Although the earlier attacks failed miserably, Rodes expected a different outcome once his most determined fighter entered the fight. “Ramseur’s Brigade, which under my orders had been so disposed as to support both Iverson and O’Neal, was ordered forward, and was hurled by its commander with the skill and gallantry for which he is always conspicuous, and with irresistible force, upon the enemy just where he had repulsed O’Neal and checked Iverson’s advance,” Rodes declared in his official report. Unlike Iverson, Ramseur led the way at the front of the assault.⁴

The situation his troops faced as they swept onto the field about half past three o’clock in the afternoon appeared far from promising. “I found three regiments of Iverson’s command almost annihilated, and the Third Alabama Regiment coming out of the fight from Iverson’s right,” recalled Ramseur. “I requested Colonel Battle, Third Alabama, to join us, which he cheerfully did.” According to Capt. James Harris of the 30th North Carolina, he encountered the 3rd Alabama, about 350 officers and men, just as his own regiment stepped into the Forney field. His understanding at the time was that “Rodes’ old brigade did not come up to the scratch—as they ought—that day, and this Regt. by some means was cut off.”⁵

Captain W. H. May recalled that men from the 3rd Alabama shouted to Ramseur for permission to attach themselves to his force as he passed nearby. According to May’s account, the general replied, “N. C. will stay with you.” Still frustrated by the earlier lack of response for guidance from General Daniel, one of the men yelled back that “they haven’t been a doing it.” This time, however, the 3rd Alabama joined in the attack against the Federal position along Oak Ridge. “Away we went with him charging a stone fence,” May recalled.⁶

Another 3rd Alabama soldier reported that he and his comrades “moved forward with a shout” across the field. “The enemy was in our front, behind a stone fence,” he explained. “We could see them; they were ‘pegging away’ at us, like good fellows, and Gen. Ramseur said they had to be driven from there.” According to the same Alabamian, “Gen. R., riding up to the front, clapped spurs to his horse, and waving his hat, cried out for us to follow him.” Their advance carried them through the same hollow where Iverson’s men had taken shelter during the earlier attack. “We now began to notice our men laying on the field,” one veteran remarked. “Some one yells our boys have charged here and been repulsed.”⁷

About the same time, Ramseur discovered on his right Lt. Col. William Davis’ largely unscathed and apparently unengaged 12th North Carolina from Iverson’s Brigade. He ordered Davis to “push the enemy in front.” The Tar Heel’s of the 12th had been holding their position in the Forney field for more than an hour without assistance. Captain Weldon Davis of the 30th North Carolina, writing without a full appreciation of how its position on the far right and the rolling terrain had saved the regiment, claimed that “the 12th Regt actually clothed itself in honor [in] this fight.” He also noted that “three regiments of their brigade were taken prisoners, but the 12th kept fighting, would not surrender, and by itself held the line marked out for their whole brigade.” Lieutenant Medicus Ward from the 12th North Carolina bragged to his parents that they “alone held the enemy in check until Daniel’s and Ramseur’s brigades came to our assistance.”⁸

Lieutenant Colonel Davis responded to Ramseur’s request by ordering his men to let out a yell and “charge rapidly” at the Federals in the woods opposite their position. Within minutes, they could see the enemy to their right front falling back. “So completely surprised were the enemy that they fled in confusion without firing a gun,” Davis recalled with some exaggeration. What Davis did not know was that Cutler’s men were running low on ammunition and had already begun pulling back to the area of the unfinished railroad bed.⁹

Farther north, Ramseur’s 30th North Carolina halted briefly on the field while the 3rd Alabama and 12th North Carolina moved into position. From that vantage point, Captain Harris caught a brief glimpse of the fighting underway between his position and the area south of the Chambersburg Pike. “During all this time a warm engagement had been going on just to our right between the enemy, who held position in a thickety woods, and the 12th N.C. Troops,” Harris recalled. He also observed that “still farther to the right Daniel’s brigade was hotly engaged and further still was Pettigrew’s brigade.”¹⁰

After charging the woods, the 12th North Carolina moved to assist Ramseur’s troops in the attack farther north against the stone wall. “The 12th was badly used up but a part of it joined us in the charge,” explained Col. Francis M. Parker from the 30th North Carolina. “But just how many companies of the 12th went in with us I do not know. In fact, I am not sure that any organized part of the 12th N.C. was in that charge.” The colonel also noted that “it was such hot and close work that a fellow had to attend pretty closely to his own business.” Adjutant Fred Phillips, also from the 30th North Carolina, believed that “every man was at his post, and some of the gallant men of the 12th N.C. Regiment of Iverson’s Brigade which had been driven back joined us.”¹¹

As Ramseur’s 14th and 30th North Carolina regiments moved ahead, their orders suddenly changed. Instead of attacking due east, they were hurriedly advised to file left and strike the Federal right closer to the Mummasburg Road. The warning came from Lt. James A. Crowder of the 23rd North Carolina, who was stationed nearby with Iverson’s sharpshooter detachment, and Lt. Edward M. Duguid of the 5th North Carolina, who had escaped from the deadly field on Iverson’s left. Ramseur did not miss a beat. Colonel Parker recalled that the young brigadier “wheeled the line to the left and then sent us forward at the double quick, or, rather, run.”¹²

The new line of attack farther north was straight ahead along the Mummasburg Road. “We were ordered to left flank, which threw us into the road leading directly into the city,” an officer from the 14th North Carolina recalled. “We marched down the road through a copse of woods.” At that time, the officer continued, they were “ordered by the right flank, which changed the direction of the Brig throwing us in rear of the Yankees behind the rock fence.” From there, the Tar Heels pressed forward into the ranks of the enemy troops posted along the northern end of Oak Ridge.¹³

The brilliant tactical maneuvering was personally directed by Ramseur, who displayed remarkable courage and presence of mind throughout the attack. Phillips of the 30th North Carolina reported that the general “led the charge and he was the only officer on the field who had a horse under him.” Tragedy nearly ensued when “the fine gray mare upon which he rode fell from bullet wounds within a few yards of the stone fence.” Shaken but unhurt, Ramseur continued leading the assault on foot in front of the wall.

Despite mounting casualties, the men pressed ahead with a rush toward the northern section of the fence. “Col. Parker of the 30th Regiment was badly wounded in the face just as we reached the wall,” Phillips recalled. “The bullet ridden flags of the 14th and 30th were planted there, and for a few minutes the fighting was terrific.” Ramseur’s troops from the 2nd and 4th North Carolina regiments, which had moved to support O’Neal’s Alabamians, struck about the same time, moving “promptly up” against the shorter part of the L-shaped line facing northwest along the Mummasburg Road. The arrival of the Tar Heels there began to overwhelm the 104th New York and 13th Massachusetts along the road on the far right of the Federal line.¹⁴

The first sign that the enemy line was faltering came as welcome relief for Col. Cullen Battle from the 3rd Alabama. He admitted his regiment had been in “critical condition” until then, with a mass of Federal troops extending far beyond their position on both flanks. By all indications, the prospects for the attack were far from good. “But there was no time for hesitation,” Battle reported. “‘Forward Third Alabama!’ was the order. Not a man flinched,” he continued. “The regiment was melting away in the furnace of battle, when to my surprise, the enemy’s right began to waver and fall back.”¹⁵

Captain May recalled that the Alabama men “drove the enemy troops from the fence,” forcing them to retreat by their left flank under cover of the stone wall. “This threw them to our right,” he explained. “Gen. Ramseur here halted the right, and threw around his left to confront them, and charged.” Another member of the regiment reported that “on our right the enemy had held their ground with more stubbornness or success than in our front.” He pointed out “that when we had driven them from the stone fence the line had to halt till the forces on our right could push them from a wood, from which they were enfilading us.”¹⁶

The added support from the troops in the 3rd Alabama on Ramseur’s right proved critical in driving the enemy from behind the stone wall. Ramseur credited much of their skill and bravery in the assault to the outstanding leadership of their commanding officer. Ramseur complimented Battle for his “brilliant and invaluable service” during the attack. “Attaching his regiment to my command on his own responsibility, he came in at the right place, at the right time, and in the right way,” reported the brigadier. For a commander to so highly commend another commander and organization that did not even belong to his brigade was high praise indeed.¹⁷

As the main battle line pressed on toward the Federal position, the valiant efforts of Asst. Adjt. Gen. Don Halsey in organizing the shattered remnants of Iverson’s command worked to Ramseur’s advantage. “The Twelfth North Carolina, which had been held well in hand by Lieutenant-Colonel Davis,” explained Rodes in his after-action report, “and the shattered remnants of the other regiments of Iverson’s Brigade, which had been rallied and organized by Capt. D. P. Halsey, Assistant Adjutant-General of the brigade, made under his guidance a dashing and effective charge just in time to be of considerable service to Ramseur and Daniel, and with them pressed closely after the enemy.”¹⁸

Ramseur declared that he met only “feeble resistance to the front attack” once the two regiments attacking from Oak Hill turned the enemy’s right flank. Within minutes, the Southern troops along that part of the attack swung directly into the rear of the startled defenders. “Our gallant Brigadier, Ramseur, seeing the advantage in the face of a torrent of bullets wheeled his entire brigade to the right,” wrote Capt. John Gorman of the 2nd North Carolina. “And before the Yankees could think, we were pouring showers of rifle balls into their right flank and rear.” Gorman went on to note that “their whole line broke and fled, and at one time I was fearful their running troops would crush our little brigade.”¹⁹

After encountering a “severe, galling, and enfilading fire” from the strip of woods directly behind Paul’s brigade, the 4th North Carolina under Col. Bryan Grimes was forced to change front to the right before attacking across the Mummasburg Road. “We then advanced upon the enemy, joining our brigade, and driving them in great confusion,” Grimes reported. “And, but for the fatiguing and exhausting march of the day, we would have succeeded in capturing a very large number of prisoners.” He went on to note that they still seized more enemy soldiers “by far than the number of men in the command.”²⁰

When the right wing along the Mummasburg Road collapsed, the Federals farther south on Oak Ridge began abandoning their position along the wall. Lieutenant William Calder from the 2nd North Carolina wrote that “when we appeared on their flank, the dark mass of the enemy could be plainly seen to waver, break and finally fly headlong toward town, as we rushed after them pouring a deadly hail of balls into their confused columns.” Philips correctly observed that “the retreat of the enemy assumed the character of a rout” once the enemy emerged from the cover of the wall. “Quite as many were captured as we had in the attacking column,” he declared.²¹

About this time, the repulsed regiments from O’Neal’s Brigade and part of Lt. Col. Thomas Carter’s artillery battalion entered the fight from the east slope of Oak Hill. “O’Neal’s shattered troops, which had been assembled without order on the hill, rushed forward, still without order, but with all their usual courage, into the charge,” Rodes reported. “Fry’s battery, by my order, was pushed closely after Ramseur.” Colonel Risden T. Bennett from the 14th North Carolina in Ramseur’s Brigade recalled that he “could almost hear their bones crunch under the shot and shell” as Fry’s Battery repeatedly fired into the rear of the retreating Federal troops.²²

A soldier from the 3rd Alabama reported that they soon “had the satisfaction of seeing the whole Yankee line fleeing like frightened wild beasts toward town, followed closely by our boys,” Captain May from the same regiment insisted that the attack became “almost a slaughter” as the Confederate forces pursued the Federals along the railroad embankment and through a nearby apple orchard. “This was the most murderous assault I saw during the four years,” he confessed. “They were making no attempt to fight. Right there I saw five stands of Colors from first to fifth no more than 100 yards [away].” As “soon as room was made for them to run they did it.”²³

The entire Federal line was engaged in a frenzied flight for safety along the Chambersburg Pike or in the direction of town. Captain Gorman declared that Ramseur’s troops “had them fairly in a pen, with only one gap open—the turnpike that led into Gettysburg—and hither they fled 20 deep, we all the while popping it to them as fast as we could load and fire.” Lieutenant Ward from the 12th North Carolina bragged to his parents that their whole line “drove the enemy pell mell from their strong position beyond the town.” Ramseur agreed, observing that the Federal troops “ran off the field in confusion, leaving his killed and wounded and between 800 and 900 prisoners in our hands.”²⁴

While Rodes’ other troops were knocking the Federals off the northern and central portions of Oak Ridge, Junius Daniel’s large North Carolina brigade was dislodging Col. Roy Stone’s brigade from its position north of the Chambersburg Pike behind the unfinished railroad bed. Daniel’s four regiments and one battalion numbered nearly 2,200 officers and men. The front line consisted of the 45th North Carolina and the 2nd North Carolina Battalion, which “engaged the enemy, very strongly posted along a railroad cut, and in the edge of the woods in rear of the cut.” According to Daniel’s official report, the Federal line of battle was “nearly at right angles with General Iverson’s line and supported by two batteries of artillery posted near a stone barn on the right of the railroad cut, and another on the hill to the left of the railroad.”²⁵

The railroad bed ran on a parallel line about 200 yards north of the Chambersburg Pike. The bed had been graded but no track had been put down. Three deep cuts had been excavated to depths between 15 and 30 feet where the line traversed Seminary Ridge and the two branches of McPherson’s Ridge. The easternmost cut, which ran through Seminary Ridge, was about 200 yards long. The middle cut, behind which most of Stone’s troops were posted, extended through the eastern branch of McPherson’s Ridge for about half that distance. The westernmost cut traversed the main ridge line opposite the McPherson farm for nearly 100 yards at an average depth of 20 feet.²⁶

The 45th North Carolina and the 2nd North Carolina Battalion continued moving forward toward the Chambersburg Pike until “within close rifle range” of the Federal position. From there, they launched a charge against the enemy skirmishers along the north side of the railroad bed. There, however, they encountered a “murderous fire” from Stone’s brigade and Battery B of the 4th U.S. Artillery, posted along both sides of the railroad bed in the area of Seminary Ridge. The enfilading fire from the battery forced the North Carolinians back in confusion about 30 yards.

After regrouping, the two Tar Heel regiments resumed the advance southward. One of the men recalled that they were “ordered to charge the enemy, which was formed in three lines just in our front.” When the renewed attack broke apart the Federal skirmish line and opened the way deeper into the Federal position, the 2nd North Carolina Battalion “found itself on the verge of a deep railroad cut, which was not before seen.” Lieutenant Leonidas L. Polk of the 43rd North Carolina reported that his regiment on the left of the battle line also “advanced steadily across the open fields, until checked by the deep Rail Road Cut, which had hitherto been undiscovered, as it was concealed by the growing crop of small grain.”²⁷

The obstacle caught nearly everyone by surprise. “Suddenly we were on the brink of a chasm in the railroad since known as the Deep Cut, when the enemy opened on us with both field pieces and small arms,” Lt. Col. Wharton Green of Daniel’s staff recalled. “And before it could be prevented the men were jumping down into the Cut with the view to scrambling up on the other side, which was found to be impracticable owing to the precipitous sides encountered.” According to Green, the situation became even worse when “some masked guns opened an enfilading fire, which was most destructive.”²⁸

Following a “bloody and protracted” fight, Daniel ordered the men around the cut to fall back “some 40 paces” behind the crest of a nearby ridge. While far from perfect, that location provided the men with some much-needed shelter from the intense enemy fire. “Our troops were then ordered to lie down, and were slightly protected by a rise of a few inches in the ground between us and the railroad cut, while a detachment was sent around to our right to enter the railroad cut and uncover the Yankees in it,” Sgt. B. Frank Hall from the 43rd North Carolina recalled.²⁹

After rallying his men, Daniel directed the 43rd and 53rd North Carolina regiments to cover the left and brought up the 32nd North Carolina, which had halted just short of the railroad bed, to support the right. While that was going on, the men from the 45th North Carolina and the 2nd North Carolina Battalion resumed their attack against the main line of Federal troops, many of whom had taken up position just north of the Chambersburg Turnpike inside the railroad cut. “The Forty-fifth Regiment and Second Battalion, gallantly led by their commanders and supported by the rest of the line,” wrote Daniel in his battle report, “advanced at a charge, driving the enemy from the cut in confusion, killing and wounding many and taking some prisoners.”³⁰

Captain Van Brown of the 2nd North Carolina Battalion recalled that the enemy were soon “driven in confusion from the railroad cut across the hill into the outskirts of the town, where large numbers of them threw down their arms and surrendered.” He added that “many prisoners were also captured by the battalion and the Forty-fifth in the railroad cut.” The success proved costly for the 2nd North Carolina Battalion. “Out of 240 men, exclusive of officers, nearly three-fourths had fallen,” the battalion’s record of events report stated. “Nearly all the officers were killed or wounded.”³¹

The 32nd North Carolina under Col. Edmund C. Brabble, meanwhile, launched an attack across the railroad cut against a large stone barn on the McPherson farm just behind Federal lines. As they pushed forward, the troops encountered a fierce fire from the Federal battery posted along the railroad cut on nearby Seminary ridge. “The ground occupied by the enemy on this occasion, gave him the decided advantage, with a battery upon a hill which commanded our position and approach,” one of the men observed. He also noted that the regiment “made a charge from its position under the hill and succeeded in dislodging the enemy, but being unsupported on the right and left and the batteries on the hill opening a terrific fire upon it, it fell back to a cut in the railroad.”³²

After reforming around the railroad bed, the North Carolinians attacked again from a different direction “without hindrance.” From there, they soon joined up with troops from A. P. Hill’s Corps to push the Federals back from around the McPherson barn. The 32nd North Carolina, wrote Colonel Brabble, “moved up beyond the barn, and, waiting a few minutes for the troops on the right, advanced near the edge of town.” He added that they captured “a considerable number of prisoners” during the headlong pursuit toward town.³³

The troops from the 45th North Carolina under Capt. J. A. Hopkins, meanwhile, charged directly into the woods just north of the railroad cut. The thrust netted them “188 prisoners in this place and several smaller squads in other places.” Captain A. H. Gallaway’s company in the same regiment overtook some retreating troops from Baxter’s brigade near the railroad bed. After a brief scuffle, they recaptured the battle flag of the 20th North Carolina, which Gallaway turned over “to a member of that regiment.”³⁴

The troops were pouring off Oak Ridge toward town and running for their lives by the time Alfred Iverson moved to the front of the attack. Exactly what he had been doing the previous couple of hours is uncertain. According to the brigadier, he “observed that the enemy were retreating along the railroad, and immediately hastened the Twelfth North Carolina forward to cut them off.” The 53rd North Carolina of Daniel’s Brigade, continued Iverson, joined in the pursuit and the two regiments were the first to reach the eastern end of the railroad cut, where they gathered up droves of enemy soldiers. “Numberless prisoners were cut off by us, but I would not permit my men to take them to the rear, as I considered them safe,” he explained.³⁵

Daniel’s other regiments also pressed forward along the railroad bed against the Federal troops making a stand on Seminary Ridge. “My own troops advanced in fine order, under a heavy fire, the Twelfth North Carolina Regiment, of Iverson’s brigade, keeping abreast with my left,” Daniel wrote after the campaign ended. “After severe fighting, I succeeded in taking the hill, with a very heavy loss.” He wrote in his official report that “a very large number of prisoners were captured, and in the advance my troops passed over several stand of colors that had been abandoned by the enemy.”³⁶

The main part of the brigade pursued the Federals along the eastern slope of Seminary Ridge. Lieutenant Polk reported that, after Daniel’s Brigade cleared the railroad cut and “gained the brow of the hills overlooking the town, we could see the enemy throwing down their arms by hundreds and returning to us, while the long slope which gradually ascended from the town on the other side was literally black with the flying and frightened Yankees.” According to Daniel, his “command continued to move forward until it reached the outskirts of the town.”³⁷

On the other end of Rodes’ line, the Georgians from George Doles’ Brigade, together with troops from Jubal Early’s Division, had overrun Oliver Howard’s Federal XI Corps in the rolling plains just north of town. Rodes later reported that Doles “succeeded in driving them before him, thus, achieving on the left, and at about the same time, a success no less brilliant than that of Ramseur in the center, and Daniel on the right.” Captain Shepherd G. Pryor from the 12th Georgia, part of Doles’ command, participated in the stunning victory that was now obvious to everyone on both sides. We shoved back the enemy nearly “two miles like chaff,” recalled Pryor. Considering the credentials Doles carried to the field, the expert way in which he handled his brigade surprised no one.³⁸

Despite his lack of formal military training, the 33-year-old Doles was widely regarded as an outstanding brigade commander. He spent the years prior to the war as a businessman and captain of a militia company in the Georgia state capital at Milledgeville. When hostilities broke out, he entered military service as a captain in the 4th Georgia. In May of 1862, Doles won election as colonel. After briefly serving in the region surrounding the key seaport at Norfolk, Virginia, his regiment was transferred to Lee’s army near the end of the Seven Days’ Battles.

Over the following months, Doles aptly demonstrated his fitness for combat command. During his first engagement under Lee’s command, Doles was wounded and cited for bravery during the ill-fated attack at Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862. Following additional conspicuous displays of gallantry at both South Mountain and Sharpsburg in the Maryland Campaign, Doles was promoted to brigadier general on November 1, 1862. He once again performed brilliantly during the chaotic and horrific fighting in the woods at Chancellorsville. If anyone had any doubts about his ability to lead a brigade, his intrepid leadership on that field erased them and solidified his reputation as a hard and smart fighter.³⁹

After deploying his force of 1,300 officers and men on the plain east of Oak Hill, Doles spent the early part of the afternoon protecting Rodes’ left flank from a potential attack by the lead elements of Howard’s Federal XI Corps. “Doles’s Brigade was fully from one-half to three-fourths of a mile east of the left of the battle—the extreme left of the line engaged—occupying the attention of the Federals, who were in line along on the north side of the town,” one veteran recalled. He went on to note that “the rattle of small arms was continuous for several hours along their front, neither side seeming to gain or lose ground.”⁴⁰

The main threat to Doles’ four regiments came from Alexander Schimmelfennig’s brigade, which was being led on July 1 by Col. George von Amsberg of the 45th New York. Earlier in the afternoon, von Amsberg had pushed his troops forward into the area between the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads, where they helped repulse O’Neal’s initial attack along the lower slopes of Oak Ridge. From their position just north of town, they stubbornly held their ground against both Doles’ troops and Blackford’s corps of sharpshooters. By mid-afternoon, it appeared as though the Federals were finally gaining the upper hand.

As the outcome hung in the balance, John Gordon’s Brigade from Early’s Division arrived from the northeast about three o’clock in the afternoon. Fortuitously for the Confederates, Gordon’s all-Georgia brigade arrived at precisely the right place at the right time. “Affairs were in a very critical condition, when Major-General Early, coming up on the Heidlersburg road, opened a brisk artillery fire upon large columns moving forward against Doles’s left, and ordered forward Gordon’s Brigade to the left of Doles,” was how Ewell explained this development in his official report. Gordon’s troops appeared so suddenly that one of Doles’ veterans described their arrival as coming in on the left “like a whirlwind.”⁴¹

By this time, Federal brigades led by Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames and Col. Leopold von Gilsa had advanced into an exposed position along Blocher’s Knoll, north of the Adams County Alms House between the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads. The forward move was ordered by division commander Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, who was determined to hold that piece of high ground. Barlow, however, failed to coordinate his actions with the two brigades from Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz’s division on his left or even notify them of his movement.

Although the area around the knoll provided some limited tactical advantage, Barlow pushed so far forward that both of his flanks remained vulnerable to attack. Once Schurz, who was in temporary command of the XI Corps, recognized the problem, he ordered Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski’s brigade to Barlow’s support from its position in the rear along the Carlisle Road. Before Krzyzanowski even crossed the road, however, Barlow’s division was attacked by Doles on the left and Gordon on the right.

After arriving on the Harrisburg Road, five of Gordon’s six regiments rushed ahead “under heavy fire” across Rock Creek directly into the Federal position along the crest of the knoll. “The enemy made a most obstinate resistance until the colors on portions of the two lines were separated by a space of less than 50 paces, when his line was broken and driven back, leaving the flank which this line had protected exposed to the fire from my brigade,” Gordon reported. The brigadier pointed out that “an effort was here made by the enemy to change his front and check our advance, but the effort failed, and this line, too, was driven back in the greatest confusion, and with immense losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners.”⁴²

The three left regiments of Doles’ Brigade joined in the attack. Along with Gordon’s men, they dislodged and nearly routed Barlow’s troops from their exposed position along the crest of the knoll. A gunner from Reese’s Alabama battery, which had shifted into a nearby field of wheat to support the Confederate assault, recalled that his men began “giving the enemy a hot enfilading fire” just as the line finally started to crumble. The attack along that part of the field quickly “became a race, the Federals fleeing and the Confederates pursuing.”⁴³

Doles’ regiments pressed forward in pursuit of the retreating enemy forces. Soldiers from Krzyzanowski’s brigade appeared along their front just northwest of the Adams County Almshouse. The Federal advance and attack developed so quickly and was so unexpected that Doles’ infantrymen faltered momentarily under the sudden pressure. With assistance from Gordon’s two right regiments, Doles stabilized his line and forced the newly arrived Federal troops back in disarray. In less than fifteen minutes, Krzyzanowski’s entire brigade was on the run.⁴⁴

Krzyzanowski’s troops were being defeated when a new threat appeared on the right side of Doles’ line in the form of the 157th New York. The lone regiment from Schimmelfennig’s brigade had been sent forward in a desperate attempt to assist Krzyzanowski. The New Yorkers initially formed in a long column just west of the Carlisle Road. Within a few minutes, they pushed forward well past Doles’ flank. The New Yorkers posed a real danger in that position. If properly handled, they could potentially drive in the exposed Confederate flank and perhaps turn the tide of battle along that part of the field north of town.

The attack caught the troops from the 21st Georgia on the far right of Doles’ line so completely by surprise that they were forced back to a country lane northwest of the knoll on the Blocher farm. “Having attracted their fire, and finding their force too strong for the exposed position we then occupied, we fell back some 40 yards to a lane, where we awaited their approach,” wrote Col. John T. Mercer in his official report. “By lying down, we hid ourselves from them till they had approached within a few yards, when we commenced firing, and advanced.”⁴⁵

Within minutes, the men from the 4th and 44th Georgia regiments joined in with a barrage of gunfire from their positions along the east side of the Carlisle Road. “The enemy came up to within 30 or 40 yards of us,” remembered Maj. William H. Peebles, who had assumed command of the 44th Georgia after Col. Samuel P. Lumpkin fell wounded. “As soon as it was discovered that we were flanked, we made a wheel to the right, faced the new foe, and began to fire upon him.” The line of Federals on their flank, continued Peebles, “faced us, and opened a severe fire upon us.”⁴⁶

As the two sides blazed away at one another at short range, the 12th Georgia under Col. Edward Willis shifted around from the left into place on the far right of the main battle line facing due south. With that move, Doles’ Brigade had almost encircled the 157th New York, which was left isolated when Krzyzanowski’s brigade fell back. “During the advance a portion of the enemy’s troops overlapped, and I thought hardly pressed the right of the brigade,” Colonel Willis wrote. “I moved my regiment by the right flank, and assisting the Forty-fourth and Twenty-first Georgia regiments, the enemy was soon dislodged with heavy slaughter.”⁴⁷

Krzyzanowski’s men and the 157th New York were being routed from the field when both Brig. Gen. Harry Hays’ Louisiana Brigade and Col. Isaac E. Avery’s North Carolina brigade, both of Early’s Division, entered the fighting from the northeast. The division’s artillery provided additional close-range support as they pressed forward toward the edge of town. An officer from one of the batteries recalled that the entire force “drove the enemy pell-mell over rolling wheat fields, through a grove, across a creek, up a little slope and into the town itself.” He added that “the pursuit was so close and hot that, though my gun came into battery several times, yet I could not get in a shot.”⁴⁸

The entire Federal line north of Gettysburg was crumbling when all four of Doles’ regiments joined in the chase. The enemy retreat turned into a wild scramble to escape the pursuing Confederates. “We met the force on the right, attacked and routed him, pursuing him across the plain in front of Gettysburg,” Doles explained in his official report. “But few of his force escaped us.” His Georgians, continued Doles, “then moved toward the theological College, to the right of Gettysburg, where the brigades of Generals Daniel, Ramseur, Iverson, and Colonel O’Neal were engaged with the enemy.”⁴⁹

Doles and Early’s other brigades were moving in from the north while Daniel’s and Ramseur’s brigades pursued elements of the broken Federal I Corps from around Oak Ridge toward the western outskirts of Gettysburg. Some of Ramseur’s sharpshooters led the way at the front of the assault. “Into town we rushed pell-mell after them, our brigade in the advance,” gushed Captain Gorman of the 2nd North Carolina. “I was with my company in the skirmish line, in front, and when the Yankees got into town, they hid by hundreds in houses and barns, and I had the felicity of capturing any number.”⁵⁰

The stunning success was marred by the tragic loss of Lt. Frank M. Harney, the commander of one of Ramseur’s sharpshooter detachments. “The sharpshooters who were in front pressured them, pursued them into the town and fought them through streets,” explained Lieutenant Calder. “We captured one of their colors, but lost our gallant commander Lt. Harney of the 14th who fell mortally wounded.” According to Calder, “after the last one had been driven from the town, the enemy fled to a commanding hill that overlooked the town and all the surrounding country and there rallied and formed their shattered ranks.”⁵¹

Once again, Iverson’s role in this part of the fighting on July 1 remains difficult to establish. He indicated in his official report that he assisted in this part of the assault, but Ewell reported something different. Captain Halsey, explained the Second Corps commander, had “rallied the brigade and assumed command” long before this point in the fight. Except for the claims in his report, all other indications are that Iverson was more of a spectator at this time than an actual leader of combat troops. As the soldiers rushed into Gettysburg in pursuit of the beaten enemy, even Iverson was forced to acknowledge that he had lost effective control of his regiments. “Arriving in the town, and having but very few troops left, I informed General Ramseur that I would attach them to his brigade and act in concert with him,” he admitted in his report.⁵²

According to Rodes, his entire division pursued the enemy “closely into and through the town, Doles and Ramseur entering in such close contact with the enemy that the former, who penetrated the heart of the town first of all had two sharp, and successful encounters with the enemy in the streets.” Major Eugene Blackford from O’Neal’s Brigade complimented Rodes’ description. As Blackford recalled the situation, it became “truly a wild scene” as the troops rushed forward “capturing prisoners by hundreds” in the streets. “A squad of us would run down a street and come to a corner just as a whole mass of frightened Yanks were rushing up another,” he wrote. “A few shots made the whole surrender, and so on until we caught them all.”⁵³

Despite his overwhelming success, Rodes ordered his brigades to stop their pursuit in the middle of Gettysburg. “The troops, being greatly exhausted by their march and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and prepared for further action,” was how he justified his decision. Most of the men in the division were nearly worn out by the time they reached town. “I believe I was more completely exhausted this evening than I ever was in my life,” admitted Lt. Thomas Taylor of O’Neal’s Brigade. “I thought I would faint. I could not shut my mouth but panted like a dog on a hot summer day.”⁵⁴

In addition to exhaustion and heavy combat losses, the men also faced the very serious problem of a lack of water. One soldier from the 12th Alabama wrote to his mother that “a great many men fainted that day from exhaustion, having been obliged to go into battle without water.” An officer from Daniel’s Brigade noted in his diary that “our men suffered very mutch for Water for they were marched in quick time for severel miles before they got to the Battle field & did not have the chance of getting Water in there canteens.” The soldier estimated that they were forced to go without water from about ten o’clock in the morning until about five o’clock in the afternoon.⁵⁵

While his victorious soldiers were rooting out enemy soldiers in town and trying to regroup, Rodes and Early met up with Ewell in the main town square. Both subordinates urged the Second Corps commander to press ahead with the attack against the retreating enemy, who were now gathering on the high ground just below Gettysburg. Ewell had already received instructions from Lee “to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward.” Rather than acting immediately, he dispatched an officer from his staff to locate Lee and obtain clarification of his orders.

On his return, Lt. James Power Smith informed Ewell that Lee still wanted him to seize the high ground, if practical. Those orders left the Second Corps leader in a quandary about exactly what to do next. He was well aware that Rodes’ Division was exhausted, had sustained heavy casualties, and remained fragmented because of its long pursuit and the manner in which it entered town. Much of Early’s Division, meanwhile, also remained scattered. Both Gordon’s Brigade and a Virginia brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. William “Extra Billy” Smith had been shifted about two miles east of town along the York Turnpike in response to an erroneous report that Federal troops were threatening their left flank. The late hour of the day and a lack of response from A. P. Hill to Ewell’s requests for support in launching a new attack complicated the situation.⁵⁶

Although Rodes remained ready to press ahead once his men were rested, the order from Ewell to resume the attack against Cemetery Hill never arrived. Even Ewell’s substitute plan of having Edward Johnson’s late-arriving division seize control of nearby Culp’s Hill failed to materialize. “Receiving no orders to advance, though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not to bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await orders or further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on my right,” was how Rodes explained it in his after-action report.⁵⁷

For many of those soldiers who had served under Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, Richard Ewell’s failure to send them forward that day against the retreating enemy troops seemed nearly inexplicable. Typical of the comments were those of Ens. John A. Stikeleather from the 4th North Carolina in Ramseur’s Brigade. Stikeleather recalled pointedly that “there was a little restlessness exhibited by the soldiers on account of the halt first evening of the fight, the impression seeming to obtain among them, that, had Stonewall Jackson been with us, before we slept that night, Gettysburg heights would have been ours.”⁵⁸

Whether right or wrong, Ewell’s decision to halt in town without attacking Cemetery Hill caused at least some of his men for the first time to question the leadership abilities of their new corps commander—especially in comparison to the lamented “Stonewall” Jackson. Captain Gorman of Ramseur’s Brigade reported about a week after the battle that they had clearly “missed the genius of Jackson” that day. “The simplest soldier in the ranks felt it, and the results have proven it,” he grumbled in a letter home. “But, timidity in the commander that stepped into the shoes of the fearless Jackson, prompted delay.”⁵⁹