1944
Sholto Douglas summarised the duties of RAF Middle East in December 1943. They consisted of operations in Turkey and the Aegean, convoy protection and the defence of bases in the eastern Mediterranean, operational training in Egypt, Cyprus, Palestine and South Africa, internal security and inter-service cooperation in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Persia, the Sudan, Aden and East Africa, operations from bases in Arabia, Somaliland and East Africa in cooperation with Indian Ocean units, maintenance work for all air forces in the region and, not least, the preservation of the Middle East as an ‘entity’. It would remain, thought Douglas, a focus of RAF activity ‘in any postwar structure that can now be foreseen.’ Its geographical location at the intersection of three continents must make it of paramount importance in relation to any air-route developments, of which the foundations were then being laid. In Douglas’s opinion, the idea of placing Middle East under the control of MAAF for all purposes was ‘unworkable’ and would lead to ‘inefficiency and friction’. Operations in the Mediterranean must remain under MAAF’s control, but Middle East should be permitted the greatest degree of administrative autonomy.
Slessor took up his dual appointment as Eaker’s deputy at MAAF and C-in-C MEDME on 12 January 1944 and for the next year would do his considerable best to limit that autonomy. As soon as he arrived in the Mediterranean, Slessor decided that Park was inadequate and wrote at once to tell Portal this. Park had been given a position of great importance, he wrote, but was simply not up to it:
He has an excellent record as an operational group commander and is very conscientious about getting round his units and so on. But he has no experience at all of dealing with these semi-political problems, and is not really interested in them as far as I can see, and I think is probably inwardly conscious of his limitations in this regard. I have never had any official contacts with him before and frankly am rather alarmed at finding what a very stupid man he is; and I am very much afraid that unless we take some steps about it we shall lose our position in the Middle East and the control of policy will drift increasingly into the hands of the Army – who would be only too delighted to assume it. . . . I am, of course, not suggesting that you should remove Park. That would be impossible [he conceded] just after he has been appointed.
He had therefore thought hard about how best to help Park and decided that he needed the help of a first class civil servant.
I am really uneasy about the situation [he concluded], with him here alone with Toomer who, though a good solid staff officer [he was Senior Air Staff Officer], has not the experience, character, brains or personality to fill the bill on the political as apart from the purely RAF side.
Slessor’s criticisms, as he admitted, were based on a very slight knowledge of Park, although he and Park had already differed sharply in 1936 over the handling of 48 Squadron in August 1918. Slessor was new to his own job, which should have been absorbing his whole attention. Park, moreover, had much more experience of Egypt than had Slessor, and while at Malta had been in touch with Middle East affairs, as Tedder reminded Portal when advocating Park’s positing to Cairo – and Tedder was that rare bird, an officer of whom Slessor approved. Slessor’s letter was addressed to Portal, a man who had known Park well for over twenty years and was better placed to evaluate him than Slessor. Park was not a man to yield any essential RAF interests to the army or to the navy and his record in Malta (and later in Kandy and Singapore) showed him more than ready to bat for his own service.
Perhaps Slessor’s interest in ‘semi-political problems’ was excessive; he was, after all, a serving officer with military duties and the temptation to meddle outside those duties was particularly dangerous in sensitive regions which Slessor knew only slightly and could rarely even visit. Nor did Slessor say what it was that Park should do that he was not doing. Presumably the expression of contempt for Toomer, no less than Park, was not lost on Portal, who would be aware of Slessor’s tendency to hold dismissive opinions. No assistant was sent out to Park, who made no important mistakes and was not relieved of his command. (Indeed, his next job was to carry even greater responsibility.) Nor did Slessor find it impossible to work with Park during the next three years, though he rather often failed to get his own way. There were other senior officers, British and American, who did not find Park over-placed for his talents either in Egypt or in the Far East.
Coralie Hyam was personal secretary for four commanders of RAF Middle East between 1942 and 1946 – Linnell, Douglas, Park and Medhurst – and regarded Park as by far the ablest. He was an efficient despatcher of business and a good delegator. This left him free to travel round his units, which he loved to do, but it also gave his subordinates great responsibility: there was no other way for him to learn if they were up to their jobs – nor, indeed, for them to learn this – and he was ruthless with those who failed. Miss Hyam thought Park very even tempered. He had great self-control and did not shout or even raise his voice when angered or placed under pressure. He was approachable to all ranks and very straight, never finding someone else to deal with such unpleasant jobs as telling people they would not be promoted; in such areas he did not delegate.
He would quietly visit ships passing through the Canal and find a word of comfort not only for the wounded and sick but also for those being sent home for ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’. Whereas Douglas imported a large team of friends and clients to the Middle East, Park arrived alone and made do with the staff on hand, unless and until he needed to remove any of them. When he went to Ceylon in 1945 it was the same. During Douglas’s regime, as many as five aircraft were reserved for his personal use, even though he was no longer a pilot. Park, still able to fly himself, retained only two. His aircraft were available for the use of other senior officers when he did not need them.
Flight Sergeant Tet Walston was working in Flying Control at Heliopolis in January 1944 when Park arrived from Malta in a Lockheed Lodestar to take up his appointment. The CO, recounted Walston, was naturally anxious to make a good impression and assembled the most respectable-looking part of his entourage. Park shook hands with the senior officers of the welcoming party and then ‘strolled over to have a little chat with the airman who drove the crash tender’, thereby astounding everyone present. He went into Flying Control to report his arrival and, catching sight of Walston, casually asked him how he had enjoyed the shrimps. Walston savoured the aftermath. His CO withdrew from the procession following Park and whispered: ‘You never told me you knew the C-in-C,’ to which Walston was able to make the classic reply: ‘You never asked me.’1
On 15 January, his first full day in command, Park held the first of his daily conferences with his senior staff officers. The next day, he told his staff of his wishes in regard to dealing with the Americans. They were helping Britain to win the war, he said, and close cooperation with them was essential. The political or postwar aspects of particular problems were to be dealt with ‘by the people at home’. He made it clear that he intended to visit units every week and that far too much paper was coming to him. Once a matter had been discussed and agreed, he assumed that the necessary action followed. If it did not, he would know what to do. He was not to be presented with a sheaf of papers to wade through and ruled that henceforth the officer most concerned with the particular case must provide a short brief as well as the papers. One piece of paper crossing his desk at that time gave him pleasure, however: a message from Field Marshal Smuts (another man of whom Slessor approved): ‘Please tell Keith Park with what pleasure I have heard of his promotion to chief air command in Middle East. It is a most fitting honour and recognition for his great work in Malta. All good luck for the great job ahead.’
Park thanked Beaverbrook on 30 January for his congratulations on his new appointment. This is a vast and sprawling command,’ he wrote, ‘with only one area where we are conducting active operations, but I find it most interesting.’ He was delighted to have with him again Beaverbrook’s son, Max Aitken. During 1944, he often sailed in Alexandria harbour with Aitken and another squadron commander, John Grandy. There was more time for socializing, Park was readier to gossip and Grandy thought him more relaxed than he had been in 1940.
Since times were easier, the Parks decided they would like to be together again. Park wrote to Sinclair on 10 February to ask permission for Dol to come to Cairo and do welfare work. When Lady Tedder had been there in 1942, said Park, she had had a full-time job doing welfare work, but since her departure little had been done. Several army generals had their wives with them and they looked after the soldiers’ welfare, but there were no senior RAF officers’ wives in Cairo. Sinclair, however, refused to permit Dol to go on the grounds that once it was done at the top it would be hard to resist lower down. In April the question was reviewed again. Slessor conceded that there were arguments in favour of Lady Park going out to Cairo, but had resolved that she should not be allowed to fly out. At the end of May, the War Office withdrew its objection to wives joining husbands ‘if it is definitely in the national interest’ and if the husband was stationed overseas until the end of the war or longer. However, the Air Ministry rejected both principles.
At Park’s suggestion, Dol asked Beaverbrook to help. He wrote to Balfour, the Under-Secretary of State for Air, on 23 May. ‘You know that Park is a great friend of mine,’ said Beaverbrook, ‘and I would like to help. Can you direct me please?’ Balfour replied the same day. He had learned of a considerable correspondence between the Parks and Sinclair on this matter. The position was that she could go to Cairo, but not until the Home Office ban on travel was lifted and he could give her no indication of when that would be. I hope this will set her mind at ease,’ Balfour concluded, somewhat optimistically. Beaverbrook advised Dol to tackle the Home Office. This she did and by early August, after six months of determined joint effort, she was in Cairo.2
One of Park’s main tasks in Egypt was aircrew training. As well as meeting British needs, he was responsible for training the nationals of occupied countries. Yugoslavs were a particular problem because part of the air force remained loyal to the King while part had gone over to Tito. In Slessor’s view, Tito’s desire for an independent Yugoslav air force was ‘a manifest absurdity . . . professional discussion of technical details of air force organization with a Balkan brigand will not be easy.’ Nor was it: General Franjo Pirc, Tito’s senior airman, tried to renege on an agreement signed with Park on 29 March. As Park signalled Slessor on 2 April: Tire says cannot risk Tito’s wrath otherwise must shoot himself but promises to do so in own country not Middle East.’ The Soviets, added Park, had offered Tito his own squadron if the British failed to meet his wishes.
Both Park and Slessor were reluctant to give aircraft to guerrilla groups, believing private air forces undesirable, but 173 Squadron was assigned to meet transport requests for ‘any sound military purpose’. In Park’s opinion, Colonel Prendergast, Deputy Commander of Raiding Forces in the Middle East, was doing valuable work in March against coastal shipping in the Aegean and needed transport for his staff officers to get around scattered forces in Syria. Force 133, however, he thought inefficient. Normally under Prendergast’s command, it was in fact a poorly organized group, composed mainly of Greek partisans assisted by British officers. It also concerned itself with attacks on Aegean shipping, but suffered losses on three successive missions. Park proposed to send an officer to liaise with Force 133, though he recognized that ‘it is difficult to get these people away from their cloak-and-dagger methods.’
Nevertheless, given his enthusiasm for improvisation, Park delighted in properly organized cloak-and-dagger work. Operation Zeppelin, for example, was a combined services operation intended to persuade the Germans that a large invasion of the Balkans was being prepared in North Africa, between Tobruk and Derna. The most obvious sign that the operation had succeeded came when the Germans reinforced the eastern Mediterranean in May and June despite the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June; but Zeppelin also concealed a withdrazval of Allied squadrons from the Middle East to assist in that invasion. Park’s contribution included arranging aircraft and glider displays on Cyrenaican airfields, a balloon barrage over Tobruk and an increase in R/T traffic designed to persuade the Germans that Operational Training Units in Palestine were being used as a cover for front-line work. He also used heavy bombers in daylight to give the impression that they were troop-carrying (they were in fact flown by pupil pilots experiencing a welcome – and unexplained – break from night-flying). Operation Turpitude was a follow-up to Zeppelin, involving ‘Colforce’: a build-up of army and air force strength in northern Syria. The RAF was to move various squadrons and armoured cars into the Aleppo area in the hope of making the Germans think an invasion of Turkey was imminent. Park even fed false information about Colforce into his staff meetings to keep the deception pure.
Despite Slessor’s opinion that he lacked interest in political affairs, Park was quick to react when Slessor neglected to send him reports and minutes of Middle East Commanders-in-Chief meetings, and asked Slessor to ensure that these papers were sent to him, whether he was in Cairo or elsewhere. Temporarily chastened, Slessor asked him on 1 April if he should say anything at a forthcoming press conference which could help partisans in Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. Park suggested that Slessor stress the dual role of air power: to bomb Germans and to supply partisans. The Air Ministry, however, refused to permit Slessor to mention partisans. When representatives of Life magazine and Britain’s Paramount News visited Cairo in April, Park was also forbidden to mention them.
He returned to Cairo on the 3rd from a four-day tour of the Canal Zone and the Western Desert that covered 1,700 miles. He visited units of all kinds, chatting with the men for half an hour at each one. He asked them to gather round in an informal group and told them that their work was valuable, encouraging them to ‘stick at it’ despite the loneliness of their bases. Then he sketched the general war situation, inviting questions which he answered in plain, straightforward terms. Park made the tour by air, taking regular spells at the controls. He also navigated an air-sea rescue launch in heavy seas, bringing it safely into harbour, and rode in a DUKW landing-craft.3
On 18 April, while Park was visiting units in East Africa, King Farouk suddenly proposed wholesale changes in the Egyptian government. The British civilian and service chiefs quickly forced him to back down and even considered deposing him. Park, back in Cairo, signalled Slessor on the 23rd to say that there was no danger of riots and that if Farouk were deposed the Egyptian Army would support his successor. On the 25th he added that Slessor’s reference to the Egyptian political situation at a meeting attended by Americans had caused annoyance in Cairo; Lord Killearn (the British ambassador) would be most perturbed, said Park, if he learned that his remarks to service chiefs had been passed on to the Americans. Slessor thanked Park for keeping him informed about the crisis and assured him that he would not tell the Americans anything they should not hear. Although he liked Americans, Park was acutely aware that the Wafd, a powerful upper-class nationalist movement in Egypt, wanted rid of the British after the war – if not during it – and was ready to play upon the well-known sympathy of Americans for nationalist aspirations everywhere in the Middle East. Britain’s position in Egypt was a strange one: she exercised de facto rule, though Egypt was not constitutionally part of the British Empire and, indeed, was technically neutral throughout the war.
On 27 April Park replied to Killearn’s request for his observations on the Royal Egyptian Air Force. A squadron was operating under Park’s control, but he could not truthfully say that it was proving useful. There were maintenance and administrative problems, although the Egyptian author-ities were helping him to overcome them. The squadron would soon be moved to Mersa Matruh, where it would be employed on shipping protection and help as much as the squadrons manned by Greek and Yugoslav allies. Aircraft lost from this squadron should be replaced, Park thought, but a second squadron should not be raised at British expense. Killearn sent a copy of this report to the Foreign Office, inviting support for Park’s views, and the Foreign Office, in turn, invited that of the Air Ministry.
Early in June Killearn asked Park whether surplus Hurricanes should be transferred to the REAF. Park thought they posed no threat to British interests in Egyptian hands and such transfers would discourage the Americans from stepping in with offers of their own surplus aircraft. Killearn agreed and offered his support in recommending these views to the Air Ministry. In October the Air Ministry wrote to the Treasury about its discussions with Park concerning the supply of aircraft to the REAF. He and his predecessor had made ‘a number of arrangements of which we at the Air Ministry were not fully apprised’, intended to keep the Egyptians flying British aircraft and to encourage them to take over certain ground duties to release RAF manpower for service elsewhere. The Air Ministry emphasized that all Park’s actions and promises to the Egyptians were supported by Killearn and by the Foreign Office and asked for retrospective Treasury approval – which was given, most reluctantly, in January 1945.4
Ira C. Eaker, head of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, wrote to Park on 27 April to express his gratitude for ‘the many kindnesses shown us while in Cairo’. On the way home, he had stopped at Benghazi and learned of ‘your earnest desire to get some Mustangs at an early date to accompany the Marauders, cut down losses and punish the Germans.’ Eaker had discussed this request with Slessor, who assured him that Park was to get the next Mustang squadron probably by mid-May. These fighters, replied Park, would not only cover Marauders and Beaufighters on shipping strikes in the Aegean, but also carry out trials with rockets. Men and machines were constantly being transferred to the front line from Park’s command because he and Slessor agreed that they should be used as offensively as possible.
Late in July Park visited Eaker and Slessor at Caserta. His relations with Slessor were then in a friendly phase (Slessor having recently thanked him for his ‘very helpful collaboration’ in building up the Desert Air Force) and on his return to Cairo he found waiting for him a warm letter from Eaker. Park wrote to thank him for his generous remarks about Middle East’s contribution to MAAF.
When I came here six months ago [he continued], I found a big operational force, especially single-engined lighters, that had not enough to keep them occupied. As fast as MAAF have been able to absorb them, I have been pleased to send these squadrons along to where they can engage the enemy instead of sitting in a back area to engage an attack that might never come. We have done the same with Coastal and Bomber Squadrons of which we had quite a large number six months ago. As our operational commitments have shrunk, our Training and Maintenance organizations have been built up so that we still control about 150,000 enlisted, also civilian, personnel spread over a dozen countries com-prising the Middle East Command.5
Killearn informed the Foreign Office on 31 July that Park was seriously disturbed because he was not getting the calico and yarn needed to meet his parachute commitments. Egypt wished to purchase cotton goods from the United States, but was unable to do so because London refused import licences. In view of assurances given to the Egyptians that British forces would not make cotton purchases except for urgent needs, and bearing in mind the very large offtake for parachutes, Park considered that Egypt’s request for imports was reasonable. He had asked Killearn to recommend this in the strongest terms and he readily did so. The political dangers were real, said Killearn, and he doubted if they were appreciated in London. A Foreign Office official minuted on 2 August that Park had made a good case, based on the demand for supplies by parachute-drop to guerrillas and partisans in the Mediterranean area, but it was not until 22 September that the Air Ministry advised Park that parachute production could be reduced from 30,000 to 12,000 a month, because of Canadian supplies and a more favourable war situation.
Meanwhile, moves were afoot to send Park to Australia. During 1944 the Royal Australian Air Force was plagued by quarrels between its two most senior officers, Air Vice-Marshals Jones (Chief of the Air Staff) and Bostock (Commander of Operational Forces). The Prime Minister, John Curtin, discussed the problem with General Mac Arthur in June. The only satisfactory solution, Curtin thought, would be the appointment of an officer senior to both. MacArthur replied that it was a problem for the Australians to solve; should such an officer be appointed, he would cooperate with him. On 4 August the Australian War Cabinet agreed that Park’s services should be sought. Curtin visited London later that month and approached both Churchill and Portal in an attempt to secure Park. Nothing was concluded, however, and on 28 September Stanley Bruce (High Commissioner) informed Curtin that Park was ‘earmarked’ for an important RAF command. However, Sinclair would not stand in his way if he wished to accept an Australian invitation. MacArthur then told Curtin that it was too late to make a change. As Frederick Shedden (Secretary of the Department for Defence) pointed out, the Americans liked to play off Jones and Bostock against each other. A man of Park’s stature, in overall command, would have asserted the RAAF’s views much more effectively. On 31 October Curtin told Bruce that ‘it would now appear inadvisable’ to seek Park’s appointment. Park’s views, assuming that he was in fact consulted, are not known.
In August Dol had at last managed to join him in Cairo and for the next two years usually accompanied him on tours to non-operational areas. Her cheerful manner and abundant energy, fortified by a nursing background and personal experience of service life, fitted her admirably for welfare work. As she often pointed out, she was the mother of an RAF Corporal and an Army Lieutenant as well as the wife of an Air Marshal. Dol proved herself an extremely active welfare worker in the Middle and Far East and in New Zealand for many years after the war, until her health gave way.
On 27 October the Parks flew to South Africa for a fortnight at the invitation of Field Marshal Smuts. Park visited South African Air Force bases to study training methods and spoke to the press about his respect for Sir Quintin Brand (born in South Africa), who had so loyally supported him in the Battle of Britain. He praised the fighting qualities of South African airmen, commented favourably on their rugby and speculated that an international air police force might be formed after the war. To his great delight, he met several mining geologists who had either studied under his father or knew his work. A trip down a gold mine reminded him of the ingot James had brought home from Maunahie. On 13 November he and Dol were back in Cairo, having also visited Rhodesia and Kenya. Park had asked Slessor if there were any queries he wished him to raise in South Africa, but Slessor refused to work through Park if it could be avoided.6
Slessor wrote to the three Middle East Commanders-in-Chief on 19 November about the command and coordination of operations involving all three services. The debate evidently became unduly warm as far as Slessor and Park were concerned because on the 27th Park wrote to ‘My dear Jack’ to say that he would do as he suggested and destroy their most recent exchange of letters. Park assured him that he ‘did not suggest or intend to imply’ that Slessor should never write personally to the other Cs-in-C, but he did ask that comments on the Cs-in-C Committee ‘and especially criticism of my actions’ should go through normal channels – to Park himself – and not direct to the army and navy members. Since Slessor had agreed to do this, the matter was closed.
One of Park’s first tasks on coming to Cairo, he told Slessor, had been to improve relations with the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. His staff officers felt that MAAF had stripped them of resources and disparaged their efforts. Feelings ran high in Cairo, but Park set himself to calm them and his staff responded loyally, as Eaker and Slessor both acknowledged. MAAF, however, remained ‘ungracious and unhelpful’ and by the end of October, Park’s staff had lost all sense of security. Slessor’s failure to consult or even to inform Park about postings was an acute grievance; he also sent instructions direct to Park’s subordinate formations and dealt directly with the British Embassy in Cairo on matters which were Park’s responsibility.
Park signalled the Air Ministry (and repeated the signal to Slessor) on 24 November. Both Tedder and Douglas had told him, he said, that the main reason for placing Middle East under MAAF was to permit a closer coordination of operations then taking place at both ends of the Mediter-ranean. Eaker and Slessor had testified to the wholehearted support given them by Park during the year, but conditions had now changed: MAAF’s concern was operations, Park’s was training, maintenance and reinforcement for several commands as well as MAAF, also with internal security problems which could best be handled in Cairo. Park therefore believed the time had come for Middle East to be placed directly under the Air Ministry.
Slessor agreed that the organization of the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East should now be reviewed. It had always been intended, he said, that as soon as possible after operations against Germany ended, the main directing headquarters of the RAF should once again be in Cairo. Meanwhile, however, Slessor argued that MAAF should continue to control Middle East, even though he admitted that Park’s position was ‘slightly anomalous’ in that he had a Commander-in-Chief between him and the Air Ministry, whereas his army and navy counterparts dealt directly with the War Office and the Admiralty respectively – and Park had a far wider responsibility than either.
Slessor wrote to Park on 3 December in an unusually conciliatory tone. Policy control, he repeated, should return to Cairo as soon as the German war ended. Middle East ‘should clearly exercise far more responsibility and deal more directly with the Air Ministry than an ordinary subordinate HQ.’ It had always done so, Slessor thought, and he was sorry to hear that Park’s staff felt there had been ‘undue interference’; he would instruct his own staff to intervene only in matters where ‘coordination and a common standard’ were essential. Matters of higher policy should be reserved for discussion between himself and Park. He looked forward to seeing Park soon because these discussions on paper at long range were never satisfactory.7
In the 1945 New Year’s Honours List Park was made a Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (KCB) and on 2 January Beaverbrook again sent his warmest congratulations. ‘It will be a matter of the widest satisfaction,’ he said, ‘that this public recognition has been given to what you have done for the British cause in the past two years.’
One of Park’s last duties in Cairo was to hand over an aircraft to King Farouk. This simple ceremony formed the centrepiece of a saga that began in 1939 and lasted until 1951, when agitation over payment for spare parts was finally resolved. Should Farouk be presented with or permitted to purchase an old or new aircraft and of what type? The political and financial ramifications proved labyrinthine. An Avro Anson was mooted in October 1943, the gift of which was authorized in December; instructions for shipment were given in July 1944.
Park wrote to the Air Ministry on 2 December 1944 to say that the Anson would shortly arrive in Egypt for Farouk. He was a good friend to the RAF, said Park, and took a keen interest in his own air force. It had therefore been suggested that Park make an official presentation of the Anson. The Commanding General of the USAAF in the Middle East had personally presented an American aircraft to the Emperor of Ethiopia in August and a great occasion had been made of it. If the Air Ministry agreed to Park doing the same for Farouk, it would help if he could read out a message from King George or from the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who had recently made a very favourable impression in Cairo.
The Foreign Office, however, was gravely concerned about American reaction to Farouk’s aircraft: presentation might be construed as export, infringing an agreement with Washington and offending senators who might say that Britain could only afford such a gesture because she had so much Lend Lease equipment. The presentation might, perhaps, go ahead, but there could be no message from the King or the Foreign Secretary. On 5 December a Foreign Office official minuted: ‘The civil air war with the USA is now virtually on’; it was suggested that while Britain worried about not offending the Americans, they would step in and give Farouk one of their own aircraft. Two days later, a brilliant solution was advanced: why not put the aircraft at Farouk’s disposal ‘until the time when we can present him with a better one’? No gift would have been made. Killearn was advised that he might present the Anson on the RAF’s behalf, but without publicity, because another Anson was meanwhile being sold to the Regent of Iraq.
Park wrote to the Air Ministry again on the 10th. They were aware no doubt that a similar Anson, intended for the Regent of Iraq, was arriving in Cairo about the same time as Farouk’s but that that aircraft was being purchased by Iraq. In view of the gift of an aircraft by the Americans to the Emperor of Ethiopia and the British gift to Farouk, would it not be wise, even at this late hour, to waive the cost of the Regent’s aircraft and make a ceremonial presentation to him? He pointed out that the Regent was bound to learn that Farouk was getting an Anson free while his had cost £10,000.
Much Foreign Office debate ensued on a new tack: that Egypt wished to buy a second Anson for the use of court officials. After prolonged discussion, it was agreed that this might be permitted. Moreover, it could be put about that Egypt was buying an Anson and therefore the Iraqis need not be upset. Unless, of course, they could count to two. On 7 February 1945, his last day in command of Middle East, Park visited the REAF and marked the occasion by presenting (at Killearn’s request) an Anson to Farouk ‘as a birthday gift’. Foreign Office officials, having decided that news of the ceremony could not be entirely censored, passed anxious days and nights until it became clear that the Americans had not noticed it. A short paragraph had appeared in The Times on the 8th, but not in a prominent position and mercifully there had been no photograph.
Major-General Ben F. Giles (Commanding General USAAF, Middle East) wrote to Park on 5 February to express his appreciation of Park’s ‘untiring efforts to get things done in the most efficient and friendly manner possible.’ Giles recommended Park for the award of the U.S. Distinguished Service Medal, but instead he received the Legion of Merit in the degree of Commander. His ‘willing cooperation’, in the words of the citation, had helped the Americans to acquire land for airfield construction. He had readily handed over technical installations, provided supplies and materials and agreed to the removal of RAF units to facilitate American operational control of airfields. Park’s liking for Americans and their methods, his experience in managing enormous air forces scattered about many countries (not all of them able or willing to espouse the Allied cause enthusiatically) and, by no means least, his gifts as an operational commander fitted him well for his next, last and greatest service appointment: Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia.8