CHAPTER 13

German Perspectives

The objective and intention of this long appraisal of the Great War was to focus on the success of British effort; success that enabled the six division army that went to war in Europe in August 1914 to become an organisation of sixty divisions and lead the Allies to victory in the final campaign during the autumn of 1918. The Germans however were the enemy and it is impractical to exclude from the sources consulted opinions and information of the professional soldiers who were sent to war on behalf of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Some semblance of impartiality can be provided with a selective summary of the German assessment of the effectiveness of the British Army as it expanded relentlessly to wage war on equal terms. It seems reasonable to bring forward some of the published comments from German sources on their British enemy. This is not exhaustive, rather is it summarised as a counterpoint to the myths that have become ingrained as received wisdom of the bungling British generals; a calumny born of malign prejudice, or is there a whiff of Marxist rectitude as well?

To restate details of the German situation already made in other parts of the text as a focus for the main points at issue. The German Army that went to war in 1914 was an army that had never fought a war. The unification of Germany had enabled the constituent states of the new nation to organise a new land force using the resources of the semi autonomous princely states of Bavaria, Brandenburg, Hanover, Prussia, Saxony et al to combine them and their armies with Teutonic efficiency, into a mighty force. Dominated by the Prussian’s General Staff with their military ethos, the German Army looked to be thing of beauty and a joy forever.

There were the two snags to which earlier reference has been made, first not all of the other German states admired the Prussian style and took exception to the assumption of superiority. There is even reference in one account of the tension that arose when officers of the armies of constituent states of the new Germany, such as Bavaria, found that they were to serve in a lower rank in the German Army than their rank as an officer in the army of their own state. The second snag was simply this, the new all purpose army had never fought a war. In all its martial glory never once had its plans been confused by the enemy pulling a fast one, the weather turning foul, the reinforcements getting lost, the communications going awry; events all too familiar to soldiers of all ranks in the British Army. Never once had the new German Army had to order the rear ranks of a field force to face about and fight as disciplined demons, when the enemy appeared from both front and rear. The compensation was the German General Staff, an elite officer corps of grandeur that had planned all things to such perfection that uncertainty had been eliminated; such faith, such folly!

At the commencement of hostilities in August 1914 there are accounts that record the surprise of the German commanders when they found the opposition included a significant British presence. The speed of mobilisation and the deployment of the BEF in France as a fighting force took them unawares, a major tactical mistake by the Germans in the first days of the war. The skill at arms, musketry, to the old regular army also taught the Germans some nasty lessons, fast. It is well attested that the soldiers of the German Army were convinced the British were using machine guns in significant numbers to create the weight of fire faced by their advancing infantry. For certain the classic stopping action by II Corps of the BEF at Le Cateau commanded by Lt. Gen. Smith Dorrian, was unexpected and very unwelcome.

Quite one of the most intriguing accounts of war on the Western Front is Storm of Steel by the previously mentioned Ernst Junger of the73rd Hanoverian Regt. for many months of the Great War, fighting as a junior infantry commander against both the British and French. The account he wrote has the authentic tone of immediate recall, his memory is untainted by the weight of historical reconsideration. Christopher Duffy has also prepared a valuable summary of German opinions in his book Through German Eyes. He has used diary extracts and contemporaneous official material from German sources to build a word picture of how British operations influenced enemy ideas and attitudes.

From both these sources it immediately becomes clear that the front line German soldiers loathed and detested the barbed wire defences of the British positions at the front and were of the opinion that the Brits were too damned good with their machine guns. Matters got worse, so far as machine guns were concerned when the Vickers MMG was consolidated into the Machine Gun Corps and the front line infantry were issued with the portable Lewis gun. By the time the Battle of the Somme took place each platoon of a British infantry regiment had a Lewis gun as part of its weaponry, with the Vickers providing additional fire power. The German Army could not match the Lewis gun, imperfect as it was; another small ingredient to add to the cake of alternative conclusions.

The German equivalent of Tommy Atkins, ‘Fritz Schmidt’?, also found other close quarter trench weapons, the 2” spigot mortar, the 3” tube mortar and the larger 4” and 6” versions to be thoroughly nasty; both the weapons and the way they were used by Tommy. Then there were the unofficial items used to make a point in close quarter fighting, pick helves for example with half a yard of barbed wire wrapped around the business end, knuckle dusters and entrenching tools with the spade end ground to razor sharpness, all these, when wielded by a determined enemy, can make quite an impression on the resistance of those under attack. Before considering other aspects of the fighting as the Germans saw things, we should pay our respects to one other item of trench fighting: the British hand grenade, the Mills bomb. A success from the day it came into use, replacing the improvised devices such as jam tins packed with scrap nails and other crude inventions. The Mills bomb, designed by a manufacturer of golf balls, was a classic device easy to use and deadly in effect, 21bs (0.8 kg) of iron in the shape of an olive, filled with explosives which shattered the casing on detonation and spread a shower of hot metal at significant velocity within a radius of ten yards. The real advantage was that the national game of cricket had taught many of the young soldiers to throw a cricket ball with great accuracy up to sixty yards. This was a skill the Germans could not replicate for two reasons, throwing skills and the long wooden handle of the German ‘potato masher’ grenade. The grenade was another hated device. What was that rumble from the myth mill? Some critics complaining that the playing fields of the nation are not appropriate places for training to win wars, tosh!

And what of Thomas Atkins, how was he regarded by the enemy? As previously commented the German Army had no experience of the British soldier in action, diary excerpts do offer some guide to the attitudes of the front line German troops. Tommy was regarded as a doughty fighter, particularly in defence, he was seen as tough, well organised and well supplied. In attack the opinion seems to have been that the British showed insufficient imagination and as such failed to make the most of opportunities both during local actions and in larger battles. Tommy was much admired for being a prodigious ‘digger’; several accounts refer to the speed at which a British detachment could convert a few shell holes into a defensible strong point. The Germans were critical of the lack of information given to the front line soldiers, commenting that when junior leaders were lost or put out of action the ordinary soldier was at a loss to know what to do. Perhaps the British policy of ‘need to know’ went too far. This is how Ltjunger saw things when his company surprised a party of British who had made their way by some means through German lines during an action. Unusually in his experience, the British party surrendered. At more senior levels the criticism that I have found is the willingness of British commanders to reinforce tactical failure. The counter argument needs to be made; the impetus of an action has to be maintained. For this reason extra troops are sent as reinforcements to keep the action moving. Now a decision within the context of any battle is always a matter of judgement. If you win, the right thing was done; fail and you are to blame for the losses. In so far as this criticism is valid I can only ask, what was done by the Germans during the Battle of Verdun? Failure was reinforced consistently. The policy of immediate ‘counter attack’ to recover lost ground is much the same. Two sides of the same coin, I wonder?

As the months passed, the Allied armies and the enemy strove to find a means to dominate the battlefield and impose their will on opposing forces. The increasing significance of the artillery was recognised. This was the Arm’ of the combatant armies that protected the PBI in the front line trenches, interdicted enemy positions, the ‘lines of communication’ and rear areas. The guns also provided the infantry with much needed protection before and during attacks. Briefly in the section on the Royal Flying Corps, reference was made to the achievements of the Royal Regiment of Artillery and the RFC. Between them by 1916 they had devised and brought into operation systems and equipment which enabled indirect artillery fire to be directed with much greater accuracy than had previously been thought possible. The qualitative improvement in fire control with further refinements continued through to 1918 when a devastating barrage launched the British attack in August 1918, the eventual outcome being the defeat of the German Army and surrender on 11th November.

After the Battle of Cambrai at which tanks made their first appearance the German General, Erich von Ludendorff recorded that; “the enemy [British] enhanced the power of their infantry to a comprehensive degree by [use] of the machine. Our efforts [German] depended too much on the men.” It is this change of emphasis which is notable in the context of diary entries. Consistently reference is made by diarists to the amount and quality of arms, ammunition, stores and equipment available to the British Army. The siege was having its effect on both the available supplies and the morale of the Germans who had to do the fighting. The climax of this situation was reached during the German spring campaign of 1918 when German soldiery abandoned the actions to which they were committed and went ‘a looting’, just as soldiers have done for centuries when there’s booty for the taking.

As a comment on the way the Germans regarded the British response to the exigencies of war I plead in aid the following opinions of General von Kuhl, Chief of Staff, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht.

First, “What Britain actually achieved went a good deal further. ”It is impossible to have reckoned on that in advance.“ Britain deployed forces in Macedonia, the Middle East, German colonies [in Africa], Europe, the Western Front, Serbia and Italy. ”The mighty reinforcement and reorganisation of the British Army in the course of this war amounted to an administrative achievement of the first order.“ (my italics). This opinion confirms that at the highest level of operations within the German command, strategic surprise was achieved; a pearl beyond price in the war fought by the British commanders. Odd perhaps that such a favourable opinion of the British achievement never ranks for a mention when the latter day critics are offering their opinions.

Second, “It would be quite wrong to deny the British credit for the way they fought and for the obstinate way they brushed aside the heaviest casualties and kept renewing their assaults. It would be equally wrong to suggest that there was any possibility that they may have broken through.“ The fact that, despite this, they continued their offensive was justified by the British on the basis of the overall situation. After the total collapse of the Russian offensive in July 1917, the Russian Army as a fighting force had completely fallen out of the picture. The Italian front was in complete tatters in October. Above all the hitting power of the French, after the failure of the offensive on the Aisne and in Champagne, followed by the mutinies and internal disturbances was so greatly reduced that they were in urgently need of reorganisation and relief.

“The United States was still not in a position to do anything. ”The one and only army capable of offensive action was the British. If they had broken off their offensive, the German Army would [could?] have seized the initiative and attacked the Allies where they were weak. To this end it would have been possible to have withdrawn strong forces from the east after the collapse of the Russians. For these reasons the British had to go on attacking until the onset of winter ruled out a German counter attack. Today, now that we are fully aware about the critical situation in which the French Army found itself during the summer of 1917, there can be absolutely no doubt that through its tenacity, the British Army bridged the crisis in France. The French Army gained time to recover its strength; the German reserves were drawn towards Flanders. The sacrifices that the British made for the ‘Entente’ were fully justified.“(source; Der Weltkreig 1914̵1918 Band II, Berlin 1929 (in translation) Kuhl v. General d. Inf.)

My point exactly, confirmed by a German general whose task it was to defeat the Allied armies.

Having made these points that the efforts of the force under British command had not gone unrecognised by senior German commanders, these comments need to be treated with some caution. One explanation could be that the favourable comments are intended to shift the focus of blame for the failure of the German nation and its army to win the war for which they were responsible; no more nor less than an example of the ‘Macavity’ beloved of modern politicos, an argument to exonerate themselves. The comments of Ernst Junger though have the authentic tone of the junior field commander. In particular when he writes of the surprise experienced by the advancing forces of the German Army including himself during the spring offensive of 1918 when the quality and extent of supplies available to the British forces was revealed.

Chapter 8 of the main text (pg. 155) makes reference to the German attack on Verdun with the strategic objective of breaking the French Army before dealing the British Army a decisive blow forcing their withdrawal from continental Europe. Richard Holmes in his book Western Front makes an interesting point. The policy described does appear in the post war memoirs of the Field Marshal von Falkenhayn, the snag is that there is no documentary evidence that the proposal was made to the German supreme command in 1915/16. The available state and military records for the relevant time do not include any reference to such a strategy or planning options to seek battle with the British Army, should Verdun fall to the German attack. This poses the question of authenticity, was the Field Marshal being constructively imaginative post hoc? Or was the old boy lying in his teeth? Haig gets a hard time for apparently amending his diaries, what about others?

A German Commentary; a domestic viewpoint

A book published in English translation in 2007 provides some insight into the opinions of an upper middle class German family from the late nineteenth century until the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945.The family archives and importantly the personal diaries of the Klamroth family have been researched and documented by Frau Wibke Bruhns (b. 1938), the daughter of Hans George Klamroth (b.1898) and his wife Else Podeus who was Danish. The family were wealthy, influential, manufacturers and merchants, land owners; the ’haute-bourgeoisii of the Imperial German class system, not though aristocratic ‘Junkers’. They lived well and exercised a benevolent, paternalistic oversight of both their families and their employees; they were though committed to the ambitions of Bismarck and Wilhelm II to create a place in the sun for the new Germany.

Both Kurt, the father, and his son Hans Georg (HG) served in the army through the system that obliged all males to undertake service in the armed forces. Just as in Britain the social standing of the family ensured that their army service was as officers. Kurt commanded a reserve supply column, first in Belgium and then on the Eastern Front during the Great War. HG became involved with the ‘Nazi party’ during the 1930s and was for a short period a member of the SS. The majority of his service though was with sections of the army dealing with ‘Intelligence’ matters.

The atmosphere created by the reworking of the diaries and documentation is a curious mirror of ‘Edwardian’ England; self confident and assured. There are though undertones of envy and anxiety that the new Germany was not respected to the same extent as France and Britain. The progress of events in the summer of 1914 does not seem to cause the Klamroths of the day to have second thoughts. War declared, Belgium and France invaded and the BEF joining the battle, the edited diary entries concern the alleged use of soft nosed ’dum dum’ bullets by the British Army and the effrontery of unidentified Belgian ’francs-tireurs’ (guerrillas of the day) resisting the advance of the German Army. Later in the war the issue of shortages and the means by which HG as a young man could find an appointment in the cavalry and avoid the nasty reality of the infantry and in all probability the Western Front! Not once it seems does the family consider their nation’s aggressive actions to be in any way unreasonable. The consequence of the Allied victory producing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 also records the anger of the diarists at the ‘War Guilt’ clause and the ‘unreasonable’ terms of the reparations forced on Germany. Not a whisper about Brest Litovisk in 1918 when the unequal settlement between Germany and Russia enforced annexation of the Baltic States plus large portions of the Ukraine.

As events progress in Germany following the 1919 settlement the diarist finds the French tiresome and expects sympathy for their damaged dignity. After the ‘Weimar Republic’ and the catastrophic inflation; enter stage right Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist Party. HG is an early joiner, to protect his business interests you understand, reserve officer training at weekends and cultivating his party credentials. The atmosphere created by the accounts in the diary suggest that the Klamroths see Hitler and the Nazis as aliens running Germany until the old order is able to resume their proper place. History we know did not go with this hopeful version of events; the second act of the tragedy of total war consumes Germany, damages the free democracies almost beyond repair and provides a platform for the equally abhorrent Communism of Russia to force the world into a ‘Cold War’.

HG pays with his life for his involvement in the plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, not it appears to redress the effect of German aggression, but to protect German national interests from the advancing Russian Army and the political commissars included in the baggage train.

The interpretation that eventually developed was sceptical disbelief. The original diarists, their wives, relations and employees were guiltless in the events between 1914Ᾱ8 and 1939Ᾱ45; France, Britain (always referred to as England) were to blame for shortages, bombing raids and all the other nastiness that the family suffered. The culpability of Wilhelm II, Hindenberg, Ludendorff, Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist (Nazi) Party for the wars and their outcome was not the responsibility of the population of the German nation, or so the text provided by Frau Bruhns would have us believe.

The description of the lifestyle of the family over the years is fascinating reading; the treatment of the family’s participation in the events of the thirty-one years between 1914 and 1945 is breathtaking in its complacency and denial. There seems no alternative but to conclude that ‘contrition’ is not within the scope of reactions of which the collective psyche of the German people is responsible.

There is more to consider for completion of this summary of the perspectives through which the Germans considered their commitment to the Great War in Europe from 1914 to 1918. It is not attractive now to look back and offer an account, however brief of the distortions that passed for national policies. There appears in retrospect to have been a malign style of reasoning that found an outlet in some disgraceful actions taken in pursuit of the victory Germany believed was its due. This appears to have been a cast of mind that was to find even more dreadful means of expression twenty-five years later in Act II of this European tragedy.

The events chosen for comparison in this portion of the account have been arranged deliberately to proceed from the general to the particular, leaving the sequence and the outcome to speak for itself, or otherwise.

First in the order of consideration is the issue to which allusion has already been made that the whole enterprise of Germany’s war with Europe in 1914 was an enterprise of startling risk. Yes I know all wars are a matter of risk. Where, however, did the Kaiser, his General Staff and the government find the confidence to convert Belgium into a satrap province and look to the occupation of a significant portion of the Ukraine as an extension of the German Empire. On what authority were they to base their government? Were the residents of the newly colonised territories expected to welcome ‘Pax Germanica’ as another phase of life? What reaction was anticipated from the Russian Orthodox Church and its priesthood? How were the Landowning aristocracy and indeed the peasants of mother Russia to be treated? The questions tumble out in a cascade once the issue is raised. I have never found any explanations. Has anyone else?

Having raised the question of the validity of the whole enterprise there are also issues to be put that reflect upon the attitude of the Germans in respect of how the war was to be conducted and the effect of the actions on world opinion. In this category of events first for consideration must rank the Zimmerman Telegram.27 By what mental gymnastics did the government of Germany conclude that its interests would be advanced by promoting a war between the United States of America and its poverty stricken neighbour, Mexico? This was not just digging oneself deeper into a hole; it was a completely new excavation.

Every neutral nation in the world now had to think it could be a target for German diplomatic or military adventures.

And so the sorry litany continued. The introduction of unrestricted submarine warfare began in 1916, not with the sinking of one or two cargo ships but the torpedoing of a 35,000 ton passenger liner, the Lusitania, on 7th Mayl915. 1,154 non combatants died, this, in the days when the general principle was observed ‘women and children first’. The ship was a legitimate target. The consequence of the sinking and the loss of life was international opprobrium; for which apparently Germans had no concern. Their intention was to make a point to the whole world. The use of the submarine during the Great War was a vexed question but it was a legitimate weapon of war. The error was in the rules of engagement. Submarine commanders were clearly awaiting the order to apply the policy, the error was to authorise immediate attacks on ships which would have non combatant passengers on board as well as the crew. International opinion and in particular those of Americans was disgust. Another hole blown in the proposition that Germany was defending its legitimate rights.

Then there was the Wilson Peace Plan advanced to the nations at war by the President of the United States and rejected out of hand by the Germans. A rejection made when the German Army was in occupation of most of Belgium and a slice of northern France which included valuable coal and iron smelting resources. Probably the plan was not in the interests of Germany nearly two years into a costly war, Germany though did hold a good negotiating hand which it did not use. Once the chance for a negotiated peace passed there was no way out of the tangle other than the defeat for one side or the other.

As the scale of the comparisons reduces the fate of Belgium has to be considered. The nation was invaded when, as was its right in international law, it refused permission for the German Army and its supplies to transit the national territory to invade France. The Belgians and their army resisted the incursion by force of arms and were defeated to the extent that the majority of the country was occupied. King Albert and the remainder of his forces clung stubbornly to the small strip of Belgium between the North Sea and Ypres. Throughout the war the Belgians acted in concert with their Allies but retained an army independent of both the French and British commands, fighting on behalf of the occupied portion of their country. The Germans were not pleased with the way Belgium and her army reacted and set about demonstrating their perspective of events. At the time the more lurid press reports were awash with accounts of ‘atrocities’, the raping of nuns, bayoneting of babies, summary executions and deportation for forced labour. The press reports were not perhaps as concerned with accuracy as they should have been and the extent of the acts described needs to be treated with caution. There are however two serious pieces of evidence that cannot be ignored. Firstly, the American Minister (Ambassador) in Belgium made numerous reports to Washington of acts of repression that lend credence to the newspaper reports of atrocities28 occurring if not the scale on which they were carried out. Figures of 200 civilian deaths in the town of Andenne and 400 in Tamines are quoted by Richard Holmes, another reliable source. Secondly there is Louvain, a Belgium city with one of the oldest universities in Europe, a centre of learning and scholarship recognised throughout the world, including one of the largest collections of medieval manuscripts and records in Europe. How did the Germans treat this centre of culture and learning? Louvain was put to the sword, ransacked, burnt to a significant extent, the library destroyed; an action of which the Visigoths who sacked Rome 1,500 years previously would have been proud; so much for German culture.

Finally there was an act which revolted Britain in particular but also set a bench mark against which German intentions were judged by the world at large for years to come. In August 1914 a middle aged British nurse was taking some holiday at home in England from her duties in a Belgian nursing school. She returned immediately to her work when the war commenced, by which time the school had become a Red Cross hospital. She nursed the patient casualties, British, Belgian, French and when they arrived German, without regard for their nationality. She remained in Brussels when the city was occupied by the Germans. As such her actions were unimpeachable. Then the lady concerned committed herself to hiding Allied soldiers from the Germans and helping them to escape to neutral Holland. In this act she was in clear breach of international laws on the role of civilians of any nationality within occupied territories, for such actions the penalties include death. Spies were executed, neither the British or the French hesitated to deal summarily with those caught up in espionage, which had an immediate military purpose. The humanitarian actions of the nurse were not of military significance, was the interpretation of the world at large. The Germans did not agree; at dawn on 12th October 1915, a firing squad on a rifle range outside Brussels executed Edith Cavell.

World opinion was outraged!