5 
5 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
December 19, 1974
6:05 to 6:58 p.m.
Oval Office
Rumsfeld and the President
I gave the President the memo that Jerry Jones had worked up on the responsibility of the Vice President under Executive Orders and statutes. Pointed out that it was very thin—said that there are other options—Productivity Commission, the WIN thing, the economy, energy conservation. I said if he went with just what was statutory or already in Executive Orders that it would be really perceived as a real let-down. And that you’ll really want to carefully craft this and we’ll need something much more creative. I said if you want a creative idea why don’t you make him Secretary of the Treasury, give him a Department to run—Department of Transportation. 1 said I’ve always believed that the job [of VP] was a non-job and that there is nothing wrong at all with having the Vice President run a Department.1
Spiro T. Agnew was not an impressive Vice President. He did, however, make great efforts to look the part. “Never let your back touch the back of the chair,” he lectured some White House staff members in his zeal to avoid wrinkles in his jacket.2 During the early years of the Nixon administration, I was in many meetings with Vice President Agnew. Other meetings, such as those for the President’s Committee on School Desegregation, of which on paper Agnew was the Chairman, he seldom attended. Though he rarely contributed much in the way of substantive thought in meetings when he was present, Agnew seemed to always sport perfect creases in his well-pressed, unwrinkled pants. His taste for panache carried over into his public performances. He cultivated a reputation as a bold public speaker, in part due to his alliterative assaults on journalists, labeling them “pusillanimous pussyfooters,” “hopeless hysterical hypochondriacs of history,” and, most famously, in a speech written by my friend, the skilled wordsmith William Safire, describing members of the media as “nattering nabobs of negativism.”3
A former Governor of Maryland, he was not well known when he had been selected by Richard Nixon as his vice presidential nominee at the GOP convention in 1968 over at least a dozen better qualified contenders, including then–California Governor Ronald Reagan and—as fate would have it—Gerald R. Ford.4 There may well have been an allure to President Nixon to pick someone who would jolt and surprise the so-called Washington Beltway establishment. But Agnew soon underscored the political dangers of selecting a relatively unknown and untested candidate. Not sufficiently vetted by the FBI, the media, or the Nixon political operation, and unknown to most of the public outside of Maryland, Agnew had a propensity for corruption that had been undetected.
In August 1968, I was a thirty-six-year-old third-term Congressman from Illinois and had been a supporter of Richard Nixon in his competition for the presidency with Nelson Rockefeller. Immediately after winning the nomination for President, he invited me to a 2 a.m. meeting in his top-floor suite in a Miami Beach hotel to participate in his deliberations on his selection for the nomination for Vice President. There I sat, a relatively junior member of Congress, along with fifteen or twenty others—prominent Governors, U.S. Senators, former presidential candidates Senator Barry Goldwater and Governor Thomas Dewey, and even the highly respected Reverend Billy Graham. Throughout the early morning meeting it became clear the candidate was moving the discussion in a specific direction. As Nixon asked the participants for their thoughts, he periodically brought the discussion back to two governors: John Volpe, who was serving his second nonconsecutive term in Massachusetts, and Spiro T. Agnew, then the Governor of Maryland and the former Maryland Chairman of the Nelson Rockefeller presidential campaign committee. Nixon specified directly that he favored a centrist figure—not a vice presidential nominee from either the left or the right. He effectively turned the discussion away from political figures such as John Lindsay, Nelson Rockefeller, or Senator Charles Percy of Illinois on the left and from Senator John Tower on the right. When the discussion turned to others, Nixon would ask: “What about John Volpe?” or “What about Spiro Agnew?” His eventual choice of Agnew changed history, though certainly not in a way either Nixon, or Agnew, for that matter, intended, anticipated, or desired. Agnew’s eventual successor, Gerald Ford, certainly took the lessons from Mr. Nixon’s unhappy experience to heart as he selected the nation’s third Vice President in the space of two years.
* * *
As Gerald Ford assumed the presidency, the vacancy in the office of the Vice President was a pressing concern. President Ford had indicated his intention of consulting leaders on Capitol Hill and in the Republican Party before deciding on his selection. He wanted a nominee who could help him lead the administration and strengthen the GOP ticket for his upcoming presidential election campaign. Under the Twenty-fifth Amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1967 to clearly establish the lines of succession should there be a vacancy in the office of the vice presidency, whoever Ford selected would have to achieve a majority vote in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, both of which were then under the control of the Democratic Party. During a morning meeting in the Oval Office, while I was still serving as Chairman of his transition to the presidency, Ford had told me I was one of three candidates he was considering to replace him as Vice President. The other two, he told me, were Nelson Rockefeller, the four-term former Governor of New York, and George H. W. Bush, a former two-term Texas Congressman and then the current Chairman of the Republican National Committee.5 Each of us had filled out the extensive required legal and financial forms and had been vetted by the FBI.
On August 13, 1974, four days after Nixon had resigned, and well before I had been told that I was under consideration, I had hand-delivered to Ford a memo he requested and I had drafted, suggesting several “criteria” he might consider when selecting a Vice President. I noted that the individual’s “personal behavior” should meet the “considerably higher standards now required in this post-Watergate period.” Next, he or she should complement Ford “by virtue of a different background and appeal,” which in my view ruled me out. I appreciated the President’s consideration of me, but I was certain there was little to no possibility I would be his choice given our common midwestern and congressional backgrounds. I offered no geographic balance and would bring no particular national political strength to the ticket. (Back in those days, more so than in recent political history, geography tended to be an important factor in vice presidential nominees.)
In his deliberations on who he would recommend to become his Vice President, Ford was clear about what he did not want to do. When President Nixon nominated Ford for the vice presidency back in October 1973, the announcement had been a dramatic, drawn-out guessing game, and what Ford labeled “an oddly exuberant” affair, considering that the event followed the embarrassing departure of Agnew.6 The announcement of Ford came after several days of news stories about other possible candidates, which the Nixon White House clearly had floated—Rockefeller and John Connally were among others who received prominent mention. Adding to the drama, Nixon retreated to Camp David to deliberate on his choice. His visit there was followed by a surprise prime-time announcement live on television and radio from the East Room of the White House, during which Ford emerged before a crowd of dignitaries feeling like a game show contestant.7 Now, as President, Ford wanted to do something that was more businesslike and dignified. On August 20, meeting with members of the Cabinet in the Roosevelt Room, the President without much fanfare announced that he intended to send the name of Nelson Rockefeller to the Congress for its consideration and approval.8
I later learned that Nelson Rockefeller had been Nixon’s recommendation. In fact, according to President Ford, Rockefeller was Nixon’s sole recommendation.9 Perhaps Nixon believed Rockefeller, a well-known national name, would add stature to the Ford administration. It is also conceivable that Nixon, ever the chess player, may well have surmised that the left-leaning, big-city scion of one of America’s richest families, who was energetically detested by many conservatives, would pose less of a challenge in 1976 to Richard Nixon’s hoped-for successor John Connally.
Rockefeller, then sixty-six, was born in affluent Bar Harbor, Maine, to a more-than-affluent and prominent family. After graduating from Dartmouth College in 1930, he became involved with family-related businesses and nonprofit organizations. In a step toward politics, he was appointed to be the head of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. He stayed in the nation’s capital for several years to work in various capacities under President Truman and then later President Eisenhower.
Rockefeller was elected Governor of New York in 1958 as a Republican and re-elected in 1962, 1966, and 1970. An activist Governor, he was known as a liberal spender, particularly on public works projects. In 1960, just two years into his first term, he sought the Republican presidential nomination but lost to Richard Nixon. Four years later, he ran again for President and was once again defeated for the nomination, this time by conservative Senator Barry Goldwater, who represented the new Sunbelt, limited-government character of the Republican Party. Rockefeller’s reputation was marred for some by his controversial divorce and second marriage as well as by criticism of dealings he made to use the New York state police to suppress the Attica Prison riot in 1971, which left forty-three people dead, including ten correctional officers and civilian employees.
The Rockefeller family had a history of sharing its wealth with employees, arguably, in the view of some, to garner or solidify political support and loyalty. Those practices would prove to be hard habits to shake. Besides enjoying his sizable inherited wealth, Rockefeller presented other unique concerns as Ford’s vice presidential selection.
Rockefeller’s personality, for example, was an issue. As I came to know him, he seemed almost to be two different people. On the one hand, he could be open, engaged, friendly, and enthusiastic. One of his favorite words was “fabulous!” Experienced in state government and modestly in federal government, he came to the vice presidency leaning forward and seemingly eager to help President Ford.
On the other hand, Rockefeller was accustomed to being in charge and to getting his way. Aggressive personalities and the vice presidency of the United States are rarely an easy mixture, especially for a man who had sought the top job for himself more than once. Perhaps knowing this about himself, Rockefeller had, publicly at least, expressed reluctance to be Vice President, noting that he wasn’t suited to be what he properly characterized as “standby equipment.”10 Rockefeller denied he still harbored presidential ambitions of his own. This led former President Lyndon Johnson’s aide Bill Moyers to memorably quip, “I believe Rocky when he says he’s lost his ambition. I also believe he remembers where he put it.”11
The relationship between Presidents and Vice Presidents can be delicate. There have been times in recent history, such as during the Kennedy-Johnson administration, when the two men saw each other as rivals. And there have been other occasions when Presidents bridled at the idea of giving their Vice Presidents too much responsibility, or even the perception of influence. President Ford, rather atypically, had none of those concerns. In fact, in offering Rockefeller the nomination, Ford had apparently left Rockefeller with the impression it was to be a “partnership.” He offered him a broad portfolio in domestic matters. This was a typically generous and astute decision by the President, at least at the outset: Ford knew that Rockefeller brought a different kind of experience to the administration from his years as Governor of New York State and therefore had dealt with a wide array of issues from a different perspective than Ford had as a former legislator. Ford saw Rockefeller not as a threat, but an asset.
Unfortunately, Ford underestimated, as we all did, Rockefeller’s tendency to seize the bit in his teeth, turning any ambiguity to his full advantage. His new portfolio seemed, at least in Rockefeller’s mind, to include most everything except foreign policy and national security affairs. Those were the domain of Henry Kissinger, who had previously been recruited by the Rockefeller family and by Rockefeller himself in various capacities for some period of years. But this arrangement, at least envisioned by Rockefeller, posed an obvious problem. If Kissinger was seen as the leader in foreign affairs, intelligence, and national security matters, and Rockefeller saw himself as the leader on domestic issues, then what was left for President Ford? Belatedly, Ford realized the seriousness of this misunderstanding.
Former President Nixon, the first outsider to hear the news of the selection, told Ford in a phone call that Rockefeller’s name and stature would help him internationally. The “extreme right wing,” Nixon noted, would be upset by the choice, but Nixon suggested there was nothing Ford could do to satisfy them anyway.12 A story had run in Newsweek about a meeting Nixon had allegedly had with Rockefeller in the White House when Nixon was still President. According to the article, presumably related by Rockefeller, Nixon had looked at his Oval Office desk and asked Rockefeller, “Can you imagine Gerald Ford sitting in this chair?” Nixon denied to Ford that he’d made that remark, though Ford may not have been completely persuaded.13
In any event, even Nixon had underestimated the GOP’s conservative opposition to Rockefeller. Rockefeller, a highly visible northeastern liberal, was the perfect target for conservative dissatisfaction with the establishment. As one conservative leader, National Review publisher William Rusher, later noted, “Every movement needs a villain. For the GOP right, Nelson Rockefeller was it.”14 Rumblings of disapproval instantly arose. Senator Jesse A. Helms of North Carolina organized a group of conservatives in the Congress who vowed to fight the nomination.15
Overtures to mollify conservative dissatisfaction flowed in. An apprehensive Lee Edwards, a historian and a founding member of Young Americans for Freedom, sent a letter in early November outlining ways to retain the support of not only the “Conservative Establishment,” but also “those Americans who voted ‘conservative’ and for Richard Nixon in 1972.” One idea he suggested, wisely foreshadowing an approach Donald Trump used decades later when his conservative credentials were questioned, was preparing a list of “constructionist” jurists from which, if the situation were to arise, President Ford would choose for appointments to the Supreme Court.16
Democrats had their own concerns about the Rockefeller choice. In The New York Times, the columnist R. W. Apple reflected the mood of some on the left when he opined, “President Ford’s nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller as Vice President completes a reversal of national political tides of potentially historic proportions. Ten days ago, politicians were asking whether the Republican Party could survive; today, they were asking how the Democrats were going to mount a challenge in 1976.”17 Echoing these fears, the Democrats, who then had majorities in both houses of the U.S. Congress, vowed vigorous and extensive hearings. Even though Rockefeller had been a household name for decades, the Democrats were exacting in their examination and vowed to review every word Rockefeller had ever uttered and every piece of paper he ever touched.
The extended hearings on the Rockefeller nomination, which went on for months, led to embarrassing though not disqualifying revelations. One hit rather awkwardly close to home. In early October 1974 it was revealed that Rockefeller had given tens of thousands of dollars in gifts to various Republican figures over the years.18 Shortly after that, Rockefeller disclosed that the Rockefeller fortune had financed a negative biography of one of his political opponents, the former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, which had been published during their 1970 battle for Governor of New York.19 (According to news accounts, 100,000 copies of the 116,000 sold had been purchased and distributed by the Rockefeller re-election campaign.) Learning of the revelation, by then years after his defeat for governor, Goldberg blasted Rockefeller for “belatedly admitted misconduct and its cover-up.”20 By the middle of December 1976, nearly four months after he had been nominated, a bruised but not broken Rockefeller was finally confirmed by the House and Senate.
When it was becoming clear that Rockefeller would eventually assume the vice presidency, I asked the President how he wanted to handle Rockefeller and Rockefeller’s staff. As I noted at the time, “[Ford] said when he came in the Nixon people were defensive; their man [Nixon] was going down, Ford was popular. He wants a good feeling. He wants us to embrace [Rockefeller], make him feel at home, not have reservations, make him part of it.”21 I did my best to help carry out the President’s instructions. In fact, I even offered the President a suggestion, as I noted in a December 19, 1974, memo, to give Rockefeller a Cabinet post in addition to the vice presidency. “A guy who is energetic and active, I think, would like it,” I noted.22
On December 21, two days after Rockefeller was confirmed, the President and the new Vice President conferred in the Oval Office. Ford was in a warm, welcoming mood. He said this was a historic meeting and it offered a unique opportunity for the administration and the country. He noted that we all had the same aims, but, undoubtedly reflecting on his own experience under Nixon, he observed that “history shows a lot of staff jealousies” between presidential and vice presidential staffs.
“Nothing bothers me more than problems within a staff or between staffs,” Ford said.
At some point during the discussion, Vice President Rockefeller commented on how nice the Navy people had been in connection with the new vice presidential residence that was being established at the site of the old U.S. Naval Observatory. After the meeting, I went to Rockefeller and offered a cautionary suggestion. “Mr. Vice President, a lot of people are going to want to be very nice to you. You are a very powerful man,” I said. “The danger is that they’ll be nice to you through ignorance. That is to say, it’s not their money that they’re being nice to you with. It’s taxpayers’ money.”23
Still in my mind was an article written many years earlier by columnist Jack Anderson when I had been serving as the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the Nixon administration. Anderson said later he had received a rumor that I had made expensive renovations to my government office. Despite the fact that it was flat not true, the story carried in Anderson’s widely read column and dogged me for some time. (Anderson, years later, publicly admitted his error—saying it was one of the worst he had ever made—before a congressional committee.)
In any event, I advised Rockefeller, “You and your staff have to make conscious decisions as to whether or not you want people to do things for you in the bureaucracy because you can get yourself in an awful lot of trouble real fast.”24 He nodded and said he agreed.
Shortly thereafter, I had another lengthy meeting with Rockefeller. He did most of the talking. I came away remarking in my note, “He’s such an enthusiastic, decent person.” This was an initial characterization that I would later have cause to revise.