Prominent among the buildings that lined the Olas Altas, the broad roadway that fronted Mazatlán harbor, was the American consulate, a two-story structure built in the Spanish style of old Mazatlán, with smooth sides of white cement, barred windows at street level, and ornate casement windows on the second story that opened outward like glass doors to overlook the sea below. The American consul in Mazatlán, W. E. Chapman, could often be seen standing at one of the windows, scanning the harbor with powerful binoculars like a military commander reconnoitering terrain, as he watched crates and boxes from visiting steamers being manhandled ashore by an unending procession of cargadors. “Military commander” was a fitting description for Chapman, who was the U.S. State Department’s senior officer in the secret war being waged against the German empire in neutral Mazatlán.
In normal times, the duties of a consular official are to assist a country’s citizens during their residence in a foreign nation, to process government travel documents, and above all, to help in promoting trade with the nation to which they have been assigned. But Consul Chapman’s mission in Mazatlán was to deny trade between American companies and German-owned firms in Mexico, through enforcement of the blacklist, while maintaining a vigilant watch over German activities south of the border. In W. E. Chapman, the State Department could not have found a man better suited for the job.
William Edgar Chapman was born in the rural farming community of Mount Pisgah, Arkansas, in February 1877. Like most Americans of the time, after receiving a public school education, Chapman found work on a local farm. The Arkansas farm boy’s quiet, secluded existence took a dramatic turn in 1898, with the outbreak of the Spanish–American War. The twenty-one-year-old enlisted in the U.S. Army and became a member of Company B, Thirty-Third Regiment United States Volunteers. Arriving too late for the conflict in Cuba, Chapman was sent to the Philippines, where he served from 1899 to 1901. After his release from the army, he remained in the Philippines for eight years, where he worked as a teacher, a school superintendent, the terminal agent for a railroad company, and as the general manager and editor of a Philippine newspaper. Returning to the United States in 1909 a capable manager with a strong command of the Spanish language, Chapman went to Washington DC where he obtained employment as a clerk in the War Department, while attending a business college at night. In 1910, Chapman was appointed the assistant superintendent of the State, War and Navy building, one of the largest and most significant buildings in the capital. Recognizing that he would need to further his education to achieve the higher position in government that he desired, Chapman attended law school and received a bachelor’s degree in law (LLB) from the Washington School of Law in 1914, and a master’s (LLM) from the National University Law School in 1915. He was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 1915, and after passing the U.S. consular examination was appointed a Consul of Class Eight and assigned to Mazatlán.
Through dedication and hard work, the Arkansas farmhand had transformed himself into a worldly, highly educated government official. Chapman was a “no-nonsense” bureaucrat; intelligent, resourceful, and driven by a desire to serve his country. He would prove a ready adversary for anyone attempting to circumvent American law or aid the enemies of the United States.
Chapman maintained watch over American companies trading with suspect firms in Mazatlán under the direction of the secretary of state. On a regular basis, cablegrams listing the names of businesses that were under suspicion arrived at the office of “William E. Chapman, Esquire, American Consul” for investigation. Chapman was instructed to obtain the correct company name and address, provide detailed information on current activities and business connections, the nature and size of the entity, and the length of time it had been in operation. He was to consult with representatives of the British, French, and Italian governments to determine which firms were to be indexed on the “Enemy Trading List” (“the blacklist”), the “white list” of businesses that had no affiliation with any enemy-owned companies, or the “cloak list” of “front” companies that allowed their names to be used by enemy-owned businesses in order to obtain American goods.
Chapman worked closely with the French Consul, Henri Claisse, and the British vice-consul, Theodore E. S. Watson to identify German firms and their surrogates operating in Mazatlán. This information was sent by Chapman to the State Department, who then forwarded it to the War Trade Board for use in restricting German businesses and their “cloaks” from obtaining merchandise from the United States.
On July 31, 1917, Chapman received a typical report from Henri Claisse, agent consulaire de France. “I have the honor to remit to you herewith a list, as complete as I could make it, according to my knowledge, of the firms established in the States of Sinaloa and Nayarit which are antagonistic to the policy of the government of the United States. I have for each firm given the reasons which form the basis for my criterion.” Listed at the top of Claisse’s enclosure, “Firms Considered As Unfriendly to the United States of America,” was “Melchers Sucs, Mazatlán,” of whom Claisse commented, “The head of the firm here is the German Consul, and of course the firm is the center of the propaganda in favor of German interests and against the enemies of Germany . . . [They] make use of other firms in their efforts to thwart the effects of blacklisting.”
A communiqué with similar information was sent to Chapman by Theodore Watson, the British vice-consul, on August 4:
With regard to D. G. Aguirre of Tepic (a suspect firm), I have ascertained that since the commencement of the war they have transferred their agency in Mazatlán from V. Patron, a Spanish firm, to Melchers . . . You will have noticed a circular in the local press announcing the formation of the “Compania de Transportes Maritimos, S.S.” for lightering goods and passenger traffic, also to act as Shipping Agents. The President thereof is F. Gregoire, an employee of the House of Wohler, Bartning Sucs. I have no doubt that this is the German-controlled shipping concern that I previously mentioned to you.
After receiving information from his fellow consuls, Chapman took immediate action. He initiated an investigation of the lightering company identified by Watson and sent a cable to the U.S. secretary of state the following month, advising, “M. Miranda, Director General, Company Transportes Maritimos, leaves today for San Francisco aboard the steamer ‘City of Para’ with articles of incorporation. Said company is trying to arrange business connections there, capital is almost entirely that of Germans in Mazatlán under names of Mexicans connected with them . . . If United States objects to American connections I have to suggest secret service San Francisco prevent them.”
As Chapman gained experience in ferreting out information on companies violating the Trading with the Enemy Act, he became knowledgeable about the various subterfuges and deceptive practices that were being employed to evade the U.S. trade authorities. He was soon recognized as an expert on the operations of blacklisted firms in Mexico; a resource for the government to rely on not only for identifying enemy firms violating the law, but for devising methods to thwart them.
In an October 1917 report to the State Department, Chapman advised:
I am told by an American that at the time he learned of the arrangements of the Germans with José Sanchez y Cia [a suspected cloak firm] to get goods for them in the United States, he learned also that these Germans were laughingly boasting that Americans were too inefficient to effect an organization such as would seriously stand in the way of their getting all the goods from the United States which they desire.
I realize that it will take some time and a good deal of vigilance on my part and on the part of my colleagues and trustworthy associates to put a stop to this sort of thing, if it is the wish of the Government of the United States that it be stopped (I have no official information that it really is) but I am anxious to see it done and am confident that I can furnish the Department with information by which it can at least be very materially reduced.
I would strongly urge that all American authorities having anything to do with the granting of export licenses or the granting of shipments of goods where no license is required be given specific orders not to permit any bag, box, case, sack, package, bundle, or other form of shipment to leave any United States port for Mexico without first having clearly written thereon the full name of the firm whose name appears in the papers upon which the goods are invoiced and manifested for shipment.
Such a requirement would greatly facilitate observations by government agents in Mexico. For example, it would at this point make it easier for me, the several loyal Americans, the British Vice Consul, and the French Consular Agent to watch the handling of shipments by local carting companies to ascertain whether these shipments were being carted to the places of business of those whose names appeared thereon or to German houses, and if to the former, then whether they were later transferred to the latter.
In response, Chapman’s superiors forwarded him a letter from Herman Oliphant, the assistant director of War Trade Intelligence, that stated reassuringly, “I hope you will take the occasion to assure Mr. Chapman that the War Trade Board is extremely anxious to stop the practices (he) referred to. I am recommending to the War Trade Board that Mr. Chapman’s suggestion concerning the marking of packages be adopted, as I consider this an important and very practical means of enabling our Consular Representatives to acquire information such as we desire.”
During the summer of 1917, Chapman was notified by the State Department that the U.S. Navy planned to assign sub chasers to Mexican ports on the Pacific coast to maintain surveillance of the area. The ships were to enter Mexican territorial waters only to obtain fuel, water, and supplies, as their limited range demanded that they operate from a fixed base, but would otherwise cruise offshore. Although the navy sub chasers would not be subject to the orders of consular officials, they were to be used by the consuls as conduits for communicating information about German activities, and to “keep a close watch in Mexican waters” and protect U.S. interests.
American naval officers were soon calling at the consulate in Mazatlán on a regular basis, with Chapman’s observations and commentary being included in the weekly dispatches from the commanding officer of the USS Brutus, a collier stationed off the Mexican coast, to the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet:
Mr. Chapman, the American Consul, stated that large quantities of merchandise are going into San Blas from the United States and continually finding their way into the hands of Germans. As the large German firm of Delius & Co. own or control most of that section, some means should be adopted to offset this steady supply, is Mr. Chapman’s opinion . . .
Mr. Chapman informed me that the “Enemy Trading List” is having the effect of causing many Mexicans, and some foreigners . . . to pretend to be pro-American and pro-Ally very strongly, but this sentiment is not genuine, but rather evidence that they have felt the pinch of the “black list” and a means to further their business interests . . .
In talking over the “Trading With the Enemy Act” and its operation, Mr. Chapman stated that he has been embarrassed at times by lack of cooperation with his office on the part of the San Francisco officials by reason of their having cleared shipments consigned to firms that appear on the list.
By late 1917, the American blacklist was having a significant impact on the earnings of German-owned companies and the daily life of German nationals in Mexico. Intended as a means to induce German firms in neutral countries to bring pressure on the German government to end the war, the blacklist often had the opposite effect, bringing otherwise passive German businessmen into open hostility against the U.S. government.
On December 15, Chapman wired a warning coded “Red” to the secretary of state: “Germans embittered by black list make threats. German Consul said today Americans should no longer consider them responsible for what they do, also that one or more German officers (were now) with every Mexican Army general. Suggest advisability keeping naval vessel at Mazatlán for present for protection of Americans and interests.” Chapman’s warning was another indication of the extent to which the blacklist had transformed German sentiment from resigned submission into readiness for action.
To assist him in investigating the activities of German-owned firms in Mazatlán, Chapman relied on a network of spies and confidential informants. The web of intelligence gatherers that he cultivated included government agents, expatriate Americans, visiting U.S. businessmen, and a variety of friendly tipsters in the harbor area. One of his best sources of information, referred to in reports as “the special secret service agent assigned to the coast,” was Paul Bernardo Altendorf. The intrepid doctor-spy made numerous visits to Mazatlán before establishing his medical practice there as a cover, and provided Chapman with a stream of confidential information regarding German intentions—everything from important diplomatic and military initiatives, to common gossip, such as “the consul [Unger] is furious at the U.S. government for establishing a base on the Gulf of Fonseca.”
Chapman also gained valuable intelligence from American traders and merchants passing through Mazatlán on legitimate business. In March 1918, G. Danielson, the treasurer of a dry goods company in Los Angeles, arrived with a license from the War Trade Board that granted him permission to collect a sum of money owed to his company by Melchers Sucesores in payment for a prewar transaction. While waiting in the office of a Melchers Sucs manager, Danielson was able to read a “bill of goods” sitting on the man’s desk, which revealed that a San Francisco-based company was taking orders from brokers that were acting as “cloaks” for German firms on the blacklist. After the meeting, Danielson visited the consulate and signed a sworn affidavit to what he had seen, which Chapman immediately wired to the State Department for relay to the War Trade Board.
On the opposite side of the scale from the Americans conducting lawful business in Mazatlán were the slackers—draft dodgers who had deserted the United States for Mexico in order to avoid military service overseas—men like Charles Boston and Cornelius Heintz. On the rare occasion when Chapman encountered Heintz in public, he would dismiss him with an unmistakable look of contempt.
But in private, their interaction was markedly different.
For Cornelius Adolph Heintz, the loathsome draft dodger, was also Chapman’s most trusted informant within the German community of Mazatlán. Heintz began reporting to Chapman shortly after winning the gunboat Morelos at auction for Louis Arzak in the summer of 1917. Uneasy about his partners’ purpose in acquiring the formidable warship—and the consequences of his own involvement in the project—Heintz had discreetly visited the American consulate to learn whether the U.S. government would have any objection to his employing Germans from Santa Rosalía to assist in refloating the vessel. Chapman contacted the State Department for guidance on the matter, but their reply was noncommittal. Taking the matter into his own hands, Chapman cautioned Heintz that he would be wise to have no further business dealings with German nationals, and in October 1917, Heintz terminated his partnership with Arzak on the Morelos project.
Although the marine engineer severed his business connections with the Germans on the advice of the American consul, he continued to maintain his social contacts, and remained in good standing within the German community. Heintz socialized with Arzak, Unger, and Burgmeister at the German club, and visited the Cervecería del Pacífico brewery on a regular basis to meet with his German “comrades” to discuss recent happenings and future plans. All knew that Heintz had come to Mexico at the invitation of Bernard Hilbing, now imprisoned in the United States as a dangerous enemy alien, and that he had refused to return to America so as to avoid being drafted to fight against Germany. In their eyes, Heintz remained a true German who could be safely confided in regarding important and confidential matters.
Through secret meetings at the consulate, Heintz kept Chapman aware of everything that occurred in the enemy camp. When the Mexican agent for an American shipping company booked two Germans on a U.S.-registered steamer for a voyage to Manzanillo, Heintz exposed this violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Chapman, who instructed the shipping company to refuse them passage, and arranged for the Mexican intermediary to be added to the blacklist. If a rumor harmful to the United States was being circulated by Germans in Mazatlán, Chapman was immediately informed by Heintz. He also kept the consul updated on the progress of Arzak’s workmen in rebuilding the gunboat Morelos.
Heintz received nothing in return for providing Chapman with confidential information. He would later recall, “I kept the American consul fully advised of everything that went on . . . but never received any pay for this, nor asked for any.”
In early February 1918, Heintz paid a surprise visit to the U.S. consulate to report an astounding development to Chapman: Consul Unger planned to send the Alexander Agassiz to sea as a raider with a German crew.
Chapman was stunned by the news, and fired a score of questions at Heintz. Who was involved? When would the boat sail? What was their destination?
Heintz provided Chapman with a detailed account of the German scheme, describing how Bauman was to convince Maude Lochrane to set sail for the South Seas islands, the direction that he had been given to return the worn schooner to seaworthy condition, and the means by which the Agassiz would be armed and equipped for the raiding expedition.
Startled by Heintz’s revelations, Chapman decided to sit tight and monitor new developments as they unfolded. It would be weeks before the Agassiz could be made ready for sea and equipped with arms and navigational instruments from Santa Rosalía. At present, the scheme was nothing more than idle talk. He would not alarm Washington by sending a wire about a German plot that might not get off the ground, or be drawn into premature action that would only serve to warn off the conspirators. Those responsible must be caught in the act with indisputable evidence for a case to be made.
Chapman directed Heintz to carry on as if he were a willing participant in the venture, “but keep both of your eyes open—and keep me posted on everything that happens.”
The consul ruminated that after the Alexander Agassiz returned to port at the conclusion of her last voyage, Miss Lochrane had failed to deliver the ship’s papers to him, as required by law. If she was not in possession of the documents, she would not be able to legally clear the port.
Chapman instructed Heintz to tell Maude to bring the ship’s papers to the consulate.
“She does not intend to surrender them,” Heintz informed him. “The Germans want to get away with them on board. They have coached her on what to say when you ask for them. She is to state that the papers got wet and damaged on the last trip to sea, and that they are in a drawer on the ship which is also wet and has swelled up so badly that it cannot be opened without forcing it.”
Bristling with anger at the thought of such an open act of defiance, Chapman told Heintz to deliver Miss Lochrane the message that he expected to receive the Agassiz’s papers at once.
That afternoon, Maude Lochrane called at the consulate to discuss some matters related to the schooner, and Chapman immediately asked her for the ship’s papers. Her response was exactly as Heintz had predicted—the papers were in a drawer on the boat that had swollen shut and could not be opened without damaging it. If she could manage to get the drawer open, she would gladly deliver them.
She left a short time later, and the afternoon passed without the ship’s papers being brought to the consulate.
The following day, when Maude returned to the consulate to meet with Vice-Consul Brown, Chapman entered the room and handed her a typewritten letter on consular letterhead that instructed “Miss Maude Lochrane” to deliver the ship’s papers of the Alexander Agassiz to the American consulate.
Maude read the note, then carefully folded it and turned to Chapman.
“I see you want the papers,” she stated calmly, “but as I told you, they all got wet and are in a drawer which is all swelled up so that it will have to be forced open.”
“I cannot and will not accept excuses,” Chapman sternly warned. “I must have the papers and I want them today.”
“Well, I think I can get them for you,” Maude replied. “I’ll see what I can do about it.”
Then she rose and walked out of the consulate.
The following morning, while working to repair the schooner alongside Madden and Brandt, Heintz watched Maude take the ship’s papers from the wheelhouse and carefully douse them with water from the estuary. Now if the papers came into Chapman’s possession, the story that she had not delivered them because they had become wet would appear to be true, he reflected.
Shortly before noon on March 9, Heintz called on the American consul to report a significant development in the German scheme. Bauman had returned from Santa Rosalía with charts, a sextant, a chronograph, and a compass. He had also brought a machine gun of the latest make, and one box of ammunition. Heintz did not know the caliber of the gun, but it “shot a shell that was about the size of a rifle cartridge.” He informed Chapman that the Agassiz was almost ready to return to the sea, and that Bauman expected to depart Mazatlán within the next seven days.
For W. E. Chapman, the Agassiz plot had reached a critical juncture. With the latest revelations from Heintz, it could not be dismissed as the delusion of a few discontented German nationals stranded in the backwater of rural Mexico. The conspirators now had the means at hand to carry out their devious scheme. Chapman responded by sending a priority telegram to Washington, warning of the imminent danger.
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
March 9, 2pm
I have what I believe to be reliable information that a German Captain and several Germans from the interned vessels in the Gulf of California are planning fitting out as a raider, American vessel ALEXANDER AGASSIZ, now at Mazatlán, between now and March 15th. Germans have machine gun, charts, sextant, et cetera, and expect to take supplies for ninety days. Naval vessel should call at Mazatlán immediately full details.
CHAPMAN
When Chapman’s telegram was delivered to the State Department the following morning, it created a sensation, and resulted in the exchange of a flurry of messages between the State Department and the U.S. Navy. Blue jackets were soon hunched at glowing wireless sets on land and sea, tapping out coded radiograms to the commanders of Naval Operations and the Pacific Fleet:
From: Operations.
March 11, 1918
To : Commander, Division Two.
Following from American Consul, Mazatlán to Secretary of State for information and guidance: “I have what appears to be reliable information that a German captain and several Germans from the interned vessels in the Gulf of California are planning to fit out as a raider the American vessel Alexander Agassiz now at Mazatlán, between now and March 16th. Germans have machine guns, charts, sextants, etc. Navy vessels should call at Mazatlán Consulate for full details.”
From: Vicksburg.
March 12, 1918
To : Commander, Division Two.
The American yawl Alexander Agassiz has been refitted is acting suspiciously, and it is reported that she has on board a large amount supplies, including medical stores, sufficient for a three months cruise. Also reported that she has ten Germans on board and is sailing soon. Later news gives Thursday evening. Gardiner, American Vice Consul.”
From: Commander, Division Two.
March 12, 1918
To : Vicksburg.
Vicksburg immediately proceed Mazatlán, investigate reports that harbor is mined and that American power boat Agassiz with German crew will leave before March 16th as raider with machine gun. Upon completion duty, coal at Pichilinque or from Brutus at Acapulco. Submarine Chaser 302 will proceed as directed by you. Acknowledge.
From: Commander, Division Two.
March 13, 1918
To : Operations.
Vicksburg will arrive at Mazatlán at about 10:00 a.m., March 13th in company with Sub Chaser 302. Rainier at Pichilinque. Brutus due there, Yorktown at Ampala, Arctic, Dreadnaught, Undaunted off Magdalena Bay, southbound with tows, Snohomish, Arapaho, Sea Rover, Goliath off Salina Cruz. If Agassiz sails before arrival of Vicksburg all vessels will be employed in search, otherwise Vicksburg will blockade her in Mazatlán.
From: Commander, Division Two.
March 13, 1918
To : Vicksburg.
Operations reports that a small raider will leave Mazatlán on the night of March 14th. Take necessary steps immediately to prevent her escape after departure Mexican waters. Utilize the services of Sub Chaser #302, Brutus, Rainier and tugs at your discretion. Yorktown sailed Ampala 8:00 p.m. Monday for Mazatlán. Acknowledge.
From: Commander, Division Two.
March 13, 1918
To : Vicksburg.
Referring my (last radio) if upon arrival at Mazatlán AGASSIZ is still in harbor board and investigate her in regular manner for American vessel. Vicksburg will prevent her escape from Mazatlán pending action by State Department and at discretion you will direct other vessels proceed on duty assigned. Acknowledge.
March 14, 1918
To : Commander, Division Two.
Vicksburg will arrive Mazatlán Wednesday midnight and will investigate and attempt report tonight.
At 1:43 a.m. on March 15, the American gunboat USS Vicksburg steamed to the northern entry of Mazatlán harbor and dropped anchor. The Vicksburg was a formidable coastal patrol vessel, heavily armed with a brace of 4-inch, 6-pounder, and 1-pounder cannons. The 1,010 ton Annapolis class gunboat had a maximum speed of 13 knots (15 mph) under steam power, and was equipped with a full barkentine rig of sails for extended cruising.
In the early morning darkness, a launch was lowered from the Vicksburg, and Lieutenant Charles Edwin Reordan, the ship’s commanding officer, boarded with a contingent of sailors and headed for shore. Although only twenty-nine years old, Reordan was a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, and a serious, highly dedicated officer with a command presence that far exceeded his youthful age. His orders from Pacific Fleet headquarters were to prevent the escape of a suspected enemy warship, and he was not going to wait for “normal business hours” to call on the American consul. Leading his men in a march from the wharf through the darkened streets of Mazatlán, Reordan arrived at the consulate at 4:00 a.m. to awaken Chapman and request a full briefing on the situation.
Chapman welcomed the navy men inside and then ushered Reordan to his private office. He gave the young officer an affidavit to read that had been taken from Cornelius Heintz five days earlier, in which the marine engineer had sworn under oath that Fritz Bauman and a group of German accomplices planned to fit out the Alexander Agassiz for duty as a German raider.
“Mr. Heintz . . . has gone over with us many of the numerous details as to how the whole matter has been planned for the Alexander Agassiz to put to sea as an outlaw,” Chapman related, continuing,
He has in very convincing statements shown that the vessel intends to leave port without clearing at this office or at the local port office. He has told us . . . of the ship being too small for the Germans who are to go aboard the Alexander Agassiz, which is therefore intended to be used until a larger vessel can be captured. He has shown us such papers as the ship has and explained to us how Miss Maude Lochrane . . . took the papers and wet them with her own hands so that in case they should come into my possession she could make good her excuse that she did not deliver them because they were wet.
Reordan leaned forward in his seat, listening to the consul attentively as he outlined the German scheme.
“He has told us,” Chapman continued, “of how they boast of being able to maneuver and run away from any boat the United States has on this coast, of how the Germans laughed at my demand for the ship’s papers, and called me and the other American officials impossible names by way of ridicule and contempt for American government organization and of numerous other things which go to prove the claims of Mr. Heintz to the truth of his story that the vessel is about to go on a raiding expedition.”
“I must therefore conclude,” said Chapman, “that since Miss Lochrane plans as Mr. Heintz says to go on the vessel with these Germans, she is an outlaw, that she is a traitor to and a dangerous enemy of the Government of the United States and that her vessel has been given over by her into the hands of the enemy to be used as an instrument of war against the United States and its allies, and therefore has the status of an outlaw, an enemy of our country.”
Reordan questioned Chapman on the particulars of Heintz’s story, and then requested that he put his statements in writing and provide him with a copy. He also requested a copy of the affidavit that Heintz had signed on March 9, and asked Chapman to set up a meeting with his informant so that he could learn more about the Germans’ intentions. The consul agreed to arrange a meeting at the consulate later that day.
Reordan rose, and after commending Chapman for his vigilance and good judgment, departed with his men for the Vicksburg.
Shortly before noon, he returned ashore and called at the consulate to interview Cornelius Heintz. The marine engineer confirmed that Bauman and Madden intended to put to sea on the Agassiz armed with small arms and a machine gun to capture a larger ship and initiate a raiding voyage. Reordan questioned him at length about the German plan. Heintz’s responses were immediate and consistent with his prior statements. He gave Reordan several dates that the Agassiz might attempt to escape, one possible date being Sunday morning, March 17. By the end of the meeting, the naval officer believed Heintz to be a very credible informant.
Reordan next paid a courtesy call on the Alexander Agassiz to investigate the suspect schooner, as instructed by a coded dispatch from the Pacific Fleet. He found the Agassiz still beached in the saltwater estuary, and approached the craft in a friendly manner, trying not to arouse suspicion. On board were Maude Lochrane, Cornelius Heintz, and “six or seven officer-like looking Germans.” Reordan made a routine inspection of the boat, during the course of which he found no incriminating evidence or stores of any kind, but observed that extensive repairs had been made to the sails, hull, and engines, just as Heintz had described.
He struck up a conversation with Maude Lochrane, telling her that he had spoken to Consul Chapman about coming out to look the boat over, and that Chapman had mentioned that the ship’s papers were in a drawer that had swollen shut. Maude informed him that earlier that morning she had “broken open the drawer and found the drawer empty—no papers in it.” She told Reordan that on a recent voyage the boat had been caught in a very heavy sea and the cabin had become swamped. After returning to port she had found a great many papers that had become “nothing but pulp” and that were strewn about the deck like so many pieces of trash. She had thrown them all overboard, thinking that they were of no importance. Maude now supposed that some of the papers thrown overboard were the ship’s papers.
Reordan nodded understandingly, and then excused himself, saying that he had to call on other American boats in the area. He returned to the Vicksburg and sent a wireless message to his divisional commander at the Pacific Fleet:
From: Vicksburg.
March 15, 1918
To : Commander, Division Two.
Completed search. Nothing important found. Stores for Agassiz probably assembled onshore. Her papers are not in order. I am confident that she is going to leave either as German raider or else as blind for other operations. Vicksburg will prevent her escape. Reliable information says that other raiders will sail soon.
Reordan dispatched a whale boat and a pair of smaller boats from the Vicksburg on “fishing excursions” throughout Mazatlán harbor to maintain watch for any attempt by the Agassiz to escape. The boats also used their lines to drag the anchorage areas and entrance ways to the harbor probing for mines, but none were found. It seemed possible that the schooner might attempt to slip out of the harbor that night under cover of darkness; with four exits to watch, it would be impossible to guard them all.
At dusk, he sent Assistant Paymaster Armstrong and Ensign Wrucke ashore to occupy a position at the top of Monte Silla Point, a saddle-shaped hill that stood 250 feet above sea level, where they could easily monitor all four points of exit from the harbor and signal to the Vicksburg if the Alexander Agassiz should make an attempt to escape. At regular intervals throughout the night, the lookout team sent coded messages to the American gunboat, using a powerful flashlight to keep Reordan updated on the status of their surveillance.
Unknown to the two seamen from the Vicksburg, secret activity was under way on the Alexander Agassiz that night, as items critical to the success of the covert mission were brought on board, including charts, a sextant, the heavy machine gun that Heintz had seen, a container of ammunition, Winchester .30-.30 rifles, and a German naval flag.
Despite these preparations, the purpose behind the Vicksburg’s arrival and her boats “fishing” in the harbor had not been lost on Unger and Bauman. Even the signaling atop Monte Silla Point had been noticed by the German plotters. Charles Boston, the draft evader from Missouri who had been recruited for the raider crew, saw “signaling from the shore that night . . . I don’t know who they were signaling to or who it was that was signaling . . . It looked like flashes of lightning. I ascertained who it was to and from [through discussion with other crew members] and the answer was that there was a warship in port and that it was a reflection from the signaling of the warship.”
Seated at his desk at Melchers Sucs, Unger was not pleased by the “borregos” (slang for rumors) that he had received about the unusual U.S. naval activity in the harbor with the Alexander Agassiz on the verge of being dispatched on its mission, and one member of the raider company in particular had become the focus of his displeasure and a cause for concern—Cornelius Adolph Heintz.
Doubts about Heintz’s loyalty had been raised by the actions of one of the officials at the American consulate. W. E. Chapman was assisted in his duties by two vice-consuls named Gardiner and Brown. Charles Edwin Gardiner, forty-seven years old, was new to the position, having worked as the foreign representative of a refinery in Argentina before joining the consular service and being posted to Mazatlán. It is unclear what Gardiner did or said to bring Heintz under suspicion by the German plotters. Perhaps it was something as simple as offering a friendly smile or wave to a “slacker” that the Americans were expected to detest, or an indiscreet comment to a German informant, but through some act Gardiner made the conspirators aware that Cornelius Heintz might be more than he appeared to be.
On the evening of March 15, while supplies and equipment were being loaded aboard the Agassiz and coded messages being flashed across the harbor between Monte Silla Point and the Vicksburg, Heintz was told to report to the German consul. When the engineer arrived at Melchers Sucs, he was given a simple message:
“You had better be shooting square with us—or we will see to it that you are not walking around in the morning.”