Plato devotes a good deal of attention to this topic, for obvious reasons: sex arouses tremendously strong passions that make men difficult to handle and prone to crime. Adultery and paederasty are socially disruptive and spring from base desires, whereas our energies and aspirations should be directed to higher aims.
There are two crucial points in this section, one philosophical and one political. The philosophical point is the insistence on the ‘naturalness’ of intercourse between man and wife for the purpose of procreation, argued for by (selective) analogy from the practices of animals. This and related arguments from ‘nature’ have had a long run and in spite of widespread criticism are still common. The political point is the clear distinction between the desirable and the possible. Plato wishes to regulate our lives in the utmost detail, but recognizes that there comes a point when to stay his hand will be wiser than to persist. He apparently thinks there is a chance of suppressing sodomy entirely; but he refuses to make extra-marital relations a formal crime, provided they are kept secret. This is a particularly clear example of the tension between the ideal and the practicable that is present throughout the Laws.
THE PROBLEMS STATED
ATHENIAN: It’s not difficult to see how to cast these and similar matters in the form of a law, and making this or that alteration won’t help or harm the state very much. But now for something which is not a triviality at all. It’s a point on which it is difficult to convince people, and God himself is really the only [c] person to do it – supposing, that is, we could in fact somehow get explicit instructions from him. Since that’s impossible, it looks as if we need some intrepid mortal, who values frankness above all, to specify the policy he believes best for the state and its citizens, give a firm ‘no’ to our most compelling passions, and order his audience of corrupted souls to observe standards of conduct in keeping with, and implied by, the whole organization of the state. There will be no one to back him up. He’ll walk alone, with reason alone to guide him.
CLEINIAS: What new topic is this, sir? We don’t see what [d] you’re getting at.
ATHENIAN: That’s not surprising. Well, I’ll try to put the point more explicitly. When I came to discuss education, I envisaged young men and women associating with each other on friendly terms. Naturally enough, I began to feel some disquiet. I wondered how one would handle a state like this, with everyone engaged on a life-long round of sacrifices and [e] festivals and chorus-performances, and the young men and women well-nourished and free of those demanding and degrading jobs that damp down lust so effectively. Reason, which is embodied in law as far as it can be, tells us to avoid indulging the passions that have ruined so many people. So how will the members of our state avoid them? (Actually, most desires may well be kept in check by the regulations we have already framed. If so, we needn’t be surprised. After [836a] all, the law against excessive wealth will do a great deal to encourage self-control, and the educational curriculum is full of sound rules designed for the same purpose. The officials too, who have been rigorously trained to watch this point closely, and to keep the young people themselves under constant surveillance, will do something to restrain ordinary passions, as far as any man can.) But there are sexual urges too – paederasty (of either sex) and heterosexual love among adults. What precautions should one take against passions [b] which have had such a powerful effect on public and private life? What’s the remedy that will save us from the dangers of sex in each? It’s a great problem, Cleinias. We’re faced with
the fact that though in several other respects Crete in general and Sparta give us pretty solid help when we frame laws that flout common custom, in affairs of the heart (there’s no one listening, so let’s be frank) they are totally opposed to us. [c] Suppose you follow nature’s rule and establish the law that was in force before the time of Laius.1 You’d argue that one may have sexual intercourse with a woman but not with men or boys. As evidence for your view, you’d point to the animal world, where (you’d argue) the males do not have sexual relations with each other, because such a thing is unnatural. But in Crete and Sparta your argument would not go down at all well, and you’d probably persuade nobody. However, [d] another argument is that such practices are incompatible with what in our view should be the constant aim of the legislator – that is, we’re always asking ‘which of our regulations encourages virtue, and which does not?’ Now then, suppose in the present case we agreed to pass a law that such practices are desirable, or not at all undesirable – what contribution would they make to virtue? Will the spirit of courage spring to life in the soul of the seduced person? Will the soul of the seducer learn habits of self-control? No one is going to be led astray by that sort of argument – quite the contrary. Everyone [e] will censure the weakling who yields to temptation, and condemn his all-too-effeminate partner who plays the role of the woman. So who on earth will pass a law like that? Hardly anyone, at any rate if he knows what a genuine law really is. Well, how do we show the truth of this? If you want to get these things straight, you have to analyse the nature of [837a] friendship and desire and ‘love’, as people call it. There are two separate categories, plus a third which is a combination of both. But one term covers all three, and that causes no end of muddle and confusion.
CLEINIAS: How’s that?
THREE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP
ATHENIAN: When two people are virtuous and alike, or when they are equals, we say that one is a ‘friend’ of the other; but we also speak of the poor man’s ‘friendship’ for the man who has grown rich, even though they are poles apart. In either case, when the friendship is particularly ardent, we call it ‘love’.
CLEINIAS: Yes, we do. [b]
ATHENIAN: And a violent and stormy friendship it is, when a man is attracted to someone widely different to himself, and only seldom do we see it reciprocated. When men are alike, however, they show a calm and mutual affection that lasts a lifetime. But there is a third category, compounded of the other two. The first problem here is to discover what this third kind of lover is really after. There is the further difficulty that he himself is confused and torn between two opposing instincts: one tells him to enjoy his beloved, the other forbids him. The lover of the body, hungry for his partner who is ripe [c] to be enjoyed, like a luscious fruit, tells himself to have his fill, without showing any consideration for his beloved’s character and disposition. But in another case physical desire will count for very little and the lover will be content to gaze upon his beloved without lusting for him – a mature and genuine desire of soul for soul. That body should sate itself with body he’ll think outrageous; his reverence and respect for self-control, courage, high principles and good judgement will make him want to live a life of purity, chaste lover with [d] chaste beloved. This combination of the first two is the ‘third’ love we enumerated a moment ago.
So there’s your list of the various forms love can take: should the law forbid them all, and keep them out of our community? Or isn’t it obvious that in our state we’d want to see the virtuous kind spring up – the love that aims to make a young man perfect? It’s the other two we’ll forbid, if we can. Or what is our policy, Megillus, my friend?
[e] MEGILLUS: Indeed, sir, I heartily endorse what you’ve said on the subject.
ATHENIAN: So it looks as if I’ve won you over, my dear fellow, as I guessed I would, and there’s no call for me to inquire what line the law of Sparta takes on this topic: it is enough to note your assent to my argument. Later on I’ll come back to the subject and try to charm Cleinias also into agreeing with me. Let’s assume you’ve both conceded my point, and press on with our laws without delay.
MEGILLUS: Fair enough.
HOW TO DISCOURAGE UNNATURAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
ATHENIAN: I want to put the law on this subject on a firm [838a] footing, and at the moment I’m thinking of a method which is, in a sense, simplicity itself. But from another point of view, nothing could be harder.
MEGILLUS: What are you getting at?
ATHENIAN: We’re aware, of course, that even nowadays most men, in spite of their general disregard for the law, are very effectively prevented from having relations with people they find attractive. And they don’t refrain reluctantly, either – they’re more than happy to.
MEGILLUS: What circumstances have you in mind?
ATHENIAN: When it’s one’s brother or sister whom one finds [b] attractive. And the same law, unwritten though it is, is extremely effective in stopping a man sleeping – secretly or otherwise – with his son or daughter, or making any kind of amorous approach to them. Most people feel not the faintest desire for such intercourse.
MEGILLUS: That’s perfectly true.
ATHENIAN: So the desire for this sort of pleasure is stifled by a few words?
MEGILLUS: What words do you mean?
ATHENIAN: The doctrine that ‘these acts are absolutely unholy, an abomination in the sight of the gods, and that nothing is [c] more revolting’. We refrain from them because we never hear them spoken of in any other way. From the day of our birth each of us encounters a complete unanimity of opinion wherever we go; we find it not only in comedies but often in the high seriousness of tragedy too, when we see a Thyestes on the stage, or an Oedipus2 or a Macareus, the clandestine lover of his sister. We watch these characters dying promptly by their own hand as a penalty for their crimes.
MEGILLUS: You’re right in this, anyway, that when no [d] one ventures to challenge the law, public opinion works wonders.
ATHENIAN: So we were justified in what we said just now. When the legislator wants to tame one of the desires that dominate mankind so cruelly, it’s easy for him to see his method of attack. He must try to make everyone – slave and free, women and children, and the entire state without any exception – believe that this common opinion has the backing of religion. He couldn’t put his law on a securer foundation [e] than that.
MEGILLUS: Very true. But how on earth it will ever be possible to produce such spontaneous unanimity -
ATHENIAN: I’m glad you’ve taken me up on the point. This is just what I was getting at when I said I knew of a way to put into effect this law of ours which permits the sexual act only for its natural purpose, procreation, and forbids not only homosexual relations, in which the human race is deliberately murdered, but also the sowing of seeds on rocks and stone, where it will never take root and mature into a new individual; [839a] and we should also have to keep away from any female ‘soil’ in which we’d be sorry to have the seed develop. At present, however, the law is effective only against intercourse between parent and child, but if it can be put on a permanent footing and made to apply effectively, as it deserves to, in other cases as well, it’ll do a power of good. The first point in its favour is that it is a natural law. But it also tends to check the raging fury of the sexual instinct that so often leads to adultery; it discourages excesses in food and drink, and inspires men with [b] affection for their own wives. And there are a great many other advantages to be gained, if only one could get this law established.
But suppose some impatient young man were standing here, bursting with seed, and heard us passing this law. He’d probably raise the echoes with his bellows of abuse, and say our rules were stupid and unrealistic. Now this is just the sort of protest I had in mind when I remarked that I knew of a [c] very simple3 – and yet very difficult – way of putting this law into effect permanently. It’s easy to see that it can be done, and easy to see how: if the rule is given sufficient religious backing, it will get a grip on every soul and intimidate it into obeying the established laws. But in fact we’ve reached a point where people still think we’d fail, even granted those conditions. It’s just the same with the supposed impossibility of the common meals: people see no prospect of a whole state [d] keeping up the practice permanently. The proven facts of the case in your countries do nothing to convince your compatriots that it would be natural to apply the practice to women. It was this flat disbelief that made me remark on the difficulty of turning either proposal4 into an established law.
MEGILLUS: You’re absolutely right.
ATHENIAN: Even so, I could put up quite a convincing case for supposing that the difficulties are not beyond human powers, and can be overcome. Do you want me to try to explain?
CLEINIAS: Of course.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SELF-CONTROL
[e] ATHENIAN: When will a man find it easier to keep off sex, and do as he’s told in a decent and willing spirit? When he’s not [840a] neglected his training and is in the pink of condition, or when he’s in poor shape?
CLEINIAS: He’ll find it a great deal easier if he’s in training.
ATHENIAN: Now of course we’ve all heard the story of how Iccus of Tarentum set about winning contests at Olympia and elsewhere. He was so ambitious to win, they say, and his expertise was strengthened by a character of such determination and self-discipline, that he never had a woman or even a boy during the whole time he was under intensive training. In fact, we are told very much the same about Crison, Astylus, Diopompus and a great many others. And yet, Cleinias, their characters were far less well educated than the citizens you and I have to deal with, and physically they were much lustier. [b]
CLEINIAS: Yes, you’re right – our ancient sources are quite definite that these athletes did in fact do as you say.
ATHENIAN: Well then, they steeled themselves to keep off what most people regard as sheer bliss, simply in order to win wrestling matches and races and so forth. But there’s a much nobler contest to be won than that, and I hope the young people of our state aren’t going to lack the stamina for it. After all, right from their earliest years we’re going to tell them stories and talk to them and sing them songs, so as to [c] charm them, we trust, into believing that this victory is the noblest of all.
CLEINIAS: What victory?
ATHENIAN: The conquest of pleasure. If they win this battle, they’ll have a happy life – but so much the worse for them if they lose. That apart, the fear that the act5 is a ghastly sin will, in the end, enable them to tame the passions that their inferiors have tamed before them.
CLEINIAS: Quite likely.
ATHENIAN: So thanks to the general corruption, that’s the [d] predicament we’ve got into at this point in our consideration of the law about sex. My position, therefore, is that the law must go ahead and insist that our citizens’ standards should not be lower than those of birds and many other wild animals which are born into large communities and live chaste and unmarried, without intercourse, until the time comes for them to breed. At the appropriate age they pair off; the male picks a wife, the female chooses a husband, and for ever afterwards they live in a pious and law-abiding way, firmly faithful to [e] the promises they made when they first fell in love. Clearly our citizens ought to reach standards higher than the animals’. But if they are corrupted by seeing and hearing how most other Greeks and non-Greeks go in for ‘free’ love on a grand scale, they may prove unable to keep themselves in check. In that case, the law-guardians must turn themselves into law-makers and frame a second law for people to observe.
[841a] CLEINIAS: So if they find it impossible to enforce the ideal law now proposed, what other law do you advise them to pass?
ATHENIAN: The second best, Cleinias, obviously.
CLEINIAS: Namely?
ATHENIAN: My point is that the appetite for pleasures, which is very strong and grows by being fed, can be starved (you remember6) if the body is given plenty of hard work to distract it. We’d get much the same result if we were incapable of having sexual intercourse without feeling ashamed: our [b] shame would lead to infrequent indulgence, and infrequent indulgence would make the desire less compulsive. So in sexual matters our citizens ought to regard privacy – though not complete abstinence – as a decency demanded by usage and unwritten custom, and lack of privacy as disgusting. That will establish a second legal standard of decency and indecency – not the ideal standard but the next to it. People whose characters have been corrupted (they form a single group we call the ‘self-inferior’7) will be made prisoners of [c] three influences that will compel them not to break the law.
CLEINIAS: What influences do you mean?
ATHENIAN: Respect for religion, the ambition to be honoured, and a mature passion for spiritual rather than physical beauty. ‘Pious wishes!’ you’ll say; ‘sheer moonshine!’ Perhaps so. But if such wishes were to come true, the world would benefit enormously.
TWO ALTERNATIVE LAWS
[d] However, God willing, perhaps we’ll succeed in imposing one or other of two standards of sexual conduct. (1) Ideally, no one will dare to have relations with any respectable citizen woman except his own wedded wife, or sow illegitimate and bastard seed in courtesans, or sterile seed in males in defiance of nature. (2) Alternatively, while suppressing sodomy entirely, we might insist that if a man does have intercourse with any woman (hired or procured in some other way) except the wife he wed in holy marriage with the blessing of the gods, he must do so without any other man or woman getting to [e] know about it. If he fails to keep the affair secret, I think we’d be right to exclude him by law from the award of state honours, on the grounds that he’s no better than an alien. This law, or ‘pair’ of laws as perhaps we should say, should govern our conduct whenever the sexual urge and the passion [842a] of love impel us, wisely or unwisely, to have intercourse.
MEGILLUS: Speaking for myself, sir, I’d be very glad to adopt this law of yours. Cleinias must tell us his view on the subject himself.
CLEINIAS: I’ll do that later, Megillus, when I think a suitable moment has arrived. For the nonce, let’s not stop our friend from going on to the next stage of his legislation.
MEGILLUS: Fair enough.