Book Ten deals with philosophical and theological themes rather than social or political, and is probably the best-known part of the Laws. Much ink has flowed from learned pens in attempts to identify which contemporary philosophers Plato was attacking, and to unravel the intricacies of his arguments and the obscurities of his Greek. These are the difficulties of an interpreter; the translator has in addition to render into English a number of key terms for which no precise equivalents exist. Some of these terms I hope to explain below.
The entire book is devoted to refuting three ‘heresies’: (i) that gods do not exist, (2) that they exist but are unconcerned about the world, (3) that they exist and are concerned, but can be influenced by prayer. From Plato’s impassioned denunciations we may fairly assume that all three views were current in his day. It was vital that he should refute them. He believed in the existence of what we would today call ‘absolute’ moral standards, laid down by some higher power, and perpetually valid. Obviously any of these three heresies could, and doubtless did, afford by themselves arguments for the relativity of moral standards (or at least, in the case of the third heresy, for supposing that these standards are not really absolute if the gods were prepared to waive them).
But there were profounder reasons for opposing the first heresy, that gods do not exist. This (according to Plato) was associated with a pernicious doctrine about the origins and development of the world, and the status of moral terms. The doctrine depended on a distinction between ‘soul’ (psychē) and ‘design’ (technē) on the one hand, and ‘matter’ (sōma), ‘chance’ (tuchē) and ‘nature’ (phusis) on the other. It was held that the latter were in some sense basic or primary or fundamental; matter had fallen into certain patterns of arrangement and behaviour by chance and/or its natural constitution and properties; nothing had started or directed the process. ‘Art’ and ‘design’ were seen as late and minor influences on a world where life, order, movement and regularity were largely the products of chance, not intelligence. This thesis effectively undermined the position of ‘absolute’ standards, because it excluded any agency such as gods to establish or enforce them; and law and government were simply matters of human ‘design’ or convention.
Plato’s reply is, in outline, simple. He reverses the order of priority as between matter and soul. Physical motion, he argues, is always produced by some antecedent motion. But what started the process? It can only be soul, the one thing capable of self-generated motion (look at animals, who ‘move themselves’: we say they are ‘alive’, that is, they have soul). And soul is presumably intelligent, and imposes movement, order and regularity on the physical world. Individual souls that drive round the heavenly bodies in an orderly and regular manner, observable here on earth, are gods.
Once Plato has established in this way the existence of gods, the refutation of the two remaining heresies becomes comparatively easy. Neglect of the world, and venality, become vices that could not possibly be attributed to gods, because the regularity and beauty of the movements the gods induce indicate that they are ‘good’. (Plato hints mysteriously at a ‘bad’ soul or souls responsible for irregular motion, and evil.)
Two points may be made about this thesis. (1) It is written at a very high level of generality, which makes it almost impossible to identify as the object of Plato’s strictures any particular philosopher or school of thought active at the time. Plato is, in my view, attacking a ‘climate of opinion’, or an amalgam of several views, rather than a single clear-cut doctrine; but this is still a matter of learned debate, and likely to remain so. (2) Plato’s actual ‘proof’ is philosophically none too rigorous, and depends for any cogency it may have on large assumptions to bridge awkward gaps in the argument. (For instance, the identification of ‘soul’ with ‘god’, mentioned above, is possible only if we are prepared, as Cleinias was, to identify without further ado these two vague and exalted notions; only thus can ‘priority of soul’ be converted into ‘existence of gods’.)
It remains to say a few words about the actual law of impiety. It is not an institution peculiar to Plato. Several prosecutions are known of philosophers who held unpopular religious opinions. Precisely how far Plato’s law coincides with Athenian law of his day is obscure, apart from two major respects: (1) belief in the venality of the gods was of course widespread and Plato is alone in legislating against it; (2) committal to prison was not usually used, as far as we know, as a punishment in itself or to facilitate re-education. We may approve in general of Plato’s desire to rehabilitate criminals, but his proposal that officials should visit heretics or atheists for five years ‘to admonish them and ensure their spiritual salvation’ suggests (but does no more than suggest) disturbing modern parallels.
I have stated Plato’s thesis in its barest essentials in order to give the reader a preliminary framework within which he may read this book.
THREE SOURCES OF IMPIETY
ATHENIAN: So much for cases of assault. Now let’s state a [BK X] single comprehensive rule to cover acts of violence. It will run [884a] more or less like this. No one may seize or make off with other people’s property, nor use any of his neighbour’s possessions without getting the permission of the owner. Contempt for this principle has always been (and still is and always will be) the source of all the evils just mentioned. But there are other acts of violence, too, of which the worst are the insolence and outrageous actions of the young. These actions are most serious when they affect sacred objects; and the damage is particularly grave when it is done to sacred property that also belongs to the public, or is held in common by the members of a subdivision of the state, such as a tribe or some similar 885a association. Second, and second in order of gravity, comes wanton damage to sacred objects that are privately owned, particularly tombs; third come attacks (apart from those already dealt with1) on parents. A fourth2 category of outrageous conduct is when someone ignores the wishes of the authorities and seizes or removes or uses something belonging to them without their permission; and any violations of the civil rights of the private citizen which demand legal redress will constitute a fifth class. We have to frame a comprehensive law that will cover each individual case. As for robbery from [b] temples, whether clandestine or open and violent, we have already specified in general terms the appropriate punishment;3 but our statement of the penalty for offensive remarks about the gods or outrageous actions against their interests should be prefaced by these words of exhortation:
No one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an unholy act or lets any lawless word pass his lips. If he does, it is because of one of three possible misapprehensions: either, as I said, he believes (1) the gods do not exist, or (2) that they exist but take no thought for the human race, or (3) that they are influenced by sacrifices and supplications and can easily be won over.
[c] CLEINIAS: So what’s the right thing for us to do or say to these people?
ATHENIAN: My friend, let’s listen to the ridicule and scorn with which I imagine they put their case.
CLEINIAS: What ridicule?
THE CASE OF THE OPPOSITION
ATHENIAN: They’ll probably go in for bantering, and address us like this: ‘Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta and of Crete, you are quite right. Some of us are indeed absolute atheists, whereas others do believe in such gods as you describe. So we demand of you what you yourselves demanded of the laws, that before you resort to threats and bullying, you should try [d] to convince us by argument and cogent proofs that gods do exist, and that they are in fact above being seduced by gifts into turning a blind eye to injustice. But you see, it’s precisely in these and similar terms that we hear them spoken of by the most highly thought-of poets and orators and prophets and priests and thousands of other people too. That’s why most of us make little effort to avoid crime, but commit it first and try to put things right afterwards. So from lawgivers who [e] profess to use the velvet glove rather than the iron fist we claim the right to be tackled by persuasion first. Even if, when you state your case for the existence of gods, your elegance of expression is only marginally superior to your opponents’, persuade us that your argument is a better expression of the truth, and then perhaps we’ll believe you. Isn’t that fair enough? Well then, try to reply to our challenge.’
CLEINIAS: Well sir, don’t you think that the gods’ existence is an easy truth to explain?
ATHENIAN: How? [886a]
CLEINIAS: Well, just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe in general; look at the wonderful procession of the seasons and its articulation into years and months! Anyway, you know that all Greeks and all foreigners are unanimous in recognizing the existence of gods.
ATHENIAN: My dear sir, when I think of the contempt these scoundrels will probably feel for us, I’m overcome with embarrassment – no, I withdraw that word: let’s say they ‘alarm’ me – because you don’t appreciate the real grounds of their opposition to you. You think it’s just because they can’t resist temptation and desire that they are attracted to [b] the godless life.
CLEINIAS: What other reason could there be, sir?
ATHENIAN: A reason which you two, living rather off the beaten track as you do, simply wouldn’t appreciate. It will have completely passed you by.
CLEINIAS: What are you talking about now?
ATHENIAN: A form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble, but which passes for the height of wisdom.
CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
ATHENIAN: In Athens a number of written works are current which are not found in your states (which are, I understand, too well run to tolerate them). The subject of these writings [c] (some of which are in verse, others in prose) is theology. The most ancient accounts, after relating how the primitive substances – the sky and so on – came into being, pass rapidly on to a description of the birth of the gods and the details of how once born they subsequently treated each other. On some subjects, the antiquity of these works makes them difficult to criticize, whatever their influence – good or bad – on their audience; but when it comes to the respect and attention due to parents, I for one shall never recommend them either as a good influence or as a statement of the honest truth. Still, [d] there’s no need to bother with this old material: we may freely allow it to be arranged and recounted in any way the gods find amusing. But the principles of our modern pundits do need to be denounced as a pernicious influence. Just look at the effects of their arguments! When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods and adduce what you adduced – sun, moon, stars and earth – and argue they are gods and divine beings, the proselytes of these clever fellows will say that these things are just earth and stones, and are incapabl[e] of caring for human affairs, however much our plausible rhetoric has managed to dress them up.
CLEINIAS: Even if it were unique, sir, that theory you’ve just described would make trouble. But as similar doctrines in fact exist in their thousands, the situation is even worse.
ATHENIAN: What now, then? What’s our reply? What must we do? It’s as though we were on trial before a bench of godless judges, defending ourselves on a charge arising out of [887a] our legislation. ‘It’s monstrous,’ they say to us, ‘that you should pass laws asserting that gods exist.’ Shall we defend ourselves? Or shall we ignore them and get back to our legislation, so that the mere preface doesn’t turn out longer than the actual code? You see, if we’re going to postpone passing the appropriate legislation until we’ve proved properly to those with a taste for impiety all the points they insisted we had to cover, so that they feel uneasy and begin to find their views going sour on them, our explanation will be anything but brief.
CLEINIAS: Even so, sir, as we’ve often said in the comparatively [b] short time we’ve been talking, there’s no reason at the moment to prefer a brief explanation to a full one: after all, no one’s ‘breathing down our neck’ (as they say). It would be an awful farce, if we appeared to be putting brevity first and quality second. It’s vital that somehow or other we should make out a plausible case for supposing that gods do exist, that they are good, and that they respect justice more than men do. Such a demonstration would constitute just about the best [c] and finest preamble our penal code could have. So let’s overcome our reluctance and unhurriedly exert what powers of persuasion we have in this field, devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to a full exposition of our case.
ATHENIAN: How keen and insistent you are! I take it you’re suggesting we should now offer up a prayer for the success of our exposition, which we certainly can’t delay any longer.
ADDRESS TO THE YOUNG HERETIC
Well now, how can one argue for the existence of gods without getting angry? You see, one inevitably gets irritable and annoyed with these people who have put us to the trouble, [d] and continue to put us to the trouble, of composing these explanations. If only they believed the stories which they had as babes and sucklings from their nurses and mothers! These almost literally ‘charming’ stories were told partly for amusement, partly in full earnest; the children heard them related in prayer at sacrifices, and saw acted representations of them – a part of the ceremony a child always loves to see and hear; and they saw their own parents praying with the utmost seriousness for themselves and their families in the firm [e] conviction that their prayers and supplications were addressed to gods who really did exist. At the rising and setting of the sun and moon the children saw and heard Greeks and foreigners, in happiness and misery alike, all prostrate at their devotions; far from supposing gods to be a myth, the worshippers believed their existence to be so sure as to be beyond suspicion. When some people contemptuously brush aside all this evidence without a single good reason to [888a] support them (as even a half-wit can see) and oblige us to deliver this address – well, how could one possibly admonish them and at the same time teach them the basic fact about gods, their existence, without using the rough edge of one’s tongue? Still, we must make the best of it: we don’t want both sides maddened at once, they by their greed for pleasure, we by our anger at their condition. So our address to men with such a depraved outlook should be calm, and run as follows. Let’s use honeyed words and abate our anger, and pretend we’re addressing just one representative individual.
‘Now then, my lad, you’re still young, and as time goes on [b] you’ll come to adopt opinions diametrically opposed to those you hold now. Why not wait till later on to make up your mind about these important matters? The most important of all, however lightly you take it at the moment, is to get the right ideas about the gods and so live a good life – otherwise you’ll live a bad one. In this connexion, I want first to make a crucial and irrefutable point. It’s this: you’re not unique. Neither you nor your friends are the first to have held this opinion about the gods. It’s an illness from which the world is never free, though the number of sufferers varies from time to time. I’ve [c] met a great many of them, and let me assure you that none of them who have been convinced early in life that gods do not exist have ever retained that belief into old age. However, it is true that some men (but not many) do persist in labouring under the impression either that although the gods exist they are indifferent to human affairs, or alternatively that they are not indifferent but can easily be won over by prayers and sacrifices. Be guided by me: you’ll only see this business in its truest light if you wait to gather your information from all [d] sources, particularly the legislator, and then see which theory represents the truth. In the meantime, don’t venture any impiety where gods are concerned. You may take it that it will be up to your lawgiver, now and in the future, to try to enlighten you on precisely these topics.’
CLEINIAS: So far, sir, that’s very well said.
NATURE AND CHANCE VERSUS DESIGN
ATHENIAN: Certainly, Megillus and Cleinias, but what an amazing doctrine we’ve got involved in, without noticing it!
CLEINIAS: What doctrine do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I mean the one which many people regard as the [e] highest truth of all.
CLEINIAS: Please be more explicit.
ATHENIAN: Some people, I believe, account for all things which have come to exist, all things which are coming into existence now, and all things which will do so in the future, by attributing them either to nature, art or chance.
CLEINIAS: Isn’t that satisfactory?
ATHENIAN: Oh, I expect they’ve got it more or less right – they’re clever fellows. Still, let’s keep track of them, and see [889a] what’s really implied in the theories of that school of thought.
CLEINIAS: By all means.
ATHENIAN: The facts show – so they claim – that the greatest and finest things in the world are the products of nature and chance, the creations of art being comparatively trivial. The works of nature, they say, are grand and primary, and constitute a ready-made source for all the minor works constructed and fashioned by art – artefacts, as they’re generally called.
CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I’ll put it more precisely. They maintain that fire, [b] water, earth and air owe their existence to nature and chance, and in no case to art, and that it is by means of these entirely inanimate substances4 that the secondary physical bodies – the earth, sun, moon and stars – have been produced. These substances moved at random, each impelled by virtue of its own inherent properties, which depended on various suitable amalgamations of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft and hard, [c] and all other haphazard combinations that inevitably resulted when the opposites were mixed. This is the process to which all the heavens and everything that is in them owe their birth, and the consequent establishment of the four seasons led to the appearance of all plants and living creatures. The cause of all this, they say, was neither intelligent planning, nor a deity, nor art, but – as we’ve explained – nature and chance. Art, the brain-child of these living creatures, arose later, the [d] mortal child of mortal beings; it has produced, at a late stage, various amusing trifles that are hardly real at all – mere insubstantial images of the same order as the arts themselves (I mean for instance the productions of the arts of painting and music, and all their ancillary skills). But if there are in fact some techniques that produce worth-while results, they are those that co-operate with nature, like medicine and farming and physical training. This school of thought maintains that government, in particular, has very little to do with nature, and is largely a matter of art; similarly legislation is [e] never a natural process but is based on technique, and its enactments are quite artificial.
CLEINIAS: What are you driving at?
ATHENIAN: My dear fellow, the first thing these people say about the gods is that they are artificial concepts corresponding to nothing in nature; they are legal fictions, which moreover vary very widely according to the different conventions people agree on when they produce a legal code. In particular, goodness according to nature and goodness according to the law are two different things, and there is no natural standard of justice at all. On the contrary, men are always wrangling about their moral standards and altering them, and every [890a] change introduced becomes binding from the moment it’s made, regardless of the fact that it is entirely artificial, and based on convention, not nature in the slightest degree. All this, my friends, is the theme of experts – as our young people regard them – who in their prose and poetry maintain that anything one can get away with by force is absolutely justified.5 This is why we experience outbreaks of impiety among the young, who assume that the kind of gods the law tells them to believe in do not exist; this is why we get treasonable efforts to convert people to the ‘true natural life’, which is essentially nothing but a life of conquest over others, not one of service to your neighbour as the law enjoins.
CLEINIAS: What a pernicious doctrine you’ve explained, sir! It [b] must be the ruin of the younger generation, both in the state at large and in private families.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF REFUTING ATHEISTS
ATHENIAN: That’s very true, Cleinias. So what do you think the legislator ought to do, faced with such a long-established thesis as this? Is he simply to stand up in public and threaten all the citizens with punishment if they don’t admit the existence of gods and mentally accept the law’s description of them? He could make the same threat about their notions of beauty and justice and all such vital concepts, as well as about [c] anything that encourages virtue or vice: he could demand that the citizens’ belief and actions should accord with his written instructions, and insist that anyone not showing the proper obedience to the laws must be punished either by death, or by a whipping and imprisonment, deprivation of civic rights, or by being sent into exile a poorer man. But what about persuading them? When he establishes a legal code for his people, shouldn’t he try to talk them into being as amenable as he can make them?
CLEINIAS: Certainly, sir. If even limited persuasion can be [d] applied in this field, no legislator of even moderate ability should shrink from making the effort. On the contrary, he should argue ‘till the cows come home’, as the saying is, to back up the old doctrine that the gods exist, and to support the other arguments you ran through just now. In particular, he should defend law itself and art as either part of nature or existing by reason of some no less powerful agency – being in fact, to tell the truth, creations of reason. That, I think, is the point you’re making, and I agree.
[e] ATHENIAN: Really, Cleinias, you are enthusiastic! But when these themes are presented as you suggest, in addresses composed for a popular audience, aren’t they found rather difficult to understand? And don’t the addresses tend to go on for ever?
CLEINIAS: Well, sir, we put up with one long discussion, about inebriation in the cause of culture, so surely we can tolerate another, about theology and so forth. And of course this helps intelligent legislation tremendously, because legal instruc [891a] tions, once written down, remain fixed and permanent, ready to stand up to scrutiny for ever. So there’s no reason for alarm if at first they make difficult listening, because your slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them. Nor does their length, provided they’re useful, justify any man in committing what seems to me, at least, an impiety: I mean refusing to facilitate these explanations as best he can.
MEGILLUS: Yes, sir, I entirely approve of what Cleinias says.
[b] ATHENIAN: As well you may, Megillus, and we must do as he suggests. Of course, if this sort of argument had not been disseminated so widely over pretty well the entire human race, there would be no call for arguments to prove the existence of gods. But in present circumstances we’ve no choice. When the most important laws are being trampled under foot by scoundrels, whose duty is it to rush to their defence, if not the legislator’s?
MEGILLUS: Nobody’s.
[c] ATHENIAN: Now then, Cleinias, you must take your share in the explanation, so tell me your opinion again. I assume the upholder of this doctrine thinks of fire and water, earth and air as being the first of all substances, and this is precisely what he means by the term ‘nature’; soul, he thinks, was derived from them, at a later stage. No, I do more than ‘assume’: I’d say he argues the point explicitly.
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: Now then, by heaven, haven’t we discovered the fountain-head, so to speak, of the senseless opinions of all those who have ever undertaken investigation into nature? Scrutinize carefully every stage in their argument, because it will be crucial if we can show that these people who have [d] embraced impious doctrines and lead others on are using fallacious arguments rather than cogent ones – which I think is in fact the case.
CLEINIAS: You’re right, but try to explain their error.
ATHENIAN: Well, it looks as if we have to embark on a rather unfamiliar line of argument.
CLEINIAS: Don’t hesitate, sir. I realize you think we’ll be straying outside legislation if we attempt such an explanation, but if this is the only way to reach agreement that the beings [e] currently described as gods in our law are properly so described, then this, my dear sir, is the kind of explanation we must give.
THE PRIORITY OF SOUL (1)
ATHENIAN: So it looks as if I must now argue along rather unfamiliar lines. Well then, the doctrine which produces an impious soul also ‘produces’, in a sense, the soul itself, in that it denies the priority of what was in fact the first cause of the birth and destruction of all things, and regards it as a later creation. Conversely, it asserts that what actually came later, came first. That’s the source of the mistake these people have made about the real nature of the gods.
CLEINIAS: So far, the point escapes me. [892a]
ATHENIAN: It’s the soul, my good friend, that nearly everybody seems to have misunderstood, not realizing its nature and power. Quite apart from the other points about it, people are particularly ignorant about its birth. It is one of the first creations, born long before all physical things, and is the chief cause of all their alterations and transformations. Now if that’s true, anything closely related to soul will necessarily [b] have been created before material things, won’t it, since soul itself is older than matter?
CLEINIAS: Necessarily.
ATHENIAN: Opinion, diligence, reason, art and law will be prior to roughness and smoothness, heaviness and lightness. In particular, the grand and primary works and creations, precisely because they come in the category ‘primary’, will be attributable to art. Natural things, and nature herself – to use the mistaken terminology of our opponents – will be secondary products deriving from art and reason.
[c] CLEINIAS: Why do you say ‘mistaken’?
ATHENIAN: When they use the term ‘nature’, they mean the process by which the primary substances were created. But if it can be shown that soul came first, not fire or air, and that it was one of the first things to be created, it will be quite correct to say that soul is pre-eminently natural. This is true, provided you can demonstrate that soul is older than matter, but not otherwise.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: So this is precisely the point we have to tackle next?
[d] CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: It’s an extremely tricky argument, and we old men must be careful not to be taken in by its freshness and novelty, so that it eludes our grasp and makes us look like ridiculous fools whose ambitious ideas lead to failure even in little things. Just consider. Imagine the three of us had to cross a river in spate, and I were the younger and had plenty of experience of currents. Suppose I said, ‘I ought to try first on my own [e] account, and leave you two in safety while I see if the river is fordable for you two older men as well, or if not, just how bad it is. If it turns out to be fordable, I’ll then call you and put my experience at your disposal in helping you to cross; but if in the event it cannot be crossed by old men like yourselves, then the only risk has been mine.’ Wouldn’t that strike you as fair enough? The situation is the same now: the argument ahead runs too deep, and men as weak as you will probably get out of your depth. I want to prevent you novices in answering from being dazed and dizzied by a stream of [893a] questions, which would put you in an undignified and humiliating position you’d find most unpleasant. So this is what I think I’d better do now: first I’ll ask questions of myself, while you listen in safety; then I’ll go over the answers again and in this way work through the whole argument until the soul has been thoroughly dealt with and its priority to matter proved.
CLEINIAS: We think that’s a splendid idea, sir. Please act on your suggestion.
TEN KINDS OF MOTION
ATHENIAN: Come then, if ever we needed to call upon the help [b] of God, it’s now. Let’s take it the gods have been most pressingly invoked to assist the proof of their own existence, and let’s rely on their help as if it were a rope steadying us as we enter the deep waters of our present theme. Now when I’m under interrogation on this sort of topic, and such questions as the following are put to me, the safest replies seem to be these. Suppose someone asks ‘Sir, do all things stand still, and does nothing move? Or is precisely the opposite true? Or do some [c] things move, while others are motionless?’ My reply will be ‘I suppose some move and others remain at rest.’ ‘So surely there must be some space in which the stationary objects remain at rest, and those in motion move?’ ‘Of course.’ ‘Some of them, presumably, will do so in one location, others in several?’ ‘Do you mean,’ we shall reply, ‘that “moving in one location” is the action of objects which are able to keep their centres immobile? For instance, there are circles which are said to “stay put” even though as a whole they are revolving.’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And we appreciate that when a disk revolves like that, points near and far from the centre describe circles of different radii in the same time; their motion varies according to these [d] radii and is proportionately quick or slow. This motion gives rise to all sorts of wonderful phenomena, because these points simultaneously traverse circles of large and small circumference at proportionately high or low speeds – an effect one might have expected to be impossible.’ ‘You’re quite right.’ ‘When you speak of motion in many locations I suppose you’re referring to objects that are always leaving one spot and moving on to another. Sometimes their motion involves [e] only one point of contact with their successive situations, sometimes several, as in rolling.
‘From time to time objects meet; a moving one colliding with a stationary one disintegrates, but if it meets other objects travelling in the opposite direction they coalesce into a single intermediate substance, half one and half the other.’ ‘Yes, I agree to your statement of the case.’ ‘Further, such combination leads to an increase in bulk, while their separation leads to diminution – so long as the existing states of the objects remain unimpaired; but if either combination or separation entails the abolition of the existing state, the objects concerned are destroyed.
[894a] ‘Now, what conditions are always present when anything is produced? Clearly, an initial impulse grows and reaches the second stage and then the third stage out of the second, finally (at the third stage) presenting percipient beings with something to perceive. This then is the process of change and alteration to which everything owes its birth. A thing exists as such so long as it is stable, but when it changes its essential state it is completely destroyed.’
So, my friends, haven’t we now classified and numbered all [b] forms of motion, except two?6
CLEINIAS: Which two?
ATHENIAN: My dear chap, they are the two which constitute the real purpose of every question we’ve asked.
CLEINIAS: Try to be more explicit.
ATHENIAN: What we really had in view was soul, wasn’t it?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: The one kind of motion is that which is permanently capable of moving other things but not itself; the other is permanently capable of moving both itself and other things by processes of combination and separation, increase and diminution, generation and destruction. Let these stand as [c] two further distinct types in our complete list of motions.
CLEINIAS: Agreed.
ATHENIAN: So we shall put ninth the kind which always imparts motion to something else and is itself changed by another thing. Then there’s the motion that moves both itself and other things, suitable for all active and passive processes and accurately termed the source of change and motion in all things that exist. I suppose we’ll call that the tenth.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Now which of our (roughly) ten motions should we be justified in singling out as the most powerful and [d] radically effective?
CLEINIAS: We can’t resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate itself is infinitely superior, and all the others are inferior to it.
ATHENIAN: Well said! So shouldn’t we correct one or two inaccuracies in the points we’ve just made?
CLEINIAS: What sort of inaccuracy do you mean?
ATHENIAN: It wasn’t quite right to call that motion the ‘tenth’.
CLEINIAS: Why not?
ATHENIAN: It can be shown to be first, in ancestry as well as in power; the next kind – although oddly enough a moment ago we called it ‘ninth’ – we’ll put second. [e]
CLEINIAS: What are you getting at?
ATHENIAN: This: when we find one thing producing a change in another, and that in turn affecting something else, and so forth, will there ever be, in such a sequence, an original cause of change? How could anything whose motion is transmitted to it from something else be the first thing to effect an alteration? It’s impossible. In reality, when something which has set itself moving effects an alteration in something, and that in turn effects something else, so that motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things one after another, the [895a] entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion.
CLEINIAS: You’ve put it admirably, and your point must be allowed.
ATHENIAN: Now let’s put the point in a different way, and once again answer our own questions: ‘Suppose the whole universe were somehow to coalesce and come to a standstill – the theory which most of our philosopher-fellows are actually bold enough to maintain – which of the motions we have [b] enumerated would inevitably be the first to arise in it?’ ‘Self-generating motion, surely, because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists. Self-generating motion, then, is the source of all motions, and the primary force in both stationary and moving objects, and we shan’t be able to avoid the conclusion that it is the most ancient and the most potent of all changes, whereas the change which is produced by something else and is in turn transmitted to other objects, comes second.’
CLEINIAS: You’re absolutely right.
SOUL MOVES ITSELF
[c] ATHENIAN: So now we’ve reached this point in our discussion, here’s another question we should answer.
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: If we ever saw this phenomenon – self-generating motion – arise in an object made of earth, water or fire (alone or in combination) how should we describe that object’s condition?
CLEINIAS: Of course, what you’re really asking me is this: when an object moves itself, are we to say that it is ‘alive’?
ATHENIAN: That’s right.
CLEINIAS: It emphatically is alive.
ATHENIAN: Well then, when we see that a thing has a soul, the situation is exactly the same, isn’t it? We have to admit that it is alive.
CLEINIAS: Yes, exactly the same.
[d] ATHENIAN: Now, for heaven’s sake, hold on a minute. I suppose you’d be prepared to recognize three elements in any given thing?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: The first point is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. And in addition there are two questions to be asked about every existing thing.
CLEINIAS: Two?
ATHENIAN: Sometimes we put forward the mere name and want to know the definition, and sometimes we put forward the definition and ask for the name.
CLEINIAS: I take it the point we want to make at the moment is this.
ATHENIAN: What?
CLEINIAS: In general, things can be divided into two, and this [e] is true of some numbers as well. Such a number has the name ‘even’ and its definition is ‘a number divisible into two equal parts’.
ATHENIAN: Yes, that’s the sort of thing I mean. So surely, in either case – whether we provide the name and ask for the definition or give the definition and ask for the name – we’re referring to the same object? When we call it ‘even’ and define it as ‘a number divisible into two’, it’s the same thing we’re talking about.
CLEINIAS: It certainly is.
ATHENIAN: So what’s the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely we can do nothing but use our formula of a [896a] moment ago: ‘motion capable of moving itself’.
CLEINIAS: Do you mean that the entity which we all call ‘soul’ is precisely that which is defined by the expression ‘self-generating motion’?
THE PRIORITY OF SOUL (2)
ATHENIAN: I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the original source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all change and [b] motion in everything.
CLEINIAS: Dissatisfied? No! On the contrary, it has been proved up to the hilt that soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is.
ATHENIAN: But when one thing is put in motion by another, it is never thereby endowed with the power of independent self-movement. Such derived motion will therefore come second, or as far down the list as you fancy relegating it, being a mere change in matter that quite literally ‘has no soul’.
CLEINIAS: Correctly argued.
ATHENIAN: So it was an equally correct, final and complete [c] statement of the truth, when we said that soul is prior to matter, and that matter came later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and matter its natural subject.
CLEINIAS: That is indeed absolutely true.
ATHENIAN: The next step is to remember our earlier admission that if soul were shown to be older than matter, the spiritual order of things would be older than the material.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: So habits, customs, will, calculation, right opinion, [d] diligence and memory will be prior creations to material length, breadth, depth and strength, if (as is true) soul is prior to matter.
CLEINIAS: Unavoidably.
ATHENIAN: And the next unavoidable admission, seeing that we are going to posit soul as the cause of all things, will be that it is the cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice and all the opposites.
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: And surely it’s necessary to assert that as soul [e] resides and keeps control anywhere where anything is moved, it controls the heavens as well.
CLEINIAS: Naturally.
ATHENIAN: One soul, or more than one? I’ll answer for you both: more than one. At any rate, we must not assume fewer than two: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity.
CLEINIAS: That’s absolutely right.
ATHENIAN: Very well, then. So soul, by virtue of its own motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea. The names of the motions of soul are: wish, reflection, diligence, counsel, opinion true and false, joy [897a] and grief, cheerfulness and fear, love and hate. Soul also uses all related or initiating motions which take over the secondary movements of matter and stimulate everything to increase or diminish, separate or combine, with the accompanying heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, roughness and smoothness, white and black, bitter and sweet. These are the instruments [b] soul uses, whether it cleaves to divine reason (soul itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity), and guides everything to an appropriate and successful conclusion, or allies itself with unreason and produces completely opposite results. Shall we agree this is the case, or do we still suspect that the truth may be different?
CLEINIAS: By no means.
SOUL MOVES THE HEAVENLY BODIES
ATHENIAN: Well then, what kind of soul may we say has gained control of the heavens and earth and their entire cycle of movement? Is it the rational and supremely virtuous kind, or that which has neither advantage? Would you like our reply [c] to run like this?
CLEINIAS: How?
ATHENIAN: ‘If, my fine fellow’ (we should say) ‘the whole course and movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflect the motion and revolution and calculation of reason, and operate in a corresponding fashion, then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path.’
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: ‘If however these things move in an unbalanced [d] and disorganized way, we must say the evil kind of soul is in charge of them.’
CLEINIAS: That too is true.
ATHENIAN: ‘So what is the nature of rational motion?’ Now this, my friends, is a question to which it is difficult to give an answer that will make sense, so you’re justified here in calling me in to help with your reply.
CLEINIAS: Good.
ATHENIAN: Still, in answering this question we mustn’t assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately: let’s not produce darkness at noon, so [e] to speak, by looking at the sun direct. We can save our sight by looking at an image of the object we’re asking about.
CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
ATHENIAN: What about selecting from our list of ten motions the one which reason resembles, and taking that as our image? I’ll join you in recalling it, and then we’ll give a joint answer to the question.
CLEINIAS: Yes, that’s probably your best method of explanation.
ATHENIAN: Do we still remember at any rate this from the list of points we made earlier, that all things are either in motion or at rest?
CLEINIAS: Yes, we do.
ATHENIAN: And some of those in motion move in a single [898a] location, others in a succession of locations?
CLEINIAS: That is so.
ATHENIAN: Of these two motions, that taking place in a single location necessarily implies continuous revolution round a central point, just like wheels being turned on a lathe; and this kind of motion bears the closest possible affinity and likeness to the cyclical movement of reason.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: Take reason on the one hand, and motion in a single location on the other. If we were to point out that in both cases the motion was determined by a single plan and procedure and that it was (a) regular, (b) uniform, (c) always [b] at the same point in space, (d) around a fixed centre, (e) in the same position relative to other objects, and were to illustrate both by the example of a sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one could ever show us up for incompetent makers of verbal images.
CLEINIAS: You’re quite right.
ATHENIAN: Now consider the motion that is never uniform or regular or at the same point in space or round the same centre or in the same relative position or in a single location, and is neither planned nor organized nor systematic. Won’t that motion be associated with every kind of unreason?
CLEINIAS: Absolutely true, it will.
ATHENIAN: So now there’s no difficulty in saying right out that [c] since we find that the entire cycle of events is to be attributed to soul, the heavens that we see revolving must necessarily be driven round – we have to say – because they are arranged and directed either by the best kind of soul or by the other sort.
CLEINIAS: Well, sir, judging from what has been said, I think it would be rank blasphemy to deny that their revolution is produced by one or more souls blessed with perfect virtue.
ATHENIAN: You’ve proved a most attentive listener, Cleinias. Now attend to this further point. [d]
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually?
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: Let’s take a single example: our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies.
CLEINIAS: And your example is…?
ATHENIAN:… the sun. Everyone can see its body, but no one can see its soul – not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily [e] senses, and is perceptible by reason alone. So by reason and understanding let’s get hold of a new point about the soul.
HOW SOUL MOVES THE HEAVENLY BODIES
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: If soul drives the sun, we shan’t go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three ways.
CLEINIAS: And what are they?
ATHENIAN: Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes, just as our soul takes us around from one place to another, or (b) it acquires its [899a] own body of fire or air of some kind (as certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the external contact of body with body, or (c) it is entirely immaterial, but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers.
CLEINIAS: Yes, it must necessarily be by one of these methods that the soul manages the universe.
ATHENIAN: Now, just wait a minute. Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or by moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god. Isn’t that right?
[b] CLEINIAS: Yes, one would be absolutely stupid not to.
ATHENIAN: Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and months and all the seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or souls – and perfectly virtuous souls at that – have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods. Can anybody admit all this and still put up with people who deny that ‘everything is full of gods’?7
[c] CLEINIAS: No sir, nobody could be so mad.
ATHENIAN: Now then, Megillus and Cleinias, let’s delimit the courses of action open to anyone who has so far refused to believe in gods, and get rid of him.
CLEINIAS: You mean…
ATHENIAN:… either he should demonstrate to us that we’re wrong to posit soul as the first cause to which everything owes its birth, and that our subsequent deductions were equally mistaken, or, if he can’t put a better case than ours, he should let himself be persuaded by us and live the rest of his life a believer in gods. So let’s review the thesis we argued for the [d] existence of gods against the non-believers: was it cogent or feeble?
CLEINIAS: Feeble, sir? Not in the least.
ADDRESS TO THE BELIEVER IN THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE GODS
ATHENIAN: Very well. So far as atheists are concerned, we may regard our case as complete. Next we have to use some gentle persuasion on the man who believes in gods but thinks they are unconcerned about human affairs. ‘My splendid fellow,’ we’ll say, ‘your belief in the existence of gods probably springs from a kind of family tie between you and the gods that draws you to your natural kin and makes you honour them and recognize their existence. What drives you to impiety is the good fortune of scoundrels and criminals in private and public [e] life – which in reality is not good fortune at all, although it is highly admired as such by popular opinion and its misplaced enthusiasms: poetry and literature of every kind invest it with a pernicious glamour. Or perhaps you observe men reaching the end of their lives, full of years and honour, leaving behind [900a] them their children’s children, and your present disquiet is because you’ve discovered (either from hearsay or personal observation) a few of the many ghastly acts of impiety which (you notice) are the very means by which some of these people have risen from humble beginnings to supreme power and dictatorships. The result is that although by virtue of your kinship with the gods you’d clearly be reluctant to lay such things at their door, your mental confusion and your inability [b] to find fault with them has brought you to your present predicament where you believe they exist, but despise and neglect human affairs. Now, we want to prevent your thoughts from becoming more impious than they are already: let’s see if argument will ward off the disease while it is still in its early stages. We must also try to make use of the original thesis we argued so exhaustively against the absolute atheist, [c] by linking the next step in the exposition on to it.’ So you, Cleinias and Megillus, must do what you did before: take the young man’s place and answer on his behalf. If any difficulty crops up in the argument, I’ll take over from you two as I did just now, and conduct you across the river.
CLEINIAS: Good idea. You play your part, and we’ll carry out your suggestions to the best of our ability.
PROOF THAT THE GODS CARE FOR MANKIND
ATHENIAN: Still, perhaps it won’t be too difficult to show our friend that gods are just as attentive to details as to important [d] matters – more so, in fact. You see, he was here a moment ago and heard that their special job – an expression of their perfect virtue – is to watch over the universe.
CLEINIAS: Yes, he certainly did hear that said.
ATHENIAN: The next thing is for our opponents to join us in asking this question: what particular virtue have we in mind when we agree that the gods are good? Now then: don’t we regard moderation and the possession of reason as a mark of virtue, and their opposites as marks of vice?
CLEINIAS: We do.
[e] ATHENIAN: What about courage and cowardice? Are we agreed they come under virtue and vice respectively?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And we’ll label the one set of qualities ‘disgraceful’ and the other ‘admirable’?
CLEINIAS: Yes, we must.
ATHENIAN: And if the base qualities are characteristic of anyone, they are characteristic of us; the gods, we shall say, are not affected by them, either radically or slightly.
CLEINIAS: No one would disagree with that either.
ATHENIAN: Well, then, shall we regard neglect and idleness and riotous living as part of the soul’s virtue? Or what’s your view?
CLEINIAS: Really!
ATHENIAN: As part of vice, then?
CLEINIAS: Yes.
ATHENIAN: So it’s the opposite qualities that will be ascribed [901a] to virtue?
CLEINIAS: Right.
ATHENIAN: Very well then. In our view, all idle and thoughtless bons vivants will be just the kind of people the poet said were ‘like nothing so much as stingless drones’.8
CLEINIAS: Very apt, that.
ATHENIAN: So we mustn’t say that God has precisely the sort of character he himself detests, and we mustn’t allow any attempt to maintain such a view.
CLEINIAS: Of course not; it would be intolerable.
ATHENIAN: Take someone who has the special job of looking [b] after some particular sphere of action, and who is preoccupied with his major duties to the neglect of the small. Could we possibly commend him, except for reasons that would ring quite hollow? Let’s consider the point in this light: doesn’t this sort of conduct – divine or human – fall into two categories?
CLEINIAS: Two categories, do we say?
ATHENIAN: Either a man thinks it makes no difference to his job as a whole if he neglects the details, or important though [c] they are, he nevertheless lives in idleness and self-indulgence and neglects them. Or is there some other possible reason for his neglecting them? (Of course, if it is simply impossible to look after everything, and a god or some poor mortal fails to take care of something when he has not the strength and therefore the ability, no question of positive neglect of either major or minor duties will arise.)
CLEINIAS: No, of course not.
ATHENIAN: Now let our two opponents answer the questions [d] of the three of us. They both admit gods exist, but one thinks they can be bought off, the other that they are careless about details. ‘First of all, do you both admit that the gods know and see and hear everything, and that nothing within the range of our senses or intellect can escape them? Is this your position, or what?’
CLEINIAS: ‘It is.’
ATHENIAN: ‘And also, that they can do anything which is within the power of mortals and immortals?’
CLEINIAS: Yes, of course they’ll agree to that too.
[e] ATHENIAN: Further, the five of us have already agreed that the gods are good – supremely so, in fact.
CLEINIAS: Emphatically.
ATHENIAN: So surely, given they’re the sort of beings we’ve admitted, it’s absolutely impossible to agree that they do anything out of sloth and self-indulgence. Among us mortals, you see, laziness springs from cowardice, and sloth from laziness and self-indulgence.
CLEINIAS: That’s very true.
ATHENIAN: Then no god neglects anything because of sloth and laziness, because no god, presumably, suffers from cowardice.
CLEINIAS: You’re quite right.
[902a] ATHENIAN: Now if in fact they do neglect the tiny details of the universe, the remaining possibilities are surely these: either they neglect them because they know that no such detail needs their attention, or – well, what other explanation could there be, except a lack of knowledge?
CLEINIAS: None.
ATHENIAN: So, my dearest sir, are we to interpret you as saying that the gods are ignorant, and display negligence where it is necessary to be solicitous, because they don’t know? Or alternatively that they realize the necessity, but do what the most wretched of men are said to do, namely fail in their duty because they are somehow overcome by temptation or pain, [b] even though they know that there are better options than the one they’ve in fact chosen?
CLEINIAS: Indeed not.
ATHENIAN: Now surely human life has something to do with the world of the soul, and man himself is the most god-fearing of all living creatures, isn’t he?
CLEINIAS: I dare say.
ATHENIAN: And we regard all mortal creatures as possessions of gods, like the universe as a whole.
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: So whether you argue these possessions count for little or much in the sight of the gods, in neither case would it [c] be proper for our owners to neglect us, seeing how very solicitous and good they are. You see, there’s another point we ought to consider here.
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: It’s a point about perception and physical strength. Aren’t they essentially at opposite poles, so far as ease and difficulty are concerned?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: Although little things are more difficult to see or hear than big, they are much easier, when there are only a few of them, to carry or control or look after.
CLEINIAS: Yes, much easier. [d]
ATHENIAN: Take a doctor who has been given the entire body to treat. Will he ever get good results if he neglects the individual limbs and tiny parts, in spite of being willing and able to look after the major organs?
CLEINIAS: No, never.
ATHENIAN: Nor yet will helmsmen or generals or householders, nor ‘statesmen’ or anybody of that ilk, succeed in major day-to-day matters if they neglect occasional details. You know how even masons say the big stones don’t lie well [e] without the small ones.
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: So let’s not treat God as less skilled than a mortal craftsman, who applies the same expertise to all the jobs in his own line whether they’re big or small, and gets more finished and perfect results the better he is at his work. We must not suppose that God, who is supremely wise, and willing and able to superintend the world, looks to major [903a] matters but – like a faint-hearted lazybones who throws up his hands at hard work – neglects the minor, which we established were in fact easier to look after.
CLEINIAS: No sir, we should never entertain such notions about gods. It’s a point of view that would be absolutely impious and untrue.
ATHENIAN: Well, it looks to me as if we’ve given a pretty complete answer to this fellow who’s always going on about the negligence of heaven.
CLEINIAS: Yes, we have.
ATHENIAN: At any rate, our thesis has forced him to admit he [b] was wrong. But I still think we need to find a form of words to charm him into agreement.9
CLEINIAS: Well, my friend, what do you suggest?
THE JUSTICE OF THE GODS, AND THE FATE OF THE SOUL
ATHENIAN: What we say to the young man should serve to convince him of this thesis: ‘The supervisor of the universe has arranged everything with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active or passive roles according to their various capacities. These parts, down to the smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been put under the control of ruling powers that have perfected the minutest constituents of the [c] universe. Now then, you perverse fellow, one such part – a mere speck that nevertheless constantly contributes to the good of the whole – is you, you who have forgotten that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life of prosperity. You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you exist for the sake of the universe. Every doctor, you see, and every skilled craftsman always works for the sake of some end-product as a whole; he handles his materials so that they will give the best results in general, and makes [d] the parts contribute to the good of the whole, not vice versa. But you’re grumbling because you don’t appreciate that your position is best not only for the universe but for you too, thanks to your common origin. And since a soul is allied with different bodies at different times, and perpetually undergoes all sorts of changes, either self-imposed or produced by some other soul, the divine draughts-player has nothing else to do except promote a soul with a promising character to a better situation, and relegate one that is deteriorating to an inferior, as is appropriate in each case, so that they all meet the fate they deserve.’ [e]
CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I think my account explains how easy it could be for gods to control the universe. Suppose that in one’s constant efforts to serve its interests one were to mould all that is in it by transforming everything (by turning fire into water permeated by soul, for instance), instead of producing variety from a basic unity or unity from variety, then after the first or second or third stage of creation everything would be [904a] arranged in an infinite number of perpetually changing patterns.10 But in fact the supervisor of the universe finds his task remarkably easy.
CLEINIAS: Again, what do you mean?
ATHENIAN: This. Our King saw (a) that all actions are a function of soul and involve a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice, (b) that the combination of body and soul, while not an eternal creation like the gods sanctioned by law, is nevertheless indestructible11 (because living beings could [b] never have been created if one of these two constituent factors had been destroyed), (c) that one of them – the good element in soul – is naturally beneficial, while the bad element naturally does harm. Seeing all this he contrived a place for each constituent where it would most easily and effectively ensure the triumph of virtue and the defeat of vice throughout the universe. With this grand purpose in view he has worked out what sort of position, in what regions, should be assigned to a soul to match its changes of character; but he left it to the [c] individual’s acts of will to determine the direction of these changes. You see, the way we react to particular circumstances is almost invariably determined by our desires and our psychological state.
CLEINIAS: Likely enough.
ATHENIAN: ‘So all things that contain soul change, the cause of their change lying within themselves, and as they change they move according to the ordinance and law of destiny. Small changes in unimportant aspects of character entail small horizontal changes of position in space, while a substantial [d] decline into injustice sets the soul on the path to the depths of the so-called “under”world, which men call “Hades” and similar names, and which haunts and terrifies them both during their lives and when they have been sundered from their bodies. Take a soul that becomes particularly full of vice or virtue as a result of its own acts of will and the powerful influence of social intercourse. If companionship with divine virtue has made it exceptionally divine, it experiences an exceptional change of location, being conducted by a holy [e] path to some superior place elsewhere. Alternatively, opposite characteristics will send it off to live in the opposite region. And in spite of your belief that the gods neglect you, my lad, or rather young man,
“This is the sentence of the gods that dwell upon Olympus”12
– to go to join worse souls as you grow worse and better souls as you grow better, and alike in life and all the deaths you suffer13 to do and be done by according to the standards that [905a] birds of a feather naturally apply among themselves. Neither you nor anyone else who has got into trouble will ever be able to run fast enough to boast that he has escaped this sentence – a sentence to which the judges have attached special importance, and which one should take every possible care to avoid.14 Make yourself ever so small and hide in the depths of the earth, or soar high into the sky: this sentence will be ever at your heels, and either while you’re still alive on earth [b] or after you’ve descended into Hades or been taken to some even more remote place, you’ll pay the proper penalty of your crimes. You’ll find the same is true of those whom you imagine have emerged from misery to happiness because you’ve seen them rise from a humble position to high estate by acts of impiety, or some similar wickedness. These actions, it seemed to you, were like a mirror which reflected the gods’ total lack of concern. But you didn’t appreciate how the role of the gods contributes to the total scheme of things. What a bold fellow [c] you must be, if you think you’ve no need of such knowledge! Yet without it no one will ever catch so much as a glimmer of the truth or be able to offer a reasoned account of happiness or misery in life. So if Cleinias here and this whole group of old men convince you that you don’t really understand what you’re saying about the gods, then the divine assistance will be with you. But it may be that you need some further explanation, so if you have any sense you’ll listen while we address [d] our third opponent.’
Now as far as I’m concerned, we’ve proved, not too inadequately, that gods exist and care for mankind. However, there remains the view that they can be bought off by the gifts of sinners. No one should ever assent to this thesis, and we must fight to the last ditch to refute it.
CLEINIAS: Well said. Let’s do as you suggest.
ATHENIAN: Look – in the name of the gods themselves! – how would they be bought off, supposing they ever were? What [e] would they have to be? What sort of being would do this? Well, if they are going to run the entire universe for ever, presumably they’ll have to be rulers.
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: Now then, what sort of ruler do the gods in fact resemble?15 Or rather, what rulers resemble them? Let’s compare small instances with great, and see what rulers will serve our purpose. What about drivers of competing teams of horses, or steersmen of boats in a race? Would they be suitable parallels? Or we might compare the gods to commanders of armies. Again, it could be that they’re analogous to doctors concerned to defend the body in the war against disease, or [906a] to farmers anxiously anticipating the seasons that usually discourage the growth of their crops, or to shepherds. Now since we’ve agreed among ourselves that the universe is full of many good things and many bad as well, and that the latter outnumber the former, we maintain that the battle we have on our hands is never finished, and demands tremendous vigilance. However, gods and spirits are fighting on our side, the gods and spirits whose chattels we are. What ruins us is injustice and senseless aggression; what protects us is justice [b] and sensible moderation – virtues that are part of the spiritual characteristics of the gods, although one can find them quite clearly residing among us too, albeit on a small scale. Now there are some souls living on earth in possession of ill-gotten gains, who in their obviously brutish way throw themselves before the souls of their guardians (whether watch-dogs, shepherds, or masters of the utmost grandeur) 16 and by wheedling words and winning entreaties try to persuade them of the truth of the line put about by scoundrels – that they [c] have the right to feather their nest with impunity at mankind’s expense. But I suppose our view is that this vice we’ve named – acquisitiveness – is what is called ‘disease’ when it appears in flesh and blood, and ‘plague’ when brought by the seasons or at intervals of years; while if it occurs in the state and society, the same vice turns up under yet another name: ‘injustice’.17
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Thus anyone who argues that gods are always [d] indulgent to the unjust man and the criminal, provided they’re given a share in the loot, must in effect be prepared to say that if wolves, for instance, were to give watch-dogs a small part of their prey, the dogs would be appeased by the gift and turn a blind eye to the plundering of the flock. Isn’t this what people are really suggesting when they say that gods can be squared?
CLEINIAS: It certainly is.
ATHENIAN: So consider all those guardians we instanced a moment ago. Can one compare gods to any of them, without [e] making oneself ridiculous? What about steersmen who are turned from their course ‘by libations and burnt offerings’,18 and wreck both the ship and its crew?
CLEINIAS: Of course not.
ATHENIAN: And presumably they are not to be compared to a charioteer lined up at the starting point who has been bribed by a gift to throw the race and let others win.
CLEINIAS: No sir, to describe the gods like that would be a scandalous comparison.
ATHENIAN: Nor, of course, do they stand comparison with generals or doctors or farmers, or herdsmen, or dogs beguiled by wolves.
CLEINIAS: What blasphemy! The very idea! [907a]
ATHENIAN: Now aren’t all the gods the most supreme guardians of all, and don’t they look after our supreme interests? .
CLEINIAS: Very much so.
ATHENIAN: So are we really going to say that these guardians of the most valuable interests, distinguished as they are for their personal skill in guarding, are inferior to dogs, or the mere man in the street, who’ll never abandon justice, in spite of the gifts that the unjust immorally press upon him?
CLEINIAS: Of course not. That’s an intolerable thing to say. [b] There’s no sort of impiety that men won’t commit, but anyone who persists in this doctrine bids fair to be condemned – and with every justification – as the worst and most impious of the impious.
TRANSITION TO THE LAW OF IMPIETY
ATHENIAN: Can we now say that our three theses – that the gods exist, that they are concerned for us, and that they are absolutely above being corrupted into flouting justice – have been adequately proved?
CLEINIAS: Certainly, and we endorse these arguments of yours.
ATHENIAN: Still, I fancy that being so anxious to get the better of these scoundrels, we’ve put our case rather polemically. But what prompted this desire to come out on top, my dear [c] Cleinias, was a fear that the rogues should think that victory in argument was a licence to do as they please and act on any and every theological belief they happen to hold. Hence our anxiety to speak with some force. However, if we’ve made even a small contribution to persuading those fellows to hate themselves and cherish the opposite kind of character, then [d] this preface of ours to the law of impiety will have been well worth composing.
CLEINIAS: Well, there is that hope. But even without those results, the lawgiver will not be at fault for having discussed such a topic.
ATHENIAN: Now then, after the preface we’ll have a form of words that convey the purpose of our laws – a general promulgation to all the ungodly that they should abandon their present habits in favour of a life of piety. Then in cases of disobedience the following law of impiety should apply:
[e] Anyone who comes across a case of impiety of word or deed should go to the aid of the law by alerting the authorities. The first officials to be notified should bring the matter, in due legal form, before the court appointed to try this category of case.
58. If an official who hears of the incident fails to perform this duty,
he must himself be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes to champion the cause of the laws.
When verdicts of ‘guilty’ are returned, the court is to assess [908a] a separate penalty for each impious act of each offender. Imprisonment is to apply in all cases. (The state will have three prisons: (1) a public one near the market-place for the general run of offenders, where large numbers may be kept in safe custody, (2) one called the ‘reform centre’ near the place where the Nocturnal Council19 assembles, and (3) another in the heart of the countryside, in a solitary spot where the terrain is at its wildest; and the title of this prison is somehow to convey the notion of ‘punishment’.)
TWO KINDS OF OFFENDERS
Now since impiety has three causes, which we’ve already [b] described, and each is divided into two kinds, there will be six categories of religious offenders worth distinguishing; and the punishment imposed on each should vary in kind and degree. Consider first a complete atheist: he may have a naturally just character and be the sort of person who hates scoundrels, and because of his loathing of injustice is not tempted to commit it; he may flee the unjust and feel fondness [c] for the just. Alternatively, besides believing that all things are ‘empty of’ gods,20 he may be a prey to an uncontrollable urge to experience pleasure and avoid pain, and he may have a retentive memory and be capable of shrewd insights. Both these people suffer from a common failing, atheism, but in terms of the harm they do to others the former is much less dangerous than the latter. The former will talk with a complete lack of inhibition about gods and sacrifices and oaths, and by poking fun at other people will probably, if he continues unpunished, make converts to his own views. The [d] latter holds the same opinions but has what are called ‘natural gifts’: full of cunning and guile, he’s the sort of fellow who’ll make a diviner and go in for all sorts of legerdemain; sometimes he’ll turn into a dictator or a demagogue or a general, or a plotter in secret rites; and he’s the man who invents the tricks of the so-called ‘sophists’.21 So there can be many different types of atheist, but for the purpose of legislation [e] they need to be divided into two groups. The dissembling atheist deserves to die for his sins not just once or twice but many times, whereas the other kind needs simply admonition combined with incarceration. The idea that gods take no notice of the world similarly produces two more categories, and the belief that they can be squared another two. So much for our distinctions.
THE PUNISHMENT FOR IMPIETY
59. (a) Those who have simply fallen victim to foolishness and who do not have a bad character and disposition
should be sent to the reform centre by the judge in accordance [909a] with the law for a term of not less than five years, and during this period no citizen must come into contact with them except the members of the Nocturnal Council, who should pay visits to admonish them and ensure their spiritual salvation.
(b) When his imprisonment is over, a prisoner who appears to be enjoying mental health should go and live with sensible people; but if appearances turn out to have been deceptive, and he is reconvicted on a similar charge,
he should be punished by death.
[b] There are others, however, who in addition to not recognizing the existence of gods, or believing they are unconcerned about the world or can be bought off, become sub-human. They take everybody for fools, and many a man they delude during his life; and then by saying after his death that they can conjure up his spirit, and by promising to influence the gods through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers and charms, they try to wreck completely whole homes and states for filthy lucre.
60. If one of these people is found guilty,
the court must sentence him to imprisonment as prescribed by [c] law in the prison in the centre of the country; no free man is to visit him at any time, and slaves must hand him his ration of food fixed by the Guardians of the Laws. When he dies the body must be cast out over the borders of the state unburied.
61. If any free man lends a hand in burying him,
he must be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who cares to prosecute.
If the prisoner leaves children suitable for citizenship, the guardians of orphans must look after them too, from the day [d] of their father’s conviction, no less than ordinary orphans.
PRIVATE SHRINES
All these offenders must be covered by one general law, which by forbidding illegal religious practices will cause most of them to sin less in word and deed against religion, and which in particular will do something to enlighten them. The following comprehensive law should be enacted to deal with all these cases.
No one is to possess a shrine in his own private home. When a man takes it into his head to offer sacrifice, he is to go to the public shrines in order to do so, and he should hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses responsible for [e] consecrating them; then he, and anyone else he may wish to participate, should join in the prayers. The grounds for these stipulations are as follows. To establish gods and temples is not easy; it’s a job that needs to be very carefully pondered if it is to be done properly. Yet look at what people usually do – all women in particular, invalids of every sort, men in danger or any kind of distress, or conversely when they have just won a measure of prosperity: they dedicate the first thing that comes to hand, they swear to offer sacrifice, and promise to found shrines for gods and spirits and children of gods. And [910a] the terror they feel when they see apparitions, either in dreams or awake – a terror which recurs later when they recollect a whole series of visions – drives them to seek a remedy for each individually, with the result that on open spaces or any other spot where such an incident has occurred they found the altars and shrines that fill every home and village. The law now stated must be observed not only for all these reasons but also in order to deter the impious from managing to [b] conduct these activities too in secret, by establishing shrines and altars in private houses, calculating to win the favour of the gods on the quiet by sacrifices and prayers. This would make their wickedness infinitely worse, and bring the reproach of heaven both on themselves and on the virtuous people who tolerate them, so that, by a sort of rough justice, the whole state would catch the infection of their impiety. Still, God won’t blame the legislator, because this is the law to be enacted:
The possession of shrines in private houses is forbidden. If [c] a man is proved to possess and worship at shrines other than the public ones, and the injustice committed is not an act of serious impiety (whether the possessor is a man or a woman), anyone who notices the fact must lay information before the Guardians of the Laws, who should give orders for the removal of the private shrines to public temples.
62. (a) If the culprits disobey,
they must be punished until they carry out the removal.
(b) But if a man is proved guilty of a serious act of impiety typical of an adult, and not just the peccadillo of a child, either by establishing a shrine on private land or by sacrificing on public land to gods not included in the pantheon of the state,
[d] he must be punished by death for sacrificing with impure hands.
The Guardians of the Laws, after deciding whether the crime was a childish peccadillo or not, must then take the matter straight to court, and exact from the culprits the penalty for their impiety.
The Athenian now embarks on a long series of explanations, preambles and laws on a wide variety of topics. At first sight, his exposition is chaotic, but close examination of the sequence of his thought will show that this is simply the result of letting the subject in hand suggest a fresh one. For instance, at the end of §24, in dealing with the respect due to parents, he provides that a slave should be protected from injury in revenge for giving information against someone who has committed a crime. But this almost casual remark reminds him that he has not yet dealt fully with all types of injury, so he launches into a discussion of injuries inflicted by the use of drugs and charms, in order to fill this gap in his legislation. Sometimes he tries, somewhat laboriously, to justify a transition from one subject to another – as for example that from ‘Lunacy’ to ‘Abuse’ (934d). Such explanations are not simply literary devices to connect disparate subjects, but (I conjecture) the fruit of systematic analysis and classification carried on in the Academy. But some of his changes of subject are abrupt and quite unexplained, and there are passages that look like a mere series of jottings. However, the next three sections form reasonably coherent wholes and I have called them ‘The Law of Property’, ‘Commercial Law’ and ‘Family Law’. Thereafter, no single theme appears to predominate, and I have been forced to call §25 ‘Miscellaneous Legislation’. Yet even this welter of regulations shows signs of being not entirely unplanned. The passage dealing with the Scrutineers, who investigate the conduct of other officials, comes naturally towards the end of the legislation; the discussion of relations with the outside world seems to have been reserved until this late stage in view of its relevance to the philosophical activities of the Nocturnal Council, which as the supreme power in the state is discussed last of all; and the rules for funerals appropriately round off the section and indeed the entire legal code.