Offering Hope

Our patience will achieve more than our force.

—Edmund Burke

My main approach was to deepen his and my burgeoning relationship, not terrify him. Developing trust is more natural to me than intimidation. In any event, one can only be oneself. One’s character will emerge eventually, even through concerted efforts to project certain attributes or attitudes.

Over the following days, CAPTUS became less tense. He showed what I came to find a likeable personality; a bit of the hustler and rough, but with bonhomie. It was unclear to me how clever CAPTUS was, and he was frustratingly incoherent. He reminded me of so many I had met in the Third World, who saw shapes and heard signs where I saw shadows and heard sounds, who often understood my words, but not my meaning. I supposed, too, of course, that I had my own delusions about what CAPTUS meant and thought. But how could I know what they were?

I tended to keep this sort of reflection to myself, or at least to be selective about to whom I shared my views on how cultural anthropology provided relevant insights to case officer operations—and interrogations. Many times over the years superiors had told me, one way or another, that “we don’t do sociology in the DO; we collect intelligence.” This was not a moment to be the abstruse “Harvard guy.” Nonetheless, each day I worked hard to know CAPTUS as a man. Flies, honey, and vinegar, I thought.

CAPTUS’s and my worlds were so different. XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX.1

The KUBARK manual had noted the usefulness of discussing ideology or religion to establish rapport and motivation, and to help the detainee reason his own way toward cooperation. It noted the merits of “discussing the principles of and offering valid alternatives to the ideology that motivated the subject . . . to provide him reasons which he can use to justify for himself switching sides.” I considered this sound advice and assessment, and followed KUBARK’s precepts.

The KUBARK manual was remembered by the public, if at all, only from the Agency’s involvement with the Contras in the mid-1980s, for a few controversial passages concerning coercive methods in interrogation. But I was repeatedly surprised to find that KUBARK presented a remarkably accurate portrayal of a detainee’s reactions and thoughts, and in a number of regards a subtle and even humane approach to interrogation. This was ironic on a number of levels: Two decades earlier, as I was beginning my career, the KUBARK manual was cited by many as proof of the Agency’s involvement in torture and human rights violations. But this misinterpreted the objective of the KUBARK manual. I knew then that the Agency had worked hard to stop human rights abuses by the participants in the Sandinista-Contra war—I worked the issue specifically in my assignment as an assistant to Alan Fiers, the head of our Central American Task Force—and that the KUBARK manual, for all its debatable points and faults—was part of our effort to stop abuses of detainees. As the days and weeks with CAPTUS passed, I was consistently surprised to find that my reactions and the approaches to interrogation that I developed myself, on the fly—emerging from my intense determination to accomplish my mission, and to do so morally, honorably, and legally—frequently corresponded to the psychological approaches described in the KUBARK manual.

XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXX. Yet, I was no sucker that establishing good rapport and CAPTUS’s willingness to discuss “safe” topics exonerated him from anything. I was interrogation team leader. The pressure to produce disseminable—operationally useable—intelligence now was intense. No one in the chain of command would care what I asked CAPTUS, or how I spoke to or with him, so long as I produced intelligence quickly. There was little time for what I knew would be considered irrelevant, soft conversations. An HVT interrogation team was a huge investment of precious officers, resources, liaison equities, and Headquarters support. The Agency had not spent years finding CAPTUS and committing huge resources so that a case officer could discuss comparative religion with a terrorist. And there was always the criticism against which I had to guard, that I was being duped into wasting my time by a clever opponent.

The days and nights ran together, and I always worked long hours, sending in my reports to a Headquarters waiting for the payoff from such a big coup. Sometimes I surged with frustration and anger at incomprehensible nonsense. I was not surprised to find that CAPTUS came to feel pleased to meet with me. I was the only world he had now; whatever my personal qualities or skills, the Stockholm Syndrome is powerful. Who else was CAPTUS going to identify with? Slow as the process was, the information he provided was useful. Al-Qa’ida member or not, CAPTUS knew things we did not, and needed to know. But my assessment started to challenge the official view that CAPTUS was a willing and critical member of the al-Qa’ida network.

1 The passage above describes how I used CAPTUS’s and my cultural and religious differences to assess his motivations, actions, and truthfulness.