CHAPTER 14

Generals, Historians and Critics

One feature of the fallout from the Great War is the effect on the reputation of individuals and in particular the generals of the British Army From a historical standpoint, conventionally, generals who were successful and won, received a good press, losers were soon forgotten. The different treatment meted out, retrospectively, for the military leaders of the 1914/18 conflict is quite exceptional. The leaders available for a particular war are a matter of chance, five years earlier or later and the personalities will be different for no other reason than the passage of time. Britain sent its army to war in 1914 with the senior officers available and in 1918 the army presented the government with a win: result! After a short period of euphoria, the reputation of senior officers went into decline to the point that a whole school of history grew up to excoriate the generals as ‘Butchers and Bunglers’, the opposite of the usual treatment.

It was not the intention of this account of the Great War’s place in the history of the twentieth century to undertake a detailed review of individual personalities, others have done the original research in English, French and German with scholarship and diligence, which is both time consuming and beyond my abilities. In most cases, but by no means all, I am offering each as an example of how individual talents enabled a team to meet the threat the Allied nations faced. As for the Germans named, read for yourself.

The officers named in the following summary are just a few of those who contributed to the Allied victory, without their experience, determination and effort there would have been no victory. Flawless paragons of military endeavour they were not, they were though the best the nation had. Senior commanders cannot be plucked from some alternative occupation, shipbuilding say, and let loose with 100,000 soldiers when a determined enemy is knocking at the gates. On the job learning has to be kept to a minimum, which is not to allow all commanders the increase of experience that should accumulate by the success and failure of events as they unfold.

First for consideration has to be, Field Marshal Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, putting aside the technicality that by convention Field Marshals do not retire, they remain on the active list until death, Kitchener did not have command responsibility during the Great War, he was Minister of War. To him must go the credit for two achievements, firstly he was one of the very few who realised once war broke out in Europe on the scale of August 1914 that the conflict would be long and drawn out, three years was his estimate. Second he was able to deploy his knowledge and experience of military affairs to organise the ‘Kitchener armies’ of volunteers in such a way that the new formations became worthy reinforcements for the hard pressed remnants of the original forces of the BEF that went to France in August 1914. History does not allow us the judgment of any contribution he could have made to the second half of the Great War. HMS Hampshire on which he was sailing to Russia was sunk with heavy loss of life by a German mine of Orkney in June 1916. He it was though who created the foundations for eventual victory.

Second on the race card for a mention is Field Marshal Sir William Robertson who as CIGS became the professional head of the British Army in 1915. His career began as a trooper (private) and he made it to the very peak of his profession in the army ‘crippled by class’ odd that! Not only must ‘Wully’ have been an outstanding soldier with all that implies, he must have been a very shrewd29 judge of men of which more later. It was not to be expected that his background and career would produce a sophisticated political general, such as Sir Henry Wilson. It follows then that when Lloyd George (LG) arrived on the scene as Prime Minister the sparks would fly and they did. LG opening on one occasion by saying “I’ve heard di, da, di, da, di, da” and adding his opinion to conclude the issue; ‘Wully’ thought for a moment and responded “An’ I’ve heard different” and went no further, subject closed. Politicians find such a style of discussion almost incomprehensible. There is no dissimulation, no explanation offered. I suspect LG was caught flat footed in some misrepresentation of a situation of which ‘Wully’ was fully informed. The emphatic contradiction told LG, ‘you’re walking on water and I know you are, so back off.

Robertson’s tenure as CIGS from 1915 to early 1918 was of enormous significance, he it was who controlled the relationship between government and commanders, moderated the demands for men and materiel by the soldiers and deflected politicians from over ambitious alternatives to war on the Western Front. Gordon Corrigan in his summation of events Mud, Blood and Poppycock, (Chap 11), quotes an example, verbatim, of the text of a memo from the CIGS (Robertson) to Lord Curzon (Foreign Secretary) which begins, “It would be valuable if you could explain to the Prime Minister (LG) Ᾱ ”; continuing with an explanation of the difficult terrain in Salonika and the sheer impossibility of undertaking the military action proposed by the PM in this theatre of war.

The influence wielded by Robertson was immense in numerous ways; in one particular though the decisions he took, more than any other, influenced the way the war was fought. As professional head of the army it was for him to agree recommendations to appoint the British Armys’ senior commanders. He moulded the team to meet and defeat the enemy. He understood in the instinctive way of an ‘old and bold’ soldier, that the best available must be concentrated at the point of the greatest danger, the Western Front. The critics’ view is the generals were not good enough, but they were the only ones available to the army and the nation. Robertson’s employment of his commanders in ways that made the best of their strengths and characters was inspired, a talent which it seems has gone almost unrecognised.

Continuing the review now in the order of events, two of the most well known names of the Great War rank for consideration, with two of the lesser names; Field Marshal Sir John French, subsequently raised to the peerage as an Earl, and his successor Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, also raised to the peerage as an Earl. Sir John commanded the BEF when it mobilised and went to France in August 1914. He had command experience in South Africa and had held numerous staff appointments up to 1914 when he was CIGS. There occurred then the ‘Curragh incident’ and the threat by officers in Ireland to resign if required to take military action against protestant activists in Ulster. The government of the day did not meet undertakings given to the army and French resigned as CIGS. French was recalled in 1914 and commanded the BEF in France until December 1915. As C in C in 1914 he faced a situation for which he and all the other British generals had no experience. He was to command the British forces as an ally of the French in the minor role that by force of the comparative numerical strengths of the two armies was the only option available. Not since Waterloo had Britain fought in continental Europe when in 1815 Wellington led coalition forces with the Prussian Marshal, Blucher. Field Marshal French was not used to making war in consort with Allied armies and did not speak French. Nevertheless he faced the responsibility and with the troops of the two corps on which the BEF was initially based made life difficult for the German attackers; to the extent that with the assistance of poor German decisions the Schlieffen plan failed. Then as the campaign solidified into trench warfare he settled the BEF into its defensive lines, incorporated reinforcements into the organisation of the army, held the line against the enemy attack at second Ypres in the spring of 1915 and launched the unsuccessful attack at Loos in 1915. What he did not do, because it was beyond his power, was win the war. The politicians needed an explanation and he was a readymade fall guy, replaced by Douglas Haig in December 1915. The change was not welcomed by Sir John who then put pen to paper and in a book he wrote, 1914, criticised the political direction of the war, oops!

There are aspects of Sir John’s behavior, not least the authorship of the book mentioned above, which are distinctly odd for an army officer of the Victorian and Edwardian era. Society and in particular the closed community of the army had very different ideas on acceptable norms of lifestyle to be expected of those in the public eye to those current in society today. He married when a very junior officer, almost unheard of at that time, then divorced his wife. He kept a mistress, three black marks before we get serious. He used his friendship with Charles Repington, a former officer (Lt Col) required to resign his commission for paying too much attention to other officers’ wives, then a correspondent for The Times, to plant stories attacking the government for the inadequate supply of shells in 1915; the shortage was a serious business but two wrongs don’t make a right. He was also reputedly poor at personal finance, to the extent that he borrowed money, £2,500 is one suggested amount, a very large sum at the time, from a more junior officer; the officer who provided the loan, Douglas Haig. The breaches of army conventions of the day in that brief summary are astounding; a guardian angel somewhere was on overtime, most officers would not survive one or at the most two such misdeeds. More damaging for the army was the dislike he had for Lt. Gen. Horace Smith Dorrien, who took command of II Corps in August 1914 when the original commander, Grierson, died of a heart attack as the BEF mobilised in France. The origins of the antipathy arose from the changes made by Smith Dorrien to the training of cavalry formations when he succeeded French as C in C Aldershot. French was a cavalryman, Smith Dorrien an infantryman, the latter set in train changes to the training of cavalry units to use them as mounted infantry. French who was Inspector General of Cavalry was fiercely opposed and from then on there was a very unpleasant mutual antagonism.

Generals it has to be said by the nature of their responsibilities need to be determined and forceful personalities, ’shrinking violets’ get no sympathy as senior commanders. If they are unable to develop ideas and put them into action in the face of opposition, they fail, that after all is the nature of warfare. Generals must, however, have allies amongst their peers, particularly amongst those of different opinion, teams are not built on ‘yes men’, controlled dissent is vital to the development of creative action. French it seems did not understand this need.

Nevertheless he saw the BEF through the first very difficult fifteen months of the war and left it better able to face the future than it was during the early weeks of the conflict.

Douglas Haig, who was successor to French, commanded I Corps of the BEF from August 1914, as the size of the BEF in France increased he became Commander 1st Army and then in December 1915 the BEF’s Commander in Chief. There were, it would seem, some times during the first weeks of the war when Haig was less than sure of himself or so it is said. My point is, which of the generals of the early weeks got ten out of ten, none. Haig, just as all the others had to, needed to learn how to handle this new high intensity warfare with the multiplicity of complications it brought with it. Kitchener and Robertson were needed for other things and contemporaries of Haig were clearly not judged suitable. Rightly or wrongly we will never know.

The task of C in C was complicated by the responsibilities of commanding the smaller component of the Allied armies in France. This was a task for which none of the commanders available had experience, there was no training manual, Wellington was the last Brit who had fought a major war as a coalition general. Haig grew into the responsibilities, he had to protect the BEF and larger British interests whilst supporting joint actions to bring about the defeat of the German Army, this was a tall order. Those concerned had to make things up as they went along. In this Haig did better than anyone anticipated.

The name Haig was not unknown in 1914 in Britain and its Empire, and it remains so now. A member of the family which made its money dosing the population with a medicine of many people’s choice, his character took more from the Scottish Presbyterian tradition than it did from the geniality of a dram or three. Reserved and unsocial by repute, he found some difficulty in expressing himself verbally with clarity and conviction. His preference was for the written word. The feature of the man that ought to be recognised is his intellect, he was one with Kitchener recognising the implications of events in 1914 and planning for a long war. His task was to impose his will on the German Army and bring about its defeat. John Terraine has done much to address this problem and published in 1963, Douglas Haig, ‘The Educated Soldier’ as a well argued defence of the man and his actions.

I have argued elsewhere in these ramblings that the BEF had, from the commencement of the German offensive against Verdun in February 1916, to fight the war in such a manner that the French government and Army would continue the conflict until Germany was defeated. This was the prime responsibility of the C in C, without success in this aspect of affairs all other considerations and all the previous casualties were wasted. Field Marshal Haig should be recognised for the architecture of his strategy, not vilified because the German Army got in the way and killed and maimed Allied soldiers.

The Field Marshal may have foolishly offered himself to his critics as a hostage to fortune. Some researchers suggest that he rewrote his original diaries, not just necessary sub editing, the originals being destroyed. If that is so it was an open goal for all those who want to find fault, which is what happened. He should have known better or been better advised.

As the BEF mobilised it was a two corps army, Haig we know commanded I Corps and Horace Smith Dorrien took command of II Corps. The dispositions of the BEF were such that as the battle developed during the opening weeks, II Corps and Smith Dorrien were in the hot seat, fighting fiercely day after day, retreating from Mons and engaging the German Army in a classic stopping action at Le Cateau. In this action, II Corps faced six German divisions, held them when they attacked; inflicting severe casualties then disengaged from the battle and withdrew. Smith Dorrien had in fact been ordered by Sir John French to continue the retreat through Le Cateau, he decided that following earlier engagements this was impracticable given the fatigue of his soldiers and the dispersion of his units. He was able to call on the support of additional forces from Major General Snow’s 4th Division and cavalry from Major General Allenby’s division, who would fight dismounted when necessary. These troops were in the locality as they continued to withdraw under pressure from the Germans. French was advised of the action planned by the Commander of II Corps, his reply was not a model of clarity. The men of II Corps fought their action and withdrew successfully; Smith Dorrien was tagged as ‘The General who disobeyed’. That was unfair; commanders on the spot have the responsibility of judging the validity of orders and acting in accordance with their own appreciation of conditions. That is why officers have ‘original authority’. The Nelsonian blind eye is an important component of command. What the events did do though was to exacerbate further the ill feeling between the C in C and one of his corps commanders. From then on he was a marked man. In the spring of the following year he proposed a withdrawal at Ypres to a more easily defensible position, the right thing to do militarily but a ‘no no’ from a political perspective. Robertson, ever tactful, advised him that he had sealed his own fate with the immortal line “ ‘Orace your fer ’ome”.

The proposition that is raised by these events has some unpleasant undercurrents; French disliked Smith Dorrien who had shown himself to be a competent commander in the field and very much his own man. The BEF was expanding rapidly as the Territorial Forces reinforced the original regular formations. Senior commanders of proven ability were very scarce, yet Smith Dorrien lost his command and returned to Britain. The events do not square with the demands of the moment. French we know had an obligation to Haig; Haig also had some influence at Court, his wife was a lady in waiting to the Queen. Was this something Sir John hoped he might turn to his advantage? Although by the middle of 1915 Haig had lost confidence in the generalship of French. What though would have been the outcome if Smith Dorrien had been preferred to Haig as replacement for French in December 1915?

There is though one suggestion of a dark cloud that has been raised to cast doubt on the true nature of Smith Dorrien and that concerns his temperament. Generals as noted above can be of fiery temperament, several writers though refer to the violence of Smith Dorrien’s outbursts in terms that suggest more than the impatience of a man striving to achieve against the odds. I wonder if this was one of those circumstances in which ‘Wully’s’ instinct saw a more dangerous condition in the outbursts and took the hard decision in the best interests of the British Army? Following his return to Britain Sir Horace fell victim to a serious illness and did not take up the appointment as Commander of the East African campaign. Later he became Governor of Gibraltar, retired in 1923 and was killed in a car accident in 1932. Whatever the answers, Horace Smith Dorrien has a memorial, a stone obelisk erected by his admirers on a lonely, windswept hilltop above the Derbyshire village of Crich.

If this portion of the review were to continue at the length of the above paragraphs, there would be no end in sight for weeks to come and that is not the purpose, the intent was again to demonstrate the complex conditions created by the demands of the Great War.

Before we leave the subject some of the other commanders should be acknowledged, Plummer and Maxse for their never ending efforts to train and care for their men, Trenchard who built the RFC, Allenby who was posted from the Western Front to the Middle East where he conducted a sparklingly successful campaign to defeat the Turks. Monash from Australia and Currie from Canada who built the troops of these nascent nations into such battle worthy units that they formed the spearhead on 8th August 1918, opening the attack at the battle of Amiens and initiating the Allied advance to victory; Pershing of the USA who managed somehow to reconcile the unrealistic constraints of Congress, President Wilson, his own preconceptions with the military demands of the Great War. Jan Smuts the former Boer Commander who became an admired soldier statesman in not one, but both acts, of the German war of the twentieth century. Then the other generals of British Armies, Home 1st Army, Byng 3rd’ and Rawlinson 4th, all committed by their duty to the defeat of the sovereign’s enemies. Like it or not anyone who reviews the Great War has to recognise that the perceptions of responsibility within the army and nation that went to war in 1914 are utterly changed ninety years later.

There is an insider’s account and commentary of events that is little reported but despite the caveats previously brought to the attention of the reader the account is well worth attention.

In 1953, Maj. Gen. Sir John (Tavish) Davidson, KCMG, CB, DSO, published in book form a critique and description of events and circumstances of Allied military operations in France in 1917 and 1918. The author during the period 1916Ᾱ18 held the appointment of Director of Military Operation at General Headquarters of the British Army in France. He was an essential member of the inner circle, an officer from whom Haig would have required analysis, argument, alternatives, diligence and unflinching loyalty. In shorthand terms he was, with the Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Haig’s right hand. This was the officer who saw everything and everyone, understood in full the strategy, purpose and constraints which the C in C, Haig, had to take account in his deployment and use of the British forces placed at his disposal; a uniquely privileged position.

The text provides descriptions, comments and alternatives to various aspects of events in the years in question which shed another light on aspect of events, personalities, circumstances and crucially the strategic philosophy adopted under Haig’s leadership. The first example summarised below is cited to illustrate the alternative version of circumstances that preoccupied the C in C and his subordinates. Other examples are in the briefest form words will allow.

First: there is in the accounts of the French Army’s campaign in 1917 recognition that after Nivelle’s spring offensive failed, this lead to disillusionment and mutiny which affected significant portions of the French Army. This was too large an event to escape notice in relevant accounts of the time. Davidson though paints a much bleaker picture, his version of the situation as it developed was that to all intents and purposes the French Army lost all coherence as a fighting force at the height of the disorder in the summer of 1917. Two divisions only, were considered battle worthy and with the colonial troops for a crucial period, the only formations on which reliance could be placed. Not only was the army in confusion, there was also widespread political dissent and civil disturbance with strikes and riots, ‘avowedly pacifist’ politicians arrested, together with the appearance of a left wing dissident organisation ‘Le Bonnet Rouge.⁽ Haig and his General Staff had to plan on the basis that the activities of the British Army including all the overseas components should attract the attention of the German High Command and the armies at its disposal. The Germans must at all costs be diverted from any ambition to attack the French held portions of the Western Front: the route to Third Ypres (Passchendaele) was the means to this end.

Second: the successful attack on and capture of the Broodseinde ridge on 4th October 1917 was regarded by the German High Command as a major setback and the official German History refers to the success of the British forces as ‘a Black Day’ and Ludendorff described that the outcome ”was extraordinarily severe and again we [Germans] only came through it with enormous losses.“ A prime objective was, by the admission of the attacked, achieved.

Third: as would normally be expected the weather varied during the Third Ypres, legend has it that there was continuous rainfall during the weeks of the battle. Not so apparently, wet in August when the offensive was launched, dry in September and early October. So much so that there was added to the usual perils of battle, the effect of bullets, shells and shrapnel ricocheting from the hard ground, compounding the perils of direct fire by this secondary hazard; wet again from the middle of October until the battle was drawn to a conclusion in the middle of November when the Canadians captured and consolidated their position on the high ground at Passchendaele.

Fourth: General Davidson draws on German commanders‘ diaries and reports to establish the concern, amounting almost to despair, of the enemy commanders as their divisions and formations were drawn into the maelstrom and returned damaged almost beyond recovery. The official British historian, Brig. Gen. Sir James Edmonds, CB, CMG is also quoted and reinforces the reports of the likes of Crown Prince Ruprecht, Ludendorff and von Kuhl.

Finally: the introduction to the book is provided by Viscount Trenchard, the Commander of the Royal Flying Corps and subsequently the Royal Air Force in France during this crucial period. In a few hundred words he sharpens the focus of present day perceptions and opinions by summarising the constraints, attitudes and actions of those who exercised the responsibilities of command for Britain and her forces in France as circumstances demanded to defeat the barbarians at the gates. This was the achievement of all those who served.

The most unsatisfactory aspect of the critics of Haig, his commanders, staff, campaigns, planning, direction and control of the war in France is that the myth of the ’Butchers and Bunglers’ gained popular credence despite the accounts of events available which interpreted events in a more balanced and realistic way. That is the flaw in their argument, the information used was made to fit preconceptions; there is no greater sin for a serious study of history!

The names of two other generals are worthy of mention to illustrate the undying humour of Thomas Atkins, always able to make a joke at someone’s expense. From the army of France, General Franchet D’Esperey known throughout the BEF as ‘Desperate Frankie’ and from the enemy, General Alexander von Kluck, there are no prizes for guessing what Tommy did to this general’s last name!

The generals have had their day, now what of the historians, some of whom were generals as well. They come in all shapes and sizes. Easiest by far to categorise are those who were there. The men who when the tumult and the shouting died wrote and in most cases published their accounts of events as they experienced them. Each time one of these histories is read some new aspect of experience is to be found. The accounts are the primary source of our knowledge and for the experienced researcher valuable material to cross reference the numerous accounts of events. Factually these versions of events are the most straightforward, in particular those completed within a decade of the war’s end, prior to the onset of revisionism. Each of these accounts has to be treated with respect. That being said historians have to apply a dose of healthy scepticism even to vernacular accounts; details between accounts are often contradictory. In particular questions have to be raised when the details related are provided by those who served their country well but were not by profession military men. The communicators, C. Day Lewis, Robert Graves, Siegfried Sassoon, et al, were each able to summon up the images of despair faced by the fighting men, turning the emotions they experienced against their own leaders too often, neglecting the inconvenience of German participation. The extent of their experiences and the mourning that followed the death of friends allows them a place in the library of records written on the subject. They must though have equal credit with other narrators, the sharpness of their words does not promote their evaluation above that of others.

Then there are the writers who were soldiers and also by intent became historians, Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart and Lt. Col. J. E C. Fuller are of this caste. Each is sharply critical of the conduct of the war on the Western Front and it has to be said made a respectable living from their writing and lectures. Lt. Col. Fuller remained in the army eventually achieving the rank of major general. Each had an understanding of how the tactical doctrine should be changed but do not appear to have appreciated the difficulties of putting such doctrines in place. When the men, equipment and opportunity occurred in August 1918, then the armies under British command used every resource available: air power, tanks, artillery, cavalry and infantry to launch the assault and stormed to victory in a hundred days; at no small cost in casualties, a precursor of the ‘Blitzkreig’ of Act II of the tragedy

Later day soldier historians have done great service to counteract the ‘Butchers and Bunglers’ school of thinking, Gordon Corrigan, Richard Holmes, Alan Mallinson and John Terraine are outstanding for the quality of their analysis and clarity of their prose.

The academic historians, the likes of Correlli Barnett, Arthur Bryant and A. J. P. Taylor are each valuable sources of factual material, they have the time and access to resources denied to the amateur dabbler, all have done admirable work to trace the pattern and sequence of events. What they were not and had never been were commanders on the ground, facing problems calling for immediate decisions, knowing at best no more than half of the information needed. Historians of this calibre would be better received if their own ideas developed in retrospect were not substituted as the solution to complicated multi faceted situations. They should also be treated with suspicion when claiming second sight and favouring particular personalities whilst criticizing others, did they ever meet these men and understand their characters, if not, their credibility as judges of the outcome of events is compromised, hearsay evidence, as such, always has to be treated with great caution!

The list can go on, whatever has been written including this commentary can be criticised for partiality. The subject is so vast that the best that can be hoped for is the honest admission of intentions and realistic support from factual material of propositions and explanations. The accounts that have to be treated with suspicion are those that substitute the judgement of hindsight, battles cannot be replayed with a different script to prove a point; wars are immediate and the outcome of events settles the situation, to play the ‘ah but if game gets you nowhere, the past as they say is history.

Then there are the correspondents and diarists whose letters and written accounts of the time have in more recent years found life in the numerous books and programmes that have stimulated the national conscience. The words written are often poignant, affectionate, expressing pride in achievement, as well as longing for a peaceful end. Letters were censored, so rarely contain much by way of true detail of events, their value lies in the reaction of the men of all ranks to the task in hand, so often there is explicit concern to succeed and win against the Germans who were perceived by soldiers of all ranks as a real and potent enemy against whom victory was essential.

Mixed within all the available material on the Great War can be found comment and criticism which is both unfair and unrealistic. An example has been quoted of the idea of providing armour for soldiers on the Somme as protection against small arms fire; it is unrealistic in the extreme to advance such a proposition, given the state of technology of the day. Other examples include the complaint that the provision of reflecting metal triangles on the packs carried by soldiers during an advance to make it easier for men to follow each other, made them more vulnerable to marksmen. The same critic however passes over without comment the detail that Scottish units painted a white saltire (St. Andrews cross) on their packs. Either both were misguided or both were sensible aids. Pipers playing their comrades into battle were just as brave or misguided as the men who ran with footballs towards the enemy trenches. As a conclusion to this short paragraph of warning there is the ill informed criticism by one author who, on finding in the diary of a regular officer of the Great War an entry following the announcement of the Armistice in November 1918 that reads “Now we can return to some proper soldiering”, castigates the diarist for the flippant treatment of the war just ended and the losses suffered. This critic clearly has no understanding at all of the ‘low key’ ethic of understatement that was the essential attribute of the British officer, officers who had just lead their army to victory.

Commentators of this group are in general terms unreliable, their inconsistent are too obvious.