GLOBAL ALERT ANALYZES the rationale of modern terrorist organizations, placing particular emphasis on organizations motivated by jihadist-Islamist ideology. Many of the terrorist organizations active in the world today fall under the rubric of Islamist-jihadist terrorism: from al-Qaeda and its satellites, through the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, Al-Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Palestinian Salafist groups (the jaljalat). On the one hand, this book concludes that these organizations and their leaders are rational actors who make decisions based on cost-benefit analyses and who choose the available alternative that they perceive to be most efficacious. On the other hand, it concludes that the criteria used to determine the costs and benefits of the various alternatives, and the weight given to each of these criteria, differ from those that the West employs in calculating the rationale for its actions.
Global Alert explains that the decision-making process of terrorist organizations is fueled by root and instrumental goals, interests, and considerations, some of which are shared by organizations with a similar religious or ideological worldview, and some of which are idiosyncratic, dependent on the changes in time, place, and circumstance relevant to each organization. Any attempt to formulate effective policy for countering modern terrorist organizations as a rule, and jihadist terrorist organizations in particular, must be founded on an analysis and understanding of the organizations’ rationales, ideological foundations, and hierarchy of goals. We must understand the interests and considerations of these organizations’ decision makers, their interpersonal relationships, the warp and weft of the internal and external influences and pressures on them, and the decision-making process itself. Then we must consider all of the criteria at our disposal in estimating the weight their leaders and activists give these factors.
Taken together, the chapters of Global Alert propose a generic model—adaptable to the characteristics and circumstances of any given modern terrorist organization—meant to promote an understanding of the rationales and decision-making processes of hierarchical terrorist organizations in general, and of jihadist-Islamist organizations in particular. It is hoped that this model will be an effective tool for analyzing the functioning of terrorist organizations in specific circumstances and at decision-making crossroads.
To summarize Global Alert, and to illustrate the functionality of the model it proposes, this final chapter will examine Hamas’s behavior prior to, during, and after Operation Pillar of Defense, which was carried out by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip in November 2012. The analysis herein considers the root goals and instrumental goals of Hamas, its decision-making processes, and the tapestry of interests and internal and external pressures and considerations that govern its actions.
HAMAS: IDEOLOGY, GOALS, INTERESTS, AND METHODS
Hamas—an acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement” (Harakat al-Mukawama al-Islamiyya)—is a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movement, which was established in December 1987 as the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Article 2 of the Hamas Charter states: “Hamas is a body of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood is a worldwide organization, the largest Islamic organization of the modern age.”
1 As an “organization that deliberately uses violence against civilians to achieve political aims,” Hamas may be considered a modern terrorist organization.
FROM INCEPTION TO ENTRENCHMENT
The establishment of Hamas was one byproduct of the first intifada in the Palestinian territories, which began in late 1987 and lasted until 1991. The intifada, which captured the hearts of the younger generation of Palestinians, also increased the prestige of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a newly founded Islamist organization that had entered the fray. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who headed what was then the main nonviolent faction of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood—known as the Islamic Mujamaha—concluded that to remain relevant and prevent young people from “defecting” to PIJ, it would be necessary to create a rival organization that would actively participate in the violent uprising in the territories: Hamas. Determined as it was to take charge of the intifada, Hamas deployed its many members throughout the Palestinian territories. It also exploited the violence of the intifada—which was directed against Israel—to attack groups and individuals whom it perceived as debasing Palestinian society: drug dealers, criminals, heretics.
At the same time, Hamas avoided sliding into direct conflict with the nationalist Fatah organization despite the clear ideological differences between them, as such conflict could easily have devolved into civil war. The fear of civil war continued to haunt Hamas and its tense relationship with Fatah well into the next decade (1993–2000). Throughout the political process between the PLO,
2 led by Yasser Arafat, and Israel, which culminated in the Oslo Accords, Arafat held the threat of civil war like a sword of Damocles above Hamas’s head. During his tenure as president of the Palestinian Authority, Arafat largely avoided direct conflict with Hamas, allowing it to arm itself and conduct terrorist attacks against Israel whenever this suited his goals. On the other hand, whenever Hamas’s activities jeopardized Arafat’s accomplishments or embarrassed him, Arafat threatened to take steps that might have led to civil war. In this way, by alternately cajoling and intimidating, Arafat elicited Hamas’s obedience.
3 From time to time, Arafat even entered into alliances or agreements with Hamas regarding the use or avoidance of terrorist attacks. This gave Hamas a wide berth for social, economic, religious, and military development.
Hamas was further aided by the Oslo Accords. Under the Palestinian autonomy mandated by the agreement, Hamas was able to quietly entrench itself and reverse its policy regarding terrorist attacks. Prior to Israel’s withdrawal from densely populated Palestinian municipal areas, the control exerted by the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had made it difficult for Hamas to recruit, train, arm, and send men to commit terrorist attacks; after the advent of Palestinian autonomy, the limitations on Hamas all but vanished. Prior to autonomy, the factor curtailing Hamas’s terrorist activity was its operational
capability: Hamas launched terrorist attacks only when all provisions for them were in readiness. After autonomy, the factor curtailing Hamas’s terrorist attacks was its
motivation, for from that point on, Hamas was able to launch attacks at will. Hamas had absolutely no difficulty finding volunteers for terrorist attacks, obtaining the necessary explosives, and sending terrorists on their mission. Hamas’s policy governing terrorist attacks from the mid-1990s—the start of Palestinian autonomy—can be deduced from the comments of General Moshe Ya’alon, head of the IDF’s Intelligence Unit at the time: “When Hamas launches a suicide attack, it is the fruit of a systemic decision by the key leadership, which is outside the Palestinian territories, in Jordan, Damascus and elsewhere. They formulate a strategy of attack, which is then transmitted to the field. The potential [to attack] is ever-present, but is not deployed without instructions from on high.”
4During the 1990s, three factors determined the scope and characteristics of Hamas’s terrorist attacks against Israel. The main factor was Arafat’s determination to prevent these attacks and to sabotage Hamas’s infrastructure. Another factor was Palestinian public opinion: Hamas was very attentive to the sentiments of the Palestinian people; their attitudes influenced how Hamas set policy regarding terrorist attacks. Yet another factor was Israel’s policy, its stance in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, its willingness to transfer additional territories to Palestinian control and free Palestinian prisoners, and its counter-terrorism policy (targeted killings and other offensive measures) vis-à-vis Hamas.
The Palestinian-Israeli political process came to a halt in a burst of Palestinian violence in 2000, which ultimately lasted until 2003 and became known as the second intifada. This round of violence was perpetrated by both Fatah and Hamas, with the blessing of Yasser Arafat; it led the Sharon government to decide to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip. In 2005, disillusioned by the failure of the Oslo Accords and disheartened by the lack of a political horizon, Israel dismantled its Jewish settlements and withdrew from the Gaza Strip without coordinating the move with the Palestinians. The concomitant withdrawal of the IDF created a power gap in the Gaza Strip, which was quickly filled by Hamas. In 2006, Hamas participated in the general election to the Palestinian legislative council, in which it won a large majority, replacing Fatah de jure as the governing party in the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, in a swift and particularly violent move, Hamas pushed Fatah out and took control of governing institutions and centers of influence, eliminating opponents as it went. Hamas’s “revolution” in the Gaza Strip was absolute.
The day after the election, Hamas faced a new dilemma. On the one hand, it wanted to use its governing power to allocate funding to intensify its indoctrination and promulgate Islamic education and religious activity, as well as social welfare, and to promote its interests in the Palestinian arena. This was one of the main reasons it had participated in the parliamentary election in the first place. Yet to do so Hamas would have to ensure the calm necessary for an influx of large sums of money into the Palestinian Authority’s budget. On the other hand, Hamas had been elected under the banner of “armed struggle”—i.e., terrorism.
Since its establishment, Hamas had striven to expand its influence on Palestinian society by waging a broad campaign to win people over; this campaign was for years generously funded by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar, among other countries. In fact, it was this influence that had been translated into the significant electoral gains of the 2006 election. That election established Hamas even more as a hybrid terrorist organization, which now functions simultaneously in three spheres: military-terrorist activity, da’wa and political activity.
After the election, Hamas worked energetically to fulfill its strategic plan of turning the Gaza Strip into an “Islamic theocracy.” To this end, Hamas used all manner of media, the Internet, schools, mosques, welfare associations, and all other available tools of influence. Hamas even changed the prevailing school curriculum in the Gaza Strip, which had been based on the Egyptian curriculum, to reflect its ideology. It placed the justice and penal systems in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Islamic law (
shari’
a).
5 Moreover, most of the respondents to a study of Hamas’s attitude toward democracy described the structure and functioning of the Palestinian Islamic state as following a division among three branches of power: a legislative branch—the Shura Council, elected by popular vote; an executive branch selected by the Shura Council; and an independent judiciary. All three branches ruled by law, with the main source of legislation being
shari’
a. The entity that Hamas has established in the Gaza Strip indeed reflects this pseudo-democratic structure.
6IDEOLOGY, ROOT AND INSTRUMENTAL GOALS
Hamas’s ideology mingles Palestinian nationalism and a radical Sunni Islamic worldview. Together, they generate the organization’s root goals: to establish an independent Palestinian state on all of Palestinian territory, and ensure that that state is governed by Islamic law.
7 The Hamas Charter (1988) reflects the organization’s ideological foundation, fundamental principles, and root motivations and goals. Article 1 of the charter defines Islam as the normative underpinning of the organization’s ideology and as the authority and operative source of guidance for its activities. As the charter states, “The Islamic Resistance Movement draws its guidelines from Islam; derives from it its thinking, interpretations and views about existence, life and humanity; refers back to it for its conduct; and is inspired by it in whatever step it takes.” This is what it turns to for adjudication in all matters; from (Islam) it derives inspiration, guidance, and the affinity of the Islamic resistance movement to the Muslim Brotherhood.
8Unlike Fatah and the PLO, Hamas’s opposition to the existence of the State of Israel does not derive from nationalism per se. Rather, because Islam sees each and every clod of “Palestinian earth” as holy Muslim land, even if the leaders of Hamas were to want otherwise, Islamic law forbids them from compromising by allowing the existence of a non-Islamic country on any part of Palestinian territory whatsoever. Consequently, article 11 of the Hamas Charter determines that
the Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic
Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it. No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no Arab King or President nor all of them in the aggregate, have that right, nor has that right any organization or the aggregate of all organizations, be they Palestinian or Arab, because Palestine is an Islamic
Waqf throughout all generations and to the Day of Resurrection.
9
Eradicating the State of Israel is therefore also a root goal of Hamas, and a precondition for realizing its root goal of establishing a Palestinian Islamic theocracy. According to Article 6 of the Hamas Charter, Hamas “strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.”
10 Article 13 adds clearly:
[Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement. For renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its faith, the movement educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad: Allah is the all-powerful, but most people are not aware.
11
Military jihad—that is, terrorism—is thus the instrumental goal defined in Hamas’s founding charter; it is delineated as a personal obligation incumbent on every Muslim, wherever or whoever he may be (article 15). This instrumental goal is meant to promote the root goal of fully liberating Palestine by destroying the State of Israel. Article 8 of the Hamas Charter summarizes Hamas’s ideological foundation thus: “Allah is the goal, the Prophet is the sublime example, the Qur’an is the constitution, jihad is the path, and death for Allah’s sake is the loftiest of aspirations.”
12 According to Shabi and Shaked, Hamas added another important fundamental concept to the concept of jihad as it appears in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood:
subur (patience, perseverance).
13 In an interview with the Saudi Arabian daily
Al-Hiyat in January 1993, Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghaoushe stated: “Hamas alone will not be able to liberate Palestine, but it is the spearhead in the war of attrition, which may last 30, 40 years, until the Zionist enemy understands that the land does not belong to it.”
14The obligation to wage jihad was translated by Hamas into massive terrorist activity against Israel. During the 1990s, Hamas committed multiple terrorist attacks whose purpose was to scuttle the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. The moment the Oslo Accords fell apart in 2000, Hamas became the most active of the Palestinian terrorist organizations attacking Israel, making extensive use of suicide attacks. Of the 155 terrorist attacks conducted between 2000 and 2005, 92 were perpetrated by Hamas. Between 2000 and 2009, 457 Israelis were killed and 3,008 were wounded in terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas alone.
15METHODS
Since taking control of the Gaza Strip during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Hamas has promoted its various operative interests, including firmly establishing its control of the Gaza Strip and increasing its military prowess in preparation for conflict with Israel. In addition, due to the land and sea blockade that Israel has imposed on the Gaza Strip and the severe limitations that Egypt has placed on the border crossings into the Sinai Peninsula, Hamas activists have dug many hundreds of tunnels under the Egyptian border. These are used, unimpeded, to smuggle goods, people, weapons, and even heavy military equipment into the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula. Hamas controls this “oxygen pipeline,” which thus constitutes another of its operational interests, as well as a crucial source of income: Hamas levies taxes on the transfer of goods through the tunnels. This, too, cements its control over the population of the Gaza Strip.
Hamas’s augmentation of its military might has included the establishment of semi-regular military frameworks and training mechanisms, some of which teach recruits to fire ground, anti-tank, and antiaircraft missiles, for example. These efforts benefit from the significant funding of Iran and the guidance of Hezbollah. However, since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas has directed most of its energy toward creating an extensive and varied arsenal of rockets and missiles—the conclusion it drew from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This arsenal consists of homemade Qassam rockets, Grad rockets supplied by Iran and smuggled into the Gaza Strip via Sudan and the Sinai Peninsula, and mid-range Fajr missiles. On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012), Hamas had some 10,000 missiles.
At the same time, Hamas prepared many underground, camouflaged launching sites that could be used automatically, remotely, in the event of conflict with Israel. Alongside them Hamas built a network of safety bunkers in which it concealed and stored weapons and established command centers. Hamas simultaneously expanded its firing range, threatening targets deep inside Israel, such as greater Tel Aviv. It did not bother to improve the accuracy of its missiles, as they were not meant to hit well-defined military targets but rather to hit densely populated areas on Israel’s home front. To this end, Hamas packed its warheads with shrapnel, bits of metal that would disperse far and wide on impact.
16Since its inception, Hamas has earned the support and assistance of multiple countries whose identity has changed from time to time in accordance with changes in the balance of Hamas’s interests, and changing external pressures. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hamas was heavily supported by Saudi Arabia. But since the mid-1990s, Hamas has received the bulk of its support from Iran (usually via Hezbollah)—part of the Iranian effort to thwart the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Iran has been involved in Hamas’s terrorism at all levels. Nevertheless, Hamas has maintained its independence in deciding when, where, and how to attack Israel. Unlike PIJ, Hamas has been careful not to become a puppet of any Arab or Muslim country, including Iran, despite welcoming any and all assistance.
DECISION-MAKING DYNAMICS
Even as Hamas has grown stronger and expanded its military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula has begun to serve as an operative interest and strategic rear guard for Hamas. The Mubarak government’s flaccid control of the Sinai Peninsula; the imperviousness of the terrorist organizations there to attacks by the IDF; Hamas’s dependence on the Sinai Peninsula as the sole locus of transfer of goods, people, and weapons; and the increasing involvement of local Bedouin tribes in criminal and terrorist activity have all made the Sinai Peninsula a platform for the manufacture and smuggling of weapons for terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip.
17 Some of these organizations have even established command centers in the Sinai Peninsula, built armories and weapons-production factories, and come to use the territory as a base from which to infiltrate Israel, whether to carry out terrorist attacks or launch rockets.
Egypt’s failure to govern the Sinai Peninsula has also led to the infiltration of global jihad elements, with jihadist mercenaries from various countries finding the Sinai Peninsula a convenient haven in which to take root and gather strength.
18 This process worsened after the fall of Egyptian president Mubarak in early 2011 and the release from Egypt’s prisons of large numbers of jihadists, some of whom fled to the Sinai Peninsula.
Global and local jihadists were thus finding their feet in the Sinai Peninsula just as Salafist groups inspired or guided by al-Qaeda were taking root in the Gaza Strip. These groups are composed of Palestinians—some of them former members of Hamas—who see Hamas as “too pragmatic.” The Army of the Muslim Nation, Fatah al-Islam in the Lands of al-Rabat, and other jihadist groups are known somewhat pejoratively as
jaljalat (rolling thunder). They persist in carrying out terrorist attacks and firing rockets at Israel even when Hamas policy forbids this, thereby challenging Hamas and jeopardizing its interests. So far, Hamas has preferred to try and “ride” the Salafist tiger; in fact, it sees doing so as an operative interest. Just as Arafat avoided confronting Hamas in his day, so, too, does Hamas avoid direct conflict with the
jaljalat or destruction of their military infrastructure today, some two decades later.
19 In an attempt to minimize friction with these groups, Hamas has so far preferred a policy of containment, setting and enforcing the “rules of the game” with threats and coercion by turns.
20Aside from being influenced by such external pressures, Hamas’s policy is governed largely by its internal power structure—especially the complex relationship among the political leadership in the Gaza Strip, headed by Ismail Hania; the military leadership in the Gaza Strip, headed, until his killing in November 2012, by Ahmad Jabari; and the “outside” political leadership, headed by Khaled Mashal and his deputy, Musa Abu Marzuk, who until the outbreak of civil strife in Syria were headquartered in Damascus. In many respects, Hamas’s “outside” leadership took a sterner stance than did the leadership in the Gaza Strip, which was relatively responsive to the sentiments and needs of the Palestinian public. At the time when this book was being written, Hamas’s leadership in Damascus was finding itself between a rock and a hard place as the Sunni Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s natural ally, rebelled against the Alawite Assad regime, which is heavily supported by Iran and Hezbollah—which are also Hamas’s patrons. Torn between loyalty to its natural rebel allies and obedience to its patrons, Hamas’s outside leadership was forced to flee Damascus in April 2011, finding refuge in Qatar. The transfer of Hamas headquarters attenuated the status of its outside leadership, and motivated Khaled Mashal to announce, in September 2012, his intention to resign from his post.
Hamas’s internal power dynamic was also influenced by the mercurial relationship between Ismail Hania and Mahmoud al-Zahar, its “domestic” political leadership (in the Gaza Strip), and Ahmad Jabari, head of its military leadership. Jabari’s popularity reached its apex with the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and the protracted negotiations with Israel for his release, which culminated in an exchange of 1,027 Palestinian terrorist prisoners for Shalit. For a time, Jabari’s power overshadowed that of Hania and al-Zahar. However, this situation was abruptly ended by Israel’s killing of Jabari in November 2012, which in turn sparked Operation Pillar of Defense.
The Hamas government in the Gaza Strip had nevertheless amassed significant political and economic power since 2007. Its canny management of both the revenue from smuggling through the tunnels that crisscross the Strip and international aid monies reduced the Gaza Strip’s dependence on Hamas’s external leadership, to the point where its internal leadership could challenge the former’s policies and authority. To distinguish itself from the “domestic” leadership, which it saw as being responsible merely for the day-to-day affairs of the residents of the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s “external” leadership positioned itself as vying for ascendancy in the Palestinian arena. To this end, it even promoted reconciliation with Fatah, with the aim of ultimately integrating Hamas into the PLO, overtaking the latter, and becoming, in its stead, the sole internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people.
21 Evidence of this “plan” may be seen in the reconciliation agreement signed by Fatah and Hamas’s external leadership in Doha, Qatar, in February 2012, which appointed Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) to head a transitional government until elections could be held in the Palestinian Authority. Although this agreement clearly reflected the goals of Hamas’s external leadership, it was apparently not to the liking of its internal leadership, which sent no representatives to the signing ceremony.
22THE EFFECT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON HAMAS’S INTERESTS
As a popular movement, Hamas is constantly striving to maintain its status and promote its interests: among its members, among the members of rival Palestinian terrorist groups such as PIJ, Fatah, and the
jaljalat, among the Palestinian and Arab public, and among the international community. Over the years, Hamas has set policy regarding terrorist attacks by weighing its status—i.e., its perception in the eyes of the various publics cited above and its ability to recruit the support of the Palestinian people—against its operative interests, including its desire to maintain and increase its military, political, and economic power. At many crossroads, the tension between its status and operative interests—also influenced by external challenges such as Israel’s counter-terrorism policy, targeted killings, and pressure from its patron states—dictated Hamas’s policy on terrorist attacks. This tension also affected other decisions of Hamas’s leadership, such as the willingness to reach cease-fires with Israel; the types of terrorist attack it preferred (e.g., suicide attacks versus high-trajectory rocket fire); its decision to participate in elections to the Palestinian Authority; its radical or conciliatory attitude toward Fatah; and its attitude toward the Assad regime in Syria.
The recent revolutions in Arab countries, which have come to be known as the Arab Spring, have also affected Hamas’s decision making. The events that began in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries followed a pattern, which Hamas sees with approval: popular rebellion against a traditional regime—often perceived as both corrupt and a puppet of the West, especially the United States—leads to the overthrow of that regime, which is replaced, through democratic elections, by an Islamist party that usually represents the local Muslim Brotherhood movement, often with the participation of more extreme Salafist-jihadist elements. Hamas easily conceives of itself as being part of this historic process. In the opinion of many Hamas leaders, the organization’s victory in the 2006 elections in the Gaza Strip marked the beginning of the Arab Spring, far preceding the current revolutions in Arab countries. As the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, Hamas has sought to wrest political control of the Palestinian Authority from the more traditional, nationalist Fatah and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). It is thus not surprising that Hamas’s leaders see the Arab Spring as a deterministic process that serves their goals.
Yet Hamas is in no rush. In light of the Arab Spring, its leaders have defined additional operative interests, among them strengthening Hamas’s ties with the new regimes arising in Arab countries, and especially with that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (until its overthrow in July 2013); gaining intra-Arab and international legitimacy; and removing the blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip and by Egypt at the Sinai border crossings.
23 These new operative interests contradict the long-standing Hamas instrumental goal of expanding armed struggle with, and terrorist attacks against, Israel—a policy that guarantees military devolution that would endanger Hamas’s achievements in the Gaza Strip. In effect, then, the addition of these operative interests spurred a change in Hamas’s rationale of jihadist terrorism, and in its policy regarding terrorist attacks.
OPERATION PILLAR OF DEFENSE
The underpinnings of this change were visible “on the ground” soon after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and Hamas took control there. As early as 2005, Hamas began diverting its military efforts from perpetrating “classic” terrorism inside Israel to preparing extensive infrastructure for launching rockets at Israel. Hamas derived the rationale for this from its analysis of the opportunities and limitations it then faced. At the same time, Hamas had the benefit of absolute control of the Gaza Strip; a patron (Iran) willing to allocate the necessary resources; a strategic rear (the Sinai Peninsula) that was not being effectively ruled or policed; and active channels for smuggling weapons and equipment into the Gaza Strip. Together, these factors led Hamas to decide to emulate Hezbollah and draw on its rich experience in developing a huge rocket arsenal.
Along with these “positive” incentives, Hamas faced certain “negative” incentives to investing in rocket power at the expense of “classic” terrorism after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. For one, Hamas was stymied in its ability to carry out suicide attacks inside Israel by the physical barrier that Israel built around the Gaza Strip, which included a sophisticated warning fence guarded by dedicated IDF forces. Similarly, Hamas could not easily launch terrorist attacks into Israel from the West Bank, because Fatah, as a rule, and Abu Mazen, in particular, opposed them. Lastly, Israel’s deepening intelligence capability vis-à-vis Hamas, and its growing offensive capabilities, thwarted most of the attempts to launch terrorist attacks inside Israel from either the Gaza Strip or the West Bank.
Hamas’s rocket fire was meant to achieve the same ends as “classic” terrorism: to sow death and destruction deep inside Israel, and to translate this physical damage into fear and anxiety among the Israeli public. As it had when preparing “classic” terrorist attacks, in preparing for high-trajectory rocket fire, Hamas first identified, recruited and trained eligible operatives to use rockets, which were either made by Hamas members at foundries and factories in the Gaza Strip or smuggled into the Gaza Strip through the tunnels under the Sinai border that Hamas controlled. Hamas and its collaborators inside Israel gathered intelligence on potential targets inside Israel, with emphasis on population centers. Unlike the
jaljalat and other small Palestinian organizations that launch rockets at Israel from the Gaza Strip, Hamas is an orderly, hierarchical organization with headquarters and command centers; it made sure that its initiatives to fire at Israel were issued from the top down—that is, from Hamas’s leadership and senior military commanders, and not from the men in the field.
Thus, even before Israel’s unilateral withdrawal and more so thereafter, the Gaza Strip became a nest of rocket launchers.
24 Starting in 2006, many hundreds of rockets were fired at towns and villages in the south of Israel, disrupting daily life, causing damage and injury, and forcing hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians to stay within running distance of a bomb shelter. In part, this rocket fire was a response to the IDF’s targeted killings in the Gaza Strip. In most cases, however, it was perpetrated by the small Palestinian terrorist organizations whose watchword was armed struggle against Israel, and whose ability to send terrorist cells into Israel had been thwarted. In 2008, the IDF launched Operation Cast Lead, an extensive military campaign that did significantly reduce the rocket fire during 2009. However, the rocket fire soon resumed and increased, extending farther into Israel and endangering the lives of more than one million civilians. In October 2012 the rocket fire further escalated, accompanied by increased attempts to attack IDF forces, including by permeating the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. This escalation was the outgrowth of a deliberate decision by Hamas, after years of respecting an unspoken agreement that it not fire into Israeli territory, to join and even spearhead the rocket fire.
25 This change in Hamas policy was the result of processes inside the Gaza Strip.
Hamas’s policy of self-imposed restraint during the months and years that preceded IDF Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012 was the result of a rational decision-making process in which Hamas considered and weighed its root goals (to establish and lead a Palestinian state under the rule of Islamic law, on all of the lands that are now Israel); its instrumental goals (to expand the armed struggle, including terrorism, against Israel); and its immediate operative and status goals and needs. The latter—to gain the upper hand with the Palestinian public in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and to discredit Abu Mazen; to expand its hegemony among other Palestinian organizations; to deepen its relationship with new Muslim Brotherhood governments, especially that in Egypt, as well as with Hezbollah and Iran; to gain intra-Arab and international legitimacy; and to remove the blockade of the Gaza Strip—contradicted the instrumental goal of greater armed struggle with Israel. Hamas resolved this tension by temporarily holding its terrorist activity in abeyance so that it could promote its immediate interests. This strategy represented neither an essential change nor, certainly, an ideological change, but rather only a careful cost-benefit analysis of the available alternatives. It was easy for Hamas to set aside armed struggle for a time, because it was an instrumental goal rather than a root goal.
It is thus not surprising that the change in Hamas’s policy regarding rocket fire at Israel emanated from a change in the balance of its interests in October 2012. What triggered the change was the announcement by certain Salafist terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip of their intention to establish a political party
26 that would stand in the next election in the Palestinian Authority, in effect competing with Hamas. As noted, these Salafist organizations have for years challenged Hamas for its alleged restraint, pragmatism, and “disloyalty to pure Islam”; their decision to run in an election suddenly made them a palpable, fundamental threat to Hamas rule. The Egyptian precedent, in which the Salafists surprisingly defied all forecasts to take 25 percent of the vote,
27 only brought home for Hamas the extent of the danger posed by the Salafists’ politicization. In other words, the Salafists—many of whom, as noted, had seceded from Hamas—were competing for Hamas’s voters.
Meanwhile, the Salafist
jaljalat continued firing rockets at Israel even as Hamas avoided doing so, and responding to every IDF air incursion in the Gaza Strip with rocket fire even as Hamas prevented its operatives from engaging in retaliation. This state of affairs made Hamas’s policy of restraint a burden—and an electoral risk. All at once, the balance of Hamas’s interests had changed. For the first time in years, the cost of restraint outweighed its benefit.
On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense, during the evening hours of October 7, 2012, the Israel Air Force carried out a targeted killing against Salafist activists motorcycling through the Gaza Strip. One of them, Abdallah Muhammad Muhsein Makawi, was a member of the Shura Council of the Salafist organization Mujahideen in the Environs of Jerusalem; he had been involved in terrorist activity against Israel. According to Palestinian reports, nine Palestinian civilians were also injured in the attack. The next day, October 8, 2012, tens of mortars and rockets were fired at Israel. The excessiveness of this reprisal, and Hamas’s involvement in it alongside other Palestinian terrorist organizations, signaled the beginning of the change in Hamas’s policy. Moreover, the rocket fire was accompanied by a statement by Abu Ubeidah, spokesman for Hamas’s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades: “Bombing Israeli strongholds sends the message that the ‘resistance’ will not allow unilateral aggression by Israel. Its continued ‘aggression’ will lead to a harsher, broader response.” According to Abu Ubeidah, Hamas’s retaliation had been coordinated with the highest echelons of the military arm of PIJ.
28 It was on that same day, October 8, 2012, that Salafist groups announced their intention to establish a political party, called the Light (al-Nour) and modeled after the Salafist political party in Egypt. A prominent Salafist stated that the party’s principal goal was to implement
shari’
a for Palestinian civilians.
29From that date and until the beginning of Operation Pillar of Defense on November 14, 2012, Hamas, other Palestinian organizations, and Israel began a cycle of increasing clashes, terrorist attacks, and high-trajectory rocket fire deep into Israel, followed by targeted killings and Israeli air strikes on the Gaza Strip. Each round of rocket fire brought an ever larger quantity of missiles, until Israel decided to embark on Operation Pillar of Defense.
Thus, in November 2012, Hamas found itself embroiled in a massive military conflict with Israel. On the face of it, such a conflict contradicted and even jeopardized Hamas’s operative interests, not least because it resulted in severe damage to its arsenal of long-range missiles in the Gaza Strip, although Pillar of Defense had been an Israeli initiative, ignited by the killing of Ahmad Jabari, who headed Hamas’s military wing. However, Israel’s decision emanated from the change in Hamas’s policy and the involvement of its activists in the massive rocket fire at Israel during the weeks preceding the operation.
Israel’s decision to launch Operation Pillar of Defense must be understood in the context of a democratic country’s “democratic-governance dilemma” when faced with terrorism. Israel’s government could not allow itself to stand idly by as more and more rockets were fired ever deeper into its territory; military reprisal was essential to halting this missile assault. Hamas’s accusation that Israel’s leadership launched Operation Pillar of Defense to gain public support on the eve of an election is wrong, if only because the outcome of that military operation could have seriously damaged the ruling party, if its goals were not met. On the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the timing of the operation, in light of the impending election: Israel’s government apparently feared criticism from opposition parties if it did not act, given the increasingly severe rocket fire caused by Hamas’s having joined the Salafist melee.
30 Therefore, once the IDF had precise intelligence on the whereabouts of Ahmad Jabari, it struck.
In effect, on the eve of the operation, military escalation contradicted the interests of all of the main parties to this conflict: Hamas, which found itself dragged into a deterministic cycle it had not sought, one that, for the reasons cited above, contravened its interests; Egypt, whose new Muslim Brotherhood regime and president, Mohammad Morsi, were trying to achieve stability, gain legitimacy, and procure sizable economic aid from the United States; and Israel, which was trying to balance its sensitive, vulnerable relationship with Egypt and its fear of military entanglement on the eve of an election. The only beneficiaries were the Salafist organizations, whose constant rocket fire at Israel had challenged the status quo and the de facto calm between Hamas and Israel. Their efforts were meant to kill Israeli civilians and damage Israeli property, goading Israel into military retaliation that would perforce (also) target Hamas, which in the eyes of Israel was responsible for all hostile activity emanating from the Gaza Strip. In this way, the Salafist “plan” to force Hamas into direct conflict with Israel was realized.
31Conversely, according to Israel’s minister of defense at the time, Ehud Barak, Operation Pillar of Defense was meant to strengthen Israel’s deterrence, severely damage Hamas’s arsenal of missiles, mortars, and rockets, harm Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, and reduce attacks on Israel’s home front.
32 During the eight days of the operation, the Israeli Air Force made more than 1,500 bombing raids while maintaining strict margins of safety from Palestinian centers. Thanks to Israel’s restraint, there were fewer Palestinian deaths and injuries in this operation, compared to the previous one: according to Palestinian sources, 139 deaths, mostly of civilians
33; according to Israeli sources, 177 deaths, of whom approximately 120 were combatants.
34 Nevertheless, Operation Pillar of Defense was dogged by complaints that it had been “disproportionate,” if one compared the number of casualties in Israel (6) to the number of casualties in the Gaza Strip.
This begs the question, how is it possible to determine “proportionality” in such a military conflict between a state and a non-state terrorist organization? After eight days of intensive fighting, which included more than 1,500 air attacks on terrorist targets and rocket launchers embedded intentionally in densely populated areas whose residents act as human shields, in one of the most populous areas in the world, can the deaths of an average 150 Palestinians—more than half of whom are known members of terrorist organizations—be considered disproportionate? Or does this number of deaths indicate Israel’s restraint in maintaining strict principles of proportionality? Moreover, is it apt, or even possible, to assess the proportionality of a military operation by comparing the number of casualties of the opposing parties? Or should proportionality be measured per battle or action, and not according to the number of people killed on each side? When calculating proportionality, should it be noted that the Palestinians fired 1,506 rockets at Israel, 421 of which were meant to hit Israeli population concentrations but were shot down by Israel’s “iron dome” system?
35 Had these rockets not been intercepted, and had they hit their targets, causing untold Israeli casualties, would Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip then have been considered disproportionate?
Throughout the eight days of Operation Pillar of Defense, Hamas emulated Hezbollah’s propaganda during the Second Lebanon War. In other words, it sent messages to the Israeli public threatening to fire on, and beyond, Tel Aviv. It promised “surprises”—such as rocket fire on Jerusalem, Israel’s capital—and warned of suicide attacks. Its psychological warfare included an attempt to emblazon a Hamas victory on the consciousness of the Palestinian public (and indirectly on the consciousness of the Israeli public). To this end, Hamas’s leaders and spokesmen did not balk at touting falsehoods to the Palestinians and the Arab world, such as that Hamas had shot down an F-16 Israeli Air Force plane, or that its missiles had hit the Knesset (Israel’s parliament building). In addition, Hamas called the iron dome system “an operational failure,” claiming it had shot down only 20 percent of the missiles fired at Israel.
36 Hamas spokesmen further claimed that Hamas had deterred Israel from launching a ground operation, for fear of the many casualties that it and its allies would have caused the IDF.
In reality, both Hamas and Israel benefited from Operation Pillar of Defense—in which both simultaneously declared victory. Israel stopped the rocket fire into its territory (at least temporarily), with relative support from the international community and a certain respect for the IDF’s restraint. However, Israeli restraint apparently came at a significant price. Israel’s desire to minimize harm in the Gaza Strip dictated large margins of security, which enabled the IDF to strike only those military compounds and rocket launching sites farthest from civilian centers and protected facilities. It spared those command centers, weapons caches, and launching sites located in densely populated civilian areas or near civilian structures, thereby preserving Hamas’s strategic capability.
Despite Israel’s incessant air strikes, Hamas succeeded in firing more than 1,500 rockets at Israel, including a number of missiles at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Hamas presented Israel’s decision to avoid a ground operation as a result of its successful deterrence. Hamas also claimed that the agreement with Israel brokered by Egypt was to its benefit, as it required Israel to cease targeted killings in the Gaza Strip. Hamas also saw as a success its maneuvering between Iran and Egypt without losing the support of either, despite their contradictory interests.
37In summary, both Israel and Hamas engaged in Operation Pillar of Defense against their will. For both, the motives and catalyst for military action were the image of each in the eyes of its respective electorate, and the fear of paying a political price on election day for not presenting a tough, uncompromising willingness to sacrifice in the face of the enemy. The behavior of Hamas and Israel on the eve of, and during, Operation Pillar of Defense proves that democratic mechanisms do not necessarily obviate political violence and terrorism, or even channel volatile energies into nonviolent talks and negotiations. On the contrary, democratic mechanisms sometimes (as in this case) launch processes that promote violent clashes.
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Twenty-five years after its establishment, Hamas can look back in satisfaction. Since its inception, Hamas has presented itself as a radical-Islamic alternative to the nationalist Palestinian Fatah. While Hamas has yet to achieve its root goal—establishment of an Islamist Palestinian caliphate instead of Israel—it has made significant strides within the Palestinian arena, in its struggle against Israel, and in the Middle East. Moreover, Hamas has succeeded in promoting its status and many of its operative interests. In the competition for hegemony between Hamas and Fatah, the Palestinian public sees Hamas as better representing its interests and as less corrupt. This was borne out by Hamas’s victory in the 2006 election and its subsequent routing of Fatah from the Gaza Strip. Hamas also outflanked PIJ—its principal rival among Palestinian Islamists—long ago. Hamas succeeded in thwarting the Oslo process and, according to its version of events, forced Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip. Hamas is now perceived as a key player in the Middle East, which must be taken into account in any regional move. It has procured the support of Arab countries without losing its independence.
On the other hand, Hamas has found it difficult to fulfill its voters’ expectations or meet their daily needs. It has failed to overcome Israel’s superior intelligence capabilities and military power. The physical obstacles that Israel has erected around the Gaza Strip have impeded Hamas’s ability to perpetrate terrorist attacks, forcing it to wage a war of attrition by firing rockets at the population of Israel’s south. In addition, Hamas has yet to win international legitimacy, or to force Israel to remove its naval and continental blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Hamas’s development and behavior in the Gaza Strip in general, and during Operation Pillar of Defense in particular, illustrate the importance of understanding the rationale of a modern hybrid terrorist organization, especially a jihadist-Islamist terrorist organization. It is necessary to identify the root goals of an organization like Hamas, and to distinguish them from its instrumental goals and operative and status interests and needs. To understand the cost-benefit considerations employed by such an organization at any decision-making crossroad, it is also necessary to understand the tension between its goals and interests, given changing challenges and exigencies, and to map its internal and external pressures and considerations. The model proposed in this volume, and which was here used to analyze Hamas’s actions in a discrete set of circumstances, is meant to be a generic, adaptable tool for analyzing what motivates modern terrorist organizations and dictates their policies of terrorism. Only through the understanding gained by such an analysis will it be possible to devise effective strategies for coping with modern terrorism.