Webber Brothers joint detailed report on organisation, risks and support/opposition to operation of the secret radio in Chungkai and Kanburi Camps
The following is written at the request of the interrogation officer.
Origin
A wireless set at which had been in operation for a month or two in Chungkai Camp Thailand was handed over by its Lt. T. Douglas R.C.O.S. to myself (Lt. D.H.Webber) on 5th Feb 1942. From then until the Jap surrender it was operated jointly by Capt M.L. Webber & Lt. D.H.Webber. During the 2½ years 702 news Bulletins were distributed.
The Set
The set was a simple 2 valve receiver of the detector L.F. type with reaction and transformer coupling. It was made originally and subsequently redesigned by Lt. T. Douglas. The components were various old pieces which had been brought up from Changi. The valves were 6 J.5. all metal 8 pin valves which were used as simple triodes. From time to time various components broke down and had to be replaced such as the transformer & resistances. For the rewinding of these parts the necessary wire were stolen from the Japanese. A new set of earphones was purchased from Bangkok through Boon Pong of Kanburi. These also, due to dampness, broke down several times and had to be repaired. For all my repair work as well as in preparing fresh banks of batteries, Sgt. Oliver J.V.E. was of great assistance. The set operation on 6v low tension and 60v. H.T. which was supplied by banks of torchlight cells of the appropriate voltage.
Dangers
In the early stage it is not certain what the consequences of being discovered with the radio set would have been but later when the Japanese retreat in the Pacific started, it is certain that the consequences would have been very serious. In fact it is believed that 3 officers lost their lives as the result of a set being discovered in Kanburi. From the Japs the danger lay in (1) searches at first very perfunctory but later more frequent and more thorough. To combat this risk adequate measures were taken to conceal the set while not in use (2) casual Jap sentries discovering the set whilst in operation. To combat this a very thorough system of guards was evolved. As far as our own people were concerned the main danger lay in careless talk being overheard by the Jap interpreters who frequently ‘snooped’ about the huts after dark. So a safeguard news was given out 24 hrs late so that there was a possibility however faint, that it could have been brought in from outside.
Officers also gave their promise not to discuss the news. Unfortunately there were a number of criminal types among the Ors as well as a number of Dutch Eurasians who, it was felt, could not be trusted and therefore wireless news as such was not passed on to other ranks . Steps were taken however, to keep the troops informed of the true position.
Object of the News Service
The main object of the News Service was to maintain a high morale among the P.of.W. when no authorative news was available rumours [?] rife and the morale of the camps fluctuated from day to day sometimes very light at other times very low and it was a great strain not knowing what to believe and what not to believe. In addition contact with the outside world was desirable for several reasons. For one it was always possible that messages might be sent to us in fact after the sinking of a P.O.W. convoy as the result of which a member P.O.W. from our particular camp were liberated, we were surprised that no messages were put out for us. Several of those rescued knew our times of operation
Policy
Prior to taking over the News Service a private set had been operated in Chungkai for a selected few and this caused much hard feeling. From the start we layed down our policy which contained three main points. (1) The news was to be given to all officers and later to be allowed to filter through to the O.R.s. (2) There was to be no censorship of the news in any form either by ourselves or by any outsider person. (3) News was to be given out simultaneously to all officers – no officers to have special privileges. There was one exception to this – should any news of military importance which might affect the camp come through then this would immediately be passed on to the senior Br. Officers. Both Lt. Col. Owtram & Lt. Col Dean were in full agreement with this policy. As a result of our policy no other officer was expected to shoulder any of the responsibility of the wireless set.
Operation
The method of operation was as follows:-at dusk or just after dark a cordon of guards was thrown round the place of operation then the set was uncovered a few minutes before the scheduled time of the news bulletin. The set was operated by Lt. D.H. Webber and the news taken down by Capt M.L. Webber. This was done in complete darkness. The set was then . . . away. The whole operation took less than half an hour. The following day the bulletin was made up from the notes and then issued 24 hrs later. Our place of operation varied from time to time. It first was operated inside our hut but later was moved to various places in the camp where there was a thick natural cover of bamboo, then finally to the Q.M. stores. In Kanburi the set was operated in the kitchen. From all the attached diagrams it will be seen that frequently we chose a place close to Jap quarters as these places were regarded with less suspicion than the more remote parts.
For the major part of the time the set was kept below ground.
Editor’s Note:Based on original diagram by the Webber Brothers in TNAWO344/407/2
In the early days however the batteries were built into bamboos which formed part of our bed and the set was kept in a double atap roof above our beds.
Assistance Received
At all times and in all places we found all ranks anxious to help. Assistance was always forthcoming whatever the apparent wish. Lt Col Owtram and Lt Col Dean the camp commander and senior officer respectively gave their full support to the news service. They were always ready to take any risks themselves in order that the service might be effectively run and the news distributed as widely as possible. The same remarks apply to Lt Col Toosey and Lt Col MacEachern in Kanburi. These officers dealt firmly with any breaches of security on the part of a few officers.
Lt Calderwood & his Police Staff were largely responsible for helping up the supply of batteries. Capt Ian McIntosh was our principal guard throughout.
Lt. T.D. Douglas, constructed the set & reconstructed it on several occasions, his help was readily given at all times when he was in the same camp.
Sgt Oliver (JVE) was of great assistance in repairs to the set and preparing it for transfer.
Capt Gordon Skinner & Lt De Here [?] assisted in transporting the batteries from Chungkai to Kanburi.
Major Andrews took charge of the batteries and set on their arrival at Kanburi.
Driver Marriot (Transport driver at Kanburi) was responsible for passing messages & for the transport of batteries from Tamarkan to Kanburi – he did a very good job of work at great risk – he was always absolutely reliable.
List of Persons giving assistance
| Lt Col Owtram | |
| " " Dean | |
| " " Toosey | Camp or Group Commanders |
| " " Mc Leod | |
| " " [?] | |
| Lt Calderwood (A & SH) | |
| R.S.M. Low (2nd Cams) | Police engaged in supply |
| Sgt Thomas (RM) | |
| Sgt Robbins (Metr. Police) | |
| Cpl Tough (FMSVF) | |
| Cpl Kenehan (FMSVF) | |
| Lt T Douglas (R C of S) | Construction & Repairs |
| Sgt Oliver (J.V.E) | |
| Lt Col Carpenter | |
| " " Dobbs | |
| Capt Wilkinson | |
| Capt McIntosh | Capt Monks Malay Rgt |
| " Sutherland | Lt Darby Malay Rgt |
| Lt Marsh | Lt Sheldon Malay Rgt |
| Lt Denholm | Pte Frank Reed FMSVF Guards |
| Lt F. Smith Guards | Lt Ross A & SH |
| Lt V.B. Perkins | Lt S. Taylor Malay Rgt |
| Lt McLean | Pte Thornton 2nd Cambs |
| Capt Henderson | |
| Capt A.T. Elgar | |
| Capt L Tench | |
| Lt F Barber | |
| Lt Clerk | |
| Lt [?son] |
M. L. Webber Cap
D.H. Webber Ltt
Opposition
There was no active opposition to the news service accept in the two cases mentioned below, but a number of senior officers disassociated themselves from it. Lt Col Williamson while camp commander refused to allow the news to be brought to his H.Q. and refused to be told anything himself. He has since explained that this was in order that he might not be able to give anything if tortured. Lt Col.. [?] . . . was a similar case.
The first case of active opposition came when the move to Kanburi was contemplated. The Lt. Cols in Tamarkan held a meeting and decided that it would be impossible to get the set to Kanburi undetected. They therefore decided that it must be left in Chungkai. The Chungkai Cols held a similar meeting and came to the same decision. This was without hearing what we had to say. Lt.Col. Owtram told us of this decision but on hearing the information we had received from Maj. Andrews and our . . . [?] . . . he agreed to take the responsibility for allowing us to try without informing the others.
The second case of opposition came after we had taken the set to Kamburi.
Lt.Col McEachern sent for us and informed us that there had been a meeting of senior Lt Col and that by a large majority they had decided (again without hearing our side of the question) that the set must be destroyed forthwith. He said that he agreed with the decision but that before giving the order he wanted to hear what we had to say.
We pointed out that the greatest risk, that of getting the set into camp, had been overcome, that accurate news kept up morale; that at any time news of vital importance to the camp might be received, and that all the necessary parts for the construction of a transmitter had been got into camp. After consideration Lt Col McEachern decided to take full responsibility for allowing us to carry on.
During this period Lt.Cols Toosey, Carpenter, Owtram, Dean & McLeod & Dobbs were vigorous in their support of our construction.
Supply
The set was operated on “Torch Light” cells and required fifty at any one time. These were used up and had to be replaced at the rate of approximately one per day.
In early 1943 contact was made with a Thai named Chal Rhoan who lived about 1½ miles from Chungkai – he volunteered to get supplies of batteries. The batteries were essential and it was necessary to trust someone – the risk was necessary. Chal Rhoan continued to supply us right to Dec. 1944 – at times he ran the greatest risks, never once did he fail us, and never once would he accept more than the actual price of the batteries. (He would not even accept out of pocket expenses for going into Bangkok).
During 1942 the collection of batteries was easy – there was no fence round the camp and the “Anti-Malaria” Party was allowed to wander at will. Supplies ordered from Chal Rhoan were brought in by the A.M. Party or the Police. Later a fence was erected round the camp and only the camp Police were allowed out without Jap guards. Lt Calderwood (A&SH) A.P.M. [Assistant Provost Marshall] with his staff R.S.M. W. How (2nd Cams) Sgt Thomas (RM) Sgt Robbins & Cpl Tough (FMSVF) undertook the bringing of supplies which continued even after the police were refused permission to leave camp. (We then would [have] to break out at night and collect.)
In 1944 the fence round the camp was drawn in to a much narrower perimeter and was very closely guarded. Breaking out then became too risky and a new method had to be adopted.
Only one party was allowed out of camp and that was one of 6 officers who herded 200 cattle. These cattle were taken out daily for grazing and the party was under an armed Jap sentry. The method adopted was to drive the cattle near a certain hut and then cause them to disperse amongst the bushes, it was then impossible for the sentry to watch all six officers so 5 kept his attention engaged while one slipped off to the hut and sent a message calling Chal Rhoan to the hut at a fixed time later in the day. The officer then returned to the party and the process was repeated later in the day when the order was given to Chal Rhoan.
At an agreed date later, the batteries were collected in the same manner and either carried in a haversack for the rest of the day and past the guard in the evening or an officer made his way back to camp and passed them through the fence to another waiting inside and later rejoining the cattle party.
Transport of Set of batteries from Chungkai to Kanburi
In Jan 1945 the Japanese decided to move all officers from Chungkai to Kanburi. Information was received through Cpls Tough and Kinnehan (FMSVF) from Major Andrews who had reached Kanburi from Tarmakan.
The information was (a) There was no set in Kanburi Camp and none was expected unless we brought ours. (b) The search was only moderate. (c) Major Andrews was fully prepared to take delivery of anything sent to him.
This information was laid before Lt.Col. Owtram who on hearing our plans for the move agreed to overrule the decision of the Colonels mentioned above, and allow us to try.
The material to be moved consisted of (1) the set itself, which could be broken up into small components & (2) the much more bulky batteries. The move was to be made in two stages, first, from Chungkai to Tamarkan and secondly after a . . . [space] . . . of five days from Tamarkan to Kanburi. Searches were expected on leaving Chungkai on arrival at Tamarkan, on leaving Tamarkan and on arrival at Kanburi.
The set was broken into components and the major part packed in 2 hollow stools for the batteries, the transformer etc. There were several possible methods. One was to take them in loaves of bread and issued as haversack rations – The objection to this on the large scale was the 5 day delay at Tamarkan. Another method was to conceal them in an apparently unopened tin of pig fat. Again the difficulty was that I did not know if the Japs would allow such a thing to be moved from Tamarkan to Kamburi.
It was decided that I (M.L. Webber) should go with the first party to Tamarkan taking one of the stools and then decide on the best method for my brother (D.H. Webber) to carry out the much more difficult task of bringing the remainder of the set and the bulky batteries. Code messages were arranged.
The day after arrival at Tamarkan an officers’ party started coming daily by lorry from Kanburi – Their job was to take building bamboo from Tamarkan to Kanburi. The party was in charge of Capt Briggs, a representative of Major Andrews. It was decided that if the batteries could be got to Tamarkan they would be packed with hollow bamboos and taken to Kanburi by this party. Capt Gordon Shute (A & SH) was able to say that although parties were always searched at Tamarkan single officers accompanied by a sentry were not. The Australian administration arranged for Capt. Skinner & I to return to Chungkai and we were able to bring the batteries in a pack to Tamarkan from where they were despatched in hollow bamboos to Kanburi. The final party from Chungkai arrived in Kanburi without having to go through Tamarkan and D.H. Webber was able to bring the remains of the set in a second stool. The transformer baked in a loaf of bread & the earphone magnets in a wooden shoe, the earphone covers were fixed inside a water bottle.
The set & batteries were now complete in Kanburi.
M.L.Webber (Capt)
D.H.Webber (Lt)