CHAPTER 1

Introduction; Approach March

The extent to which the events leading to the Great War have been reviewed, examined, analysed and described are exceeded by only one other event of the last hundred years, the war of 1939—45. It seems therefore excessive to add this footnote of comment to all the weighty considerations and analyses that have explained, ‘ad nauseam’, to readerships of all persuasions how very badly things were done and how the author(s) or their favoured military or political leaders would have done things so much better. The journalists who have added to the many volumes devoted to the subject have generally been following up a good story and in most cases are honest enough to admit that their motives are those of people doing their job. Others have been less explicit of their motives.

Having read numerous accounts of the events in Western Europe for the fifty-one months period of the conflict from August 1914 to November 1918, as well as the period immediately prior to the fighting, there remains an overwhelming impression in my mind of preconceptions by writers already decided on their conclusions then using the most suitable available information, of which there is an abundance, to support their contentions. There are exceptions of course, Gen. Sir A. Farrar Hockley makes no attempt to conceal that he writes from the standpoint of a trained soldier and former senior commander and comments accordingly. Richard Holmes and John Terraine also come clean as to their approach and beliefs.

There are additionally other written accounts so constrained by time and location, such as that of Mr.Terraine’s account of the last weeks of the war leading to the Allied victory, that exclude themselves from criticism by reason of their limited time scale. Also there are those dealing with a specialist aspect of events, such as the work of the mining companies. One publication needs high praise for telling things as they were, The War the Infantry Knew, by Capt.J.C.Dunn, DSO, MC and bar, DCM, MB, BS, RAMC, Medical Officer (MO) to 2nd Bn. Royal Welch Fusiliers, (23rd Foot). A wholly exceptional account that should be required reading immediately after Siegfried Sassoon’s, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer. The output of the War Poets is probably the most suspect, great communicators, enthusiastic soldiers of the moment, borne on the high tide of national emotion to enlist, but not by training or inclination sympathetic to military realities. They found great difficulty reconciling their emotions to the practical way in which modern warfare is waged.

The problem faced by anyone who disagrees with the received wisdom of the guardianista junta, who act as the conscience of the day and thought police, is that questioners have no credibility. The culture of shock and horror that masquerades as informed opinion has so infected the general appreciation of the subject that commentators who advance differing views are condemned out of hand. That standpoint amounts to academic treason, if you can only sustain your point of view by denying your opposition free and respectable expressions of their views then you deny the very purpose for which the war was fought, condemned out of your own prejudices.

This commentary on to which I venture with some trepidation is offered only as a personal view, not justification of particular policies, battle success or defeat, tactics, faulty or otherwise. This is no more than a citizen’s summary suggesting that an essential prerequisite of any judgement needs to find an answer to the question; what was the alternative? That, it seems to me, is the issue the professional commentators avoid with their freely offered criticism, lest it spoil both their own preconceptions and those whose prejudices they wish to reinforce. There is also the trap into which some fall of substituting the values of the later portion of the twentieth century on the judgements of those faced with the need to make decisions in a different era. Finally, to my amateur eye, too frequently events are vilified for poor results as a consequence of the enemy’s ability to defy one’s efforts. There is an almost total lack of acceptance that in an armed conflict any worthwhile opposition’s aim is to defeat your intentions, Quelle Horreur.

In this text I have generally confined myself to the events in Western Europe with mention only of events in Asia Minor. The Middle Eastern and African campaigns are not featured for the good practical reason that other commentators have also avoided paying too much attention to these events, all that is except the late LAC Ross, aka Lawrence of Arabia (Col. T. E. Lawrence, DSO.)

There is an atmosphere of reluctance amounting to distaste when it comes to discussions on the achievements and merits of the Great War. There is a sense in the way that some writers approach the subject that the politicians of Great Britain engineered the outbreak of war on their own, as if the cohorts of politicians and military talking heads in Germany, Austria, Russia and France were on a separate planet. No, it must have been the political nexus of Britain that betrayed a generation with an easy promise of completion by Christmas only matched by the crass failure of the generals to save the lives of the forces at their disposal: in particular the professional soldiers who were responsible for the British contribution to the Allied cause rank for harsh criticism. It is notable though that those taking this position never stay around to argue their case when asked, “and what would your alternative have been?”

A further impediment to reasoned discussion of the conflict is the almost total denial that there was a competent enemy army as the opposition. The German Army had trained, rehearsed, planned, organised every soldier, NCO, officer and general for at least twenty years to a degree of military skill that quite simply made it the best of its type in Europe. This was the army faced by France and Britain, professional, motivated and supremely self confident, but they came second, fifty-one months after they marched into Belgium and France.

N.B. In this appreciation I have used the term Great War as the preferred term to describe the whole conflict. This was the term used by those who lived through the events; it seems reasonable to me to accept their judgement that it was ‘The Great War’, later generations must find terms for the events of their times without revising the opinions of those whose lives were affected by past activities.

Political Perspective

It is feasible to take almost any date in the 900 years preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 and argue a connection through a series of events and coincidences allowing an arguable ‘causus belli’ for the war to be sustained. In reality Europe, within a recognisable political framework, developed following the Treaty of Westphalia that brought the Thirty Years War to a welcome conclusion in 1648. Progress towards the conflict to settle the grievances and ambitions, real or imagined that were inherent in the event of 1914, became increasingly rapid following the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars that culminated with Waterloo in 1815. Events that welcomed the beginning of the nineteenth century in a way that echoed down the years. This was the point when politicians recognised the opportunities available to exploit military advantage by the mobilisation of a complete nation for war like purposes. The end of war as an engagement between paid professionals had arrived. Of the major European military powers, only one, Britain, decided to live with her professional army and also applied the volunteer principle to the Royal Navy in peacetime service.

In the years that followed the defeat of the Grande Armee of France under Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, the politicians of Europe faced requirements for which past experience provided few examples. The effect on countries of demands for democratic political government(Britain and France), unification (Germany and Italy), and independence (Poland, Belgium and Greece) were in themselves a disturbance to society, albeit essential. The Industrial Revolution and the consequential changes to technology including armaments, transport (railways) and information systems (newspapers and postal services), changed pace several times to meet the commercial demands of the newly affluent society and competitive businesses. The joint stock (limited) Company, Stock Exchange, International Banking and private wealth outside the control of ruling political systems within previously stable nation states, all presented unique political challenges.

The geographical fringe states of mainland Europe added to the uncertainty, Greece fought the derelict Ottoman Empire for independence in the third decade of the century, assisted by British sea power. Italy was reunified by the political firebrand Garibaldi in 1851. The power of the Vatican as a secular government was eliminated. Spain maintained her determined decline into obscurity, Portugal struggled with poverty. Poland seethed as a Russian province and the Balkans were murderously unstable. The Balkan nations were predisposed to violent internecine warfare as a way of life even after the conflict of 1914/18 was concluded. A mixture of Orthodox and Roman Christian with Muslims added for good measure, all in a melting pot of territories lacking the essentials of social cohesion, maintaining whatever passed as an identity by reason of fear of the warring tribe next door, determined to defend what they each held and take any advantage that came available, short or long term. Of the remainder perhaps mention of Belgium’s situation should be included. This was a country carved out of the Netherlands previously under the tutelage of Spain, Austria and France. The 1815 Congress of Vienna attached the area now recognised as Belgium to the government of the Netherlands, this was not a successful arrangement and following local unrest and the Treaty of London in 1835, Belgium was established as a nation state, neutrality was underwritten in the treat by Britain, France and Prussia and renewed in 1872, by which time the modern Germany had almost completed the process of unification.

These were the conditions at the edges, the bit part players, hoping for favourable notice from one of the leading actors on the European stage. To which confusion must be added the new political theories developing under the guise of anarchism, syndicalism, socialism and Marxist communism. Each of the alternative systems had their protagonists and followers, all suffering the same defect, none of the proposals had been used to run anything at all, let alone a nation state.

The major powers of continental Europe in 1914 were; the dual monarchy of Austria/Hungary, France, the newly unified Germany and Russia; the latter having two thirds of its landmass in Asia. Additionally a few miles from the coast of France lay Great Britain, keeping a wary eye on events from the back garden of European politics but devoting the attention and efforts of governments to running the rest of the world. With the exception that is of the United States, who since 1776 had to be regarded as rebellious colonists in secession from the government of the Crown.

Austria/Hungary appears to have been locked in a time warp by some historical accident. The Emperor Franz Joseph, of the House of Habsburg, succeeded to the Imperial throne in 1848. When the Great War began in 1914 he had defined the policies of his nation and the associated Hungarian Monarchy for sixty-six years. Of the opinions and comments made of his influence on affairs the one word never found is, moderniser. Known for his pedantic attention to the detail of state administration, and wearing too many medals, he took his responsibilities seriously without the ingredient of inspiration to move his nation out of the eighteenth century. Austria preserved an Imperial Court of ferocious formality; a formality that spilt over into all levels of society and the armed forces. Notwithstanding these handicaps the Imperial government had territorial ambitions in the Balkans, eventually succeeding in 1911 in absorbing Bosnia Herzegovina, whose capital was Sarajevo.

The Emperor was estranged from his wife the Empress Elizabeth for many years. She was assassinated in 1898. Elizabeth left only a stunning portrait by Winterhalter as evidence of her place in history. The Empress moved through European society for several years and during visits to England rode out with the Cheshire hunt. There is a real possibility that whilst in the hunting field she was in the company of Friedrich Engels, a junior partner in a textile business in Salford, adjacent to the City of Manchester. This was the Engels who at the same time was cooperating with Karl Marx, working in Chetham’s Library, Manchester, writing the manifesto of the Communist Party. Should such an encounter have taken place it would be a delicious example of historical irony.

The Imperial Heir, Crown Prince Rudolph, only son of the marriage, died by his own hand in unusual circumstances. This meant that Franz Ferdinand, Great Nephew of the Emperor, became heir to the dual monarchy. Franz Ferdinand as a young man clearly did not rate his chances of becoming Emperor. He went and married a young lady who was not of appropriate quality. This marriage was ‘morganatic’ when Franz did become heir, the effect of this was that his wife would not be able to assume the rank and title of Empress. Presumably then Austria could have faced the situation, if Franz had become Emperor, of an announcement at some very grand state function on the lines of; ‘His Imperial Majesty and Highness, Franz Ferdinand the First, Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary etc.unt Frau Habsburg. The mind boggles at this example of the tyranny of etiquette. In practice when there was a formal court event in which Franz Ferdinand had an official role to play as heir, his wife was least in the order of precedence, entering the room last and unescorted.

There in the personalities and preferences of a small group of favoured aristocrats, the ingredients of a four year war began to gather in an untidy pile, combining nationalism, ambition, greed and a dose of megalomania for good measure.

The second and dominant nation of the European Central Powers was, post Bismarck Germany, a nation formed during the nineteenth century from the numerous autonomous kingdoms, electorates, principalities, palatinates, cities and assorted territories amounting in all to about 160 self-governing states occupying the strategically vital land from the Baltic to the Danube and the Low Countries, Belgium and Holland, to the Russian border; wherever that border happened to be in the year in question.

The history of Germany prior to the defeat of Napoleon was largely one of alliances and coalitions. The religious wars that were brought to an end by the 1648 treaty had a lasting effect, separating Protestant and Catholic to their mutual detriment. The states with the largest landmass such as Saxony, Bavaria and Prussia were all politically significant and economically well placed; others had to make the best of their situation and any odd scraps that fell from the rich man’s table. Prussia was the dominant power militarily, economically and in population terms. Frederick II (reigned 1740—1786), took on a well organised military establishment, he turned his energy to his inheritance and organised an advanced standing army, without a mission. Until that is, you start counting the conflicts of the eighteenth century. The wars of the Spanish Succession, the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and so on. Name a European war and Prussia always seemed to find she had an interest to defend, or exploit.

The legacy of Frederick was a state with a modern army, not a modern government, the means of defence and state control, without the mechanism to regulate the ambition of the oligarchs; a dangerous state of affairs.

Following the Vienna Congress in 1815 that finally put an end to the Napoleonic wars, Europe had to set itself to rights. By the 1830’s realisation had dawned on the major German states that the numerous states and administrations was more than just inefficient, it was a major disadvantage to trade and economic development. The eventual outcome of the contact between the states was the establishment of a customs union, the Zollverein, allowing free passage of goods and materials within the territory that was, to all intents and purposes, eventually to lead to the formation of the unified Germany in 1871. The Germany whose armies took the field in 1914 with the resources and benefits acquired by the introduction of a homogeneous economic system were part of the Prussian dowry to the unification wedding.

From the time that the customs union became an effective economic influence in the nascent German state, unification proceeded apace; driven by the ambition and vision of Bismarck and the acquiescence of the King of Prussia and his fellow rulers, a new force took its place centre stage in the complicated politics of Europe. Two quick wars against Austria/Hungary (1866) and France (1871—72), the annexation of Alsace, Lorraine, Schleswig and Holstein and the deed was accomplished. A new nation state imperial, autocratic, ambitious with the added disadvantage of a military establishment that acted as an independent estate within the body politic, and without a decent ‘Bagehot1’ democratic check or balance in sight.

There was one further change that somehow escapes the notice of commentators, yet it contains significance for future events that should be taken into account. From 1715 the King of England was also the Elector (King) of Hanover, until 1803 and the dissolution of the electorate by Napoleon. The wars of the eighteenth century fought by European coalitions financed by British money must have been advanced by this duality of influence. Parliament and the government of the day in Westminster advised the King. The King, knowing the view of his ministers, would, it seems as the need arose, find it a not inconsiderable advantage to be able to approach his neighbours as Elector of Hanover. This situation changed in 1837 with the accession of the young Queen Victoria; women were unable to ascend the throne of Hanover if an heir male, however remote, was available. Victoria’s replacement was the Duke of Cumberland, this was very fortunate for the British Monarchy; the Duke was disreputable and it is alleged, had various unpleasant habits of a personal nature.

Britain thus lost her means of immediate access to the Courts of Europe; diplomacy remained the only means of entry from now on. It also opened the way to the charge of ‘isolationism’ allowing the imperialist to gain the advantage and turn the emphasis of government to the imperial and colonial responsibilities that paid such attractive dividends. Europe, and in particular the German states, lost the opportunity to benefit from the example of British government that, whatever its imperfections, separated the powers, curbed the executive, controlled the armed forces and above all, despite disturbances, avoided bloody revolution during the unsettled years of the nineteenth century.

The development of a unified system of government for the new Germany was dominated by the landowning Junkers of Prussia, who had in the past provided the officer class for the Prussian Army. They saw no good reason at all why they should relinquish either sphere of influence. The Franco Prussian war of 1871/2 was the final scene of the prelude to the drama of European history. Prussia had been the military colossus between France and Russia during the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Frederick the Great had created a formidable military organisation. The state of Prussia was a powerful political force in continental Europe and frequently an ally of Britain. Britain made common cause with the Prussians as a matter of expediency as much as any other reason. Prussia was not a naval power, what sea board was available was in the Baltic, easily blockaded in the narrow seaways between Sweden and Denmark, even better Prussia was not concerned with imperial adventures. The victory over France and the treaty finalised at Versailles also marked the announcement of the creation of the united Germany with William, Prussian King of the House of Hohenzollern taking the imperial title of Kaiser. With an adept piece of sleight of hand, Bismarck rubbed Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony et al off the map of Europe and at the same time, with a superb use of smoke and mirrors, foisted Prussian domination of affairs on to the remainder of the Germany states, grand duchies, principalities and kingdoms.

Time and the ambitions of the Kaiser and politicians of the German ruling oligarchy created an atmosphere of rivalry and antagonism against Britain that was continually frustrated by the offshore position of Britain. It was very difficult to sustain a grievance against Britain when there were no common borders or disputed resources of minerals or population over which a squabble could be engineered.

As an aside in this account, one’s imagination can be allowed to run riot for a moment to imagine the possibilities of discussions that could have followed, circumstances being different, if Otto, Count von Bismarck, short suited on humour as a personality trait, granted an Audience of Victoria, Queen of Hanover and Britain, explained some of his more ambitious schemes and plans. The Queen would have had proper grounds for complaint that “she was not amused”. The Count for his part might just have been discomforted by examples of regal displeasure. It has to be acknowledged however that when they did meet informally they found common ground and mutual interests.

There was in the new state a neat bit of camouflage, The Reichstag was Germany’s parliament, elected by universal male suffrage with a substantial representation from newly emergent left wing parties, but seriously short of power. When push came to shove the assembly could only huff and puff. Policy was made by the Chancellor who took his lead from the King, subsequently Kaiser (Emperor) after 1871.

The wars of 1866 and 1871 differed; the foray against Austria/Hungary in 1866 was carried out in the spirit of bringing an errant child into line, as well as banishing Austria from a role in the affairs of Germany. Bruised pride for the one part and a generous treaty on conclusion of the hostilities prevented lasting ill will but ensured the dual kingdom did as it was told in the future. The war against France was a different matter, lasting eight months it was hard fought by a French Army disadvantaged by an inefficient supply system and unprepared for the quality of the reformed Prussian Army equipped with the new breech loading Mauser rifle.

The outcome included annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the end of the second Empire, the abdication of Napoleon III and the formation of the third republic. The legacy France carried forward for two generations was suspicion, resentment and an ambition for revenge against Germany.

From this time onwards both France and Germany maintained substantial standing armies, developed new weaponry, trained their officers and brought defence policies to the front of the national political agenda. As the uniforms of the day were rather extravagant and colourful the old English comment, “all dressed up and nowhere to go”, seems rather apposite; a state of affairs that usually leads children to get bored and look for trouble. And that is exactly what happened.

Bismarck really had been able to forge a new nation out of the untidy arrangement of semi autonomous states that had gone before. The new Germany suffered a major disadvantage in military terms; it was between two other major powers, France and Russia. Realising the inherent dangers of this situation Bismarck promoted and negotiated a treaty of mutual cooperation between Germany, Russia and Austria/Hungary, with a secret reinsurance clause providing for mutual assistance in the event that one of the nations party to the treaty came under attack. This arrangement had the essential objective for Germany of preventing the strategic and tactical nightmare of war on two fronts. Otto, Count Bismarck; advanced in the Prussian nobility to the rank of Prince, architect of the new Germany, confidant of Kings, Emperors and Heads of State; except Britain, who as a nation was more than a bit cautious about all this building of a new political empire by someone else, but Otto was the man of the moment.

Then the old Kaiser died at the age of ninety, succeeded by his son, Frederick III, who died himself, after a reign of ninety days, from throat cancer, leaving a grieving widow; the Dowager Empress Victoria, daughter of H.M. Queen Victoria. The vacancy for Emperor was taken up with enthusiasm by Kaiser Wilhelm’s grandson, Wilhelm II, known to all and sundry, but not to his face, as Willie: vain, erratic, greedy, ambitious, envious and if other information is credible, unable to put his mind on anything for more than a few minutes at a time. He aspired to a military image without undertaking the rigorous training through which an officer of the German Army achieved a senior command appointment. Not insane in the manner of Ludwig of Bavaria, he was nevertheless intellectually several pfennigs short of a mark. He was an outstanding argument against the virtues of hereditary monarchy.

Within no time at all Bismarck had been retired to his estates, the mutual cooperation treaty and its reinsurance clause, repudiated, followed promptly by a treaty of cooperation between Russia and France. Then just when things couldn’t get worse, Willie was sold a naval rearmament scheme by a snake oil salesman, who happened to be an Admiral, Tirpitz. The scheme was based on the hopeful premise that the British government and the Royal Navy would do nothing to catch up or keep pace with the expansion of German naval influence; a proposition of dubious quality at the very least.

That was not all, a secret plan for the invasion of France by way of Belgium was put forward by another huckster, Schifflein (Field Marshal, Alfred von) and guess what, Willie bought a copy, gave it to the German (Prussian) General Staff and exclaimed “I have a dream”; well perhaps he did say it first Rev’d. Mr King, sorry about that. The problem with buying copies is that you don’t acquire the intellect that understands all the implications of the scheme. So it was to prove.

Last, but by no means least, in the catalogue of German indulgence was the persuasive self developed argument that Germany deserved additional living space both in Europe and as colonial territory. Envious eyes were cast towards Eastern Europe, provinces such as the Ukraine, to which Germany had no sustainable claim, as well as areas elsewhere in the world under the administration of other European states.

The untidy pile of grievances, real and imagined that Austria/Hungary accumulated prior to 1914, was enthusiastically supplemented by the new Germany. The pile was taking on a perilous appearance of near collapse for anyone who cared to look; few cared, fewer looked.

Leaving the Central Powers in their land of make believe, the situation of the Allied powers, Russia, France and Britain needs to be reviewed with the same degree of healthy scepticism. First Russia, essentially of this nation, either much needs to be said or very little. That great wordsmith Winston Churchill was to say of this ally in two wars that as a nation it was “an enigma wrapped in a mystery”; the most eloquent of explanations in six words.

Prior to the events of 1914 Russia had maintained the 300 year rule of the autocratic and authoritarian Tsars, the Romanoffs, propped up by an aristocratic establishment expanding with each generation to a totally unmanageable overload of privilege and complicated interrelationships. And that was before the Tsars’ government attempted to administer the affairs of the largest of Europe’s nations, straddling two continents, reaching from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic and from the Arctic Circle to the border with Persia (now termed Iran) on the Indian Ocean. The sheer scale of the task was beyond the imagination of most competent politicians and bureaucrats; of these Russia and her Tsars had none anyway. On top of the startling physical extent of the nation it carried the baggage of the all pervasive Russian Orthodox Church and the status of the Tsars as demi-gods to a peasant population. The whole nation was administered on the fiat of the Tsar and his ministers of the day, enthusiastically supported by a secret police establishment that preserved its position by finding a plot behind every peasant kulak.

There was also the military establishment based on a conscript army and an aristocratic officer class that compared with the British system which gave the latter the substance of democratic respectability. The Russians had engaged in an unpleasant local war against Japan in 1899—1905, and lost. Not just the land war but the war at sea as well, two fleets destroyed in separate encounters. From this debacle an ineffective and corrupt administration had to rebuild the material and morale of the largest European Army.

This deplorable state of affairs did not prevent Russia making an alliance of mutual support with France following Willie’s repudiation of Bismarck’s tripartite reinsurance provision that included Austria/Hungary With all the benefit of hindsight the comment has to be made that the French government of the third republic must have had motives and reasons for concluding such an agreement that are now hidden by time, events or misunderstanding and modern perceptions of international affairs. Russia was a basket case nation in terminal decline; as an ally no more use than a busted flush to a blind poker player.

War against Russia in Europe was, and remains to this day, fraught with difficulty. The scale of operations is now, and certainly was at the beginning of the twentieth century, too enormous to contemplate. There is just too much space. An essential maxim of military strategy is that land captured must yield a worthwhile military objective such as a key communications point for road and rail movements. Territory, by itself, is just a liability to be held and controlled; that requires troops in abundance, who all have to be accommodated and fed. The geography of Russia was long on land, short on key tactical objectives. Recognisably the problems of the original Russian campaign and the retreat from Moscow in 1812; not one of the Emperor Napoleon’s number one hits with the Grande Armee.

The feature of Russian resources that seemed to loom large in the perceptions of other European powers and their military planners was the manpower available to the Russian Army. It has to be allowed that Russia had a population that dwarfed that of other countries and even the combined population of the Central Powers was less than half that of Russia. In the cold light of hindsight though, questions must be asked about the dispersion and quality of the available recruits. To bring recruits from central Asia who are functionally illiterate, have never heard of Germany, France or Britain and turning them into effective soldiers at short notice is a task of the magnitude of one of the labours of Hercules; not impossible but needing high quality organisational skills. Not the Russian’s strong suit.

One certainty of any campaign fought in European Russia is that, eventually, the invader has to fight actions against ‘General’ Winter, few if any have ever won.

The mystery has to be, why the politicians of Europe did not recognise the fault lines of any military expedition in which Russia was engaged, either as ally or opposition. For the Allied powers of 1914—18 this was the weakness of the coalition.

Weakness or not, France as the second of the Allied powers with an army based on conscription had made her alliance with the Tsar’s government in the hope that the possibility of war on two fronts, against two armies of significant size, would deter the Central Powers of Germany and Austria/Hungary from aggressive war like action. The ubiquitous philosopher of ordinary life, Murphy, was to observe, succinctly, “If something can go wrong, it will”. Right again Murphy, as events in 1914 emphatically demonstrated.

France arrived at the opening years of the twentieth century after more than a hundred years of effort. The disturbances started in 1789 with the now famous revolution; storming the Bastille, the terror, the guillotine and so on, closely followed by the rise to power of Napoleon, and the equally rapid removal within a few short years, of a competent administrator, great soldier and effective diplomat whose Achilles heel was to overplay his hand. He went for the grand slam, when perfidious Albion still had some cards in her hand. These included, sea power, the Kingdom of Hanover, an army that prospered on a good scrap against long odds, plus a fistful of money. Not a bad hand for the no hoper of the European political spectrum.

France had another look at monarchy under the restored Bourbons, decided the price was wrong and voted for the second republic, whereupon look who turns up centre stage, the nephew of Bonaparte, original version, and before you can say coronation in French we get the second empire and Napoleon III. This was the government that Bismarck decided needed to be given a lesson in German culture in 1871/72. Eight months of conflict, defeat, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and the end of the second empire. This was followed by a nasty bit of revolutionary misbehaviour before the third republic got on its unsteady feet. Small wonder the French had a jaundiced view of their neighbour next door to the east; to add to the already dim view she held of Britain; perfidious Albion, a nation of shopkeepers.

From this long and uncertain design stage however, came a government of a popular democracy, representation of the people and separation of the powers with the military and the officer corps answerable to the political leadership of the day.

The conscious perception of the French for the quality of their military inheritance was, by the time the twentieth century arrived, at best optimistic. No great depth of historical knowledge is needed to recall that in the wars and campaigns of the eighteenth century, the French Army lost more often than it won in the wars against Britain. From the Sun King’s (Louis XIV) tussle at Blenheim and onwards, France was on the losing side in wars against England in Europe, until the advent of Napoleon. The French were also outfought by the British Army in Canada and India: events which followed historically significant encounters at Crecy and Agincourt. The campaigns of Henry VI in France were badly conducted and saw the English expelled from France except for Calais.

Napoleon was the star who made the reputation of the French military image. Even then however, when the French faced the British under Wellington with Spanish and Portuguese as allies in the Peninsular War, they were defeated. Waterloo was a military catastrophe for the French but not recognised as such. The French were British Allies in the sorry campaign in the Crimea, learning little it seems and arriving less than twenty years later at the Franco Prussian war (1870/1), and being soundly beaten.

There remained, however, for the nation a belief in the essential superiority of its army. To some extent this could have arisen from the quality of the soldiers who fought for France in its colonies as the Foreign Legion. This independent army never set foot in metropolitan France as a formed unit, its utility and ferocious fighting ability was reserved for overseas encounters.

The second, and tongue in cheek opinion, is to lay the blame on the French language itself. After all, the French officer who attends, ‘L’Ecole Superieur de la Guerre’; has got to think of himself as the bee’s knees after graduation from an establishment with such a grand title. So much more impressive than the British equivalent, ‘Staff College’, with only the modest initial letters, ‘psc’, after your name in the army list, the letters of course being in lower case. The British Army always did understatement very well.

It really would be more apposite for a French wit to have remarked, when told, ‘that the sun never set on the British Empire’ to have offered the opinion that, “the reason for this state of affairs was quite simply that God didn’t trust the British in the dark”. Instead of which it was Oscar Wilde, an Irishman.

The uncomfortable fact is, however, that in 1914, this nation believing itself a paragon of military virtue committed its army to a high intensity conflict with some of the infantry wearing the uniform of horizon blue overcoat and red pantaloons of the nineteenth century and carrying a rifle that was inadequate for the job, until hastily modified. Infantry officers of the French Army stepped out onto the battlefield of 1914 wearing white gloves The mounted formations were no better served, some units rode into battle their chests covered by super shiny breast plates and attractive helmets with horsehair plumes. No surprise therefore that more than sixty French general officers had to be relieved of their commands before the end of September and banished to the city of Limoges to await their fate. The rank and file of the French Army were even more poorly paid then their British contemporaries and had leave provisions that were a source of real grievance to the front line soldier. The German Army must have wondered if they were seeing things as they settled behind their Mauser rifles and Maxim machine guns, eight per regiment of four battalions, and opened fire.

As if this was not enough the vaunted French Plan XVII was fatally flawed, the advance into Alsace and Lorraine was committing the army to undertake an aspect of the ‘swinging door’ ploy that Schifflein had built into his infamous plan of attack.

Then there was the army of the unified Germany, the ultimate legacy of Frederick the Great. The German Army was perceived as everything that was perfect in military terms, based on an officer caste of the Junkers, with military academies to school aspirant officers to undertake their military responsibilities, their destiny, universal conscription of most healthy young men for army service, followed by obligations to undertake annual training for the reserve forces, almost unchecked investment and, to crown this list of advantages, the Germans had a ‘General Staff’ to plan their activities to the last horseshoe nail.

The German Army took everything very seriously, to the extent that one Chief of Staff set his subordinates a study exercise of significant complexity, to be completed in seventy-two hours and available for discussion at a specified time on the morning of December 26th. A senior British Officer learning of this event took the view that the staff should have considered their Chief to be temporarily insane, thrown the study paper in the bin and taken themselves off to the races.

The German Army was a wonderful machine, planned, equipped and trained to perfection. Nevertheless there was one awful flaw, it had never fought a war, and never been on campaign. The Prussians had fought the Austrians and the French but this new, shiny, all purpose paragon of virtue had never experienced enemy fire, never found itself faced with professional soldiers whose orders were: kill the enemy, no retreat in the face of great odds and win the day. The new German Army had never had to face about and form the equivalent of the ‘Thin Red Line’, as did the BEF’s II Corps at Le Cateau on 26th August 1914. The Germans’ experiences between 1914 and 1918 were the penalty for their hubris

As the years drew nearer to Armageddon a glimpse of realism broke across the English Channel. That affable Prince Edward from England who loved the sea air at Biarritz, thought his German cousins to be somewhat dull, and made friends with so many pretty girls in France, succeeded Queen Victoria, his elderly mother, as King Edward VII. A change of mood slipped into the political, military and diplomatic scene almost unnoticed and very nearly too late to be effective. For France delusion and illusion with were, ‘too much with the nation late and soon’.

With the exception of Great Britain these were the nations comprising the ‘Dramatis Persona’ as the end of civilisation, as the old order knew it, approached.

Britain is frequently accused of ignoring Europe, and developing an imperial trading empire to the detriment of relations with continental Europe. Is this an example of thinking of the answer and arranging the facts to support your contention? To which we can reasonably reply, following the demise of the Stuart monarchy in 1688, it was William of Orange and his wife Mary, daughter of James II, who took the throne of England. In due course of the death of William III, Parliament offered the throne to the Elector (King) of Hanover, five kings followed of the House of Hanover, Queen Victoria married a German princeling, Albert of Saxe Coburg Gotha. Then go and read the Battle Honours of the British Regiments of the line. Most of the countries of Europe have been on the receiving end of a visit of some description from British forces. It may not have been that the action and policies were the preferred course of action for the government of the locality, but for certain Europe was not ignored.

Democracy and the Armed Forces

Britain itself had found a way to stable, economically sound government and a just system of administration for the people, not without trials and tribulation but the amount of blood on the street was very limited. By comparison with many nations Britain had a head start. The state, judiciary and church were separated, the monarchy was constitutional, the armed forces under parliamentary control. The national economy was commercially and industrially sound, with competent public and private administration of affairs and by the norms of the times a democracy with an enviable amount of individual and corporate freedom.

Industrially the achievements are difficult to understate, the motto could well have been, ‘you want it we make it’. Almost any manufactured item could be found somewhere in Britain. Additionally there was enormous experience of civil, railway and structural engineering, and a merchant fleet that sailed to every port in the world.

The weaknesses were from the viewpoint of the forthcoming conflict in two aspects of life. Britain could not feed itself from its own resources, imported food was essential to maintain the way of life of the population. Even the national beverage, tea, came from India or perhaps China, according to taste. The second deficiency was in the manufacture of organic chemicals, Germany lead the field in this product group. In particular Britain did not have the capacity to manufacture sufficient explosives to sustain a high intensity conflict of any significant scale or time. These were dangerous deficiencies.

The army occupied a curious position in the national organisation and political thinking during the eighteenth and nineteenth century and until the appalling campaign in the Crimea between 1853 and 1856. As a general principle Britain has disliked large standing armies. Only in times of war has the call gone out for volunteers from the population at large to join the ranks. With some notable exceptions such as The Tower of London, London barracks such as Chelsea, and other major cities such as Carlisle, Colchester, Windsor and Edinburgh, there were few garrison barracks; soldiers were billeted on the local population, publicans and in tented camps.

It was a policy of dispersion, the body politic wanted to avoid the threat of any sort of coordinated military insurrection. The other ranks as soldiers were not well regarded, well paid or well fed. The discipline was draconian and the average recruit only found his way into the Recruiting Sergeant’s company as a consequence of the unattractive conditions of labouring work in agriculture or to escape the consequences of his own, sometimes criminal, actions. There were just a few who joined who were from the families of regular NCO’s, there was a tradition of service on which the army relied to provide experience in the ranks when expansion was needed. There was also available, The King’s German Legion (KGL) mercenaries, almost to a man, who supplemented the British force when the Hanovarians ruled the dual monarchy.

The officers have been generally badly represented in history. The purchase system for an officer’s commission was originally introduced as a means for them to make an investment in the national system, providing a financial interest in the ‘status quo’ and a safeguard of sorts against an army sponsored or supported revolution. This system applied to the regiments of cavalry and infantry of the line including the Guards. Not all officers in these regiments purchased their commissions, there were officers commissioned from the ranks, though these could not be sold. (That which is awarded cannot be sold, was the precept.) Commissions in the formations now recognised as Engineers, Artillery and Ordnance were army commissions, not bought or sold. Commissions to the rank of Colonel or above could not be acquired by purchase; again, they were army commissions. The criticisms tend to look a bit frail when the questions is posed, who won? Armies need to be judged on their win rate and despite the hostility of some commentators the facts of the situation put the achievements of the British Army in the winner’s enclosure too many times for the system not to have suited the needs of the day.

To continue the policy of dispersion the governments of the day did two things. Regiments were raised and disbanded on an ‘hoc’ basis, as they were needed for campaigns and emergencies. An inspection of the history of the infantry of the regiments of the line is needed to confirm this practice. The regiments of foot with seniority numbers above fifty could face disbandment to be re-raised as the need arose. Only the first twenty-four in the precedence order were reasonably assured of continuous establishment. Secondly the colonial expansion needed some visible symbol of authority, what better than a battalion or two whose cost could be charged to the local administration. You can see the Whitehall mandarins dreaming up the scheme. The British Army became adept at making the best of what was available.

The foreign and defence policy of successive British governments was based on ensuring divided national power coalitions in Europe and in particular the independence of the low countries, a navy of sufficient strength to deter any invasion and an army with sufficient experience to expand with volunteers, when needed to meet an emergency. Always providing there was sufficient time. Time to put all the pieces in place, Wellington needed three years in the Iberian Peninsula before he could be confident of the outcome of his campaign against the French.

The only place where there was a serious concentration of the British Army was India. Here the units of the Sovereign’s Army were supplementary to the Indian Army. The Indian Army replaced the armies of the Honourable East India Company (HEIC), following the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Even that simple statement needs qualification for the Company’s Indian Army was divided. The three presidencies, Bengal, Bombay and Madras each had an organised military component. It was the army of the Bengal Presidency which was the centre of the 1857 mutiny. Each of these Company armies soldiered to some extent with the retained armies of the Princely States who remained within the command of their titular prince. (And you wonder why there was a mutiny.)

The two components of the garrison of India, following the demise of the army of the HEIC, were closely associated, although each with its own command structure. The Sovereign’s Army, following the unpleasant events of the Indian Mutiny, provided the artillery The Indian Army providing the largest portion of the infantry of the line, as well as the cavalry units. Many of the regiments of the Indian Army originated with irregular formations of the HEIC armies. Some of the mounted regiments such as Skinner’s, Probyn‘s and Hodson’s were socially exclusive to a degree that exceeded anything found in the British Army. Then just to add to the complications the Gurkha Regiments were tacked onto the organisation of the army of the HEIC froml818.

The Indian experience was vital for aspirant senior officers. This was the only opportunity for the higher formation headquarters and their commanders to gain experience of managing and deploying a division in the field with all its components, including support troops such as Engineers and supply train. Despite the opinion of numerous non military commentators, you do not glue the required number of units of a formation together overnight and expect them to achieve effective fighting efficiency with immediate effect. There is a substantial learning period whilst the commander introduces and defines the standards by which the subordinate units must operate. In particular the commanding general and his subordinate commanders must, in war conditions, learn to read the mind of the opposing commanders. You don’t think so? Why do you think Wellington said immediately prior to deploying his forces at Waterloo “He’s humbugged me.”? Napoleon had achieved the unexpected; surprise, a key element of war?

Commanders of the time, prior to 1914, were not allowed this essential preparation period. Not until the later days of the 1939—45 war were generals such as Slim and Montgomery allowed the opportunity of preparation. It was one of the essential lessons of the Great War, but the body politic pushed it aside because of the inconvenience and cost of maintaining large troop formations and headquarters.

The cost of this inadequate preparation prior to 1914 was to lay an account for casualties at the door of the nation. Here perhaps we begin to see the glimmer of light as the guilt for this failing is shifted onto those whose decisions are not so easily seen and blame apportioned.

The organisation of the army had been reformed well, on two occasions prior to the 1914 conflict. In 1881 the Cardwell reforms provided a sensible distribution for county based recruiting and depots for the regiments using a two battalion structure, one overseas and one for training and reinforcement at the depot. There was more but these changes together with the improvement of the command structure provided the basis of an organisation competent to deal with the demands of the government of the day. The Haldane reforms of 1908 were to provide a realistic and straightforward arrangement for a home defence army of part time soldiers under the terms of their enlistment. It was not intended that these units of territorial forces should incur a liability for overseas service. That was not to say that individuals could not volunteer for the regular service. If this took place the territorial soldier concerned transferred to the regular service on new terms of engagement.

There was the army prior to 1914, small, professional, dispersed, the necessary adjunct to civilian colonial administration. Self-sufficient in adverse conditions, drawing a significant proportion of its officers from a clique of families and following the same process for many of the men who served as warrant officers and NCOs. Dispersion though is contrary to established military doctrine that emphasises the importance of concentration of resources and firepower. This was not a military caste system to be compared with the Prussian Officer Class. It was one of those informal systems at which the British and in particular the English excelled. An arrangement of responsibilities within the nation to provide professionals for the establishment; not just the armed services the but Civil Service, the law, medicine, the Church and other sections of national life. They all needed a continuing supply of young men to undertake the needs of the state, as it was at that time.

The control of the armed forces in a democracy was a complex issue to resolve following the Cromwellian civil war. The new Model Army had given England and Wales a taste of rule by a military command, it was not an experience appreciated by the population at large or those opposed to the Lord Protector.

Restoration of the monarchy seemed at first sight to provide the opportunity to dispense with an army as a permanent feature of the state’s organisation; and that’s what happened. All did not go according to plan; there were some dangerous moments as the restored monarch wobbled on the throne from which his father had been evicted. Then in the nick of time Colonel George Monck, later the Duke of Albemarle, arrived from an outpost at Coldstream in the border country of England and Scotland with his Regiment of Foot, subsequently His Majesty’s Second Regiment of Foot Guards (Coldstream Guards). The good Colonel Monck was not one to see unrest without doing something about it, and that’s what he did. Charles II, of the House of Stuart, stayed put as the restored King.

The events created a dilemma, who ruled the nation? How were the forces of the Crown to be controlled? Being English you don’t solve problems, you compromise in a stylish manner and leave all parties with a share of satisfaction. The outcome of this particular compromise must be one of the neatest ever devised. The monarch remained head of the armed forces. Officers and men swear allegiance to the sovereign of the day. The sovereign’s command authority became more limited as time went by. It was at the Battle of Dettingen in 1743 that for the last time a British sovereign, George II, commanded his troops in the field.

Parliament and the government of the day assumed control of the actions and policies of the armed forces. This arrangement is not replicated for example in the USA. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief. This American arrangement places the armed forces under the jurisdiction of an elected politician; at the same time it allocates ultimate military authority to someone to whom the culture of command and discipline of military strategy are unappreciated arts, at the very best.

The solution reached by the government and armed forces of Britain provided a comfortable way of resolving the possible conflicts arising from an over mighty army assuming the role of government. Experience shows with all the benefits of hindsight that it contains in the terms of 1914 a near fatal defect. The armed forces of the Crown have to assume the profile and arrange their deployment, equipment, organisation and planning to meet the policies and tasks set out and defined by parliament. This arrangement assumes that the government’s policies and its ideas for the defence of the nation are right. If past decisions are wrong the soldiers take the blame.

In the context of the British political system the army therefore occupied an anomalous position. Under peacetime conditions it was required to conduct its affairs under the direction of the government of the day. Deal with the occasional emergency or insurrection and plan for the future within the objectives and time scales set by political masters. This is a system that has a lot of advantages for the politician, but few for the army.

Even in circumstances when the professional opinion of the army’s command structure is that the government has got things wrong, the generals can exercise little power. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS and head honcho) could not, on his own initiative, send the Quartermaster General (QMG) to see that nice man at Vickers and order up an extra 2,000 artillery pieces (calibres various) with a couple of million rounds of ammunition as back up, for the simple reason that without parliamentary approval, they had no money with which to make payment for the goods. Put in starkest terms if the politicians get their assessments wrong, the army and/or the navy goes to war wrongly organised, incorrectly equipped and always, as a matter of course in Britain, short of essential supplies. It is the continuing story of military matters, the assessments were wrong in 1914, 1939, 1951 (Korea), 1953 (Malaya), 1968 (Borneo), 1981 (Falklands), 2004 (Iraq) and 2006 (Afghanistan). This means soldiers and their officers get killed and injured, politicians stay at home, with one or two honourable exceptions.

Britain’s system meant that only when the sovereign by and with the consent of Parliament declares war, are the commanders in a position to require the state to provide for the practical needs of the army to carry out the decision to meet and defeat the enemy in battle. There is no room for an accommodation or conciliated outcome. Like it or not that is what is meant by war, the defeat of the enemy, to send him packing bag and baggage from the battlefield. There is no alternative available to the soldier that is his task. Governments may allow military surrenders when further resistance in the field is futile. As in Holland and Norway in 1940, the ‘de jure’ governments, in exile, of the nations concerned reconstituted their forces and continued the war with their allies until the enemy was defeated.

Who, we have to ask, would consider an action such as the invasion of France? For sure the Belgians, Italian, Swiss and Spanish neighbours could be relied on to mind their own business. Only German ambitions were sufficiently distorted to envisage such a dangerous plan; only Willie and his coterie of sycophants were sufficiently misguided to think they could get away with such a scheme.

As a recapitulation we should remember that in the decades prior to 1914 the British Army had been limited in size, dispersed over numerous overseas stations and lightly armed: essentially a field force for colonial operations. Not until 1908 did any consultations take place with the French government and the French General Staff to consider what contribution Britain could make in the event of a major European war. The outcome of these discussions provided a scheme to mobilise a force of six divisions to supplement the army of France if there was an invasion. This small army, by continental standards, deployed by one of the world’s leading economies could not be interpreted as a real and present threat to the security of nations in continental Europe, neither apparently was it a deterrent to Willie and the German General Staff.

The Commanders of British Armed Forces have a duty to deliver to Parliament the defeat of the enemy. This task is not some optional extra to add to the task of the defence of the realm. Commanders are subject to military law, in exactly the same way as Tommy Atkins. Those unable or unwilling to set about the task with sufficient commitment will be dismissed. Suddenly Parliament turns the tables and when the going gets rough, hands the responsibility for success to those who previously have been kept firmly in their place.

DUTY, that four letter word, it marks out the difference in perceptions between the soldier and those who choose the expedient of politics or pontificate through the media. There it is, four letters, the price for each letter is always to be reckoned by the lives of Tommy Atkins and his leaders, commissioned and otherwise. The soldiers and their commanders are under no illusions in respect of the inherent responsibilities that are incurred by their political masters when the war card is played.

Note. There is one of those unusual anomalies at which the British excel in respect of its unwritten constitution. The navy is the sovereign’s and does not have to be authorised by Parliament. The defence of an Island state from Anglo Saxon times depended on the quality of its navy. Even during the years immediately prior to the 1914 war, Admiral Fisher saw the army only as a projectile to be fired where needed by the navy. The army though belongs to Parliament, until the later years of the twentieth century, legislation was required annually to authorise the continued existence of this useful organisation. More conveniently now the appropriate legislation is included in the revisions of the Army Act that out of necessity are needed periodically. Odd don’t you think?

Retrospect for the Approach March

There then was the condition of Europe, oligarchy, autocracy and democracy allied and opposed by circumstance or habit. Ambition and attitude balancing resentment and fear, armed forces of some significance and none; too many generals on the lookout for their opportunity for glory and a place in history, without the least understanding of the power for destruction modern warfare would create, all waiting for Willie’s next tantrum.

All that was required was a detonator to set off the reaction from which Europe would never recover. Enter Gavrilo Princip in the Serbian capital Sarajevo equipped with a pistol, whose few rounds would cost twenty million lives.

Whatever the circumstances of other armies, the British Army found itself committed to a war for which it had not; been financed in the years before contact, not planned, equipped, officered or been of an adequate size for a major European war. As on previous occasions; the army mustered, marched to the sound of the guns, formed the thin red line, dressed by the right, kept the line straight, presented arms aimed and, held its fire until the word of command. For Willie this was ’a contemptible little army’, used as he was to armies in the mass. He forgot the lessons of history, if he ever knew them. Remember also Napoleon referred to Wellington as ‘The Sepoy General’, do they ever learn?

This was the first point in the procession of events where there were make or break alternatives for consideration by the British government of the day Britain had no formal alliance to join wars with continental powers. Britain was not under immediate threat of invasion, no direct military or naval action was apparent that would encroach on her sovereignty. Why then did the nation go to war? On a popular level the defence of ‘Gallant Little Belgium’ was the sentiment of the people. At government level it seems to have been the implications of not fighting in support of the French that carried the day. A further military defeat of France, the occupation of Belgium, German access to naval facilities a few hours steaming from the East Coast of Britain and the German Navy treating the straits of Dover and the English Channel as an adventure playground for its submarine force, such things were too awful to contemplate. Practically, this meant that if France were unable to sustain a campaign against Germany, the delayed introduction of a British force into the battle would almost certainly be too little too late. A defeated France and Belgium would leave no practical position by which the British could take the German Army to task and launch an opposed sea borne landing on continental Europe.

In the context of the day, the government of Herbert Henry Asquith, Great Britain and her King, were between a rock and a hard place, war against Germany was the only option. The nation went to war, on a tide of enthusiasm to be home for Christmas. The new Minister for War, Earl Kitchener of Khartoum was not deceived, he planned for a long game: three years at least, was his initial view, but fate and a German mine intervened to prevent him seeing matters to a conclusion.

Before leaving this section of the appreciation there is one other comparison that has at least to be noticed and added into the equation of success and failure. The democracies Britain and France separated the responsibilities of political control from the command function of the armed forces, the Central Powers did not. The Tsar of Russia began the war without command responsibility but when things began to go badly in 1916 the Grand Duke Nicholas, who did at least know one side of a map from the other, was dismissed and the Tsar took the top military job. This he did, we are lead to understand, at the insistence of his wife Alexandra whose military accomplishments seem to have escaped the notice of historians for the period.

The essential disadvantage of the combination of responsibilities as head of government and the armed forces is that, if the events go against you, then the ‘head honcho’ has no one else to blame. He wanted the glory of success and conversely had to accept the bitterness of defeat. Willie was the classic amateur whose ambition and greed was only exceeded by the avarice of his immediate advisers.

Willie and Franz Joseph were the prisoners of the status quo of their political systems; Emperor Franz exited the scene in his dotage in 1916 before the account was presented for settlement, leaving his successor to clear things up. Willie stayed to the end then jumped ship at the last minute for lonely exile in Holland, even ignored by the German Army when it occupied Holland in 1940. Nicholas lost his nation, his wife, family, life and the war and as an encore set the scene for the introduction of one of the most vicious political systems experienced by the modern world.

Quite wrongly these men were never called to account, indeed some, such as Hindenburg, were allowed to go bungling on creating even more chaos in the wake of their incompetence.

In Britain, 1916 brought Lloyd George to the position of Prime Minister and the loss by drowning of the Minister of War, Kitchener. The Welsh Wizard (LG) was a dangerous man in the position of Prime Minister for various reasons but most importantly, a passionate belief in his own infallible judgement of military operations and character. He was at odds with Haig, British C in C in France, December 1915 to January 1919, who was by contrast to LG, a dispassionate man not given to too many words. Inevitably LG decided Haig should go; in this he faced one significant problem, he hadn’t got an alternative commander of the stature and experience of the incumbent. Haig stayed.

Come the end of the conflict LG took his revenge, the loyal commander was ennobled, awarded a significant pension and never again given military responsibility. The wartime premiership of LG though was the high point of his career; as the air cleared after the war his fortunes and those of the Liberal Party declined. Additionally LG’s reputation was seriously compromised by scandals surrounding accusations of the sale of honours through a disreputable middle man, ‘Maundy Gregory’ and separately the sale by LG of shares in the Marconi company. Sometimes there is some form of justice, for Haig was the better man.

Once again in 1919 the political establishment put the armed forces and in particular the army firmly in their place. Only to find that the so called ‘War to end wars’, was no more than an interruption, a half time break of twenty years for drinks, then the services of Tommy Atkins were needed yet again, to defeat the rebuilt German Army in Act II of this European tragedy.