Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World

TERRORISM IS A dynamic, mutable phenomenon. It adapts to changes in the abilities and limitations of terrorist organizations, as well as to changes in their interests and motivations and those of their patrons and benefactors. A terrorist organization is a learning organization.¹ In order to survive, on the one hand, and realize its goals, on the other, it must “study” both itself and its enemy country. In looking inward at itself and its community of origin, the terrorist organization must recognize its advantages and disadvantages, identify the obstacles confronting it, and set short- and long-term goals. It must be very familiar with the community of origin that it purports to represent, and able to accurately identify that community’s aspirations, needs, and expectations from it. In examining its rival, the terrorist organization must identify the enemy country’s characteristics, strengths, and, primarily, its weaknesses, which can be exploited.

The learning process leads terrorist organizations to change their characteristics and tactics over time; this, in turn, has affected trends in terrorism. Specifically, modern terrorist organizations have adapted their methods and strategies to a liberal democratic enemy: they have learned to exploit the latter’s institutions, values, and inhibitions, and to manipulate its ethos to gain legitimacy. In so doing, they have striven to create a global environment that is hostile to countries that must cope with terrorism, turning liberal democracy and international humanitarian law into a double-edged sword pointed at the heart of Western democracy. This trend is analogous to the evolution of the modern battlefield.

In the mid-twentieth century, warfare strategies began evolving, concomitant with a wave of terrorism. This “modern” terrorism deliberately spread fear and anxiety among the population of enemy states, with the intention of reducing those states’ motivation to continue fighting. To this end, modern terrorism strategy fought its enemies in the media, as well as on traditional military battlefields.

Recently, modern terrorist warfare has evolved even further. States are now fighting a new breed of terrorist organization: the hybrid terrorist organization. Hybrid terrorist organizations typically have at least two parts: a military arm and a political arm. At times, a hybrid terrorist organization may develop a third part, which is charged with winning the hearts and minds of its community of origin by providing social welfare services and free or subsidized religious and education services. In Islamic rhetoric, such activities are known as “da’wa.”³ When a state is combating a hybrid terrorist organization, it must fight not only on the military battlefield, and not just in the media, but also by challenging the organization’s legitimacy and calling its “charitable deeds” into question, sometimes in national courts and at international tribunals.

In other words, this new breed of warfare is multidimensional. It requires states to fight simultaneously in three arenas: the military arena, the psychological arena (e.g., through the media), and the legal arena. In multidimensional warfare, the military fights on the battlefield, the foreign office or ministry of foreign affairs wages a battle of public diplomacy in the media, and legal experts defend the state’s legitimacy in court. Today, a state can find itself facing a paradox, whereby it has won the military battle but lost the media war, or won the military battle and the media war, but lost its legitimacy in court. States confronting terrorist warfare must neutralize the terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks; remove the terrorists’ motivation to attack; and refute the terrorists’ legitimacy while maintaining their own and defending their right to fight the terrorists. Yet, given the chimerical nature of the hybrid terrorist organization, one of the most prevalent problems facing states engaged in asymmetric warfare against them is an inability to fully grasp the nature and challenges of this new type of war. To win a multidimensional war in the twenty-first century, a state must be able to coordinate and win in all three arenas, and do so simultaneously.

Further complicating modern terrorist warfare is that it is fought by rivals of unequal strength: specifically, by liberal democratic states and terrorist organizations. This has come to be known as asymmetric warfare.⁴ States have access to a military, to intelligence, and to security and police agencies; they can raise substantial funds for and dedicate considerable resources to fighting the enemy, and their direct firepower cannot be matched by any terrorist organization, no matter how sophisticated and well equipped. In contrast, terrorist organizations have more-limited resources and fewer arms; some use improvised or standard explosives to confront a state’s artillery, or shoulder-mounted anti-tank or anti-aircraft platforms to fight the enemy’s drones and fighter jets. On the face of it, this asymmetry is reminiscent of the biblical tale of David and Goliath—a further challenge to the legitimacy of a powerful state fighting a weaker, terrorist organization.⁵

In reality, it would be more accurate to describe the struggle of a democratic state against a terrorist organization as one of reverse asymmetry, in which Goliath is chained and bound by liberal democratic values, a commitment to civil liberties, and national and international laws that preclude the use of effective action against terrorism while permitting the use of only a fraction of the state’s military, intelligence, and operational capabilities. In the scenario of modern multidimensional and asymmetric warfare, Goliath is confronted by a David gone berserk, unbound by any prohibition, a David who accepts no norm, convention, international law, or restriction, and who makes deliberate, cynical use of those prohibitions and restrictions. By using civilians as human shields, by fighting from behind or within protected facilities such as places of worship, schools, hospitals, refugee camps, and aid facilities, the terrorist organization perverts the liberal democratic state’s self-imposed restrictions. It thereby maximizes the effect of its violent activities, catches its adversary by surprise, and pushes it to unwittingly, unjustifiably contravene the norms and values to which it is (also) bound by international humanitarian law.

It is thus crucial to develop a much more sophisticated term to describe the current phenomenon of terrorist warfare, one that will subsume and more accurately describe the complexity of such warfare. The term “multidimensional warfare” indicates that modern terrorism has many facets, as described above, which come into play through various modi operandi used against a variety of targets, in multiple arenas, at varying levels of intensity, and causing anywhere from a few to tens of thousands of casualties. Moreover, like terrorism itself, multidimensional warfare is dynamic. The same perpetrator or organization may use differing levels of force, or different modi operandi, at different times. Or the same organization may attack both civilian and military targets, simultaneously or alternately.

To best illustrate the insidious threat now posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, which are engaging liberal democratic countries in the West and elsewhere in multidimensional, reverse-asymmetric warfare, it is first necessary to define and discuss the characteristics of terrorism and of (liberal) democracy.

To fully comprehend the significance of the threats and challenges that liberal democracies face when confronting modern terrorism, one must define terrorism and distinguish it from other forms of political violence; only then can one identify and discern the symptoms of this global menace and formulate an effective solution to it.

Fundamentally, modern terrorism is generally viewed as a strategy for political action that utilizes violence against civilians. Beyond this, however, no two definitions are alike; each highlights one or another attribute of modern terrorism, in an attempt to distinguish it from other forms of (political) violence. For example, some definitions emphasize the randomness ⁷ of terrorism, while others point out that terrorism aims to instill fear in its target population.⁸ Still others note that terrorism’s target population usually encompasses more than just its actual victims.⁹

This begs the question, Is it possible to arrive at a focused, agreed-upon international definition of terrorism that is not merely descriptive but sets normative benchmarks for distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political violence as an illegitimate modus operandi? Most scholars, decision makers, and legal experts would answer in the negative. In fact, at present there is no agreed-upon international definition of this subjective, emotionally loaded phenomenon, nor does it seem likely that one will soon be reached. Instead, existing definitions of terrorism reflect the particular interests and values of the definer, such that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” In other words, anyone who wields political violence against me is a terrorist—but if he uses it against my enemies, he is a freedom fighter.

Defining terrorism is further complicated by the argument, made by some, that the very search for a definition is pointless, since no definition of such a biased and subjective term as “terrorism” will be accepted. Furthermore, proponents of this argument claim that one should not waste time trying to define terrorism when it is possible to outlaw terrorist tactics. In addition, they claim that terrorists commit violent crimes—such as kidnapping, arson, extortion, and murder—and so are no different from other criminals. In their eyes, the existing corpus of criminal law, and law enforcement agencies, provides a sufficient legal and normative platform to hold terrorists accountable. United Nations Security Council resolutions have reflected this trend by issuing a patchwork of prohibitions against actions taken by terrorists—among them aircraft hijacking, suicide bombing, the use of explosive charges, and the use of unconventional methods—without ever defining the phenomenon of global terrorism as a whole.¹⁰

In the midst of the Cold War, when the modern, liberal democratic West found itself time and again supporting the struggles of subjugated peoples and national groups to liberate themselves from the yoke of a foreign power and exercise their right to self-determination, many terrorist organizations elected to present themselves as freedom fighters. Alleging that they were attempting to exercise the national rights they had been denied, these self-proclaimed “freedom fighters” used violence to reach legitimate goals, and hence rejected the label of “terrorists.” Surprisingly, the Western world accepted this misguided assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two points along the continuum of political violence. The struggle for “national liberation” was deemed the “positive,” justified point on the continuum, while “terrorism” was seen as the negative, despicable point on the continuum. According to this approach, an organization could not be both a terrorist organization and a movement for national liberation; neither could a person be both a terrorist and a freedom fighter. As Senator Henry Jackson stated, “The thought that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter is unacceptable. Freedom-fighters or revolutionaries do not blow up buses with noncombatants; terrorists and murderers do. Freedom-fighters do not kidnap and slaughter students, terrorists and murderers do.” ¹¹

Of course, the claim that a freedom fighter cannot commit acts of terrorism or murder is baseless. Many freedom fighters in modern history have committed crimes and intentionally harmed innocent civilians. Proof of this is offered by the history of Jewish underground movements on the eve of Israeli independence. The Haganah, which comprised the overwhelming majority of organized Jewish fighting forces, did in fact focus its attacks against British military installations and soldiers in the Mandate of Palestine, and eschewed targeting Palestinian civilians. However, the substantially smaller National Military Organization in the Land of Israel (aka “Etzel” or the “Irgun”) and, especially, the tiny Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (aka “Lehi” or the “Stern Gang”), did not flinch from incorporating punitive, deterrent attacks against the Palestinian civilian population. Paradoxically, they called themselves “Israel’s freedom-fighters.” The widely accepted claim that the terms “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” are contradictory plays into the hands of just such terrorist groups, which argue that because they strive to undermine what they perceive as a foreign occupier, they cannot be considered terrorists. However, the difference between terrorism and freedom fighting is not a subjective one, dependent on the observer’s point of view. In fact, they differ in their very essence: “freedom fighting” refers to the goal of the violence (freedom), while “terrorism” refers to the means being employed to achieve that goal. Neither freedom nor any other legitimate political goal can justify the use of terrorism.¹²

Therefore, the proposed working definition of “terrorism” is that it is a type of political violence in which a non-state actor makes deliberate use of violence against civilians to achieve political (national, socioeconomic, ideological, or religious) ends.¹³ The intrinsic nature of modern terrorism as a violent political act is what makes it far more dangerous than simple criminal activity. Terrorists motivated by political goals pose a greater threat to the social order and solidarity of the target state than do criminal offenders. Moreover, the modern terrorist challenges international humanitarian norms and laws, thereby making terrorism a serious threat to world peace. That terrorists are sometimes motivated by an altruistic ideology, and not by earthly desires, only emboldens them to risk or even sacrifice their lives, making them more dangerous than other criminals.¹⁴

However, the political goals of terrorism are not the sole reason it poses a grave danger. Added to them is modern terrorism’s operational imperative to intentionally—and randomly—harm the civilian population. Specifically, the planners and perpetrators of an attack usually take little notice of the individual identity of the victim(s), although they may be very particular as to the victims’ collective identity: that is, members of the enemy population, as defined by religion, nationality, class, or an opposing ideology or worldview.

The intentional targeting of civilians not only helps to define modern terrorism, but also distinguishes it from other types of political violence, such as guerrilla warfare. As noted above, terrorism is the intentional targeting of civilians to achieve political ends, while guerrilla warfare is the targeting of military forces, sometimes to further the very same ends. This distinction assumes the normative principle embodied in international humanitarian law, which prohibits the targeting of civilians but permits the targeting of enemy military forces and installations during wartime (with certain restrictions and under certain conditions). However, adopting this distinction exacts a price: in principle, it acknowledges the legitimacy of the use of force by non-state actors, under certain conditions, to further their political goals. But what if that price is insufferable for nations facing violent attacks from non-state actors?

It is an instinctual tendency of countries to group all politically violent phenomena together and assign to them the harshest definition of terrorism. It is therefore little wonder that governments expend considerable effort broadening the definition of terrorism to include actions that expressly target military forces. The U.S. State Department, for example, adopted a definition contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d), whereby terrorism “means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”¹⁵ This definition includes as victims of terrorism military personnel not on the battlefield or battle ready at the time of attack, a broad definition of terrorism that cannot provide a common denominator for international agreement. Only narrowing the definition so as to limit terrorism to the targeting of civilians will establish a clear and unimpeachable moral benchmark.

The definition proposed herein makes a moral distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This distinction is not only practical; it is ethical. Indeed, practicality and morality are intertwined in the proposed definition. Being ethically based, the definition highlights the moral dilemma posed—and experienced—by many terrorist organizations.¹⁶ By making a distinction between political violence perpetrated against civilians and political violence perpetrated against military personnel, the proposed definition rules out terrorist organizations’ present modus operandi, but provides them with an alternate means of achieving their political goals. Without expecting them to relinquish violence altogether, the proposed definition gives terrorists berth to wield violence in a normative and, under certain circumstances, effective manner.

Of course, it is difficult for a non-state actor to target military personnel, struggling as it does against an exponentially larger military force. The intentional targeting of civilians—terrorism—is not only more expedient for the terrorist organization, it is also more effective, as it generates fear and media attention, and clearly sends the terrorist organization’s message to its various target audiences. Given the common international perception that all forms of low-intensity conflict are equally normative and should be punished similarly, why would a terrorist organization voluntarily avoid a modus operandi that is relatively easy to execute and very effective? However, if the proposed definition is adopted by the majority of the world’s nations, that definition may then be used to formalize a system of international laws and conventions prohibiting all forms of terrorism, and to efficiently enforce that system against perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters. Furthermore, if enforcement targets terrorist organizations regardless of their end goals, but not organizations or groups that limit their actions to guerrilla warfare, the cost-benefit balance of political violence may change.

The proposed definition can thus be used both as a “stick” with which to threaten terrorist organizations and the countries that support them and as a “carrot” to be awarded to organizations that elect to avoid terrorism. For example, an organization that relinquishes terrorism, refraining from deliberate attacks against civilians (even if it continues its armed struggle by attacking military targets) and accepting the basic precepts of international humanitarian law, may still be regarded as a hostile enemy by the state it opposes, while enjoying legitimacy in other international forums. Such an organization’s activities in a third country will not be outlawed, its members will not be hunted down, and if it forms a political wing, its actions in the international political arena will be considered lawful. Its members will be permitted to raise funds, openly present their opinions, and even recruit new members. Any of its members who are captured by an enemy state will enjoy the status of combatants and not that of terrorists, and will be subject to an appropriate penal system. Using an agreed-upon definition of terrorism in this way would be a major achievement for the international community in its struggle against terrorism, and might significantly reduce the global scale of this phenomenon, if not eradicate it entirely.

Yet many in the world’s security establishments, and many politicians in Western and other states, hesitate to adopt a clear, agreed-upon definition of terrorism that is based on a description of terrorism as the deliberate targeting of civilians, lest their own country’s actions during wartime—in which civilians are put in harm’s way—be defined as terrorism. Their fear is revealed in seemingly moralistic statements, like that of John Horgan: “We must also face some uncomfortable facts that have become obvious since the events of 11 September…. States and governments have been responsible for equally and often far more reprehensible acts of violence on scales unreachable by conventional terrorist organizations…. We choose both to derogate and label as terrorism violence that appears to bubble up from ‘below,’ rather than [being] imposed from ‘above.’”¹⁷

In response to the question of state culpability for terrorism, it can be said that states are not necessarily more moral than non-state entities; in some cases, they are even less moral. However, one need not apply the term “terrorism” to the illegitimate actions of states in time of war: regardless of whether the proposed definition is adopted, international law already prohibits the deliberate targeting of civilians by a state or its proxies, which in wartime is defined as a war crime. The purpose of defining terrorism is to apply to sub-national entities the same norms that now obligate sovereign states, thereby setting boundaries for the permissible and impermissible use of violence. Defining terrorism will not change the requirements for normative behavior by states, nor will it add to their obligations under existing international conventions. But it will subject (terrorist) organizations to the same moral standards that are binding on states, and that determine the normative rules of engagement during wartime. The proposed definition will therefore do the following:

Can international agreement be reached on a definition of terrorism like the one proposed here? Such a task may seem daunting, but it is not necessarily insurmountable. It is true that even after 9/11, when there was unprecedented unanimous world recognition of the threat posed by international terrorism, the member states of the United Nations failed to agree on a definition. However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of October 2004 marks considerable progress toward this end. This unanimously adopted resolution requires all countries to extradite, deny asylum to, and try any person who lends support to or harbors terrorists or who initiates, takes part in, funds, organizes, or prepares acts of terrorism. Resolution 1566 also calls for the establishment of an international fund for the compensation of terrorism victims, comprising monies confiscated by governments from terrorist organizations and their supporters. Above all, the resolution lays the conceptual bricks for building an effective international coalition to combat terrorism, by emphasizing the grievous threat of international terrorism to world peace and security, and determining that terrorism constitutes a crime against civilians that cannot be justified by philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other considerations.¹⁸

In direct continuation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1296 of 1999,¹⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 determines that terrorism can never be considered a legitimate modus operandi, even when its motives are considered justifiable. This important disconnection of (illegitimate) terrorism from its (legitimate) goals is also essential to the definition proposed in this chapter. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 therefore exposes the hypocrisy of terrorist organizations and their proponents, who claim to wear the mantle of freedom fighters.

Moreover, it is important to note that Resolution 1566 was adopted unanimously. Turkey’s statement, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), that the OIC’s member countries support the resolution and accept its content was especially encouraging, and goes against the grain of all resolutions formalized at previous Arab and Muslim summits. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 was therefore an important step in the right direction toward waging an international campaign against terrorism. However, additional effort is needed to translate the moral scale set in the resolution into an objective, precise, and unanimously accepted definition of terrorism.

Russia, the initiator of the resolution, should be applauded for understanding the great importance of denying terrorist attacks’ legitimacy, regardless of their motive. However, it seems that the Realpolitik of international relations is still stronger than any morality: During a visit to Israel immediately following the Chechen terrorist attack in Beslan, the Russian foreign minister claimed that there should be a distinction between Chechen terrorism in Russia and Palestinian terrorism in Israel.²⁰ Contrary to the resolution that his government had initiated, the Russian foreign minister’s declaration hinted that the purpose behind terrorist attacks does play a part in determining our moral judgment and definition of terrorism. What the Russian foreign minister sees as Chechen terrorism, others define as acts aimed at the national liberation of the Chechen people; yet what others see as Palestinian terrorism, the Russian foreign minister seems to believe is worthy of being labeled a struggle for national liberation. It thus seems that the simple but essential imperative of defining terrorism by divorcing tactics from goals has yet to be assimilated into the minds of the world’s decision makers.²¹

Nevertheless, it is possible to cite the fundamental principles of liberal democratic governance. Taken together, these constitute a minimalistic definition of the essential ingredients of democracy. In 1863, during the Civil War in the United States, President Abraham Lincoln defined the heart of the liberal democratic idea at Gettysburg when he called democracy the rule “of the people, by the people and for the people.”²² This abstract core value is meant to be expressed through the procedures essential to the formal existence of a democratic regime: periodic elections, separation of powers, the right to vote and engage in the political process.

Robert Dahl outlines five criteria that should exist for a state to be considered a democracy: “effective participation; equality in voting; gaining enlightened understanding; exercising financial control over the agenda; and inclusion of all adults.”²³ However, procedures alone are insufficient if the fundamental liberal values of democracy—human rights and civil liberties, equality under the law and before the state—are not granted to each and every individual, regardless of religion, ethnic affiliation, gender, origin, or socioeconomic status.

Modern terrorism sees the liberal democratic state, in all its variations, as the perfect launching pad and a target for its attacks. Moreover, some terrorist organizations—particularly Islamist-jihadist organizations—have chosen to cynically exploit democratic values and institutions to gain power and status, promote their interests, and achieve internal and international legitimacy. Yet jihadist terrorists and their ideologues remain ambivalent toward liberal democracy. On the one hand, jihadist militants do not hesitate to exploit Western democracy to their ends. On the other hand, they oppose all democracy in their discourse. It is thus particularly interesting to examine the jihadist ideological attitude toward Western democracy, as it is reflected in written, oral, and videotaped comments.²⁴ As a spiritual leader of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda—Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (aka Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi)—wrote in his book, Democracy: A Religion: “By legislating man-made laws rather than divine ones, they challenge the sovereignty of the Deity. This of course is shirq [polytheism] and is the most severe of the sins that one can commit against Allah. Because these legislators disbelieve in Allah and His divine law, it is the duty of every Muslim to fight them through jihad.”²⁵

Al-Maqdisi explains that democracy is a “political philosophy that draws adherents to it, much like socialism and communism. In this way it competes with true religions such as Islam. In fact, democracy is greater than the cogs that put it to work, for if the people would demand of their representatives to inject the law with a more Islamic flavor, they would be told it contradicts democracy.”²⁶

In pitting Muslim spiritual leadership against democracy, al-Maqdisi determines the following: “The difference between democracy and shura [consensus] is that democracy is based on the rule of the majority, whereas shura is based on Allah’s given law. Democracy came from atheistic Europe where church was separated from state; after socialism, it is now the turn of democracy to seduce the Muslims and to divert them from the true path—the path of the shari’a.”²⁷

Nasir Abd al-Karim al-Wahishi (aka Abu Basir), the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), touted similar sentiments in an interview with Al Jazeera in 2009: “We do not recognize the democratic regime, which [involves holding] elections. We do not oppose holding elections or the principle of elections per se, as Islam accepts these.” Al-Wahishi elucidated:

Democracy is a new religion that America has … imposed on the Muslims … so as to tear the Muslim Nation to shreds and arouse rancor and hostility [among Muslims]…. Moreover, it is a premeditated deceit to void young Muslims of their abilities. Instead of educating and preparing [young Muslims] to defend their homes and all that is sacred to Islam against the external enemy, and to assist [one another], victory is won by placing virtual ballots in sham electoral boxes … the ultimate result is rule according to Allah’s commandments [but] oppression of the public in the name of the majority, and false claims about the rights [granted by] democracy.²⁸

In this context, Middle East expert Bernard Lewis has noted that equality is a fundamental principle of Islam, according to which all “believers in the truth” are equal—with the exception of slaves, infidels, and women (three “lesser” populations). In Islam, freedom is perceived not as a political concept but rather as a legal construct: a person is free if he is not a slave. The word “freedom” is not used in the Arab world as a metaphor for good government, as it is in the Western world.²⁹

An Iraqi jihadist affiliate of al-Qaeda—Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna, which was established in 2003 by former members of the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Islam—announced in 2008: “Democracy is a call to heresy, since it would raise man to God’s level. It has nothing in common with Islamic shura, neither in meaning nor in makeup … the ‘laws’ formulated by man in Muslim lands are laws of heresy, legislated by regimes [that see themselves as] partners of Allah. Those who ratify or obey these laws are infidels.”³⁰

Similarly, in an article in the March 2009 edition of the jihadist magazine Sada al-Jihad (The Echo of Jihad) titled “The Spread of Democracy Is a Victory for America and Israel,” Abu Tah Abdullah al-Miqdad claims:

The Americans and Jews are proud of this democracy, with which they are satisfied, instead of [with] the laws that they should be implementing. They grant equal voting and candidacy rights [in contravention of] the Bible and New Testament, which glorify their rituals … after extensive study of these American agents, I have discovered that they are proud to be democratic, and shake off affiliation to Islam, and fight against the imperative to implement Islamic law.

Citing the “dangers of democracy,” al-Miqdad adds that democracies cast aspersions on monotheism, and trade the religion of Allah for “three authorities” (the Trinity). According to al-Miqdad, democracy is divisive and fans the flames of hatred. The article concludes with this sentence: “The spread of democracy in our quarters is a victory for the Jews and Christians, who waste money and spill blood to propagate it.”

Issue no. 9 of AQAP’s monthly Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battle) included an appendix, a book by Sheikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Qadir al-Murshidi of Yemen, first published in 2009, titled Exposing the Suspect Aspects of Democracy and Destroying the Tyrant of Yemen. In it, al-Murshidi claims that democratic elections for parliament or local authorities utterly contradict monotheism (tawheed), because such elections elevate the individual to divine status—an act of heresy. The only permissible elections are those held in accordance with Islamic law. Al-Murshidi insists that the man-made laws of democracy are not Islamic but “jahilic”—that is, pre-Islamic and therefore ignorant. He implies that in a democracy, it is not God who makes the laws but the people, through their representatives in parliament; this makes man akin to “a partner of God” and as such, an infidel. Democratic laws are made in the name of the people, rather than in the name of God. The people thus take God’s place, and man becomes “God incarnate.” Al-Murshidi explains that “democracy” is a foreign word with no equivalent in Arabic, which instead uses “shura” to refer to the rule of God. Shura councils comprise religious scholars, but democracies rule according to the will of all people, who can influence (government) decisions whether they are believers or infidels, ignoramuses or learned men. It is impossible, then, to compare “shura” to “democracy,” God’s commandments to a tyrant’s rule, God’s religion to this pointless new religion. Al-Murshidi sees democracy as a complementary component of the “trinity” secularism-nationalism-democracy—the source of all trouble in the world. He explains that democracy is the religion of America and other democratic regimes; democracy facilitates American interference in (other countries’) internal affairs. Democracy separates religion from state and gives people license to do as they please—including to denigrate religion. Democracy does not lead to majority rule as it purports to, but rather imposes the absurdity of minority rule on the majority. Democracy and elections are presented as a substitute for God-endowed jihad, yet it is democracy’s supporters who fight mightily against violence and jihad. Al-Murshidi claims that wherever real democratic elections may be held, Islamists will win unless the regime interferes, because there has been an Islamic awakening and people know that existing regimes are corrupt and want to efface all signs of Islam.

Global jihad leader Abu Musab al-Suri also attacks democracy, in his treatise “The Global Islamic Resistance Call” (“Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah”). Al-Suri believes that capitalist economics, a permissive, secular philosophy, and the democratic political system are on an unavoidable collision course with Muslim culture. Nevertheless, al-Suri recognizes that while Islamists oppose democracy, they will use it to achieve their ends. Hollow democracy, writes al-Suri, as imported by the United States to Muslim lands, facilitates the establishment of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and associations that educate the public; this leaves the mosques and other religious centers with an important role to play. Further, al-Suri explains that “phony democracy” allows for the dissemination of texts and the holding of demonstrations that promote popular resistance (to the idea of democracy).

The American plan to “democratize” the Muslim world, which gained speed during the presidency of George Bush, Jr., was designed in part to counteract radicalization processes in Arab and Islamic states.³¹ Indeed, President Bush explained in 2003 that “the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder.”³² However, the demand for greater democracy—rather than greater pragmatism or liberalism—in Muslim and Arab countries, coupled with an emphasis on the procedural aspects of democracy at the expense of liberal democratic values, has played into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Similarly, the pressure exerted in the 1970s by the U.S. administration on the Shah of Iran to enact liberal democratic reforms played a decisive role in the Shah’s overthrow and Khomeini’s rise.³³ Similarly, the pressure exerted by the Bush government on Arab regimes to enact liberal democratic reforms—later manifested as a tailwind from the Obama administration to the revolutionaries in “Arab Spring” countries—paved the way for radical Islamists, who are exploiting democracy to topple traditional leaders, most of whom were pro-Western and pro-American, and establish one or another version of Islamic theocratic republic in their stead.

The process of exporting democracy to populations that have not had the necessary education in liberal democratic values may therefore prove to be dangerous. Free democratic elections are meant to occur at the end, not at the beginning, of what should be an evolutionary—not a revolutionary—process.³⁴ Any attempt to accelerate this process by artificial means, as the Carter Doctrine tried to do in the late 1970s in Iran, or as the United States intended by promoting elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2006, can be counter-productive, resulting in severe danger, regionally and internationally. As is now evident, when Islamist movements have made a strong showing in elections in the Middle East, the result is a “backlash against democracy promotion.”³⁵

This chapter has examined the evolution of the modern battlefield, discussed the importance of reaching a consensual definition of terrorism, and highlighted the ambivalence of jihadists toward democracy. Chapter 2 will analyze the strategies used by modern terrorists and the challenges they pose to liberal democratic countries.