Dean G. Pruitt
Katharina G. Kugler
It would be idle to assume that a single chapter like this one can be a comprehensive guide to the gaps in the field of conflict studies. The preceding chapters summarize the knowledge in this field, and the gaps undoubtedly greatly exceed that knowledge. Furthermore, future research is likely to follow unforeseen theoretical directions, leaving a chapter like this one in the dust. Nevertheless, we hope that it will provide some guidance to those new to the field and some stimulation to seasoned scholars.
The chapter may seem quite one-sided to those who follow traditions other than those we will describe. But there is no way around this. What we find most exciting and can think about most clearly are research issues that fit into our way of looking at the field.
We have divided the chapter into six sections: origins and impact of conflict, strategic choice, escalation and intractability, readiness for conflict resolution, negotiation, and mediation. Besides identifying recent trends in conflict research, we pose questions that need attention and present some possible directions for answering these questions with some testable hypotheses. We also discuss some of the research methods that are needed to move ahead.
Conflict originates in clashing opinions, interests, or values or in annoyance with another party. Its roots can be as superficial as attitudes and money or as profound as basic human needs such as food, shelter, security, identity, dignity, and control over one’s life (Burton, 1990). Conflict is inherent in all social life; hence, scholars in many fields have contributed to its literature. In this section, we focus on three areas that address the diverse approaches to research on this phenomenon.
Conflict has a bad reputation, but it can be quite beneficial if it remains within bounds. For example, many studies have shown that dissent, and hence within-group conflict, can increase understanding of complex issues and thus enhance work group performance, creativity, and innovation (see Brodbeck et al., 2011; de Dreu, 2002; de Dreu, De Vries et al., 2000; de Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; de Dreu and West, 2001; Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth and Kwan, 1987). However, recent meta-analytic reviews (de Dreu and Weingart, 2003; De Wit, Greer, and Jehn, 2012) do not find this positive effect across all groups, which implies that conflict is productive in some circumstances and counterproductive in others. This suggests the need to sort out those circumstances—to identify when dissent should be encouraged versus discouraged (de Dreu, 2008; Tjosvold, 2008). That problem would seem to call for experimentation in group laboratory settings, where theoretically derived variables can be systematically manipulated. Subsequent field studies, for example, in organizational settings, will be necessary to ensure the generalizability of the laboratory findings.
Relative deprivation occurs when achievement falls short of a “reasonable” standard, such as what was achieved in the past, what comparison figures are achieving, what law or custom says one deserves, or what one expects to achieve. Sociologists and social psychologists know a lot about relative deprivation but not much about its impact on behavior, including conflict behavior. For example, we know from laboratory experiments that people tend to compare themselves with others who are proximate or salient or are similar to themselves (Major, 1994). But there is little, if any, research about the effect of social comparison on social conflict.
The social psychological laboratory is a possible site for studies of these effects. Such studies could build on prior research about the impact of relative deprivation on cognition. The beauty of laboratory experiments is that they allow creation of novel conditions, precise operationalization of variables, and unambiguous assessment of cause and effect (Pruitt, 2005b). The design of such studies might compare three conditions: no deprivation, deprivation in the absence of a standard, and deprivation in the presence of a standard. The dependent variables could be such conflict behaviors as demands for changed behavior, threats, and retaliation.
In addition to determining whether and how much conflict behavior is produced under each condition, such studies should explore the mechanisms underlying these effects, such as whether relative deprivation has its effect by encouraging a sense of injustice and anger. The impact of various moderating variables should also be examined, guided by what is already known about the conditions encouraging relative deprivation.
By group , we mean any set of people with a common identity who have some ability to communicate and take organized action. Groups, in this meaning, run all the way from small face-to-face friendship groups and work groups to departments, organizations, and even nations. How do the origins of intergroup conflict differ from those of interpersonal conflict? For one thing, relative deprivation must be understood in somewhat different terms. Questionnaire studies have found that readiness to participate in social protest is more closely related to collective deprivation, a sense that one’s group is not doing as well as other groups, than to personal deprivation (Dion, 1986; Dubé and Guimond, 1986). In addition, group mobilization is usually a forerunner of intergroup conflict.
Group mobilization theory (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1996) identifies a series of stages on the way to group action. First, individuals must become strongly identified with their group—the group must be an important part of their self-definition. Then they must develop a sense of collective deprivation—a perception that the group as a whole has been victimized, that their own suffering and that of their fellow group members is part of a larger pattern. For this perception to lead to actual conflict behavior, group members must also be willing and able to pool their actions in a joint endeavor. This requires some level of group mobilization, which usually involves the emergence of an activist subgroup with militant leaders who are willing to carry the group’s grievances to the adversary. These three stages—group identity, perceived collective deprivation, and group mobilization—tend to recycle. For example, militant leaders, once they emerge, often encourage increased group identity and greater perceived collective deprivation.
Group mobilization theory is powerful, but it is not yet well developed in the sense of understanding the processes that occur at each stage and the conditions that produce them. We need more case studies to understand these processes and some large-sample studies to test hypotheses about these conditions. Among the hypotheses that could be tested are Dahrendorf’s (1959) proposal that mobilization occurs under three conditions: (1) ease of communication within the group, (2) the availability of leaders to organize for group action, and (3) the absence of outside suppression of such leadership efforts.
We hesitate to propose that such hypotheses be tested with laboratory groups because of the complexity of the phenomena under study and the corresponding difficulty of developing an adequate laboratory simulation. Yet laboratory studies require clear operationalization of concepts, making them a good place to sharpen hazy ideas, such as those now found in the theory of group mobilization. Laboratory settings also make it easy to observe stages in the development of groups because they occur right before the eyes of the investigator.
Studies should also be done on group humiliation, which has been suggested as a motive for the current spate of terrorist attacks. Research is needed to determine whether humiliation is indeed a powerful group motivator (for an exemplary study at the level of the individual, see Coleman, Goldman, and Kugler, 2009) and what conditions produce it in its apparently virulent form.
A popular version of strategic choice theory holds that parties in conflict must choose among four strategies: contending, problem solving, yielding, and inaction (de Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Thomas, 1976). The first two strategies have drawn the most attention in research. Contending, which involves such tactics as threats and coalition building, is aimed at defeating the other party. Because contending tends to elicit a comparable response from the other party, it often makes conflict hard to solve. Furthermore, contending may produce a conflict spiral, leading to escalation that hurts both parties’ interests—what Deutsch (1973) calls a “destructive process.” Problem solving, which is aimed at finding a solution that satisfies both parties’ needs, is in sharp contrast to contending. It encourages lasting settlements and improved future relations between the parties.
There are many research findings on the antecedents of contending and problem solving (see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). However, some of the field’s most important assumptions about this matter are based on theoretical reasoning or inferences from research on related phenomena. For example, Pruitt and Kim (2004) hypothesize that problem solving is fostered by positive-sum (as opposed to zero-sum) thinking, momentum from prior agreement with the other party, and a belief that both parties (rather than just the adversary) are to blame for the conflict. Hypotheses such as these need to be tested. Social psychological research suggests opposing hypotheses with respect to the impact of positive mood on strategic choice. The finding that positive mood encourages helping behavior (Isen and Levin, 1972) implies that it should also encourage problem solving, but the finding that positive mood encourages blame of the adversary (Forgas, 1994) implies just the opposite. This contradiction needs to be sorted out empirically.
Many conflict theorists believe that heavy contentious behavior, such as violence, is encouraged by moral exclusion of the other party, that is, viewing the other as “outside the community in which norms apply, and therefore as expendable [and] undeserving” (Opotow, 2000, p. 417). Moral exclusion removes some of the main inhibitions against aggressive behavior. This body of theory is challenging but quite underresearched. Data need to be gathered on the psychological nature of moral exclusion, its precise impact on behavior, the conditions that foster it, and the conditions that encourage expansion of a moral community to include one’s adversaries.
Strategic choice theory has been criticized as an oversimplification in that sequences and combinations of the four basic strategies are often found (Van de Vliert, 1997; Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans, 1995; Van de Vliert et al., 1999). For example, combinations of problem solving and contending are particularly common and are often quite beneficial. That is because problem solving requires that one be firm about one’s basic needs (while flexible about the means for achieving them), and contentious tactics are sometimes required to underline this firmness (Druckman, 2003). Furthermore, a vigorous defense of one’s position on certain issues provides information about one’s priorities and hence may help the other party locate an acceptable exchange of concessions.
Pruitt and Kim (2004) have put forward some testable advice about how to employ contentious tactics without courting escalation:
Other researchers have proposed that the capacity for flexible and adaptive use of different conflict strategies is beneficial (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Mannix, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989; Rackman and Carlisle, 1978; Raiffa, 1982; Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans, 1995; Van de Vliert, 1997). This proposal inspired Coleman and Kugler (2011) to design a measure of adaptive conflict management in organizations, the Managerial Conflict Adaptivity Assessment. The approach is based on a situated model of conflict in social relations described by Coleman et al. (2010, 2012, 2013b). Their studies show that adaptive and flexible conflict management in the workplace (i.e., changing one’s strategy as the situation demands) is predictive of satisfaction with conflicts and relationships and a sense of well-being at work. This promising beginning suggests the need for a systematic research agenda on conflict adaptivity. This and similar approaches assume that conflicts are usually complex and dynamic and hence require adaptive and flexible behavior.
Most conflicts are quickly settled in a more-or-less positive way. However, a few conflicts escalate, becoming increasingly destructive and intractable, in the sense of resisting all efforts at resolution. These conflicts, though infrequent, tend to be important because escalation and intractability can have severe consequences.
In its most basic sense, escalation means movement from less extreme to more extreme contentious tactics by one or both parties. Such movement often goes through a series of intermediate stages, which can be called an escalation sequence. There are two types of escalation sequences, unilateral and bilateral (Pruitt 2005a). In unilateral sequences, only one party escalates; in bilateral sequences, the parties escalate in tandem.
A laboratory experiment on unilateral escalation suggests questions for future research. Mikolic, Parker, and Pruitt (1997) studied reactions to persistent annoyance by having confederates of the experimenter withhold needed supplies from the participants. The data were based on a content analysis of telephone messages to the confederates. Most participants tried to get the supplies by means of the following orderly progression of tactics: requests, demands, angry statements, threats, harassment, and abuse. They stopped escalating at different points along this progression. Some made only requests; others requests and then demands; still others, requests, then demands, then angry statements, and so on. Groups on the whole escalated further than individuals—following the same orderly progression.
This study raises several questions that require further research. The most basic of these is: Why does persistent annoyance so often produce escalation? There are at least three possible answers, which need empirical test: people may reason that if a less extreme tactic fails to deter the other party, a more extreme tactic may do so; or they may become angrier and more aroused over time, which should make them more aggressive; or their moral exclusion may grow because they see the other party as increasingly guilty of a transgression. A second question concerns how to account for the orderly sequence of tactics seen in this study. A third question concerns the level at which parties stop escalating. Why did groups escalate further than individuals in our study, and why did some individuals escalate further than others?
Bilateral escalation sequences usually develop through conflict spirals, entailing repeated retaliation and counterretaliation or defense and counterdefense. Thus an employee might criticize a management policy, provoking disciplinary action such as denying the employee a raise. Annoyed by this treatment, he or she might then talk to the press, provoking dismissal.
It is possible for conflict spirals to go around and around without advancing in level of escalation. I yell at you, you yell at me, I yell at you, you yell at me. Heavy contentious tactics are being used, but they are not getting heavier. This raises an important theoretical question: Under what conditions and through what processes do conflict spirals produce bilateral escalation rather than simply going around and around? One possible answer is that in bilateral escalation, each party sees the other as responsible for every new round of the conflict spiral, a phenomenon called biased punctuation . Biased punctuation has often been discussed by conflict theorists (e.g., Kramer, 2004), but research on this topic appears to be nonexistent. If this is indeed a source of bilateral escalation, we need to understand the conditions that produce it and the processes by which it develops.
Another possible answer is that bilateral escalation occurs when persistent structural changes take place in one or both parties or the community surrounding them. Pruitt and his colleagues (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994) have put together a theory about structural change based on an earlier speculative conflict literature and social psychological research about related issues. Some structural changes are in the psychological realm. Hostile attitudes and perceptions set in, trust takes a nosedive, and new, more competitive goals develop. Hostile attitudes, perceptions, and goals are accentuated by group discussion through the process of group polarization (see Isenberg, 1986), and these psychological states often become group norms, which are perpetuated by the processes of norm enforcement. Changes may also occur in normative and social structures within the groups. Once groups become mobilized, it is often hard to put the genie back into the bottle. Strong group identities tend to persist, crystalized grievances are easily remembered, activist subgroups often remain organized, and militant leaders seldom fade away gracefully. Structural changes may also occur in the community surrounding the parties. Community members are pulled into one or the other camp, leaving nobody in the middle to mediate—a phenomenon known as community polarization. Structural change theory is a synthesis of much prior thinking, but it is greatly in need of empirical test.
A remaining question is, What are the determinants of the rate of bilateral escalation, and how severe it becomes? Some testable answers to these questions can be derived from social psychological research on the antecedents of aggression (see Berkowitz, 1993). For example, people who have been annoyed become more aggressive when they are recently angered, autonomically aroused, or under the influence of alcohol and when time pressure is too great to allow careful thought. They become less aggressive when they are in a good mood or engaged in competing activities. Impulsive individuals and those with high, unstable self-esteem are easily provoked, while people with a strong need for social approval are not. All of these conditions are possible contributors to, or detractors from, escalation, especially if found on both sides of the conflict.
Relationships between individuals are also important. Several studies (e.g., Bradbury and Fincham, 1992) have shown that people in distressed marriages are prone to retaliate when annoyed. Since retaliation is at the base of many conflict spirals, this suggests that bilateral escalation should be greater in distressed marriages and other hostile relationships, a plausible and testable hypothesis. Positive relationships presumably have the opposite effect.
An old study by Back (1951) adds an intriguing twist to the latter speculation. He found that more cohesive groups engaged in more internal conflict but were less prone to internal escalation. This suggests that strong, positive interpersonal relationships provide enough security that people feel free to raise issues with one another but they inhibit the use of heavy contentious tactics. Back’s study needs to be replicated and extended with modern research methods.
Again, there is room for laboratory research on the conditions and processes underlying bilateral escalation. What is needed is a laboratory simulation that allows discovery of complex interactions between variables and careful measurement of escalation as it unfolds. Laboratory games like the prisoner’s dilemma were once thought to provide such a simulation, and some things were learned in these studies (Pruitt, 1998). But these games are so simple that they do not involve most of the complex processes described earlier. Clearly the field needs new laboratory paradigms.
It is said that about 5 percent of conflicts become intractable—highly escalated, enduring, and destructive (Coleman, 2011). Due to the severe consequences of intractable conflicts, it is important to gain a better understanding of when and why some conflicts become intractable and how to transform and ultimately resolve them.
Drawing on dynamical systems theory, some recent authors have postulated that “intractable conflicts are formed when the cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns characterizing a party’s conflict-relevant dynamics lose their complexity” (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 1470; see also Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013). Complexity represents the degree to which people are multidimensional in their “perception of issues, judgment of out-group members, and action tendencies” (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 1471). Such oversimplification flies in the face of the enormous and increasing complexity of intractable conflicts. In addition to this basic postulate, dynamical systems theory helps understand intractable conflicts by focusing on concepts like feedback loops, tipping points, latent attractors, and others. The theory suggests research questions such as those outlined by Vallacher et al. (2010). Initial studies suggest that this approach is a fruitful basis for further research (Bui-Wrzosinska, 2005; Kugler, Coleman, and Fuchs, 2011; Kugler and Brodbeck, 2011; Kurt et al., in press). However, such studies are difficult to do because they require methods that incorporate complex dynamics.
The basic question in this section is: Under what conditions does an intractable conflict become ready for deescalation and, hence. for negotiation or mediation? A subsidiary question is, What can third parties do to hasten this readiness?
A variety of answers have been given to these questions. Some authors advocate simple contact between the parties (Miller and Brewer, 1984). While this can be an effective remedy in mild conflicts, research suggests that it is counterproductive in highly escalated ones (Rubin, 1980). A second possibility is the development of superordinate (common) goals, which seem more important to both parties than the aims of the conflict. Case materials—for example, the turnaround of US-Soviet enmity when both countries began fighting the Nazis and Sherif’s boys’ camps (Sherif and Sherif, 1969)—suggest that this can be an effective solution. But compelling common goals are seldom available in intractable conflicts. A third approach involves ordinary mediation or various kinds of problem-solving workshops (for the latter topic, see Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 2002; Lederach, 1997). Research suggests that formal mediators have great difficulty solving heavily escalated conflicts (Kressel, 2000), and the problem would seem even larger for problem-solving workshops, which usually do not include the main decision makers of the groups involved in the conflict. More research is needed on the effectiveness of these methods, but as we suggest below, it seems likely that they are mainly effective in conjunction with other forces. A fourth approach involves having powerful third parties (e.g., UN peacekeepers) pressure the disputants to stop fighting and start talking (Fisher and Keashly, 1990). This makes sense if such third parties are available and ready to serve, though much more research is needed on the details of how this works.
Efforts to resolve conflicts often fail and sustainable constructive relations between parties cannot be established. This raises two questions: Under what conditions does a heavily escalated, intractable conflict become ready for de-escalation and, hence for negotiation or mediation? What can third parties do to hasten such readiness?
Ripeness theory (Zartman, 1989, 2000) is designed to answer these questions. Its author, an international relations specialist, characterizes a ripe moment as follows: “The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate, optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe. . . . The other element necessary for a ripe moment is . . . the perception of a way out . . . a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too” (Zartman, 2000, p. 228). Ripeness is a necessary but insufficient state for conflict resolution.
Ripeness theory concerns psychological processes but is not presented in the language of psychologists. Hence, the first author of this chapter (Pruitt, 1997, 2005c, 2007, 2012b) has developed a close cousin, readiness theory, which employs variables and looks separately at the motives and perceptions of decision makers on each side of the conflict. A party’s readiness to de-escalate and enter into negotiation or mediation is a joint function of its motivation to escape a conflict and its optimism about finding a mutually acceptable solution. Motivation to escape a conflict is a direct function of the costs and risks attributed to the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived likelihood of winning the conflict. Optimism is a direct function of trust that the adversary wants to resolve the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived distance between the two parties’ positions.
When the parties are groups of any size, optimism often grows as a result of secret, informal communication between them. Hostilities typically continue during periods of informal communication. Some readiness is required for such communication to take place, but much more is needed before formal negotiation or mediation will be initiated. Third parties can try to enhance motivation to escape the conflict, but their main role is to sponsor, and often to be the medium of, informal communication that contributes to optimism once motivation is established.
The following are some of the potentially testable hypotheses implied by readiness theory:
Tests of such hypotheses need to combine laboratory experiments (e.g., Coleman, Kugler, and Vallacher, 2011) and field studies (for example Mooradian and Druckman, 1999).
Research on negotiation has a long tradition and is quite extensive (see de Dreu, 2010; Pruitt, 2012a). Here we mention three recent trends in this research, each needing further development.
Negotiations are inherently relational, yet as Gelfand et al. (2006) noted, “There is still a dearth of theory and research on relational constructs in negotiation” (p. 428). These authors introduce a model that focuses on relational self-construal, a cognitive representation of the self as connected to others that includes relational cognitions, emotions, and motives. A research agenda introduced by the authors of this model (Gelfand et al., 2006), shows avenues for future empirical work, which is likely to enrich the existing, mostly arelational, research on negotiation.
Other research has explored the relationship between affect and negotiation. Some studies have looked at the impact of affect on negotiator behavior (Carnevale and Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998) and, more recently, the impact of knowledge about the other party’s affect (Van Kleef, de Dreu, and Manstead, 2004). A blind spot in this research has been the impact of displayed affect (Pruitt, 2012a). For example, the following questions need to be addressed empirically: Does displayed negative affect provide information that helps the other party find a mutually beneficial solution, or does it produce conflict spirals that fuel the conflict further? If it has both effects, what conditions encourage one over the other?
Another recent development is the study of stages in negotiation. For example, several authors have put forward psychological models concerning when and why people initiate negotiation or refrain from doing so (e.g., Reif and Brodbeck, 2011; Volkema and Fleck, 2012). These models open new avenues for research. The reasons for initiating a negotiation can strongly influence the subsequent processes during the negotiation, a phenomenon that also needs to be explored. Time series methods (e.g., Putnam, 1990) facilitate the study of later stages and the turning points between them. However, there is little convergence in the results of studies using these methods, with each investigator finding different stages and sequences of stages (see Pruitt, 2012a). Clearly these strands need to be untangled and a theory built that explains the various findings. Such an effort might begin with Druckman’s (2001) simple classification of negotiator strategy as cooperative versus competitive. In his study, 75 percent of the turning points in negotiation were positive (competitive followed by cooperative) and 25 percent were negative (cooperative followed by competitive). Follow-up research is needed to find the conditions and processes leading to one versus the other type of turning point.
Mediation can be defined as third parties helping disputants overcome their differences. It can be formal, in the sense of involving specially trained third parties who offer their services to the public, or emergent, in the sense of involving third parties who are drawn from the same social milieu as the disputants. (For comprehensive summaries of the mediation research, see Pruitt, 2012a, and Wall and Dune, 2012.)
Mediation has traditionally been viewed as assisted negotiation, the goal being to aid the disputants reach a viable agreement through problem solving (see Kressel, 2000; Herrman, 2006). The mediator helps the parties locate the interests (goals, values, needs) underlying their initial positions and their priorities among these interests. Then a search is made for options that satisfy these interests and priorities. If the parties are unable to devise their own options, the mediator throws out suggestions, but the final decision requires agreement between the parties.
This traditional approach has been challenged from a number of directions. A friendly amendment comes from writers who stress the importance of perceived justice in both negotiation and mediation (Conlon, 2005; Tyler and Blader, 2004; Zartman et al., 1996). The argument is that disputants are as concerned about justice as about satisfying their interests. Hence, if one or both parties feel that they are suffering an injustice, the traditional approach to mediation may produce no agreement or an agreement that is not followed. Injustice can be experienced in many ways (Deutsch, 2006): distributive injustice, procedural injustice, retributive injustice, moral exclusion, or cultural imperialism; hence, mediators must have a broad understanding of this phenomenon. Research has demonstrated the importance of perceived justice for success in mediation (e.g., Albrecht, 2010; Bollen, Ittner, and Euwema, 2012; Lind et al., 1993; Pruitt et al., 1993), but more empirical work is needed.
The traditional approach to mediation is more radically challenged by two new schools of practice. One is narrative mediation, which sees the job of the mediator as flushing out and restructuring the parties’ narratives—the stories they tell about the history of the conflict and how they think, feel, and speak about it (Cobb, 2003; Winslade and Monk, 2001). Narrative mediators have little use for the traditional effort to discover the parties’ interests because they view these interests as derived from the entering narratives and as likely to change when the narratives change. Agreements may be reached during narrative mediation, but that is not the basic goal, which is to improve the parties’ capacity to deal effectively with each other. The other dissenting voice comes from proponents of transformative mediation (Bush and Folger, 2005). Transformative mediators seek to improve the relationship between the parties and give the parties a sense of empowerment rather than to find a viable agreement. Their technique is very nondirective. They provide little structure and no advice, instead encouraging the parties to make their own decisions and helping them understand their own and the other party’s viewpoints.
There is considerable evidence favoring the claims of traditional mediation (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989), but narrative and transformative mediation have rarely been evaluated empirically (for an exception, see Nabatchi, Bingham, and Moon, 2010). Laboratory research does not seem appropriate for this evaluation unless one can bring experienced mediators and genuine disputes into the laboratory, which is likely to be very difficult. A more plausible setting would be a community mediation center that uses all three types of mediation, if such could be found. Otherwise, centers specializing in each kind of mediation would have to be used.
What is needed first is a careful study of how traditional, narrative, and transformative mediators behave to pinpoint similarities and differences. Then a comparative study should be done in which several mediators of each type handle several cases. The ideal design would involve random assignment of the three types of mediators to cases. This is likely to be difficult in mediation centers, but a study by McGillicuddy, Welton, and Pruitt (1987) shows that it can be done. Finding common measures of success will be a challenge, since the proponents of these methods espouse different goals.
Advocates of the three contrasting schools just described often assume that their method fits all cases. But this assumption is highly questionable, considering the variety of conflicts that undergo mediation. Instead, it makes sense to employ a contingent approach, using diagnosis followed by choice among a diverse set of strategies and tactics (Pruitt, 2013; Wall and Dunne, 2012). Empirical researchers need to come to terms with Wall and Dunne’s (2012) observation that “faced with such a complex set of categories, scholars have not been able to grapple with the two fundamental questions for mediation: (1) What are the major causes/antecedents of mediators’ strategies? That is, what causes mediators to use the strategies they do? (2) And what are the major impacts of the mediators’ use of particular strategies?” (p. 227). To these should be added a question about contingent mediation: (3) What strategies are appropriate under different conditions?
Addressing these questions directly, Coleman et al. (2013a) have begun to identify fundamental dimensions of the situation that influence a mediator’s strategy and the process and outcome of mediation. They suggest a situated model of mediation, which asserts that mediator success depends on the situation and the mediator’s capacity to adopt strategies appropriate to it. Predictions from this model need to be tested empirically.
Fisher and Keashly (1990) have grappled with the third question, distinguishing four levels of escalation that require different approaches to third-party intervention:
At these last two levels of escalation, relationship building is not feasible, and the mediator should try to contain the conflict by taking firm steps to stop hostile action. If such steps are successful, it may be possible to turn to relationships and substantive issues. Firm action of this kind requires some form of mediator power.
Fisher and Keashly’s elegant model was developed in the context of international and ethnopolitical conflict, but it seems equally appropriate to conflict between individuals and between small groups. The model clearly needs empirical test, preferably in several different settings. Taking firm steps to stop hostile action (also advocated by Saposnek, 2005, for divorce mediation) is 180 degrees antithetical to the nondirective approach of transformative mediation, a discrepancy that needs to be sorted out empirically.
The importance of taking a contingent approach is also argued by Dugan (2001), who suggests that the source of a conflict may lie at any of three levels: the issues under dispute, the relationship between the parties, and the broader social system. Conflicts are usually presented in terms of surface issue but on deeper probing are found to derive from flawed relationships or a problematic social system. An example of the latter would be a conflict between two brothers over an old piece of furniture that turns out to hinge on a cultural norm that the older son inherits his parents’ property—a norm that the older brother accepts and the younger one rejects (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Dugan argues that systems conflicts cannot be solved by dealing with the presenting issues or trying to improve the parties’ relationship. Instead, the underlying structural problem must be addressed.
In a study of the mediation methods used by the National Institutes of Health Office of the Obmudsman, Kressel and Gadlin (2009) found evidence of a search for underlying structures similar to that prescribed by Dugan. In a series of case studies, they found that the mediators began with a diagnostic phase in which they classified most of the controversies as deriving from one of three underlying difficulties: a dysfunctional communication pattern, a supervisor blocking the scientific autonomy of a rising new investigator, or weak program administration. In some cases, they were able to work on the underlying difficulty, while in others, the disputants insisted on a more superficial, issue-based approach. Similar diagnostic templates are sometimes used by family therapists, who classify cases as arising from such standard causes as parental blockage of adolescent efforts to break away or the husband retreats–wife pursues pattern. It is possible that professional mediators often develop a typology of underlying causes in the realm of their practice and use this typology to diagnose new cases. If so, our field needs more in-depth case studies like that done by Kressel and Gadlin and broader theoretical work once they have been done.
Sometimes more than one mediator is involved with a dispute. For example, in formal comediation, two trained mediators are assigned to a case. Differences between these mediators often mirror differences between the disputants—for example, black and Hispanic mediators when one disputant is black and the other Hispanic. The pluses and minuses of comediation need theoretical analysis and empirical test.
In emergent mediation, two or more mediators may form a communication chain between the disputants. For example, in Northern Ireland in the early 1990s, a chain went from Sinn Fein (the political wing of the Irish Republic Army) to the SDLP (a moderate Catholic political party) to the government of Northern Ireland and then to the government of Great Britain (Pruitt, 2007). It can be argued that such chains are useful for two reasons: (1) there is greater understanding and trust between parties adjacent in the chain than between the parties at either end, and (2) chain length makes it hard for hawks in each camp to detect and thwart peacemaking efforts. Research is needed to fully understand the functions of such chains, the conditions under which they form, the extent of their success, and how chain users cope with the inevitable distortions in messages that are transmitted through chains.
Sometimes disputants communicate through two or more chains simultaneously. For example, during part of the time in which the chain in Northern Ireland was operating, Sinn Fein and the British government were also communicating through a mysterious individual known as the “contact” (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996). Scholarly opinion differs on whether such multiplicity contributes to (Pruitt, 2003) or detracts from (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999; Wanis-St. John, 2006) successful conflict resolution. This dispute needs to be sorted out empirically.
In this chapter, we have identified a number of questions that need to be answered, outlined some possible theoretical directions for answering these questions, suggested some testable hypotheses, and proposed some research methods. In doing so, we are under no illusion that we have made a significant dent in the research program that is needed for our field. That would be impractical in a chapter of this length and impossible for two scholars to achieve. Rather, we have explored the issues and ideas we know best. It is likely that other authors would come up with very different agendas. Our hope is that a few of you have found in this chapter an idea or two that will stimulate future research.
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