Morton Deutsch
In this introduction, I give some examples of conflicts and indicate the kinds of questions one might pose to understand what is going on in the conflicts—questions that are addressed in many of the following chapters. It also includes a brief discussion of the orientations of both practitioners and researcher-theorists to provide some insight into the misunderstandings that often occur between these two groups. It concludes with an abbreviated history of the study of conflict from a social psychological perspective.
Some time ago, I had the opportunity to do therapeutic work with a professional couple involved in bitter conflicts over issues they considered nonnegotiable. The destructiveness of their way of dealing with their conflicts was reflected in their tendency to escalate a dispute about almost any specific issue (e.g., a household chore, the child’s bedtime) into a power struggle in which each spouse felt that his or her self-esteem or core identity was at stake. The destructive process resulted in (as well as from) justified mutual suspicion; correctly perceived mutual hostility; a win-lose orientation to their conflicts; a tendency to act so as to lead the other to respond in a way that would confirm one’s worst suspicion; inability to understand and empathize with the other’s needs and vulnerabilities; and reluctance, based on stubborn pride, nursed grudges, and fear of humiliation, to initiate or respond to a positive, generous action so as to break out of the escalating vicious cycle in which they were trapped.
Many couples in such conflicts do not seek help; they continue to abuse one another, sometimes violently, or they break up. The couple I worked with sought help for several reasons. On the one hand, their conflicts were becoming physically violent. This frightened them, and it also ran counter to their strongly held intellectual values regarding violence. On the other hand, there were strong constraints making it difficult for them to separate. Their child would suffer; they felt they would be considerably worse off economically; and they had mutually congenial intellectual, aesthetic, sexual, and recreational interests that would be difficult to continue engaging in together if they separated. As is often the case in such matters, it was the woman, being less ashamed to admit the need for help, who took the initiative to seek the assistance of a skilled third party.
The wife, who worked (and preferred to do so), wanted the husband to share equally in the household and child care responsibilities; she considered equality of the genders to be a core personal value. The husband wanted a “traditional marriage” with a conventional division of responsibilities in which he would be the primary income-producing worker outside the home, while his wife would principally do the work related to the household and child care. The husband considered household work and child care inconsistent with his deeply rooted image of adult masculinity. The conflict seemed nonnegotiable to the couple. For the wife, it would mean betrayal of her feminist values to accept her husband’s terms; for him, it would violate his sense of male adult identity to become deeply involved in housework and child care.
Yet this nonnegotiable conflict became negotiable when, with the help of the therapist, the husband and wife were able to listen to and really understand the other’s feelings and how their respective life experiences had led them to the views each held. Understanding the other’s position fully, and the feelings and experiences behind them, made each person feel less hurt and humiliated by the other’s position and readier to seek solutions that would accommodate the interests of both. They realized that with their joint incomes, they could afford to pay for household and child care help that would enable the wife to be considerably less burdened by such responsibilities without increasing the husband’s chores in these areas (though doing so, of course, lessened the amount of money they had available for other purposes).
This solution was not perfect for either partner. Each would have preferred that the other share his or her own view of what a marriage should be like. But their deeper understanding of the other’s position made them feel less humiliated and threatened by it and less defensive toward the other. It also enabled them to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement that lessened tensions despite the continuing differences in basic perspective. (See Deutsch, 1988, for further discussion of negotiating the nonnegotiable.)
A conflict has developed between two groups of teachers at a high school in New York City: the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC) and the newly formed Site-Based Management (SBM) Committee. The SBM committee’s eighteen members consist of the principal, the union chairperson, a representative from the parents’ association, a student, and an elected teacher representative from each academic department. All of the SBM members are European American, with the exception of an African American teacher chosen from the math department.
At the last SBM meeting, the math teacher proposed that an official voting seat be designated for an African American teacher. After much heated discussion, the proposal was voted down. But the problems raised by the proposal did not go away. Much personal bitterness has ensued.
The school has experienced a recent demographic shift from a predominantly white student body to one that is now mainly composed of students of color. This has occurred for two reasons. First, there has been a large influx of students of color from the city-owned housing projects constructed in the district during the past two years. Second, as a result, the number of science-oriented students coming from other parts of the city has dropped.
The student population is now 40 percent African American, 30 percent Latino American, 25 percent European American, and 5 percent Asian American. The faculty is 90 percent European American and 10 percent African American. The parents’ association is 100 percent European American.
The BTC believes that the SBM committee needs its input to make the changes needed—specifically, the curriculum is Eurocentric and many school policies are out of touch with the cultural perspective of the current student population. In addition, the caucus is very concerned about an increase in bias-related incidents in the community and wants to initiate antiracism classes at all grade levels.
The members of the BTC believe that although the majority of the management committee members are sincerely interested in bringing about positive school change and are good, dedicated teachers, they lack personal understanding of the impact of racism on the African American experience. Some even seem to still value the old melting-pot approach to race relations, a position the caucus members believe is naive and dysfunctional when it comes to positive educational change.
The BTC believes that having its representative present as a voting member on the committee will add a needed multicultural and antiracist perspective at this critical time of change. The caucus wants to be part of this change and will not take no for an answer.
There are many reasons the European Americans voted against an African American seat on the SBM committee, and they deeply resent the implication that they are racists for so doing. First, they believe that if any particular black teacher wants a seat, he or she should go through regular democratic procedures and get elected by the respective department. New elections will be held in May.
Second, it would not be fair to give a special seat to the black teachers without opening up other seats for the Latino, Asian, Jewish, Greek, or “you name it” teachers. SBM is about department representation, the members say, not about representation based on race or ethnicity.
Third, designating a seat for blacks or establishing quotas of any kind based on race would give the appearance of catering to pressure from a special-interest group and be difficult to explain to the rest of the faculty and the parents’ association. They believe that the best direction for the school and society as a whole is a color-blind policy that would assimilate all races and ethnic groups into the great American melting pot. The site management members sincerely believe that they do not discriminate because of race, and they resent the implication that they are incapable of teaching children of color.
The principal of the school, who is strongly committed to both site-based management and multiculturalism, very much wants this conflict to be resolved constructively. After several months of unproductive discussions between the two groups, during which they become progressively hardened in their respective positions, the principal calls in a mediator to help the groups resolve their conflict. By various means over a period of time, she—as well as the principal—encourages a civil problem-solving discussion of the issue. Together the groups brainstorm and come up with twenty-seven ideas for handling the problem. Ultimately they agree on one solution as being the best: each year the principal will appoint seven faculty members to a multicultural task force that reflects the student composition. Two of the task force members will also be members of the SBM committee, one to be elected by the task force members and one selected from the ethnic group most heavily represented in the student population.
The solution, though not perfect, is acceptable to both sides and is implemented to the satisfaction of the teachers. It goes on contributing to the reduction of intergroup tensions as well as to the effectiveness of the SBM committee.
As Cairns and Darby (1998) point out, “The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its most basic a struggle between those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland” (p. 754). The roots of the conflict go back centuries to the period when the English colonized the island, occupied 95 percent of the land, and introduced a community of foreigners (mainly Scottish Protestants) in Northern Ireland. They became a majority in this area, in contrast to a Catholic majority in the Republic of Ireland.
Cairns and Darby (1998) also state that “years of oppression by the colonists and rebellion by the native Irish culminated in the Treaty of 1921, which partitioned the island into two sections: the six predominantly Protestant counties of the North, which remained an integral part of the United Kingdom, and the twenty-six mainly Catholic counties of the South, which separated from the United Kingdom” (p. 755) and ultimately became known as the Republic of Ireland. Despite the partition, significant violence has occurred periodically in Northern Ireland.
The use of the terms Catholic and Protestant to label the conflicting groups is not meant to indicate that the conflict is primarily a religious one, although that is an element. A small sector of the Protestant population is virulently anti-Catholic and fears for its religious freedom if union occurs with the Republic of Ireland, whose population is 98 percent Catholic. The Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy has heavily influenced its laws in such matters as divorce and birth control.
Other elements come into play as well. The Catholics mainly consider themselves to be Irish, while the Protestants prefer to be viewed as British. Economic inequality has been an important factor in fueling the conflict: there has been considerably more unemployment, less education, and poorer housing among the Catholics as compared with the Protestants. The two communities are largely separated psychologically even though they are not always physically separated. Each has developed separate social identities that affect how the members in each community view themselves and the people of the community. The social identities of the two groups have been negatively related until recently: a perceived gain for one side is usually associated with a perceived loss for the other.
Although the costs of the intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland have been relatively small compared to ethnic conflicts in areas such as Rwanda, Lebanon, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, and Syria, they have not been insignificant. Taking into account population size, the deaths due to violence in Northern Ireland are equivalent to 500,000 deaths in the United States. There are not only the direct costs of violence in terms of death and injury (about 3,000 killed and 30,000 injured between 1969 and 1994) but also the indirect, harder-to-measure economic and mental health costs. Some of these costs were borne by England: the economic, psychological, and political toll from seeing some of its soldiers attacked and killed in an attempt to control the violence.
Over the years, various attempts have been made to reduce the explosiveness of the conflict, including efforts by the Northern Ireland government to improve the economic situation of the Catholics, stimulation of intergroup contact under favorable circumstances, conduct of intergroup workshops for influential leaders in both groups, organization of women’s groups that conducted demonstrations against violence, integration of some of the Catholic and Protestant schools, recognition and honoring of the cultural traditions of both groups, and so forth. Many of these efforts were sabotaged by extremist groups on both sides. However, cumulatively they began to create the recognition that peaceful relations might be possible and that continued violence would not lead to victory for either side. Most of the ordinary people on both sides became increasingly alienated from the perpetrators of violence.
The conditions for possible successful negotiation of a solution to the conflict were beginning to develop. The heads of three interested and concerned governments—President Bill Clinton of the United States, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, and Prime Minister Bertie Ahern of Ireland—played key roles in getting the leaders of the various factions involved in the conflict to the negotiating table. Appointing former US senator George Mitchell, a highly respected and influential political figure, as a mediator was an important, positive step. He was acceptable to both sides and was a well-practiced, skilled political mediator.
There have been substantial popular votes in Northern Ireland as well as in Ireland in favor of an agreement negotiated among leaders of the main Protestant and Catholic factions in Northern Ireland that was hoped would end their protracted, sometimes violent conflict. The agreement was developed with the aid of a skillful mediator, and with strong pressures from the leaders of the three interested governments in constant telephone contact with the negotiators during the difficult phases of the process. In coming to an agreement, each of the conflicting parties had to modify long-held positions, reduce their aspirations, and act with greater civility toward one another, as well as bring the extremists in their groups under control. This was difficult to do. The level of distrust among the conflicting groups is still very high despite the agreement. Its successful implementation over a period of time requires a high level of vigilance among those committed to preventing misunderstandings or the actions of extremists from unraveling it. The agreement itself was a creative attempt to respond to the apprehensions as well as interests of the various participants in the conflict. Its achievement was honored in 1998 by the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to John Hume and David Trimble, the leading negotiators for the Catholics and Protestants, respectively.
Ed Cairns, a social psychologist at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland, e-mailed me on November 5, 2005, with his views of what has happened since the agreement. He indicated that the agreement led to the setting up of a regional parliament known as the Northern Ireland Assembly. This made a good start and included ministers from all parties, even those initially opposed to the agreement. However, the assembly has had a stop-start existence and has been suspended more often than it has been in action. These suspensions came about largely because of Protestant and Unionist perceptions that the IRA was refusing to decommission its weapons as required by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. No weapons were decommissioned until 2001, and the final decommissioning was not announced until 2005. In between, however, there were allegations that the IRA had been involved in espionage, training Colombian guerrillas, and a major bank robbery.
Sinn Fein has also pointed out that Loyalist paramilitaries, which tend to be smaller organizations, have not offered to decommission and are now believed to be involved in racketeering and major crime. Furthermore, although there have been major changes to the policing system, Sinn Fein believed that all the reforms promised in the agreement have not yet been implemented.
The IRA’s refusal to decommission cost David Trimble, the main Unionist leader at the time of the agreement and in the assembly, dearly. He had entered into the government with Sinn Fein—seen by most as the political wing of the IRA. However, Protestants felt that Catholic/Nationalists had most of their demands met—for example, by the release of “political” prisoners and the disbandment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but had given nothing in return. The result was that in the 2003 elections, Trimble lost his seat, and his party was virtually wiped out, being replaced by the more radical, antiagreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by Ian Paisley. Similarly, Sinn Fein made gains in the 2003 elections replacing the Social Democratic and Labour Party SDLP (founded by John Hume) as the largest Catholic/Nationalist party.
Generally these electoral moves have been reflected in social surveys in which a majority of Protestants report that in 2013 they would be unlikely to vote again for the agreement had they the opportunity to do so. Demographic trends also suggest a worsening of intergroup relations indicating that Northern Ireland is entering a period of “benign apartheid,” with segregation now worse than it was before the troubles began in 1968. Observers are in agreement, then, that one lesson from Northern Ireland is that a peace agreement does not necessarily lead straight to a postconflict era but instead may be followed by a postagreement phase, which may last a considerable period of time.
Despite mostly gloomy news, the original Good Friday Agreement is still in existence, large-scale violence is unknown, and there is general agreement that no appetite exists among politicians, the people, or indeed the (former) terrorists for a return to out-and-out violence.
To make recommendations for improving the situation in Northern Ireland, Shapiro (2012) in his case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland, indicates that the problems still exist in fully implementing the argument. He employs his relational identity theory (RIT), which emphasizes the importance of achieving social-emotional relationships between the conflicting parties that incorporates two main value affiliations: building positive, cooperative relations with one another at both the personal and collective levels, and autonomy, which means respecting the other, including the other’s right to have existential equality to one’s own identity, to be independent, and to have freedom. Shapiro’s important point that the successful implementation of an agreement depends not only on the quality of the substantive agreement but also on the social-emotional relationship developed between the parties making the agreement.
Conflicts such as these three suggest many questions pertinent to conflicts of all sorts—interpersonal, intergroup, and international. These questions relate to fundamental processes that have been studied extensively by social psychologists. The chapters in this book address many of the fundamental social psychological processes involved in conflict and develop the implications of these processes for understanding conflict and for managing conflicts more effectively. Here is an outline of some of the processes affecting conflict that are addressed in one or more chapters.
These and other questions relevant to all sorts of conflict are addressed in one or more of the chapters of this Handbook—sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly by articulating the fundamental social psychological processes that occur in all sorts of conflict.
Inevitable differences in theory and practice orientations can lead to misunderstanding and alienation if these inherent differences are not understood. In many disciplines of the natural as well as social sciences, the “scientist” and the “practitioner” tend to stereotype each other: the scientist viewing the practitioner as “unscientific” and the practitioner considering the scientist to be “impractical.” In the hope of fostering mutual respect and understanding of each other’s orientation, the following sections contrast several aspects of each orientation.
The practitioner must synthesize the knowledge from many theories and research studies; she must make a collage or mosaic of many theoretical ideas of the kind presented in this book rather than relying on any single one. In contrast, the theorist-researcher generates knowledge by analysis and isolation of the object of inquiry; the focus is often narrowly defined. Breadth of theoretical knowledge is more important for the practitioner than precision, consistency, or elegance, although the opposite is true for the theoretically oriented researcher. Moreover, because there are no well-established procedures for combining theories to fit them to a given practical problem, practitioners must often work intuitively without being able to specify precisely how they are weaving together the theoretical ideas they are using. In contrast, the pressure on theorist-researchers is to be explicit and specific about their ideas and procedures.
The practitioner is rewarded if what he does “works” even if his practice is not grounded in well-established knowledge. Moreover, he is usually more persuasive and effective if he has a positive, confident attitude about what he is doing and recommending. The scientist knows very well that the path of progress in science is littered with discarded theories and honor goes to those who help to determine the well-established ones. Thus, it is no wonder that the professional stance of the theorist-researcher is hesitant, self-critical, and skeptical toward the theory and research that social technologists often use with a confident attitude.
The theorist has the (rarely achieved) aim of developing knowledge that is universally true, enduringly valid for different times and places, and relevant for understanding cave people as well as astronauts, aborigines in Kakadu as well as Park Avenue sophisticates. Such theoretical knowledge is usually general and abstract, and developing its implications for specific situations requires considerable additional thought and effort. The scientist is especially interested in developing the surprising and thus interesting implications of a theory because its validity and generality seem enhanced by the ability to predict the unexpected.
In contrast, the practitioner is necessarily concerned with the mundane and practical, namely, with those aspects of a specific situation that can be altered with minimum cost to produce the desired consequence. Her interest is more focused on the here-and-now, on the concrete aspects of the situation in which she has to work, rather than on the general and abstract. Of course, the practitioner also seeks to have general knowledge of the kind of situation and type of people with whom her model of intervention is effective, but the focus of attention is on what can be done to produce the desired effects. In practical work, it is more important to know that a child’s ability to learn may be improved more easily and economically by changing motivation rather than by modifying genes, even though the child’s genes may play an important role in determining ability to learn.
This section of the introduction is an overview of the progress made during the past one hundred years or so in the social psychological study of conflict. The writings of three intellectual giants—Darwin, Marx, and Freud—dominated the intellectual atmosphere during social psychology’s infancy. These three theorists significantly influenced the writings of the early social psychologists on conflict as well as in many other areas. All three appeared, on a superficial reading, to emphasize the competitive, destructive aspects of conflict.
Darwin stressed “the competitive struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest.” He wrote that “all nature is at war, one organism with another, or with external nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, this may at first be well doubted; but reflection will inevitably prove it is too true” (quoted in Hyman, 1966, p. 29).
Marx emphasized class struggle, and as the struggle proceeds, “the whole society breaks up more and more into two great hostile camps, two great, directly antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat.” He and Engels end their Communist Manifesto with a ringing call to class struggle: “The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite.”
Freud’s view of psychosexual development was largely that of constant struggle between the biologically rooted infantile id and the socially determined, internalized parental surrogate, the superego. As Schachtel (1959) has noted, “The concepts and language used by Freud to describe the great metamorphosis from life in the womb to life in the world abound with images of war, coercion, reluctant compromise, unwelcome necessity, imposed sacrifices, uneasy truce under pressure, enforced detours and roundabout ways to return to the original peaceful state of absence of consciousness and stimulation” (p. 10).
Thus, the intellectual atmosphere prevalent during the period when social psychology began to emerge contributed to viewing conflict from the perspective of “competitive struggle.” Social conditions too—the intense competition among businesses and among nations, the devastation of World War I, the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the rise of Nazism and other totalitarian systems—reinforced this perspective.
The vulgarization of Darwin’s ideas in the form of “social Darwinism” provided an intellectual rationale for racism, sexism, class superiority, and war. Such ideas as “survival of the fittest, “hereditary determinism,” and “stages of evolution” were eagerly misapplied to the relations between human social groups—classes and nations, as well as social races—to rationalize imperialist policies. The influence of pseudo-evolutionary thinking was so strong that as a critic suggested, it gave rise to a new imperialist beatitude: “Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak” (Banton, 1967, p. 48). The rich and powerful were biologically superior; they had achieved their positions as a result of natural selection. It would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the poor and weak.
Social Darwinism and the mode of explaining behavior in terms of innate, evolutionary, derived instincts were in retreat by the mid-1920s. The prestige of the empirical methods in the physical sciences, the point of view of social determinism advanced by Karl Marx and various sociological theorists, and the findings of cultural anthropologists all contributed to their decline. With the waning of the instinctual mode of explaining such conflict phenomena as war, intergroup hostility, and human exploitation, two others have become dominant: the psychological and the social-political-economic.
The psychological mode attempts to explain such phenomena in terms of “what goes on in the minds of men” (Klineberg, 1964) or “tensions that cause war” (Cantril, 1950). In other words, it explains such phenomena in terms of the perceptions, beliefs, values, ideology, motivations, and other psychological states and characteristics that individual men and women have acquired as a result of their experiences and as these characteristics are activated by the particular situation and role in which people are situated. The social-political-economic mode, by contrast, seeks an explanation in terms of such social, economic, and political factors as levels of armament, objective conflicts between economic and political interests, and the like.
Although the two modes of explanation are not mutually exclusive, there is a tendency for partisans of the psychological mode to consider that the causal arrow points from psychological conditions to social-political-economic conditions and for partisans of the latter to believe the reverse is true. In any case, much of the social psychological writing in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s on the topics of war, intergroup conflict, and industrial strife was largely nonempirical, and in one vein or the other. The psychologically trained social psychologist tended to favor the psychological mode; the Marxist-oriented or sociologically trained social psychologist more often favored the other.
The decline of social Darwinism and the instinctivist doctrines was hastened by the development and employment of empirical methods in social psychology. This early empirical orientation to social psychology focused on the socialization of the individual, in part as a reaction to the instinctivist doctrine. It led to a great variety of studies, including a number investigating cooperation and competition. These latter studies are, in my view, the precursors to the empirical, social psychological study of conflict.
During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, quite independent of the work being conducted in the United States on cooperation-competition, Kurt Lewin and his students were theorizing and conducting research that profoundly affected later work in many areas of social psychology. Lewin’s field theory—with its dynamic concepts of tension systems, “driving” and “restraining” forces, “own” and “induced” forces, valences, levels of aspiration, power fields, interdependence, overlapping situations, and so on—created a new vocabulary for thinking about conflict and cooperation-competition.
As early as 1931, employing his analysis of force fields, Lewin (1931, 1935) presented a penetrating theoretical discussion of three basic types of psychological conflict: approach-approach, in which the individual stands between two positive valences of approximately equal strength; avoidance-avoidance, where the individual stands between two negative valences of approximately equal strength; and approach-avoidance, meaning the individual is exposed to opposing forces deriving from positive and negative valences. Hull (1938) translated Lewin’s analysis into the terminology of the goal gradient, and Miller (1937, 1944) elaborated and did research on it. Numerous experimental studies supported the theoretical analysis.
My own initial theorizing on cooperation-competition (Deutsch, 1949b) was influenced by Lewinian thinking on tension systems, which was reflected in a series of brilliant experiments on the recall of interrupted activities (Zeigarnik), the resumption of interrupted activities (Ovsiankina), substitutability (Mahler), and the role of ego in cooperative work (Lewis and Franklin). But even more of my thinking was indebted to the ideas that were in the air at the MIT Research Center for Group Dynamics. Ways of characterizing and explaining group processes and group functioning, employing the language of Lewinian theorizing, were under constant discussion there among the students and faculty. Thus, it was quite natural that when I settled on cooperation-competition as the topic of my doctoral dissertation, I employed the Lewinian dynamic emphasis on goals and how they are interrelated as my key theoretical wedge into this topic.
Even more important, the preoccupation at the MIT center with understanding group processes pressed me to formulate my ideas about cooperation and competition so that they would be relevant to the psychological and interpersonal processes occurring within and between groups. This pressure forced my theory and research (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b) to go considerably beyond the prior social psychological work on cooperation-competition. My theorizing and research were concerned not only with the individual and group outcomes of cooperation and competition but also with the social psychological processes that would give rise to those outcomes. This work has central relevance to understanding the processes involved in conflict. It is summarized in chapter 1.
In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern published their now-classic work, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior . Game theory has made a major contribution to the work of social scientists by formulating the problem of conflict of interest in mathematical terms. However, it is neither the mathematics nor the normative prescriptions for minimizing losses when facing an intelligent adversary that have made game theory of considerable value to social psychologists. Rather, it is the core emphasis on the parties in conflict having interdependent interests; their fates are woven together. Although the mathematical and normative development of game theory has been most successful in connection with pure competitive conflict (zero-sum games), game theory also recognizes that cooperative as well as competitive interests may be intertwined in conflict (as in coalition games or non-zero-sum games).
Game theory’s recognition of the intertwining of cooperative and competitive interests in situations of conflict (or, in Schelling’s useful term, the mixed-motive nature of conflict; Schelling, 1960) has had a productive impact on the social psychological study of conflict, theoretically as well as methodologically. Theoretically, at least for me, it helped buttress a viewpoint that I had developed prior to my acquaintance with game theory: that conflicts were typically mixtures of cooperative and competitive processes and that the course of conflict would be determined by the nature of the mixture. This emphasis on the cooperative elements involved in conflict ran counter to what was then the dominant view of conflict as a competitive struggle.
Methodologically, game theory had an impact on an even larger group of psychologists. The mathematical formulations of game theory had the indirect but extremely valuable consequence of laying bare some fascinating paradoxical situations in such a way that they were highly suggestive of experimental work. Game matrices as an experimental device were popular because they facilitated precise definition of the reward structure encountered by the subjects, and hence of the way they depend on one another. Partly stimulated by and partly in reaction to the research using game matrices, other research games for the study of conflict were also developed. Well over one thousand studies based on experimental games had been published by 1985. Much of this research, as is true in other areas of science, was mindless—being done because a convenient experimental format was readily available. But some of it has, I believe, helped to develop systematic understanding of conflict processes and conflict resolution. Fortunately, in recent years, experimental gaming has been supplemented by other experimental procedures and by field studies that overcome some of the inherent limitations of experimental gaming.
Social psychological research and theorizing on conflict during the past fifty years have primarily addressed fifteen major questions (see Deutsch, 1990, for more detail about the first five):
Although various chapters of this book have direct relevance to the questions listed here, the aim of this third edition of The Handbook of Conflict Resolution is not to summarize the work done so far in the field of conflict resolution. Rather, its aim is to enrich the field by presenting the theoretical underpinnings that throw light on the fundamental social psychological processes in all levels of conflict. None of the theories is adequate to deal by itself with the complexities involved in any specific conflict or any type of conflict. As I noted previously in this chapter, each theory is a component of the particular mosaic that needs to be created to understand and manage a unique conflict constructively.
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