1 (SBU) Action Memorandum for Under Secretary for Management Patrick F. Kennedy, “Future Operations in Benghazi, Libya.” December 27, 2011.
2 Id.
3 “Securing Our Embassies Overseas.” U.S. Department of State. Retrieved at: http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9004.htm.
4 Transcribed interview of Benghazi Assistant Regional Security Officer David Oliveira, October 9, 2012. See also “Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile,” A Report Prepared By The Federal Research Division, Library Of Congress, Under An Interagency Agreement With The Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office’s Irregular Warfare Support Program, August 2012, at p. 4.
5 Travel Warning, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. Libya. August 27, 2012. Retrieved at: http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5762.html.
6 U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya, Regional Security Office, “Security Incidents since June 2011.”
7 Id. See also, the State Department’s Accountability Review Board Report for a list of security incidents in Benghazi, Libya, during 2012 that were directed at western interests. These include: a March 2012 event in which members of a militia searching for a suspect fire weapons near the U.S. diplomatic compound and attempt to enter; an April 2012 incident in which a U.K. armored diplomatic vehicle is attacked after driving into a local protest; an April 2012 event in which a homemade explosive device is thrown over the U.S. diplomatic compound’s north wall; an April 2012 event in which an IED was thrown at the motorcade of the U.N. Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi; an April 2012 event in which a Special Mission Benghazi principal officer is evacuated from International Medical University (IMU) after a fistfight escalated to gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security personnel and IMU security; a May 2012, event in which the Benghazi International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) building was struck by rocket propelled grenades; a June 2012 IED attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound; a June 2012, event in Benghazi where the British Ambassador’s convoy was attacked with a rocket propelled grenade and possible AK-47s; a June 2012, event in which a rocket propelled grenade attack is made on the ICRC compound in Misrata (400 km west of Benghazi); a June 2012, attack in which protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi; an August 2012 event in which a small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat’s vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.
8 Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wood before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 10, 2012.
9 Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, at p. 31; Interview of Regional Security Officer Eric Nordstrom, October 1, 2012.
10 Interview of Regional Security Officer Eric Nordstrom, October 1, 2012. See also, email from James Bacigalupo to Brian Papanu and David Sparrowgrove, May 7, 2012, 1:01 p.m., Subject: FW: Special Agent Tony Zamudio’s TDY Performance in Benghazi.
11 Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wood before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 10, 2012.
12 “Securing Our Embassies Overseas.” U.S. Department of State. Retrieved at: http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9004.htm.
13 Email from Alec Henderson to John B. Martinec, “RE: Benghazi QRF agreement,” (Sep. 9, 2012 11:31 PM).
14 12 STATE 38939, April 19, 2012, Signature: CLINTON.
15 Email from Jennifer A. Larson to Eric Nordstrom, Ambassador Gene Cretz, et al., April 21, 2012, 1:57 p.m., Subject: Re: Tripoli–Request for DS DTY and FTE Support.
16 Email chain between Ambassador Chris Stevens and John Moretti, June 7, 2012, 3:34 a.m., Subject: MSD/Tripoli.
17 Id.
18 Email from David C. McFarland to Ambassador Chris Stevens, et al., July 9, 2012, 12:24 p.m., Subject: (SBU) Tripoli O-I July 9.
19 (SBU) Email from Charlene Lamb to State Department personnel. July 6, 2012, 2:59 p.m. Subject: Re: Tripoli–Request for extension of TDY Security Personnel.
20 12 TRIPOLI 690, July 9, 2012. Signature: STEVENS.
21 Id.
22 Briefing by Under Secretary for Management Patrick F. Kennedy to Congressional staff, January 2013.
23 Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, at p. 4.
24 Testimony of Secretary Hillary Clinton before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 23, 2013.
25 Id.
26 Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Charlene Lamb before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 10, 2012; email exchange between Assistant Secretary Eric Boswell and Diplomatic Security Chief Financial Officer Robert Baldre, September 28, 2012 (“I do not feel that we have ever been at a point where we sacrificed security due to a lack of funding… Typically Congress has provided sufficient funding.”)
27 American Corners are partnerships between the Public Affairs sections of United States Embassies and host institutions. They provide access to current and reliable information from and about the United States via book collections, the Internet, and through local programming to the general public overseas or abroad.
28 As described in this timeline, as the attacks were ongoing, seven additional personnel arrived from Tripoli to assist, bringing the total to 35 U.S. personnel on the ground that night.
29 All times local.
30 Emails from State Department Operations Center to various recipients, September 11, 2012, at 4:05 p.m. Eastern and 6:08 p.m. Eastern.
31 The Tripoli team spent the hours between the arrival at the airport and the arrival at the Annex focused on gaining situational awareness about its main mission, which at the time was locating Ambassador Stevens, who they thought might have been kidnapped.
32 Again all times local.
33 The purpose of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) is to support military command and control for the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense (often referred to as the National Command Authority). It is operated by the Joint Staff, to coordinate joint actions and coordinate with the supported Combatant Command. Principally located at the Pentagon, the NMCC broadly consists of multiple people, organizations, command and control systems, procedures, and facilities.
34 Unclassified timeline, Department of Defense.
35 U.S. Africa Command Posture Hearing testimony at the House Armed Services Committee. March 15, 2013.
36 House Intelligence Community staff briefing with key surviving personnel and U.S. security officials. December 14, 2012.
37 HPSCI review of intelligence assessments, cables, and reports.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Email from State Department Operations Center to various recipients, September 11, 2012, 4:05 p.m. Eastern.
42 Email from State Department Operations Center to various recipients, September 11, 2012, 6:08 p.m. Eastern.
43 The ARB also concluded that “there was no protest prior to the attacks, which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.”
44 “Administration Statements on the Attack in Benghazi,” The New York Times, September 27, 2012. See also, Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly, United Nation Headquarters, New York, New York, September 25, 2012, 10:22 a.m.
45 Id.
46 Found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6akGlF6g-Zw.
47 “Timeline: How Benghazi attack, probe unfolded,” CBS News, November 2, 2012.
48 Id.
49 Transcript of Meet the Press interview found at: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57513819/face-the-nation-transcripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-mccain/.
50 Email from William V. Roebuck to Beth Jones, “Update: 9-16-12,” (Sept. 16, 2012 8:38 AM).
51 Testimony of National Counterterrorism Center Director Matt Olsen before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2012.
52 “Timeline: How Benghazi attack, probe unfolded,” CBS News, November 2, 2012.
53 Id.
54 House Intelligence Committee classified briefing with Director Petraeus, September 14, 2012.
55 Draft talking points circulated via email within interagency at 6:52 p.m., September 14, 2012.
56 Email from Senior State Department official to interagency team at 7:39 p.m., Friday, September 14, 2012.
57 Email from Senior State Department official to interagency team at 9:24 p.m., Friday, September 14, 2012.
58 A Deputies meeting is an interagency gathering–often done in person or over a secure video conferencing system (SVTC)—at which deputies of all relevant departments advocate for their departments’ positions. Deputies typically reach a consensus, or the White House will provide a decision if there is continued dispute. In this case, the Deputies met by (SVTC) on the morning of Saturday, September 15, 2012. While Congress has not yet been given minutes of that meeting, it appears to have included representatives of the State Department, the CIA, DOD, the FBI/DOJ, and the White House, represented by National Security Staff.
59 This appears to directly contradict White House Spokesman Jay Carney’s comments at the Daily Press Briefing on November 28, 2012: “The White House and the State Department have made clear that the single adjustment that was made to those talking points by either of those two—of these two institutions were changing the word ‘consulate’ to ‘diplomatic facility,’ because ‘consulate’ was inaccurate. Those talking points originated from the intelligence community. They reflect the IC’s best assessments of what they thought had happened.”
60 Email to Ambassador Rice, Saturday, September 15, 2012, discussing the results of the Deputies meeting.
61 Final version of talking points circulated at 9:52 a.m., September 15, 2012.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 CIA Acting Director Michael Morrell suggested at a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the talking points were changed to protect an ongoing FBI investigation. See, e.g., http://www.cbsnews.com/9301-250_162-57555984/who-changed-the-benghazi-talking-points/
65 Email from Senior State Department Official to second Senior State Department Official explaining that the FBI “did not have major concerns” with the talking points and “offered only a couple minor suggestions.” 8:59 p.m., September 14, 2012.
66 Email to Ambassador Rice, Saturday, September 15, 2012.
67 Id.
68 The Department of Defense offered to provide a U.S. military security team to accompany the FBI team. This option was not pursued.
69 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, World Wide Threats Hearing, March 13, 2013.
70 “Convening of an Accountability Review Board To Examine the Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of Personnel Assigned in Support of the U.S. Government Mission to Libya in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012,” Notice by the Department of State, Federal Register, October 4, 2012, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/10/04/2012-24504/convening-of-an-accountability-review-board-to-examine-the-circumstances-surrounding-the-deaths-of.
71 Id.
72 Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Charlene Lamb before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 10, 2012; email exchange between Assistant Secretary Eric Boswell and Diplomatic Security Chief Financial Officer Robert Baldre, September 28, 2012 (“I do not feel that we have ever been at a point where we sacrificed security due to a lack of funding… Typically Congress has provided sufficient funding.”)
73 Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, Dec. 19, 2012, p. 4.
74 Testimony from EUCOM Commander, Admiral Stavridis, March 15, 2013, before the Armed Services Committee, “They [bases in Europe] are the forward operating bases for 21st century security. They allow us to support Carter Ham in Africa. They allow us to support Jim Mattis in the Levant, in the near Middle East, and indeed in Central Asia. So geography matters as well.”