AS WAS DESCRIBED in
chapter 4, states may be involved in terrorism in various ways. Terrorist attacks conducted by an organization that is a proxy for a state may express that state’s desire to wreak revenge, deter, intervene in the internal affairs of an enemy or rival state, generate or intensify ethnic, religious, and political disputes, or foment revolution. In the last case, terrorist attacks are only one part of a synergic compendium of activity that also includes efforts to win hearts and minds, radicalizing segments of the enemy population and turning them against their own government.
In general, terrorist organizations can be classified into two types: “skeleton organizations” and “popular organizations.”
1 Skeleton organizations are usually small structures with some kind of chain of command, comprising anywhere from fewer than a hundred up to several hundred activists who share a similar worldview, ideology, and political objectives, which they strive to impose or attain through political violence or terrorism. Skeleton organizations do not have broad popular support and, all claims to the contrary, usually do not represent a larger community, nor will the community they purport to represent perceive them as its “mouthpiece.” Conversely, popular terrorist organizations comprise thousands and sometimes even tens of thousands of activists, who are buoyed on waves of support from an extensive community.
2Although not all popular terrorist organizations are hybrids of the type that will be discussed here, most hybrid terrorist organizations are popular organizations. They purport to represent, and sometimes do represent, the political, ideological, or religious interests and aspirations of their community of supporters, and act to constantly preserve and intensify that support. Hybrid terrorist organizations are key actors in modern multidimensional warfare.
The emergence of the hybrid terrorist organization is a phenomenon sorely misunderstood by liberal democratic Western society. Yet understanding it is a prerequisite for understanding, and coping with, modern-day terrorism and terrorist organizations.
WHAT IS A HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION?
A hybrid terrorist organization operates on two levels simultaneously:
1. It is involved in pseudo-legitimate and voluntary activities such as providing charity, welfare, education, and religious services (da’wa, or missionary activities, in the case of Islamist organizations). It can also engage in political activities, either within a municipal framework or through central authorities.
2. It is involved in illegitimate and illegal activities, such as political violence and terrorism. In this framework, the hybrid terrorist organization initiates, plans, prepares, and carries out or assists in carrying out attacks.
The hybrid terrorist organization subsumes two, and sometimes three, components: a militant-terrorist wing, a political wing, and a wing devoted to providing social welfare services. All three wings are directly or indirectly subject to the organization’s leadership and operate according to the policies it delineates.
3The relationship between a hybrid terrorist organization and its community of origin is in fact one of perpetual feedback and response. The terrorist organization operates within the construct of the hopes, expectations, and ethical judicial system of the community it purportedly represents. However, at the same time, it strives to define that community’s ideological perceptions, political goals, and narratives, as well as its values and system of moral justice. This it does through populist work in the fields of education, welfare, and religion. Its ability to shape and secure the space it needs to carry out its terrorist “work” depends upon its gaining the hearts and minds of its constituent community through these social welfare efforts; if it does not, it cannot continue to grow, escalate its activities—or, in extreme cases, continue to exist. A “popular” hybrid terrorist organization that acts in contravention of the aspirations of the public it claims to represent, or that is estranged from its community of origin, may soon find itself perceived as a hostile, dangerous element, and become prey to persecution by both that community and the state or authorities it opposes.
Thus, the interrelationship of the hybrid terrorist organization—a “popular organization,” after all—and the community it purports to represent is one of mutual influence. Just as the hybrid terrorist organization claims to speak for its constituency and shape its beliefs and hopes in its own image, so, too, may it be influenced by the opinion of “its” public. In particular, such an organization’s decision to actively use violence, and the type of violence it chooses to use, may be affected by the attitudes of its constituent community. The community can facilitate an organization’s terrorist attacks—or, by voicing opposition, restrict them.
HOW DOES A HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WIELD INFLUENCE AND GAIN (POLITICAL) PRIMACY?
A hybrid terrorist organization that succeeds in maintaining a balance of influence with its community of origin may be considered a terrorist organization that has reached organizational “maturity.” As noted, it entrenches itself in its constituent community, in part by using
da’
wa (in the context of an Islamist organization) to provide free or heavily subsidized education, welfare, and religious services, by its own welfare institutions or by other institutions, in its name.
4 This process of acquiring the public’s hearts and minds does not just create a comfortable “work environment” for the hybrid terrorist organization; it also enlarges the sector of potential recruits to the organization. The seeds thus planted by indoctrination and the provision of essential services grow into political and electoral achievements, which are then harvested by the organization’s political arm or by a political party that the public identifies with the organization.
Similarly, groups and individuals who have for years been exposed to continuous indoctrination in the terrorist organization’s religious and ideological credo, and incited to hatred and violence, eventually cast their ballot for “the real thing”—that is, for the extreme ideology promoted by the terrorist organization. Da’wa thus prepares the ground for the implantation of the hybrid terrorist organization. As its representatives or supporters win seats in municipal and parliamentary elections, the terrorist organization comes to play an increasing role in government.
Some terrorist organizations engage in this process gradually. At first, their members attempt to become integrated into the community by being elected to professional and academic associations, student unions, and the like. Occasionally, an organization will focus its efforts on the municipal system, participating in local elections. Next, an organization might participate in parliamentary elections. When this tactic succeeds, the organization’s representatives may gain enough political power to become important members of a ruling government coalition.
5 At no time does the hybrid terrorist organization actually merge into the state’s political arena. Thus, its essence as a terrorist organization is preserved, and it can continue to engage in terrorist activity, parallel with its political strivings.
The culture of
shuhada (martyrdom) and incitement to terrorism in the Palestinian arena is one example of how terrorist organizations win their constituents’ hearts and minds. These organizations have for years used
da’
wa to generate sympathy for terrorism in general, and for suicide attacks in particular. They create public support for their activities and their continued growth by plastering posters extolling the acts of suicide terrorists throughout Palestinian villages and cities, by disseminating video clips and photographs of martyrs on social networks and websites, through imams who incite to terrorism at the mosque, through the education system, and through summer camps where children learn how to use weapons and survive “in the field.” Children who have from a young age been raised to identify with the model of the
shahid (martyr), aspire to martyr themselves when they grow up, and thus they constitute a cadre of future recruits and supporters for terrorism. When they reach voting age, these young people—and their parents, who receive financial support and welfare services from the terrorist organization—vote for the representatives of the organization with which they have long identified.
In this way, the hybrid terrorist organization uses democratic electoral processes to establish and strengthen its political power in its community of origin. It then parlays its political status—earned “democratically”—into national and even international legitimacy, capturing lawful posts in government and benefiting from the aura of having participated in the democratic process. The hybrid terrorist organization then cannily translates its political gains into control of state budgets and resources, which it funnels into more indoctrination and social welfare, religious, and other da’wa activities, thereby further increasing its base of support.
Thus, state funds and resources augment those of the organization and help strengthen and deepen its hold on the public. The process described here is cyclical: da’wa generates political power, which fuels more da’wa, which generates even greater political power. This is how hybrid terrorist organizations harness liberal democratic apparatuses in general, and elections in particular, to deepen their roots in their own community, strengthen their power nationally, and gain legitimacy internationally.
Yet this process cannot take place without the involvement and support of the state. In other words, states that provide hybrid terrorist organizations with massive budgets to fund the da’wa activities that will win hearts and minds are essentially states that support terrorism.
Put more bluntly, a state that allows a hybrid terrorist organization to operate within its territory automatically becomes a patron state. The state’s purported opposition to terrorism is belied by its refusal to outlaw the hybrid terrorist organization. Moreover, its turning a blind eye to the organization’s pseudo-legitimate
da’
wa efforts, and to its participation—directly or by proxy—in the political arena, grants the terrorist organization de facto legitimacy. A patron state that takes no legal action to exclude or outlaw a hybrid terrorist organization should therefore be classified as a “state that sponsors terrorism.” Such a state should also be regarded as abetting terrorism, if not providing it with financial support as the prerogative of a political party that participates in democratic elections.
A more insidious process occurs if the hybrid terrorist organization, through democratic elections, succeeds in taking over the state and utilizing its security and intelligence mechanisms, institutions and resources to maintain and intensify its terrorist activities and to initiate and support attacks by other organizations. Such a state may be deemed a “state that perpetrates terrorism.”
CASE STUDY: HEZBOLLAH AND HAMAS AS EXEMPLARS OF THE HYBRID TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
Although many Islamist terrorist organizations state that their goal is to topple an existing regime and replace it with an Islamic caliphate, there are two more-distinct models of hybrid terrorist organization, for years engaged in winning hearts and minds, that have to date translated their influence on their population of origin into significant political gains: Hezbollah and Hamas. Both have participated in parliamentary elections—in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, respectively. Similarly, nationalist Palestinian organizations like the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and, of course, Fatah, have for years placed their representatives on the ballots of professional associations, student councils, and municipal authorities. Fatah has even achieved power in the Palestinian Authority.
As for the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, it is clear that the latter never acted to stem Hezbollah’s infiltration into Lebanese politics. This dangerous process, which began in 1992, has brought Hezbollah important political standing. Because of the Lebanese government’s quiescence, Hezbollah has attained this position without ever stopping its active involvement in terrorism in the Middle East and globally—including training and supporting other terrorist organizations, among them Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Today, Hezbollah is involved in every aspect of Lebanese politics at the municipal, parliamentary, and government levels. Hezbollah also enjoys extensive public support in Lebanon, thanks to its vast financial investment in and aid to the Shi’ite community in particular, but also to the Lebanese public at large—using money and resources sent by Iran—in exchange for the public’s loyalty and political support. At the same time, Hezbollah persecutes, intimidates, and harasses any and all who dare challenge it or threaten its spheres of influence.
Given these circumstances, Lebanon should be considered a patron state that supports terrorism. Regardless of whether it opposes terrorism, fears Hezbollah, believes itself incapable of preventing Hezbollah from becoming integrated into the Lebanese political system, or is simply impotent, the Lebanese government bears responsibility for Hezbollah’s ascendance, for it could have requested international, regional, or Arab assistance to reestablish its sovereignty. This is not to suggest that the Lebanese government may or should deny representation in any of its political institutions to any sector of society in general, or to the Shi’ite population in particular. However, such representation cannot be allowed to manifest itself through a hybrid terrorist organization. It is the solemn right and duty of the Lebanese—or any—government to outlaw and prevent the involvement in state affairs of any organization advocating, perpetrating, aiding, or inciting acts of terrorism.
Inspired by the situation in Lebanon, Hamas, which won the Palestinian elections in 2006, has adopted Hezbollah’s model, undermining and exploiting the Palestinian political system to further its terrorist activities. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority, a state-like entity, bears the same responsibility as does the Lebanese government: to prevent the political activities of Hamas, as long as the latter does not abandon terrorism.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF HYBRID TERRORISM FOR THE WEST
Another group of states that inadvertently legitimizes hybrid terrorist organizations is that of liberal democratic Western states. Whether through political shortsightedness or liberal naïveté, these states sanctify democratic elections, viewing them as a means of legitimizing and even rehabilitating terrorist organizations. By taking this approach, these states unwittingly enable hybrid terrorist organizations to cynically abuse liberal democratic values and mechanisms in a manner that endangers those very same values and mechanisms. Not only do these states avoid pressuring terrorism-hosting states to outlaw terrorist organizations and their political proxies so as to prevent them from harnessing democratic elections to their own ends, but they often heavily pressure host states to allow representatives of terrorist organizations to participate in the democratic process. Liberal democratic states that allow this dangerous process to take place are then surprised when terrorist organizations and their front movements rise to power or take part in government. They then open indirect, clandestine channels of communication with these organizations—which only serves to cement their legitimacy—in an attempt to persuade them to abandon violence and terrorism.
Sometimes Western states make a dangerous artificial distinction between the terrorist-military arm and the political and welfare mechanisms of a hybrid terrorist organization, arguing that only the military arm is in fact a terrorist organization, while the political mechanism is legitimate and promotes the organization’s constituency’s authentic political aspirations. An expression of this conceptual trap can be found in the decision of the European Parliament July 22, 2013, to designate Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization. This decision was made after the Bulgarian government reported that Hezbollah carried out the attack on a bus of Israeli tourists in Burgas that killed six people. Unfortunately, however, the decision of the European Parliament represents an artificial determination, which is not reflected in the reality since one cannot separate the military apparatus from the entire organization. Thus Hezbollah created a dissonance, since hybrid terrorist organizations combine a seemingly legitimate political party with a terrorist wing.
Liberal Western democracies fall into the trap laid for them by hybrid terrorist organizations when they mistakenly avoid recognizing that democracy is more than the sum of its free elections and other processes; in fact, it is a form of government based on liberal values, norms, narratives, human rights, women’s liberation, and a commitment to civil society. Prolonged exposure to radical indoctrination, incitement to violence, and actual terrorism impede the development of the basic requirements for democratic elections. Moreover, the fundamentalist religious imperatives that accompany the ongoing, violent incitement of Islamist hybrid terrorist organizations obviate any possibility of free choice.
6But the dangers of the hybrid terrorist organization are not only the product of its pseudo-legitimate pursuits, aimed at winning hearts and minds and translating their support into political gains. They are also, and perhaps mainly, a product of the terrorist organization’s refusal to lay down its arms and cease its terrorist activities. It is important to stress, in this regard, that if such a terrorist organization were to replace its terrorist activities with legitimate political ones, this could and should be considered a positive, commendable development—even if the organization were to persevere in its politically extreme goals and aspirations. However, when a terrorist organization tries to have its cake and eat it too, engaging in a dangerous dual policy of both political activity and continued involvement in initiating, abetting, and perpetrating terrorist attacks, that process must be acknowledged to be a dangerous and problematic one. For this reason, hybrid terrorist organizations are more dangerous than their “classic” counterparts, which lack a political wing or welfare institutions. The political activities of the hybrid terrorist organization constitute a force multiplier and provide a convenient platform from which terrorist activities can be sustained and intensified.
Hybrid terrorist organizations have yet another, vicious way of winning the hearts and minds of their population of origin. As depicted in
figure 5.1, the military arm of the hybrid terrorist organization that perpetrates attacks against an opposing state indiscriminately targets that state’s civilian population, sowing fear and anxiety, which are then manifested as political pressure on the state’s decision makers to do everything they can to prevent the recurrence of such attacks. Actual public pressure—or even the mere perception that state decision makers have of their constituency’s expectations of them—can lead them to embark on aggressive retaliatory actions and preventive measures. For their part, hybrid terrorist organizations intensify the dilemma of state decision makers by perversely placing their infrastructure—headquarters, training camps, offices, weaponry—near or within heavily populated civilian and protected areas, such as schools, hospitals, and mosques. Furthermore, they have been known to employ human beings as shields—some of whom agree to this voluntarily, though others must be coerced—in an attempt to cause the attacks against them to result in numerous casualties among their own population of origin.
FIGURE 5.1 The spheres of activity of the hybrid terrorist organization
The inevitability of civilian casualties among the hybrid terrorist organization’s constituency, caused by the state that is confronting terrorism, not only tarnishes the state’s international image and legitimacy but also intensifies hatred of it among the terrorist organization’s constituency. The hybrid terrorist organization then uses that hatred to solidify its base of support, win more hearts and minds, raise funds, and recruit members.
Thus, hybrid terrorist organizations work to win hearts and minds in two spheres: the pseudo-legitimate sphere of welfare and political activities, and the sphere of violence and terrorism. The two spheres operate in syncopation and synergy, reinforcing the terrorist organization politically and militarily. It is this, above all, that must be understood if the West wishes to find a cogent means of confounding hybrid terrorist organizations.