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Ford at the Helm: The SS Mayaguez Crisis

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

May 12, 1975

12:04 to 12:52 p.m.

National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room

While the President was waiting for Kissinger, . . . the President talked about the Defense cuts. SecDef said he didn’t like them, that the House Floor is the danger, it is coming up Wednesday.

We talked about the seizure of a US merchant ship by a Cambodian gunboat. Apparently we were notified at 3:15 a.m. that it happened about sixty miles southwest of Kompong Som and about eight miles from an island claimed by both Cambodia and Saigon. Schlesinger said the ship was probably in port by now.¹

Deputy NSC Advisor Brent Scowcroft entered the Oval Office at 7:40 a.m. on Monday, May 12, 1975. He was carrying a maritime distress signal from an aging, 480-foot-long U.S.-flagged container ship: the SS Mayaguez. The ship had been transporting food, paints, and chemicals from Hong Kong to Sattahip, a port in southern Thailand, when a Cambodian P-128 gunboat had approached and fired shots across its bow. Members of the gunboat then boarded the Mayaguez and took its thirty-nine-member civilian crew hostage. The provocation occurred in international waters near Poulo Wai, an island roughly sixty miles off the coast of Cambodia claimed by both the Cambodians and the Vietnamese. At that moment, there were reports that the Mayaguez was being towed toward Kompong Som, a coastal city in the southwestern part of mainland Cambodia. It was not yet clear what would happen to the American crew, or even if they were all still alive. This posed a new challenge for the President only weeks after having turned the page on our country’s long, unsuccessful experience in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam War was technically over. U.S. combat troops had returned home. The most formidable power in the world had been nearly fifteen years in the jungles of Southeast Asia only to emerge with a defeat. As much as the U.S. had tried to leave the conflict on the far side of the Pacific Ocean, it seemed to be refusing to leave us. As the U.S. would discover over a week in May 1975, our country’s Communist foes in the region, as anticipated, seemed to be emboldened by America’s departure and were apparently ready or even eager to test the outer limits of U.S. resolve.

In the wake of the U.S. retreat from South Vietnam, President Ford was determined to re-establish our country’s credibility—to calm our allies and to caution our adversaries. “As long as I was President,” he later wrote in his memoir, “I decided, the U.S. would not abandon its commitments overseas. We would not permit our setbacks to become a license for others to fish in troubled waters.”² Better coordination and clear, readily understandable strategic thinking by those in government were needed.³ It was next to impossible, the Ford administration was finding, to advance an agenda without a conceptual framework that united the key components of the bureaucracy and the various elements of the country.⁴ Two weeks after the fall of Saigon, the Gulf of Siam became the scene of another challenge for the U.S.

Looking at what had become the new map of Southeast Asia, our friends were few and far between. We had no diplomatic relations with the communist Khmer Rouge, which had toppled the Lon Nol pro-U.S. regime in Cambodia the previous month. Our ally in South Vietnam had been toppled by the Communist regime in the North. The generally pro-U.S. Thailand was understandably deeply concerned and bitter about the unfavorable upheavals in their immediate neighborhood in Southeast Asia.

The President convened the National Security Council for an initial meeting on the SS Mayaguez in the Cabinet Room at 12:04 p.m. EST.⁵ The NSC meeting, the first of several that would take place over the next few days about the Mayaguez, was a bit bumpy, reflecting the bureaucratic fissures that had long existed. There was no substantive analysis of the dynamics animating the Khmer Rouge to risk such a provocation.⁶ The one constant in the unstructured opening discussion was the President working to draw out and assemble the facts, asking probing questions, and carrying an indisputable aura of command and confidence in the midst of the crisis.

With still only limited details about the situation available, options were posed cautiously: seize Cambodian assets, assemble a force in the Gulf of Siam, issue warnings to Cambodia through their interlocutors in China, establish a blockade, or seize Koh Tang, another island close to where the Mayaguez was and about thirty-four miles from the mainland.⁷ The objectives of the Cambodians were not yet clear. Perhaps this was part of the ongoing fracas between Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese? The Cambodians had recently seized a Panamanian boat and a Filipino boat in the area and later released both.⁸ Early on, as with many early intelligence reports, there were questions such as whether the attackers were Khmer Rouge—though it was soon confirmed that they were.

There was broad agreement in the meeting that there were two related problems and few satisfactory courses of action. The first problem was how to get the Mayaguez back and rescue the crew. A second was how to do so without doing damage to U.S. standing. One thought was to seize something of the Cambodians’ and demand release of Mayaguez and its crew. However, Defense reports were that it could be two and a half to three days before we could move appropriate U.S. warships to the area. Another thought was that the U.S. could mine the harbor, use air power to bomb relevant targets, or we could send a ground force in to free the crew of the Mayaguez.⁹

Secretary Kissinger urged “tough talk” and a demand to free Mayaguez. “At some point,” he thoughtfully said in his deep German voice while leaning over the table, “the United States must draw the line. This is not our idea of the best such situation. It is not our choice. But we must act upon it now, and act firmly.”¹⁰

The President agreed. He directed that the U.S. issue strong warnings through the Chinese, undertake continual photo reconnaissance, get several U.S. warships organized in Subic Bay in the Philippines—then one of the largest U.S. overseas bases—and order to the area the USS Coral Sea, a Midway-class aircraft carrier.¹¹

Vice President Rockefeller spoke up, tying the situation to a previous maritime crisis that still haunted America. Back in January 1968, North Korean forces had captured the USS Pueblo, a U.S. Navy intelligence vessel disguised as an oceanographic research ship. The U.S. government had not responded quickly enough. As a result, the American crew was subjected to mental and physical torture in North Korean prison camps for nearly a year. Wanting to avoid another such tragedy, the Vice President argued for an immediate, robust military response. He mentioned bombing and a set of escalating steps.¹²

Defense Secretary Jim Schlesinger then pointed out that Mayaguez was likely already in port on the Cambodian mainland. I asked, “When did we first find out about the incident?”¹³ At “7:15 a.m.,” Kissinger replied. It was “3:15 a.m.,” CIA Director Bill Colby quickly revealed. It then became clear for the first time that neither Secretary of State Kissinger nor the White House and NSC had been alerted about the capture of the SS Mayaguez and its crew for four hours after it had happened. That period might have afforded the President a considerably larger range of options, in that the ship would not yet have been moved to a Cambodian port.¹⁴

I suggested that the NSC staff prepare a clear set of options and we were cautioned to keep the information and options confidential until we gathered more information and the President had decided upon the course of action. The suggestion was made to put out an announcement, acknowledging that the incident occurred, that the NSC had met, and that the U.S. government was communicating with the appropriate governments and taking steps to secure the release of the crew of the Mayaguez.

That was Kissinger’s view, but in addition he suggested that a public demand for the release of the Mayaguez and its crew be added. The President agreed,¹⁵ and the U.S. statement declared that the capture of Mayaguez was an “act of piracy” and warned of “the most serious consequences” absent the release of the vessel and its crew.¹⁶

The President signed off on sending the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea and several destroyers, including USS Holt, to the area at flank speed. He ordered that the area be put under continual surveillance by available carrier aircraft. He gave Secretary Schlesinger authority to use antiriot measures against the enemy if the Mayaguez crew were moved toward the mainland. At Schlesinger’s recommendation, the President authorized a battalion landing team of eleven hundred Marines airlifted from Okinawa to U-Tapao in Thailand and for two Marine platoons from the Philippines be available if needed.

Just after 6:00 p.m., Brent Scowcroft met with the President. Brent reported that as of 2:30 p.m., reports from U.S. P-3 overflights indicated that the Mayaguez might still be at sea. Within the span of the exchange, which lasted about seven minutes, a note was brought in saying the sighting was doubtful.¹⁷ At that point reports were first that the SS Mayaguez was supposedly steaming toward Kompong Som, next that it was anchored off Koh Tang island, and then later that it was heading toward the mainland again. This sequence lived up to the old adage that in crises first reports are often wrong and to the truth about “the fog of war.”

I met with the President in the Oval Office the following morning. At 7:15 a.m., Brent Scowcroft had relayed that the Mayaguez was thirty miles off the coast of a second island. An intercept followed that there was an unknown ship near Mayaguez, and that the Americans in the crew had been removed from the Mayaguez and put on the island in Khmer Rouge captivity.¹⁸

Word streaked like lightning across Washington, D.C. Ron Nessen stepped into the Oval Office minutes after the meeting with a report of a leak, reportedly out of the Pentagon. A wire service was reporting the U.S. was sending Marines from Okinawa to Thailand as part of a response to the Cambodian seizure of Mayaguez. The President was not pleased. He had asked that there be no comment on the matter. By then it was nighttime in Cambodia, and daylight there would not be until about 6:00 p.m. EST.

The President decided to notify the appropriate members of Congress, on an “advisory basis,” rather than on a “consultation basis.” That decision was based on his conclusion that the War Powers Act did not apply in this particular instance.¹⁹ Also, it was reported that Thai Premier Kukrit Pramoj had been quoted in a separate wire story claiming the U.S. would not be allowed to use U-Tapao to get to the Mayaguez. The assumption in the meeting was that his comment was for domestic consumption and likely not an actual threat. Regardless, the President was prepared to take whatever steps were needed to rescue the crew, our countrymen, whether or not the Thais approved.²⁰

Another NSC meeting began in the Cabinet Room at 10:22 a.m. on Tuesday, May 13. CIA Director Bill Colby reported that the Mayaguez was then at Koh Tang island. The Vice President, annoyed by the changing intel reports, challenged Secretary Schlesinger on his account at the previous NSC meeting that the Mayaguez was in port on the mainland. The President stepped in to defuse the tension by outlining what he saw as the contingency options.²¹

First, the U.S. would use our military aircraft to prevent any boats leaving Koh Tang—there were several in the cove—if it was determined the Mayaguez’s crew might be aboard. To avoid friendly casualties, the U.S. military aircraft would be directed to fire in front of the boats and use searchlights and flares. As a last resort they would be authorized to hit the rudders and the tugboat that had been spotted.²²

Second, the U.S. would stop all boats heading to Koh Tang. That was an easier decision, in that there was confidence that there wouldn’t be any Americans aboard other vessels. The U.S. aircraft could use force to prevent the evacuation of the American crew if the Khmer forces tried to remove them from Koh Tang. And last, if required, U.S. Marines would board the Mayaguez or if necessary land on the island.²³ Another NSC meeting was set for 10:30 p.m. EST that day.

I met briefly with the President after the morning meeting. He concluded it was appropriate that U.S. actions send a signal of strength there and throughout the world.²⁴ At the same time, it was desirable that U.S. actions be measured and not be seen as an overreaction.

At 6:12 p.m. on Tuesday, Secretary Schlesinger called and reported that the Mayaguez had been fired upon by a gunboat. He discussed destroying the gunboat, and concluded that he would reopen the question once USS Holt arrived on scene in the morning. The order stood for our forces to look carefully to see if friendly personnel had been loaded onto any boats.²⁵ The Chinese had rebuffed the message the U.S. had asked them to relay to the Cambodians, effectively ending any possibility of the PRC helping to solve the crisis diplomatically. Secretary Schlesinger then reported, “There’s bad news.” Indeed there was very bad news. A U.S. CH-53 transport helicopter en route to U-Tapao had crashed, killing all twenty-three Americans on board. It wasn’t yet clear whether it might have been attacked.²⁶

When the meeting was over, the President said that the NSC process was not working as well as he wanted. He was concerned that some of his orders might not have gone out. It struck me that while there are always likely to be glitches, it was important for the President to use the Mayaguez incident to take steps to iron out any kinks he might see out of the system, a complicated system that stretched from the White House over to Foggy Bottom at the Department of State, across the Potomac River to the Defense Department, and out to the various intelligence and national security elements. He mentioned that the relationships among Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Colby seemed frayed, which didn’t help to assure that the national security process would run smoothly.²⁷

A third NSC meeting started at 10:40 p.m. on May 13. The President directed that U.S. Marines be placed on standby to seize the Mayaguez and sweep Koh Tang.²⁸ That message was hand delivered to the Cabinet Room from the Situation Room as further steps were being discussed. A U.S. Air Force A-7 aircraft was reported to be considering destroying a vessel leaving Koh Tang for Kompong Som when our pilot reported over his radio that he thought he had spotted “Caucasians” on the ship’s deck. “Get a message to that pilot to shoot across the bow but do not sink the boat,” the President advised the Secretary of Defense.²⁹ The President was then notified that several other patrol craft had been destroyed after they had ignored U.S. signals to stop. “Suppose those vessels had carried crew members from Mayaguez below their decks?” he recalled thinking. “There was no way to tell, and that possibility was not pleasant to contemplate.”³⁰

I met with the President in the Oval Office the next morning. He was sensitive to the reality that U.S. foreign policy ultimately had to have the support of the American people. He discussed the importance of getting the crew back, and doing so in a way that didn’t encourage future acts of piracy. That suggested engaging diplomatically with the Thais, boarding the Mayaguez, and preventing any boats from moving to or from the island. That also could mean attacking Koh Tang and the mainland and then disengaging as soon as possible. The President discussed having U.S. Navy jet aircraft from the USS Coral Sea provide surgical strikes to reduce possible civilian casualties. Vice President Rockefeller favored using the B-52s from Guam. Because using the large four-engine bombers, which had become so closely associated with the Vietnam War, could have been seen as overkill and unhelpful optically, the President decided against using the B-52s.³¹

The members of the NSC gathered again at 3:52 p.m. on Wednesday for a fourth and final meeting on the subject of the SS Mayaguez. There was no new information as to the whereabouts of the crew and Cambodia had not responded for over three days. The USS Holt was still twelve miles away and out of sight. The USS Hancock, the Essex-class carrier that the President had asked the Secretary of Defense to send to the area, would not arrive until noon two days later. But the USS Coral Sea was on station.

At 4:34 p.m., President Ford authorized the Secretary of Defense to initiate a three-pronged attack: a Marine helicopter assault on Koh Tang, strikes on military installations near Kompong Som by attack aircraft from the USS Coral Sea, and a naval interdiction operation to capture the Mayaguez. Kissinger advised that any prisoners should be taken with us and the President agreed. There was discussion about issuing an ultimatum through a diplomatic initiative. Kissinger advised that he had already done it.

The President and Kissinger differed with Schlesinger. “Henry and I felt that we had to do more,” the President noted. “We wanted them to know that we meant business.”³² Then at 5:00 p.m., the President decided to go with aircraft from the USS Coral Sea in waves against Koh Tang and the mainland. The first wave would begin at 8:45 p.m.³³

The intelligence available, as is often the case in a crisis, was less than perfect. There was only one map of Koh Tang immediately available, and the reported two dozen ragtag Cambodians turned out to be between two hundred and three hundred reasonably well-armed, battle-hardened Khmer Rouge troops in embedded positions.³⁴ Of concern, the Mayaguez’s crew didn’t seem to be on the island. Further, the USS Holt had pulled alongside the targeted ship, but the small force of Marines found no signs of the Mayaguez crew there either. At 8:15 p.m., with U.S. aircraft in the air and the first wave of airstrikes due to start in thirty minutes, Cambodians broadcasted over a local Phnom Penh radio station their willingness to return the Mayaguez. They said nothing about the crew. Unable to rely upon such an imprecise message, the President moved forward with the air strikes.³⁵

The President returned to the Oval Office at 11:00 p.m., after a working dinner with Dutch Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl. Secretary Schlesinger called from the Pentagon to inform the President that the third wave of attack had commenced. Some of the U.S. Marines were unaccounted for and the fighting on Koh Tang was heavier than expected. As of 11:20 p.m. one Marine was known to have been killed in action and eight others were wounded.³⁶

A meeting with the President and Kissinger started twenty minutes later. I was there along with Brent Scowcroft, Ron Nessen, Bob Hartmann, Jack Marsh, and Max Friedersdorf. Schlesinger telephoned to report that a reconnaissance plane had spotted a Thai fishing vessel with what appeared to be Caucasians on the deck, and they were waving white flags. The Secretary of Defense called again minutes later. The vessel had approached the destroyer USS Wilson and the individuals on board were in fact the crew of the SS Mayaguez. “They’re all safe,” the President reported to cheers of relief. “We got them all out. Thank God.”³⁷ The Khmer Rouge had apparently released the crew out of fear of still more reprisals. Having switched into a business suit, President Ford went on television and announced that U.S. forces had successfully rescued the Mayaguez crew.³⁸

*  *  *

Only a very few in the media and the Congress contended that the President had evaded the War Powers Act by “informing” lawmakers of his actions rather than “consulting” with them before responding in the time-sensitive crisis. But the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee praised the President and added his approval of the President’s dealing with the Congress. “I’ve always felt that we were fully advised as to what was taking place,” Senator John Sparkman, Democrat from Alabama, told reporters just steps away from the White House. Tom Brokaw of NBC News reported that the public’s response was “overwhelmingly favorable,” with calls and letters running about ten to one in support of the President. The international community seemed persuaded that the U.S. was on its way back.

Things were a bit less encouraging inside the administration. On May 16, the day after the Mayaguez crew was rescued, Secretary Schlesinger called. He believed that the State Department was circulating stories that they had been leaning forward while the Defense Department had opposed the use of force.³⁹

Mel Laird suggested that everyone ought to be low key about Cambodia. The message was passed to Scowcroft that no one should be gloating. The experience clearly called for taking steps to smooth out the NSC process.⁴⁰

The rescue of the Mayaguez crew had not come without sacrifice. The 3 Marines the U.S. lost on Koh Tang were the last three names included on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C.⁴¹

In the week after the Mayaguez crisis, Secretary Schlesinger usefully raised the need for better coordination. He suggested the possibility of closed-circuit television connecting the Defense Department, the State Department, the CIA, and the White House. Whether on the phone or in person at an NSC meeting, he said, key people had to be working off the same information.⁴²

Cabinet-level officials need to make many of the decisions. The President need not be engaging in less than presidential-level details of military or diplomatic matters. The President asked that in the future his orders be written down and shown to him for confirmation. Then if an order ended up not being followed, he wanted to know the reason.⁴³

In some ways, the Mayaguez episode proved to be a turning point for Ford, who had had to demonstrate his command at a time of international crisis. He had performed well. Aided by a recovering economy, President Ford’s approval rating rose from 40 percent to 51 percent. It was one of the largest “rallies” yet in measured presidential approval.⁴⁴ As I watched the President handle a meeting with Republican leaders shortly after the episode, I made a note to myself. My old friend, Jerry Ford, I wrote, “has done most of what he must learn to do and he’s learned more every day. He’s brought in some good people and is now thinking about 1976 and the campaign. It won’t be smooth sailing, but he’s on the way, and he’s done well and is learning continuously. He’s starting to refine and tune-up, yet throughout it he has kept his balance and what makes him what he is. He knows who he is and what he is, and he may just be exactly the right person for today.” The President had handled the unexpected extraordinarily well—but there were other unanticipated tests still to come.