SINCE THE FALL of the Berlin Wall, the integration of former socialist countries into the EU, as well as wider economic processes of globalisation, has made borders more porous allowing people and goods to move more freely, developing what the sociologist Bauman (2000) termed ‘liquid modernity’. The theoretical concept of mobilities has been developed to make sense of the increased and uneven geopolitical and everyday mobilities and immobilities of people and things under processes of neoliberal globalisation (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006). Following Brexit, and the election of President Trump in the USA, is arguably a new geopolitical world order of re-bordering where the movement of people and things will be subject to new controls, making travel more difficult. These events will undoubtedly affect ‘tourism mobilities’ – the integration of tourism with other practices of mobility such as migration and its infrastructures (Sheller and Urry, 2004; Rickly, Hannam and Mostafanezhad, 2016).
The popular vote in favour of Brexit in the UK (although not in Scotland specifically) has been seen to be a reflection of UK residents or hosts (as tourism researchers would term them) being worried about immigration, particularly the wrong types of immigrants. Much of this sentiment was supported by media emphasis on the economic impact of potential migrants who might become a burden on UK taxpayers (Vollmer, 2016). In Scotland, however, the popular vote was to remain part of the EU, perhaps reflecting the lower levels of net migration. In 2011, an estimated 14,000 EU citizens, or 37 per cent of total inflow, entered Scotland as migrants. In the same year, citizens from non-EU countries (Commonwealth and other countries) represented 47 per cent of international immigrants to Scotland, while 16 per cent were British citizens (Allen, 2013).
This situation had given rise to a somewhat difficult and challenging political scenario for the UK and Scottish governments respectively, and increased uncertainties. Whilst the aim of Brexit may be to regulate the freedom of movement of those that wish to migrate in search of a better or even different lifestyle, these regulations will also have consequences for those that wish to move for tourism and cross-border leisure. While the weakening of the British currency is an incentive for overseas visitors to visit the UK as costs of travelling and shopping become cheaper, this may only be in the short-term unless a robust tourism plan is put in place.
From a demand-side perspective, tourism as a social and cultural practice relies upon the idea that people have the freedom to move. A passport literally signifies the ability to move across national boundaries unhindered, but with Brexit this ability will lead to new real and perceived frictions of travel where border crossings are slowed and the movement of people and things for tourism and leisure become more regulated and subject to surveillance and sorting (Adey, 2002). It has been recognised that the ‘freedom’ to travel already involves many obligations or ‘unfreedoms’ (Freudendal-Pedersen, 2009) such as getting to the airport in time, queuing, and so on and these will undoubtedly increase as passengers are subjected to more ‘checks’ by those in control. Such ‘inconveniences’ may be magnified by social media and negatively impacting tourist arrivals. Scottish (and all British) travellers are unlikely to enjoy the same type of benefits they previously enjoyed from existing bilateral agreements related to travel across countries in the EU (Lim, 2017). With a significant number of ageing Scottish migrants resident abroad in the EU, this could become a long-term and significant issue as many rely on reciprocal health agreements.
From a supply-side perspective there is a recognised global ‘war for talent’ of skilled workers (and volunteers, interns and students) in knowledge-based economies that processes of re-bordering will directly impact. It has been recognised that migration has had a positive impact on the recruitment of skilled and unskilled workers into the tourism and hospitality industries (Janta and Ladkin, 2013). Furthermore, migration has been noted as having a key role to play in meeting the Scottish government’s economic strategy as Scottish employers value migrants and international students (Rolfe and Metcalf, 2009).
If we examine urban and rural differences, cities which have their own economic hinterlands, such as the global centres of London, Paris, New York and so on, will remain globally self-sustaining in terms of tourism. However, the social and economic consequences of Brexit will be more severe for those urban areas on the global periphery. The affects will also be uneven between, and within, urban areas and between urban and rural areas.
Data of migration to Edinburgh, a city which relies on events, tourism and hospitality as its economic cornerstone, reveals that Edinburgh has more registered workers from Spain than from Poland (Edinburgh City Council, 2016). As a consequence, the cosmopolitan culture of the city may be negatively affected by regulations and limits placed on tourism, hospitality and events workers, as well as students who fill many of these seasonal and part-time occupations. Furthermore, the related impact on international student recruitment to Scottish universities also needs to be taken into account in any impact analysis of tourism mobilities.
Scotland’s rural tourism economy will also feel the pressure from reduced EU investment in tourism and leisure based industries in the future. However, the weakening of the British currency as a result of Brexit has increased the cost of travelling overseas for British citizens and may lead to more ‘staycations’ as a result (as happened during the previous economic recession) thus boosting the Scottish rural tourism sector in the short-term at least.
The shock of the event of Brexit can be described as more than the sum of its parts, leading to greater uncertainties and processes of re-bordering. The effects will undoubtedly be geographically and socially uneven across Scotland. A detailed evidence base needs to be further developed to ascertain both the overall and the specific impacts on particular sectors of the Scottish tourism economy, from tourism demand as well as tourism supply perspectives, so that a long-term plan can be put in place.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2017.1278970
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