at 5:15 on the morning of September 12. This was well over seven hours after the attack had begun the day before.)
Rescue Scenario Three
Drone Attack
10:00 P.M.
The original drone arrived over the Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) and started transmitting images at 9:59 p.m., barely seventeen minutes after from Ambassador Stevens’s frantic call for help: “We are under attack.” Even though dimly lit, the infrared cameras on the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) clearly showed the scene unfolding below it was one of complete pandemonium: Heat signatures from bodies laid out in the courtyard and areas surrounding the entrance to the TMF, not moving and clearly dead or dying, fire spraying from the barrels of the guns being carried by the attackers, and RPG blasts all over the area. The attackers numbered in dozens, perhaps over one hundred.
Eventually flames started shooting from various windows in the diplomatic outpost, showing that the attackers had set fire to the buildings in the compound. Desperate radio transmissions coming from the Diplomatic Security officers on site also made it clear that some people there were still alive, and searching for the ambassador.
One thing was certain: amid the confusion, the Americans still alive on the ground were in need of help—now. Air Force personnel monitoring the images from the drone rang their superiors and put in the request for immediate help to be sent to Benghazi. They asked for clearance to send the only type of help they could personally supply, another armed version of the UAV: the MQ-9 Reaper. This drone could deliver thermal imaging showing militants cowering inside buildings.
(The original drone that arrived in Benghazi, minutes after Stevens’s call, was unfortunately a Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk. Unfortunate, because it was unarmed. Had it been armed, and if the controllers of an armed UAV had been authorized to use force to defend the lives of the American diplomats, there was a very real possibility, if not a probability, that the entire Benghazi debacle could have been nipped in the bud. Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith very probably would also still be alive.)
Given its rapid response time, the Global Hawk was already in Libya observing other matters and was retasked immediately to Benghazi. The Global Hawk has a cruise speed of 404 miles per hour, and a range of more than 8,000 miles. However, this Hawk was based out of NAS Sigonella, only some 400 miles north of Benghazi.10
The Global Hawk’s infrared camera systems easily identified dozens of heat signatures both in and surrounding the diplomatic post. Viewing these images dispelled any remaining doubt as to whether the ambassador and his staff were in grave danger. Clearly the situation had degraded to the point of complete chaos.
As senior officials viewed the images coming back from the Global Hawk, the decision was made to send another drone. This one would be armed: the fearsome MQ-9 Reaper. Given the widespread use of these drones over Pakistan and Afghanistan against the Taliban, our research and interviews made it clear that it could have been used effectively in this scenario. The armed version of the Reaper drone is a game changer.
The Reaper was aptly named.
Thirty-six feet long with a wingspan of 65 feet, the Reaper was first put into service in 2007. Built by General Atomics, the Reaper is powered by a 950-horsepower turboprop engine and is capable of speeds in excess of 300 miles per hour. Of greater importance to those under attack was the Reaper’s payload. The Reaper sent to Benghazi was armed with four of the newest 14 AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles. These missiles are capable of destroying tanks. Used extensively in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, this drone has been responsible for total reported kills of over four thousand terrorists and others. Used against an armed mob as close air support for the trapped Americans, it would be a game changer.
Cruising at a speed of 250 miles per hour, the drone arrived in Benghazi at 1:30 a.m. The attack had now been going on for approximately 3.5 hours. Approaching at over five thousand feet, it could barely be heard over the gunfire and chaos going on below. However, the operators monitoring its video and missile guidance technologies immediately picked up the laser designator painting the mortar crew just two blocks from the CIA compound where the SEALs and other State Department personnel were holed up. The enemy could be hit without hurting the SEALs.
Even though the hostile forces were located two blocks from the compound, they were in a clear line of sight from the SEALs located on the roof of the CIA compound that the Americans had fled to. The laser was pointed directly at the side of one of the vehicles with the symbol for Ansar al-Sharia painted on it. A perfect and fitting place for the Hellfire to impact.
The guiding system for the Hellfire immediately indicated that it had found and locked on the laser. Whatever was located at this point on Earth was about to experience the reason Hellfire got its name. The operators at the drone command confirmed, through their satellite patch, that the laser was in fact the target the SEALs had chosen for the strike. Even though distance was some two blocks from the SEALs’ location, the operator gave the last warning: missile locked on and engaged, danger close.
The Air Force drone operators were given the green light by their superiors. They hit the Launch button on the computer joystick. The Reaper cameras recorded the flash as the missile left the wing of the UAV and reached supersonic speed almost instantly. The Reaper operator watched the red trail from the missile honing in on its target.
The leader of the mortar team only had an instant to realize that they were under air attack before the Hellfire hit them—within inches of where the laser had marked. The blast wave radiated outward like a fiery red circular saw, slicing apart all it touched. Twenty attackers vaporized into pink mist. The secondary explosions rattled off like an oil drum thrown down a flight of stairs.
Within seconds, two more trucks exploded in a shower of hot metal. The explosion showered engine parts into the mass of attackers, wounding them with their own war machines. The shattered chassis were licked by flames, sending plumes of oily black smoke into the night sky. Those not lucky enough to die in the first few seconds lay dismembered and dying.
The second Hellfire pulverized another clump of jihadis fifty yards closer to the safe house. Another fifteen terrorists died in the Hellfire’s thunder. It also took out a militant leader, who had been barking out orders to his officers. The burning claws of the Hellfire explosion soon reached a cache of RPG rounds that the enemy had brought. The RPGs exploded immediately like a devilish series of fireworks.
The panicked remainder of the mob fled for their lives down the narrow streets. They couldn’t see the circling drone overhead but felt its wrath. They abandoned their vehicles and started to run wildly away from the blast radius.
The battle for the CIA station was over within minutes of the first missile being fired. More than fifty attackers lay dead or dying. The broken remnants of the mob were running for their desert hideouts.
Both Ty Woods and Glen Doherty and almost forty other Americans were saved. The Americans were delighted by their sudden deliverance from evil.
Rescue Scenario Four
QRF (Quick Reaction Force)
10:00 P.M.
The Global Response Staff (GRS) is an elite group of fewer than 150 specialists worldwide. Hired by the CIA to work in the most despotic hellholes on the planet, they are modern-day gunslingers and quite possibly the most highly qualified set of warriors in the world. Their hiring qualifications are not put out in public government-bid documents. Instead, members are selected and quietly tapped to apply by those who are already part of the crew. More than 75 percent come from parts of three very elite groups: Navy SEALs, Delta Force, and Marine Special Operations Force.
The GRS’s best are known as “scorpions” for good reason. Not only have they proven themselves in gunfights, but also their knowledge of traps, bombs, setups, ambushes, kill zones, and unconventional tactics separates them from an already bad-ass bunch.
True samurai that live solely by the warrior code, they know they could be betrayed by their masters at any time and would be left to fend for themselves in ungodly parts of the world. They are not asked to learn foreign languages where stationed, and generally do not even interact with the local populace, unless it is to obtain a specific item they are sent to retrieve. Their job is relatively simple and dangerous: safeguarding diplomats and spies in places where they are prized only as targets or captives.
The GRS use the full panoply of intelligence—human assets, signal intercepts, orbiting satellites—to identify and defeat threats. They protect diplomats and other government personnel in some of the most dangerous parts of the world. When left with no other options, they do what they arguably do best—they shoot their way out. This is probably one of the most dangerous paramilitary jobs in the world. Glen Doherty and Ty Woods were both highly respected members of this group.
The GRS agents in Tripoli received the word that an attack was underway almost immediately after Ambassador Stevens made his last fateful call for help at 9:40 p.m. The initial word was received from the State Department, as Greg Hicks was trying desperately to put together a force to help his friend Stevens in Benghazi. Not knowing the exact circumstances of the attack, it was enough for the GRS guys to know it was time to get ready to roll. This was what they trained for.
They were pumped and primed; other people’s crises were their motivation. Soon thereafter they tapped into the communications networks in Benghazi and quickly realized Woods was on the scene and Doherty, his friend, was going in as well.
The agents in Tripoli were largely located in a CIA facility. Little more than a large compound that had been fortified with concrete block and concertina wire, it was a very permeable Fort Apache in Indian country, nothing more.
Those that were located in other parts of Tripoli began to appear at the safe house. They knew that the situation was dire. Thus, most of the men showed up with their usual load-out of weapons and were each also carrying an additional large military duffel bag filled with special weapons and ammo. They knew they were in for a fight and wanted to have enough ammo and gear to finish it.
The word was then put out through the secure CIA channels: the operators were to assemble at a designated hangar at the Tripoli airport for further instructions.
The group that showed up would have made Wyatt Earp happy. They were quiet, sober men who knew how to handle a gunfight. They were veterans, experienced at killing men within six feet of their gun barrels, with some having made sniper shots approaching a mile away. Among the fifteen men, there was nearly a century of experience in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and other war zones. Some had recently separated from the military. Others had been out for years and working for various security contractors from Blackwater to Triple Canopy. Each sidelong glance told the same story: These are the brothers I go to war with, and some of us may not return.
The gear on display looked like an arms deal gone bad on the streets of Mogadishu. M-4s were the common gun of choice, outfitted with multiple thirty-round magazines and ten-inch close-quarter combat barrels. All guns had some form of laser sighting. The next most popular weapon was the venerable AK-47 in various configurations. While cheap in this part of the world, it was still the most common assault weapon for very good reason. It was reliable, and very easy to get ammo for virtually anywhere in the world, even from the bodies of slain enemies. They also had an assortment of semiautomatic pistols (generally .45 caliber), and 40 mm (mic-mic) grenade launchers. Ammunition and other weapons were shared among the group, not so much because anyone was in need but more to assure them that they were in this to the last round that anyone was still able to fire.
The officer in command was on loan to the CIA from a special operations unit working elsewhere in the sands of North Africa. The distance between Benghazi and Tripoli is 406 miles. The cruising speed of a US C-130 is approximately 345 miles per hour. Therefore, the flight time between Tripoli and Benghazi was no greater than one hour fifteen minutes.
A C-130 airplane had been regularly scheduled for the Tripoli-to-Benghazi run, though usually it moved packets of interoffice memos and cases of bottled water. Even though it had been repurposed, there was no need to even log a new flight plan.11 A total of two fire teams of eight men each were formed by the officer in charge. Each had a SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon) gunner, a radioman, and several others armed with various rifles and grenade launchers.
They had a clear set of objectives. First, get from the airport to the CIA station as soon as possible. Second, either engage those attacking the station from the perimeter and therefore flank the enemy, or clear a path to the station and assist those already in the battle.
They were the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), the posse riding in to the rescue. This was not the reason they were hired, but it became their mission when Americans were in jeopardy in a lonely and dangerous part of the world.
* * *
Reaching their objective would require that the group obtain vehicles for transport from the airport to the CIA station, which is approximately ten minutes away. The available intelligence, from radio traffic with the people at the CIA station, indicated that they were receiving some incoming sniper fire, and that the attacking force assembling at the CIA station seemed to be growing.
Upon arrival, the QRF was initially stopped at the airport. However, after making it clear that they were not going to take no for an answer, they quickly obtained six civilian vehicles—taxicabs that cost $500 a month to rent. A ten-minute ride, even into a shooting zone, for $500 was considered fair trade. If the taxi driver survived (and likely he would), he would make two months of wages in a few minutes.
The CIA kept reservoirs of cash for these kinds of contingencies. The men opened ziplock bags and fanned out the cash. As soon as the taxi drivers saw it, they reached for the money. “Not until we get there,” a CIA man said.
They motioned to the old Mercedes taxis. Their attitude: Let’s get this done.
A quick route was mapped out, and the two fire teams elected to break into two separate “trains” going into the compound area. This would allow each of them to act as backup in case the other was attacked along the way.
After confirming the precise location of the attackers from a review of overhead drone data, each fire team mapped a path on their handheld GPS units. The first unit left for the CIA compound. Given their rides in civilian vehicles, their infiltration into the CIA station went off without a shot.
The same was true when the second train of vehicles arrived at the location approximately ten minutes later, using a different route. The drivers took their cash and roared away in a cloud of diesel fumes.
After a few quick moments of updating with the GRS agents at the compound, the arriving GRS agents set up an immediate perimeter defense with sniper and machine-gun kill zones completely surrounding the area around the CIA compound. The overlapping machine gun kill zones would also allow the GRS agents to effectively repel the ability of the attackers trying to bracket the CIA compound with mortar fire.
By 4:30 a.m., the compound again began receiving probing fire from attackers; they were testing to see how close they were able to get to the perimeter. However, given the numbers and skill of the shooters on the roof of the CIA compound, the snipers were able to keep the attackers a few hundred yards away from the facility.
At approximately 5:00 a.m., the attacking groups had built up enough courage to attempt a frontal assault on the compound. The mob was met with a fusillade of fire from sixteen battle-hardened GRS agents. Within minutes, many of the attackers lay dead or dying in the streets surrounding the compound. Their banzai charge had failed. It did, however, produce martyrs. The losses were simply too great for them to sustain the attack.
The rising sun would make them even easier targets. Their will to fight was breaking down as they slunk away into the shrinking shadows. They were gone before the sun raised its disk over the eastern mountains.
The American diplomats looked at each other with relief and a certain measure of disbelief. As one made coffee for the group, another said what everyone was thinking: “You know, it could have been much worse—Ty Woods and Glen Doherty could have died defending us.”
Rescue Scenario Five
Cruise Missile Launch
10:00 P.M.
Several of the ships stationed at the Gaeta naval base were equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles mounted with conventional warheads. With a flight speed of just over five hundred miles per hour, the missiles could easily make it to Benghazi within 1.5 hours. Given the location of the attackers in one central area outside the CIA station, it was determined that the best missile to launch was that containing the softball-sized cluster bomblet warhead. The exact GPS coordinates of the attacking mob were provided to the missile’s guidance control from the drone circling overhead.
The Tomahawk missile is guided by a combination of a precision GPS, a special terrain way-point radar map, and two types of terminal guidance systems to place a warhead with literal pinpoint accuracy. The missile is designed to fly through a one-meter-square window on Earth at an exact predesignated time, and it has proven its ability to do so on thousands of occasions.12 The newest Tomahawks, called Block IVs or tactical Tomahawks, can be retargeted in flight.
Given the possibility that the attackers might break off the attack and/or change locations prior to the missile’s arrival, it was determined that the BGM-109 Block IV would be used. Further, given the decisions to use the small bomblets, the amount of collateral damage to the surrounding structures and civilian populace would be minimized.
The missile was launched from the destroyer at Gaeta at 3:00 a.m., after it was determined by the Pentagon that no other human and/or drone assets were capable of being used. During the hour-long flight to target, the location of the mob changed by approximately half a block to a small open area two blocks from the CIA house. The drone provided the exact location to within inches, and the targeting system on the cruise missile was reset.
The missile hit the mob at 4:40 a.m., and essentially destroyed the entire area for an approximate 150-foot radius. All attackers within the radius were instantly killed.
What was remaining of the attacking force staggered from the area after witnessing the complete devastation an unknown device had wrought upon them.
* * *
Based on a careful scrutiny of the available facts and timeline and interviews with fighter pilots, SEAL assault element leaders, and others, there were five plausible rescue options available to President Obama. Fighters could have been scrambled, armed drones dispatched, a commando Quick Reaction Force deployed, or cruise missiles launched. Instead, the president had dinner and failed to press his staff for action.
As the experts that we interviewed made clear, none of these were exotic or Hollywood-only options. Each scenario was based on the men and equipment in the theater of operations at the time, and none required those forces to do anything beyond what they had trained relentlessly to do. They are realistic alternatives.
We may never know why the president didn’t act. Was he concerned about the political ramifications of ordering air strikes or teams into harm’s way some two months before a tough presidential election? Liberating Libya and killing bin Laden were the president’s prime foreign policy achievements. Having to fight al Qaeda (or its affiliates) to save Americans in Libya would call each of those accomplishments into question. And if the rescue mission had failed, it could have been another Desert One, the Carter-era Iranian hostage-rescue effort that killed eight men and never came close to saving a single trapped diplomat (as we described in chapter 2). Surely, these were concerns that weighed on the president’s mind.
Still, two important points remain: the tragedy reveals the extraordinary prowess of only two U.S. Navy SEALs (Doherty and Woods) against some one hundred attackers. These two men helped save the lives of more than forty Americans against overwhelming odds, and that speaks volumes about the training and caliber of these men as individuals and as part of the SEAL teams.
And the tragedy reveals why the SEALs are indispensible. If a team had been deployed in time, there is little doubt that Benghazi would be simply another story of these Navy commandos triumphing against seemingly impossible odds. If America is going to continue to hold the al Qaeda menace at bay, it will need men like Woods and Doherty; it will need the U.S. Navy SEALs.
Where do these heroes come from? They are sought out and selected, they are prepared using the most demanding methods possible, and they are trained continuously to maintain their extraordinary abilities. Beyond the physical strength, mental toughness, and incredible skills, these heroes are made by a unique culture that shapes and sharpens them.
Yet the subculture of the SEALs is dependent on a political class that understands their unique abilities and summons the courage to send them in. The SEALs cannot save anyone if the president does not send them in.