CHAPTER TWELVE

I Told Him It Was Then Too Late

Robert Rodes’ exhausted soldiers rested in town while General Lee evaluated the stunning results of the July 1 fighting and determined how best to capitalize on them the next day. No one had expected the large meeting engagement, but the opportunity to roll up and crush the advance of the Army of the Potomac was too good to pass up once Richard Ewell’s Second Corps arrived from the north squarely on the flank of the enemy. The victory that followed shattered John Reynolds’ I Corps and Oliver Howard’s XI Corps and drove the enemy through town. The Federals, however, had taken up new positions on the high ground below Gettysburg, where they dug in to resist further attacks.

When the fighting ended on July 1, A. P. Hill’s bloodied Third Corps occupied Seminary Ridge southwest of Gettysburg. Richard Ewell’s Second Corps wrapped around to the north and east through town and beyond, opposite Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill. As a result, the Army of Northern Virginia now held a long exterior line, which was not an ideal tactical position. The question Lee faced was whether to continue the battle or maneuver his army elsewhere in search of more favorable conditions. He concluded that resuming the offensive was his best option because Maj. Gen. George Meade’s Army of the Potomac had been badly damaged and was almost certainly not fully united.¹

With two of the three divisions from James Longstreet’s First Corps now on the field, General Lee decided to launch a morning attack against what he believed was the vulnerable left flank of the Federal line running from Cemetery Hill south along Cemetery Ridge. The attack would then roll northward across A. P. Hill’s Third Corps front. Lee ordered Ewell to wait for Longstreet’s main assault and then “make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy’s right [on the high ground southeast of town] to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.” It took Longstreet much longer to march his divisions into position than Lee anticipated, and this delayed Ewell’s involvement in the fighting on July 2.

Edward “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division moved into position to be ready to attack Culp’s Hill after Longstreet’s main attack on the far right got underway. Jubal Early’s Division, situated on Johnson’s right, was poised to follow up with an assault against the southeastern heights of Cemetery Hill. Ewell ordered his third division under Rodes to provide support by threatening the Federal position on the western side of the hill. Ewell instructed Rodes to join the fight on Early’s right “as soon as any opportunity of doing so with good effect was offered.” In other words, Ewell expected Rodes to exploit any opportunity in his front.²

Rodes put Ramseur in de facto command of the operation against Cemetery Hill. Ramseur’s Brigade, together with those of Iverson and Doles, made up the front line and would be guided by Ramseur’s movements. The last two brigades under Daniel and O’Neal comprised a second supporting line. Iverson apparently remained in such disfavor that Rodes made no effort to inform him directly about the attack. His men remained in place until “the night of July 2, when I was informed by General Ramseur that a night attack was ordered upon the position of the enemy to the right of the town,” wrote Iverson in his official report. “I had received no instruction, and perceived that General Ramseur was acquainted with the intentions of the major-general commanding, I raised no questions of rank, but conformed the movements of my brigade to that of Brigadier-General Ramseur.” Iverson would advance with his remaining infantry but operate under Ramseur’s immediate command.³

After the horrendous losses of the previous day, Iverson’s entire brigade fielded no more than 30 officers and about 450 men. Seven field officers marched into the Forney farm field on July 1; only Lt. Col. William Davis and Maj. Robert Alston of the 12th North Carolina were still on duty as the troops readied for action on July 2.⁴

Longstreet’s attack, which finally began about four o’clock in the afternoon, caved in the salient created by Dan Sickles’ III Corps around the Peach Orchard, broke across Big Round Top, and stormed the slopes of Little Round Top. When both of his divisions were fully committed, the attack began rolling northward. Brigades from Hill’s Corps joined in, storming the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. The attack broke down along this front. Hill remained strangely inactive and was probably ill. The effort was further crippled when Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender, in command of the division on Rodes’ right, fell mortally wounded “about sunset.”

Rodes eventually dispatched Maj. Henry A. Whiting from his staff with a request for support with his own attack against the western side of Cemetery Hill. The message reached Brig. Gen. James H. Lane, who had assumed command of the division after Pender fell. Lane seemed unaware of the plan for the division and was unsure of how to proceed. “I did not give him a definite answer then,” Lane admitted. His stance changed when a message from the Second Corps commander reached him. “On being notified, however, by General Ewell, that his whole command would move on the enemy’s position that night, commencing with Johnson’s division on the left, I told Major Whiting that I would act without awaiting instructions from General Hill,” Lane reported.⁵

By that time, it was growing dark and Rodes’ brigades were still not in position for the attack. Although Johnson was not making much headway against Culp’s Hill, two of Jubal Early’s brigades were already assaulting Cemetery Hill and scaling its heights. Rodes was running so late that his troops did not begin moving out of town until just before dusk. According to Doles, his brigade did not get underway until “about 8 p.m.” Ramseur described the advance as beginning “at dark.” Rodes was late. The men soon encountered difficulties navigating the crowded streets of Gettysburg. The soldiers first had to move by the right flank to the west until they cleared the outskirts of town. Once that was complete, they changed front to the left and marched south. It took more than an hour for the three leading brigades to cover the short distance to their new position.⁶

The troops in the front line eventually halted just west of a dirt road known as Long Lane, which angled from town along the western flank of Cemetery Hill. Ramseur held the right front position, with the brigades of Iverson and Doles extending the line to the left. O’Neal’s and Daniel’s brigades took up position about 200 yards behind them after arriving from the area around the Lutheran Seminary and the unfinished railroad bed north of Chambersburg Pike. By the time these preparations were completed, Early’s pair of brigades under Brig. Gen. Harry Hays and Col. Isaac Avery had driven the defending Federals off part of the high ground and were awaiting reinforcements to exploit the stunning victory on the northeastern side of the hill.⁷

With darkness closing in, Rodes faced the daunting prospect of making a night attack against Cemetery Hill. The final confused arrangements called for the men to move forward quietly to the foot of the hill, using the cloak of darkness to approach unseen. Once everyone was in place, the main assault would commence “just as the moon arose.” To avoid detection during the approach, the infantry were ordered to use only their bayonets. Major Eugene Blackford, who commanded O’Neal’s sharpshooter battalion, recalled that the guns of the men assigned to this “bayonet affair” were “all inspected to see that none were loaded.”⁸

Another part of the plan called for individual brigade commanders to provide their troops with passwords that would allow them to identify each other once they broke through the enemy lines. “Along with the order came the announcement that when we had driven back the enemy and had gained the crest of the hill amid the darkness and confusion in order that we might recognize friend from foe, we were to cry out ‘North Carolina to the rescue,’” was how Lt. Edward Tripp from the 4th North Carolina recalled the instructions that night for Ramseur’s Brigade. Iverson’s men, who were attached directly to Ramseur’s command, presumably used the same password during the attack.⁹