SMS Ostfriesland.
T he long-awaited day of decision in the North Sea came in an unexpected way. The long-term effects of the blockade, the failure of Ludendorff’s spring offensive in 1918 and the success of the allied counter-offensive, together with the collapse of her allies and civil disturbances at home led to the abdication of the Kaiser and the request for an armistice in 1918. The allied terms involved the surrender of most of Germany’s modern warships, along with aircraft, artillery, lorries and railway rolling stock, to ensure that if peace negotiations proved difficult, she would be in no position to reopen hostilities. The allies demanded the surrender of eleven battleships of the Kaiser, König and Baden classes, the six remaining battle cruisers, eight light cruisers, fifty destroyers and all U-boats. After some debate, it was decided that the surface ships would be interned at Scapa Flow and the submarines at Harwich, neutral Norway and Spain having refused to take responsibility for them. Most were surrendered on 21 November 1918 and were escorted to Scapa Flow. There the order of Admiral Beatty, now Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, was that ‘the German ensign will be lowered at sunset, and will not be hoisted again without permission’. König and the light cruiser Dresden were in dry dock, and arrived in December, and Baden later. The greater part of the crews were repatriated, leaving only skeleton crews on board.
The Big Three at Versailles readily agreed on the need to restrict Germany’s naval as well as her military strength. She was to be allowed no submarines or dreadnoughts and her navy was to be reduced to the level of a coast defence force, with six old battleships, all over ten years old. Replacements were to be permitted when the ships would be over twenty years old, and were limited to 10,000 tons displacement – heavy cruiser size. The six comprised Zähringen, completed in 1902, and converted into a target ship in 1926, Preussen, Elsass and Hessen of the Braunschweig class, and Schleswig-Holstein and Schliessen of the Deutschland class. The first three were eventually replaced by the three ‘pocket battleships’ in the first stage of Germany’s rearmament, while Hessen was converted into a radio-controlled target ship in 1931. Schleswig-Holstein and Schliessen were still in service in 1939, and were eventually destroyed by bombing in 1944–5. Lothringen, Braunschweig and Hannover were retained as unarmed depot ships.
The disposal of the German dreadnoughts presented a greater problem. Initially it was proposed that the eight ships of the Nassau and Helgoland classes, which had not been surrendered at the Armistice, should be sunk in deep water. There were proposals for a division of the spoils and France, in particular, showed an interest in putting some of the captured ships into service. The Americans favoured the destruction of all the High Seas Fleet. The Germans themselves solved the problem. On 21 June 1919, when the ships of the Royal Navy’s 1st Battle Squadron had put to sea for gunnery practice, the order was given to the crews to scuttle the ships. Fifteen of the sixteen capital ships were sunk, and Baden was only saved by being beached in a sinking condition.
This put an end to the debate, and it was decided to divide out the remaining ships, with the proviso that they were to be scrapped, or rendered unfit for service, within eighteen months. Five light cruisers and ten destroyers were allowed for inclusion into each of the French and Italian navies. The ships scuttled at Scapa Flow were reckoned as part of Britain’s share and the work of raising them and breaking them up continued over two decades. Twelve had been disposed of by 1939, and from 1962 the salvage of phosphor-bronze from the screws of König, Markgraf and Kronprinz Wilhelm began. Baden was sunk by gunfire as a target vessel in 1921 and the four Nassau class, Helgoland and Oldenburg were broken up. Thüringen was used as a target vessel by the French before she too was broken up, a fate planned also for Ostfriesland at American hands. In 1921 she was used as a target in Chesapeake Bay to determine the vulnerability of battleships to air attack. Careful arrangements were made to control the experiment, allowing for a series of attacks, with predetermined bomb loads, after each of which observers would board the ships to assess the damage. General Billy Mitchell was intent on proving the superiority of aircraft, and after the first wave had resulted in only three hits from the eleven 500 pound bombs dropped, he ordered the second wave to deliver their 1,000 pound bombs in succession. There were no hits, but a near miss under her quarter caused such damage that she sank within minutes.
SMS Ostfriesland.
A great dispute then arose as to the lessons to be learnt from this episode. The advocates of air power – and there were many – hailed the end of the battleship era. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, who sought the creation of an independent air force in the USA, led what was described as ‘a hysterical crusade’ before overreaching himself and making allegations which led to his court-martial. Admiral William Sims also contended that air power would change the pattern of war at sea. He foresaw that ‘carrier-borne aircraft will sweep the enemy fleet clean of its airplanes, and proceed to bomb the battleships and torpedo them’.
Admiral John ‘Jacky’ Fisher in England also saw the aircraft carrier as ‘the capital ship of the future’. Traditionalists were not convinced. They pointed out that Ostfriesland was not under way, that her guns were not manned and that she had no damage control parties on board – in short, that she was an open and unrepresentative target. Against this it was argued that as her magazines were empty and her boilers not fired up, she was less likely to explode if hit. Bombing tests carried out in 1924 on the hull of the incomplete battleship Washington failed to sink her, so the lesson there appeared to be that modern ships, with better underwater protection, could survive against air attack, even discounting the absence of any anti-aircraft weapons.
For the moment, however, the main issue was that of disarmament. One of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points had been ‘the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic security’. Germany had already been disarmed by the treaty; now the League of Nations was beginning to discuss a wider disarmament. The powers had reduced their forces from the inflated size of the war years. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Britain had begun to scrap her older warships. The oldest battleships still in service were the Majestic class, four of which had been disarmed in 1915. These were now sold for scrap, as were all the remaining twenty-one pre-dreadnoughts with the exception of Agamemnon, retained as a target ship until 1926. Dreadnought herself was deleted from the list in 1920 and sold for £44,000 to the breakers in 1924. Erin and Agincourt were placed in reserve in 1919, and, after an attempt to sell the latter to Brazil, both were scrapped in 1922, while HMS Canada resumed her original identity as Almirante Latorre under Chilean colours.
This left Britain with twenty-nine dreadnoughts in service, the most modern being the battle cruiser Hood. She had been laid down in September 1916, supposedly embodying all the lessons learnt at Jutland, and had joined the fleet in 1920. At 45,200 tons, with eight 15- inch guns and capable of 31 knots, she was cherished by the press as ‘the mighty Hood’ in the inter-war years, so that her destruction in 1941 was a profound shock. Three sister ships, Anson, Howe and Rodney had been cancelled in 1917 before building work had begun. The post war building plans were for four battle cruisers designated G3 with the intended names of Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable and Indefatigable. These were to displace 48,000 tons and were to mount nine 16-inch guns in three triple turrets, two forward and one immediately aft of the bridge. Further plans existed for four battleships of 43,500 tons with nine 18-inch guns, similarly disposed but these were never laid down.
The United States had continued with her building programme of two battleships each year during the war and the 1914 programme had included a third ship, Idaho, paid for by the sale of Mississippi and the old Idaho to Greece. By 1919 she had seventeen dreadnoughts in commission, as well as twenty-three older battleships. Two more, Tennessee and California were ready in 1921, by which time the 16- inch gun Maryland was completed. In a massive building programme, three more of the Maryland class were being built, and six South Dakota class of 42,300 tons, each armed with twelve 16-inch guns, had been laid down. In addition there were plans for America’s first battle cruisers, initially to be of 35,000 tons and with a design speed of 35 knots deriving from twenty-four boilers, requiring seven funnels. Modified plans gave a displacement of 43,500 tons, with eight 16-inch guns in place of the original ten 14-inch, and a more conventional twofunnelled profile. These Lexington class battle cruisers were laid down in 1920–21.
Japan also had a major building programme. After the loss of Kawachi she had nine dreadnoughts in commission in 1918, and was building her first two 16-inch gunned ships, Nagato and Mutsu. Her 8/8 plan, devised as early as 1910, envisaged a fleet of eight modern battleships and eight battle cruisers, with a replacement age of only eight years. The next four ships in this scheme were laid down in 1920. These were Tosa and Kaga, 38,500 ton battleships with ten 16-inch guns; the battle cruisers Amagi and Akagi of 47,000 tons, a similar armament and with a speed of 30 knots. Two more Amagis and four fast Owari class battleships would complete the plan. It was clear that a new, Pacific-based naval race had begun.
With sixteen ships projected against Britain’s eight, the Americans were aiming at parity by 1924. However, Japanese ambitions in the Far East were causing great concern to both leading powers. With her acquisition of Germany’s Pacific islands north of the Equator under mandate, and after her ‘Twenty-one demands’ to China, it was clear that Japan was seeking a domination of the Pacific unacceptable to either the USA or Britain, despite the existence of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. Exacerbating this, financial problems and industrial depression began to affect both western powers in the post-war years. When, therefore, the British Government indicated unofficially to the USA its willingness to accept parity of naval strength, an arms limitation conference was convened at Washington to discuss details.
The Americans brought to the conference table more far-reaching proposals than had been anticipated. They proposed to cancel all fifteen of their capital ships under construction, together with fifteen pre-dreadnoughts, a total of almost 850,000 tons. In return they would require Britain to cancel the four G3 plan Invincible class and to scrap nineteen older dreadnoughts of almost 600,000 tons. Japan would respond by disposing of ten pre-dreadnoughts, and cancelling the seven ships under construction and those planned – 450,000 tons in all. In addition a ‘battleship holiday’ was proposed which, by putting a stop to new naval construction, would maintain the balance of naval strength between the three powers. The implications went deeper than these initial proposals, as Britain had already begun the rundown of her battle fleet, with twenty-nine pre-dreadnoughts (430,000 tons) and four dreadnoughts (97,000 tons) already destined for the breakers’ yards. Furthermore, while America had the largest number of ships under construction, those of the South Dakota class were not even half-built and the Lexington class ships barely laid-down. The Japanese were reluctant to accept numerical inferiority and Britain was aware that acceptance of the American proposals would leave her with an apparent equality, but comprising rather older ships.
The eventual agreement saw an acceptance of the broad principles, but with some modification to detail. The ‘battleship holiday’ was accepted – no new ships were to be built for ten years, and then they would be limited to 35,000 tons and mount guns of no more than 16-inch calibre (an increase to 18-inch had been planned for Japan’s Owari). The replacement age was set at twenty years, with the oldest remaining ships being the American Utah (1911) the Japanese Kongo (1913) and the British Iron Duke (1914). It would be the early 30s before new construction could begin. Japanese doubts were allayed by the consideration that her involvement was limited to the Pacific, while the USA had to maintain an Atlantic fleet, and that British commitments were worldwide. In addition, an undertaking was given that no new naval bases were to be constructed in the Pacific. This prevented the Americans from fortifying a base in the Philippines (then an American protectorate) and Britain from doing the same at Hong Kong. This left the USA with Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands and Britain with Singapore, as their advance bases.
Britain was to be allowed to build two 16-inch gun battleships to match those in the American and Japanese fleets. Meanwhile the retained strength was set at 600,000 tons for Britain (twenty-two ships, to be increased on the completion of the two new ships); 500,000 tons for the USA (eighteen ships) and 300,000 tons for Japan (ten ships). France and Italy were each allowed 175,000 tons total and were to retain some of their pre-dreadnoughts, as neither had more than six dreadnoughts in commission. The earliest date for replacement of their older ships was to be 1927.
There was a proposal that the 5:5:3 ratio should apply also to aircraft carriers, with tonnages of 80,000 tons for Britain and America, and 48,000 tons for Japan. The Royal Navy had already built or converted four ships for a total of 81,000 tons. These were Argus (laid down as the liner Conto Rosso), Furious, under conversion from her original light battle cruiser design, and Hermes, the first carrier to be designed and built as such. Eagle had been restored to Chile as the battleship Almirante Latorre, while other wartime conversions had either been disposed of, re-converted or were in use as depot ships.
As the Americans wished to convert two of their Lexington class to carriers, it was eventually agreed that each of the three major naval powers could convert two hulls without limitations, but that otherwise a maximum displacement of 27,000 tons would be permitted and a total tonnage of 135,000 tons for Britain and the USA, with 80,000 tons for Japan and 60,000 each for Italy and France. Existing ships were to be regarded as experimental and could be replaced at any time, otherwise a replacement age of twenty years was agreed. The conversion of Lexington and Saratoga into 33,000 ton carriers was therefore begun, and Japan decided upon a similar conversion of the two Amagi class. Damage to the hull of Amagi before the launch led to her being scrapped, and the work transferred to the battleship hull Kaga. The Royal Navy similarly converted the former ‘large light cruisers’ Courageous and Glorious and the French converted the Bearn.
Disposal of the other hulls then building continued, with the Japanese Tosa and the American Washington being sunk as target vessels. Britain converted two of the G3 battle cruisers into the two 16-inch gunned battleships she was allowed. These were the Nelson and Rodney which were restricted to 35,000 tons. The original design had been for 48,000 tons. The displacement did not include fuel nor reserve feed water, which gave the designers rather more scope, enabling them to incorporate the liquids into the anti-torpedo defence as a damping layer between the armour and the ships’ vitals. Nevertheless, the reduction in displacement had to be made and the choice, as ever, lay between armour, guns and speed. In practice this was easily resolved, as the vessels were to be battleships with hitting power and defensive armour the priorities. The saving was made in the engine rooms, and they were relatively slow at 23 knots. This however was faster than their American contemporaries (20.5 k) and only a little slower than the Nagatos (25 k). Their main armament was concentrated forward of the bridge in three triple turrets, B turret being superimposed over A, and giving six guns able to fire forward and all nine on the broadside. This concentration of the main armament, and therefore the magazines, reduced the extent of the central citadel and its armour. The secondary armament was similarly concentrated aft, partly compensating for the reduced arc of fire of the main armament, which could not extend much aft of the beam without causing blast damage to the ships themselves.
HMS Nelson.
Until Nelson and Rodney were commissioned in 1927 the Royal Navy retained twenty-two capital ships, but then four had to go. The oldest, Thunderer, had been converted into a cadet training ship in 1920 and was now scrapped, along with two of the remaining ships of the King George V class. The third, Centurion, was to have an extended career which began with her conversion, her main armament removed, into a remotely-controlled target ship. Japan’s oldest dreadnought, Settsu, also became a target ship, but she had only to scrap her four oldest ships to stay within the treaty limits, as had the Americans, while Britain had to lose nineteen.
Further reduction of the fleets was to take place in the early 1930s. The four ships of the Iron Duke class were taken out of service in 1931, and three of them were scrapped, along with the battle cruiser Tiger. Iron Duke was reduced to a gunnery training ship, with the removal of two of her five turrets, her armoured belt and a reduction in her engine power. Japan similarly demilitarised Hiei and the Americans, Wyoming and Utah, and Florida was scrapped. This left the USA and Britain with fifteen capital ships each by 1935, while the Japanese had nine. The limitation treaties had at least ensured that there could never again be a battle fleet action on the scale of Jutland.