Sometime ago, in what used to be referred to as the 20th Century, in certain antique inscriptions, or something like one hundred and two ziks before the modern era, there was a British philosopher, as it is said, there will always be an England, whose name may have been Bartelby Russett. And although contemporary pundits have an unwonted tendency to ignore or dispraise the Middle Ages, it must be understood that there were in such benighted, ignorant, and barbarous times occasional men of outstanding intellectual stature, of which small number Bartelby Russett was undeniably one. Had he not stood on the shoulders of pigmies he might have seen less far than he did. Russett once opined that the world might have been created but five minutes ago, bearing within it all the signs of age, memories, beliefs, records, contracts, plans, crumbling parchments, obsolete musical instruments, families, geological strata, weathered rocks, fossils, old books, old shoes, partially decayed radioactive substances, and such. The remarkable thing about Russett’s hypothesis, which was, predictably, ignored or derided in his own time, was how very close to the mark he had actually come, given the imprecise, primitive technology of his time. As it has turned out, and as every schoolboy now knows, it actually came into existence not five but four minutes ago, bearing within it all the signs of age, including Russett’s hypothesis itself.
To be sure, one of the fascinating aspects of Russett’s hypothesis involves an intriguing philosophical anomaly. Namely, how do we know, really, that the world did not come into existence billions of years ago, and slowly, gradually, develop into its present state? It is a possibility, one supposes, at least logically. Skeptics enjoy playing with such ideas, the flippant idlers. According to science, and common sense, the world is something like four minutes old, give or take a few seconds, but will the skeptic subdue his irresponsible playfulness and have the common decency to acquiesce in this point, to desist in his reckless amusements, and accept the cognitively accredited, indisputably established results of contemporary science? No. He will relentlessly tantalize us with his shallow, silly, reckless, meretricious possibilities. Who could answer him? Who would want to? If he will not accept the results of scientific inquiry, what will he accept? What has he to offer in its place? Has he a plausible challenge to science? Has he, say, a different, or better, science? No, there is no practical, relevant alternative which he offers us. Why should the burden of proof in such a rash, giddy matter be on us, and not upon him? Fie upon him! Fie upon all scatterbrains!
Let him offer his considerations.
We shall refute him at every turn.
He suggests that the scientific hypothesis is implausible, but this is absurd, because it is itself the scientific hypothesis, and thus defines plausibility. Perhaps he wonders what point there would be to the scientific hypothesis, but, better, what point would there be to his gradualistic hypothesis; too, scientific hypotheses do not have to have points; they need only truth.
Perhaps he thinks the scientific hypothesis is arbitrary, but are not all beginnings arbitrary? If there is no problem with beginning billions of years ago, as he sees it, then, too, there is no problem with beginning four minutes, or so, ago. Perhaps the world might have started, say, five minutes ago, as in the Russett hypothesis, but, in fact, it didn’t. Who are we to tell the world when, or how, to get underway?
Perhaps he thinks the scientific view is “disruptive”? But it would be so only if one accepted his own view. Are not such things relative? Why is it more disruptive to begin recently than billions of years ago? Too, why should a beginning be “disruptive”? Why should it not just be a beginning? Too, a beginning cannot be disruptive because before it there is nothing to disrupt.
The skeptic might suggest that his own vapid view is to be preferred to the scientific point of view on the grounds of allowing for the laws of nature, the principle of the conservation of matter/energy, and such, but this is to misunderstand the scientific view. The laws of nature, the principle of the conservation of matter/energy, and such, are part and parcel of the scientific view. It could not get along without them. It is merely that they haven’t been around as long as the skeptic would like. They had to start sometime, so why when they say, and not when science says?
Perhaps the skeptic bemoans the scientific view because it seems to presuppose a transempirical causative factor? Well, it does not presuppose such within its world. And outside of its world, so to speak, is it not in the same boat with the skeptic’s suggestions? Surely the mystery is there, on both views. Indeed, as the world is of recent origin the skeptic’s view of an operative, effecting mystery more than five minutes ago is simply a mistake. It could not have occurred in the past because the past does not exist, or at least not much it. To be sure, it is growing.
Consider typical criteria for evaluating hypotheses, such as precision, clarity, simplicity, testability, fruitfulness, scope, and conservatism. The scientific hypothesis is obviously precise, almost to the second. Obviously the skeptic’s suggestion is deplorably vague. Billions of years? How many billions? Nonsense! The scientific hypothesis, on the other hand, is marvelously clear. Who can not understand it, particularly if they can tell time? The scientific hypothesis, too, is simple, and easy, and straight-forward. It accounts for everything, and with a minimum of explanatory entities. It is testable, too, for one may count backward, and determine that the world was there four minutes ago. As for the rest, it started up then, and did not exist before, so there is nothing to test before the beginning. Hypothesis confirmed! The hypothesis also is fruitful and has scope. It is surely fruitful for its theoretical tentacles embrace and illuminate all fields, and it surely has scope, for it covers everything. More scope than that you cannot get. And if the skeptic is not satisfied here, do not his own views make similar universal claims? And conservatism, or the imperative to respect cognitive coherence, to fit in with other views, to cause as little cognitive dislocation, and revision and readjustment, as possible is clearly a strong suit of the scientific view. It is the scientific view; thus other views which might not cohere with it are, prima facie, to be rejected. And needless to say, the skeptic’s views are not “conservative.” Their adoption would jeopardize a world view, and lead to intellectual anarchy, if not chaos.
By now the position of skeptic is clearly in a shambles.
But, failing to make his point by an appeal to science, objectivity, fact, rationality, logic, and such, he is likely to resort desperately to pragmatic or humanistic considerations which, strictly, are irrelevant to the matter, indeed, which constitute nothing more than an embarrassing appeal to argumentum ad consequentiam.
The following sorts of appeals are typical.
Would not the scientific hypothesis require recourse not simply to a transempirical, causative factor, but to an intellectually offensively arbitrary transempirical, causative factor? Not officially, but one could always speculate on such matters. In any event, would not the skeptic’s suggestion also require something like that, as well? It seems the major differences would just be a choice of times. The skeptic’s hypothesis also admits, of course, in another variant, the possibility of a causeless, eternal ground, for a causeless, eternal world. The scientific hypothesis could opt for the same view, actually. In a sense the four-minute world is also eternal, since it has existed for all time, as it had to, since there was no time before it. It could, of course, have just have popped into being, for no particular reason at all, as might have the skeptic’s eccentric world, rather in the sense of a quantum fluctuation. If the world is the result of something like a quantum fluctuation why not a recent fluctuation rather than a remote fluctuation?
Would not the scientific hypothesis undermine revelation, subvert orthodoxy, cast doubt on the contents of highly regarded books, and so on? One supposes it might, but then science has often showed little regard for the claims of tradition, being determined to courageously follow the tracks of truth whithersoever they might lead. On the other hand, the revelation, orthodoxy, treasured books, and such, are still there, in the scientific worldview. It would be pretty much the same as it is now. To be sure, the world might be better off to have been spared various slaughterings, famines, plagues, and so on. Might it not be morally and psychologically preferable that such things, such books, and such, be understood as valuable, instructive fictions?
The skeptic might object that the scientific hypothesis wipes out glorious achievements, hard-won triumphs, noble deeds, and such. There is something to that objection, but one must remember that the scientific hypothesis would wipe out much grief, sorrow, tragedy, dishonesty, cruelty, hypocrisy, and failure, as well. It means, in effect, we could start anew, and make certain the new world is better wrought than the fictive worlds seem to have been.
Perhaps the skeptic might inquire as to whether the scientific hypothesis is just, or fair? This question, actually, does not come up, because before the world there was nothing, and thus nothing to be just or fair about. One cannot wipe out, so to speak, what never existed in the first place. Too, of course, we can do our best now to create a just, fair world, one freed of the burdens and heritages, the evils and weights, the dispositions and pressures, the miseries and pathologies, of a supposed actual past.
But the skeptic does not surrender easily, even when shattered, even when his position is incontrovertibly reduced to alarmed, shuddering atoms of gibbering rubble.
Might not, whines he, the scientific hypothesis promote a sense of insecurity. Might it not induce anxiety? Might not the wheel of the world slip off the axis of existence as easily as it once apparently found itself spinning upon it, say, about four minutes ago?
Of course, we snort! That is the nature of the world! What is wrong with you? Are you craven cowards? Who would wish, honestly, to inhabit a world which did not dangle precariously betwixt oblivions? Consider the pleasures of thriving in a world racing blindfolded amongst abysses! Who, if rational, would not welcome the carnivorous nature of reality? Who, if given the opportunity, would not choose to live thrillingly on the perilous edge of disaster and extinction? Besides, if the world popped out of existence, it might just as easily pop back in. Take comfort in that, if you wish. Cosmological popping theory, of course, is still in its infancy. We have not yet had much time to develop it, only about four minutes.
But the skeptic is indomitable in his madness.
Would not the scientific world, he asks, reflect discredit on a transempirical, causative factor, one which might produce such a world?
Certainly not, we respond scornfully.
First, speaking of discredit, would not the skeptic’s hypothesized world, if it existed, with its alleged terrors, tragedies, and cruelties, reflect discredit on a transempirical causative factor, if anything could? Certainly the scientific hypothesis wipes out most of that horror, indeed, epochs and eons of it. If one were looking for pragmatic justifications here, rather than truth, would this not be a point in favor of the scientific world? Secondly, expressions such as ‘discredit’ might well be out of place in these matters. Moral predicates are applicable only to moral agents, in moral situations. Solar systems and stars, rivers and germs, rocks, dust, and rain, are neither moral nor immoral. And for all we know, a transempirical causative factor, if it exists, even if it is intelligible to us at all, may be akin to such things, natural things which are and do, of their own internal necessities or vagaries, things to which moral predicates are simply inapplicable. Chide the stone and hurricane if you will, but they do not even know you exist.
You speak, exclaims the skeptic, as though the world were a joke.
I do not think we so speak, but perhaps the world is a joke. If so, is that not a point in favor of the world?
In the scientific hypothesis what happens to history?
Everything, and nothing.
Do human beings not need a past?
On the scientific hypothesis, they have a past. It began something like four minutes ago.