I am delighted to be invited to write the Introduction to this new edition of Vincent Orange’s biography of Sir Keith Park. Here was a man and a pilot whose career has repeatedly intertwined with many of the aspects of British military aviation history towards which my own interests have led me to research.
Following his early war service with the Artillery, both New Zealand and British, he followed the route of numerous servicemen, wounded or too sick to continue to serve on the ground, but who discovered during those early days of aerial warfare that they were still acceptable to the fledgling air forces. His service was without doubt both meritorious and gallant, and he ended the war amongst the 80 pilots of the British Empire air forces considered to have amassed the greatest totals of successes against hostile aircraft.
Here unfortunately, on behalf of the ‘purists’ I have to depart a little from the author on matters of detail. Recent research undertaken by my colleague Norman Franks and myself indicate firstly that Vincent Orange appears on occasion to have missed the fact that the RFC/RAF Communiques recorded events from 4 o’clock in the afternoon of one day until the same hour on the next; this led to activities occurring during the early evening of the preceding day frequendy being depicted as occurring a day later. This seems to have led him to the conclusion that Captain Park and his gunner were responsible for shooting down the German ‘ace’ and commander of Jasta 28, Hauptmann Otto Hartmann on 3 September 1917. In fact Park had made two claims on the previous day, but did not on the 3rd, so it is likely that Hartmann fell to Lts R.E.Dodds and T.C.S. Tuffield, also of 48 Squadron.
Further, Park’s combat reports indicated that between 12 August and 14 September 1917 he made 15 claims to add to his first, recorded in July. Subsequently he was to claim four more – not three. This total of 20 appears to have been made up of five destroyed plus 15 ‘out of control’ – one of the latter shared with another pilot.
Nonetheless, the book adequately reflects Park’s outstanding leadership qualities, and the respect in which he was held by those who served with, or under him.
The interwar years, initially plagued by problems in resolving a clear medical category, subsequently brought remarkably rapid promotion during a period of economic stringency, and to have become Group Captain by 1929 was no small achievement. It certainly offered promise of a career reaching the highest levels.
Whilst undertaking a range of duties as did most career officers at that time, his command of 111 Squadron marked him very much as a ‘fighter man’. His appointment to command Tangmere, one of the premier fighter airfields, in 1936 cemented this further into place. Consequendy his posting to Fighter Command as a newly-promoted Air Commodore and Senior Air Staff Officer, although not the move intended for him, proved in practice to be a wholly logical progression.
His relationship with his AOC, Sir Hugh Dowding, and his elevation to command 11 Group just in time for the start of the real air war, are well documented herein, and require little expansion by me. Park’s brilliant conduct of the defensive batde is now generally agreed to have been correct in the circumstances which events dictated and with the resources available to him and the author highlights this part of his career magnificently.
Subsequently there has been much controversy at the manner in which he and Dowding were replaced in their roles at the end of 1940, apparently without due immediate recognition and reward. There are however certain factors to be considered here which upon mature reflection may ameliorate these understandable and rather emotional reactions. Firstly, Dowding had already passed his age for retirement, and had been retained specifically to see the crisis through. Indeed, he had been in command for more than four years – a far longer period than any of his successors were to enjoy – two to two and a half years were the normal span for any such position of command in the RAF.
Whilst Park had been with 11 Group less than a year, his time with Fighter Command had already lasted such a normal span. Further, he had indeed just been through a period of massive stress, and was known from his past record not to be a man of the most robust health. The situation was also changing, and the need for a different style of leadership as the Command moved from mainly defensive to increasingly offensive tactics, may well have intruded – particularly when pressed at high level by self-publicists well able to play the political card, such as Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory undoubtedly were.
Park’s skills had however, been appreciated by others, and his example was to be put to telling effect in a totally different environment. I well recall a conversation with the veteran Finnish fighter leader, Colonel Gustav Erik Magnusson, who recounted that during 1940, after the conclusion of his country’s ‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union., he had visited England to study the defensive techniques employed by 11 Group. These he was to adopt in the defence of the Karelian Isthmus in early summer 1944, when the Soviets attacked in overwhelming strength. He too found them to be appropriate, and his pilots were enabled to achieve some outstanding successes.
After his spell with Training Command, and the renewal of his experience in organising the air defence of Egypt., his arrival on Malta in July 1942 was again timely. Many of the fighter pilots there were not particularly enamoured of their then AOC, a bomber man who had been sent to the island in 1941 to develop its offensive capability. Park was then to see the island through the period of its most successful defence, employing his specific skills. That he stayed on for another year during which the Sicily offensive was launched, proved fortuitous in providing him with valuable experience of attacking operations which would increasingly become the role of the RAF during the years ahead.
His promotion to Air Marshal and AOC-in-C, Middle East, seem hardly to have been a denigration of his skills., despite Slessor’s concerns regarding his lack of political acumen., whilst his final appointment as Air-in-C, South East Asia Command, looks to have been a fitting recognition of a very able tactical commander. That considerable efforts were necessary to ensure that his acting rank as Air Chief Marshal be confirmed before retirement, were perhaps no more than any other officers have experienced when faced with the legendary parsimony of the British establishment – usually it must be said., at the behest of the Treasury.
So was Keith Park justified in feeling slighted, as he obviously did, that no further position was offered to him and that he was required to retire at the end of 1946? Was he denied honours that he might fairly have anticipated receiving?
To answer the first of these questions, it is appropriate to consider the normal policy for the retirement of officers of Air Rank. For the majority, certainly in the 1940s, 50 was the age at which they went. Very few have ever gone beyond 55. In 1946 Park was 54; unless his services were to be extended, there was no time remaining for him to undertake a further full appointment.
What then had happened to his contemporaries, which might give guidance to the answers to either question? Aside from Sholto Douglas, who had been a unit commander on the Western Front as early as 1916, at least nine fighter pilots of note during the First War were to become officers of Air Rank. Perhaps the most directly comparable was Air Vice-Marshal Sir Christopher Quintin-Brand, KBE, who in 1940 commanded 10 Group, providing the back-up to Park’s 11 Group in the South-West. Born a year later than Park, Sir Christopher retired in 1943, aged 50.
Park’s fellow New Zealander, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, KCB, KBE, born three years after Park, commanded the Western Desert Air Force and the 2nd Tactical Air Force in North-West Europe, both with great distinction. He was required to retire in 1947 at the conclusion of 30 years’ service. Air Marshal Sir James Robb, KBE, GCB, born like Coningham in 1895, commanded Fighter Command after the end of the war, and retired in 1951 – he managed two more years of service, but did not make Air Chief Marshal.
The great Canadian pilot. Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw, who commanded the air force in the Western Desert during the opening years of the war, retired in 1943, aged 50. Stanley Vincent, who served with Park in SEAC, already an Air Vice-Marshal in 1945, retired in that rank after being AOC, 11 Group, in 1950, aged 53. And so on.
Only one, Sir Arthur ‘Bert’ Harris, GCB, OBE, reached the exalted rank of Marshal of the RAF, and that after his role as AOC, Bomber Command – possibly the most important post in the air force during the war.
By 1946 the war years had brought forward many brilliant young leaders such as Basil Embry, Harry Broadhurst, Tom Pike, Fred Rosier and Dermot Boyle, for whom a path to the top was vital. On the balance of the evidence, it does not appear that Keith Park was under promoted, under rewarded or pensioned off early.
Could he have done better? Certainly Park does not seem to have been either politically aware or a notable self-publicist. His health had on occasion let him down, and he was frequendy considered to be "difficult". What he did achieve needs to be considered against that background. He does not appear to have manoeuvred or intrigued for personal advancement, which may perhaps have held him back a little, the world being what it is – but he was probably the better man for that! In conclusion, I’d like to say that I enjoyed revisiting this book immensely and I commend it to the reader.
Christopher Shores
Sherborne, Dorset, February 2001