Sincere, a Dupe, or a Liar?

Seek simplicity, then mistrust it.

—Anonymous

“Jesus Christ. We are really sorry suckers.”

The reporting started to arrive from the other individual who had been rendered and who was considered part of CAPTUS’s network, while I was working on the elegant walk-in. It was apparent through the neutral and careful tones of the cables that XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX. He, the new detainee and ostensible member of CAPTUS’s network, probably did know some al-Qa’ida personnel and activities XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX. This did not make him a critical node of the al-Qa’ida network. This was absurd, I thought.

Jack turned toward me, by now long accustomed to my outbursts at the computer. He started to smile in anticipation.

“Yes?”

“Now we seize retards. This other guy we’ve rendered—it turns out he’s either a superb actor, playing a sort of terrorist’s version of the insanity defense, or he’s mentally deficient. A retard.”

Jack just looked at me, his eyebrows raised in surprised bemusement, initially enjoying my commentary, but then realizing that I was sardonic because I was serious, and disgusted. He sensed I was not in the mood for flippant repartee. I continued to vent my anger.

“XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX . Holy shit.”

“Oh, man,” was all Jack could say. He stayed out of my way. I returned to my cable writing, silent for a while.

Was rendering this individual called for? Did we need to cast such a wide net on this case and in general in response to 9/11, or were we acting simply, crudely, and without just proportion to our targets’ access, knowledge, and putative involvement in terrorism? Headquarters, on instruction from the administration, was proceeding on the view that it was better to err than to allow even the possibility of obtaining valuable information to go unexploited. Americans had died and we would not let this happen again, no matter what. Of course we all were committed to destroying al-Qa’ida and to protecting America. But I had come to feel from my involvement in the CAPTUS case that nuance and judgment were lacking, and that our actions were too often crude and unjustifiable. Lives—American and non-American—were at stake. We would—I would—do everything I could to protect them, but war or not, it was our duty to get it right, not convince ourselves and our masters that flailing and callousness about collateral damage was useful aggressiveness. Our rules of engagement lacked nuance and understanding, and had become scandalous.

The elegant walk-in returned. Josh and I met him again. Josh was slightly on edge, trying hard to get everything right, because meeting with assets was new to him still. The elegant walk-in was, once again, reserved and poised. I was pleased to meet with him again; his case was straightforward intelligence work, the kind I had done for many years. It had none of the troubling aspects of the interrogation case in which I was involved.

“I . . . have more information.”

What the walk-in then described, if true, was important to U.S. national security. This was good.

Then he explained how he claimed to have obtained it. This was not good.

As with many assets, I was not at all convinced that the elegant walk-in grasped the dangers he was running, or would take Josh’s and my cautions to heart.

Nonetheless, the elegant walk-in agreed to do as we asked. I took his explanation of how he had obtained his information to be, perversely, a sign of his legitimacy. It was a typical error of a neophyte. I saw no reason for a fabricator or a provocation to inject such foolish behavior into his description of his activities. A fabricator or double agent would be more likely focused on conveying the disinformation he wanted us to report. But who knew? Perhaps he was an especially smooth double agent.

XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX. I was inclined to accept him as a legitimate walk-in. But our formal view was that, for the moment, we had to proceed with the possibility in mind that he was a well-orchestrated provocation or disinformation operation by the XXXXX intelligence service. We were faced with a recurring dilemma in clandestine operations: the walk-in had provided unique, important information. But he was the sole source for this information. XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX. It was risky to rely on a single source. We had to decide whether to disseminate information to our policy makers and war fighters concerning matters of life and death, war and peace, which was critical to save American lives, but which might be a fabrication, and setting up our men, women, and policies for some unidentified enemy operation.

At about the same time that the elegant walk-in appeared, unbeknownst to me, the subsequently infamous source CURVEBALL provided crucial information about Iraq’s putative weapons of mass destruction programs, duping the Neocon leaders of our country and elements of the intelligence community, because it comforted the preconceptions and goals of those receiving it, and came to be the pillar on which the justification for the invasion of Iraq rested—despite strong DO opposition and the fact that CURVEBALL was a sole source of critical intelligence. Of course, he was later revealed to be the flagrant fabricator and charlatan that the DO had maintained all along.

Although those involved in the elegant walk-in case and I were unaware of CURVEBALL, the central issue for us in the field was addressing the issue of independent corroboration, and whether to disseminate the walk-in’s claims in intelligence reports (the relevant Headquarters desk, of course, was aware of all reporting on the subjects about which the elegant walk-in claimed to have information, and was better able to assess each report). Resolving bona fides and deciding whether information merited dissemination was a standard part of running a case.

The elegant walk-in returned once more to the country where I was working.

“I do not believe that I will be returning here,” he told us.

I found that somewhat alerting.

Whatever the explanation, XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XX. I had to run the CAPTUS case, Josh had his own responsibilities, and we had officers there, anyway. The walk-in agreed to provide any information he was able to obtain and to do whatever the colleague asked. We arranged for the walk-in to do XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX X XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX “ops tests” XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX. I arranged these steps in my last meeting with the elegant walk-in, as I was increasing the pressure on CAPTUS, and preparing for what I anticipated would be an order for a second CAPTUS rendition. The walk-in had no idea that I was about to leave the country for a while, but XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX . If he made the rounds of countries he had described to me as part of his regular business routine, and had traveled to where I was several times in a several-week period, why would he all of a sudden not travel here again? Who knew? There were multiple benign explanations. Almost everything he had told me had checked out. But not every last detail. We had to be paranoid, and believe nothing. This was, simply, sound tradecraft, lest we be diddled. And one cannot afford to be outmaneuvered in intelligence operations, particularly concerning matters of war. So, to the elegant walk-in I bid farewell, with warm thanks for his selfless saving of lives. To Headquarters and the field stations involved, I shared the general interest, but not entirely dissipated wariness, we yet felt.

After the meeting, Josh and I walked upstairs to brief the COS.

“What do you think?” I asked as we passed through the quiet hallways.

“I don’t know what to think,” Josh replied. I had to suppress my excitement about the case, lest I appear a sucker, and risk losing sight of the dangers of being misled.

“I think he is pretty plausible,” I said, going as far as I dared.

We cabled Headquarters and the relevant field stations that we shared the general interest in the case, but that our wariness was not entirely dissipated, not yet.

I never saw the elegant walk-in again. The case moved beyond my need-to-know. I do know that we continued to run him for a while, however, and to try to verify his information. I believe the Agency decided not long after my involvement in the case had ended to disseminate the intelligence reports I had written with the information he had provided XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX . To this day, I do not know whether the elegant walk-in was sincere and that we saved lives, was a dupe, or was a liar. I believe the first.