15 Appeals to the Near and Middle East

Implications of the Communications Studies Along the Soviet Periphery

Prepared for the Bureau of Applied Social Research

Columbia University

May, 1952

PREFACE

The Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research has recently completed an extensive research study on the general subject of communications behavior in the Near and Middle East. The results of this investigation have been presented to the Department of State in the following series of individual country reports, each giving attention to a particular aspect of the communications process:

“Greek Attitudes Toward the United States, Great Britain, U.S.S.R, and France”

“Radio Audiences in Greece”

“Mass Media in Greece”

“Information Monopolists in Rural Greece”

“Mass Communications Audiences in Turkey”

“The Radio Audiences of Lebanon”

“Communication and Public Opinion in Jordan”

“Climates of Opinion in Egypt”

“Syrian Attitudes Toward America and Russia”

“Partisanship and Communications Behavior in Iran”

“Political Extremism in Iran”

In addition, a special report comparing the communications behavior and political attitudes of different social groups of the four Arab countries studied (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt) has been prepared. It is called, “Communications Behavior and Political Attitudes in Four Arabic Countries.” The present report, which is the last of the series, represents an attempt to bring together and codify those implications of the entire study which seem most directly relevant for the International Information Administration’s program in the Near and Middle East. The recommendations which are made grow out of our experience in collecting, organizing, and analyzing the research data, they should be interpreted in the light of the manifold factors which must be considered in the formulation of policy.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION————— 277

I. MASS MEDIA AND POPULATIONS————— 279

A. THE COMMUNICATIONS SITUATION————— 279

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LOWER STRATA OF POPULATION————— 281

C. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF THE MEDIA————— 283

II. SIGNIFICANT APPEALS————— 288

A. SUGGESTIONS BEARING ON AUDIENCE DISPOSITIONS————— 288

1. Resentments and inferiority feelings————— 288

2. Distrust of U.S. political intentions————— 289

3. Oriental values————— 291

4. America as land of opportunity————— 294

B. SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING SEVERAL U. S. OBJECTIVES————— 295

1. Communism and Soviet Russia————— 295

2. Progress————— 298

3. UN and free-world solidarity————— 300

III. COMMUNICATING WITH THE ARABS————— 302

A. ABOUT REGIONAL DIFFERENCES————— 302

B. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF EGYPT————— 303

C. POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION ————— 305

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The studies of communications behavior along the Soviet periphery, conducted by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, carry many implications which might be of interest to the International Information Administration (IIA). Some of these implications are stated explicitly, while others still lie dormant in the material.

The report is intended

1.    to assemble the former and bring out the latter;

2.    to detail and supplement all of them in the interest of their usefulness for IIA.

This means that the report presents a body of proposals for the implementation of U.S. objectives: the fight against Communism and Soviet expansionism; collective security; the strengthening of the U.N. More likely than not many suggestions will only confirm what is already known and practiced.

METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

      1.  The communications studies—called “studies” in the report—are based on interviews gathered at different periods: field work in Greece and Turkey was done during the last months of 1950; in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt in the first half of 1951.

It is evident that the then existing local conditions bear on the content of the interviews as well as the inferences drawn from them. Should conditions meanwhile have changed, all those inferences palpably affected by the changes would have to be reconsidered in the light of the current situation.

For instance, the recent admission to NATO of Greece and Turkey disposes of Turkish discontent with the failure of the Western powers to recognize Turkey’s strategic position (study of Turkey, p. 49). Also, rural Turkey is said now to receive many more radio sets than at the time of the interviews a new fact which calls for revision of what the interviews themselves suggest in this respect.

Wherever possible, changes of consequence are taken into account.

      2.  Different studies approach their common subject matter—communications behavior—from different angles; the consequence being that themes featured in one study are relegated to the background in others.

Attitudes toward Communism and Soviet Russia, one of the main topics of the Syria study play a negligible part in the studies of Turkey and Egypt. Nor are the various strata of population treated uniformly, light is shed now on the existing socio-economic groups (Egypt, Jordan), now on groupings defined by identical relations to the mass media (Greece Turkey the Lebanon) or identical political views (Syria); also, Greek, Turkish and Lebanese youth are in evidence, while little is said about young people in Egypt and Syria.

To be sure, this differential treatment has the great advantage of enabling the social scientist to tackle, one by one, the new problems he encounters in the field of’ international communications research. But its undeniable disadvantage is that it renders unifications and comparisons difficult. Fortunately, these difficulties are surmountable in some oases vital to the report. Due to a plethora of data, the variegated groups of population singled out or constructed in different places can be reduced to a common denominator. It would also seem justified to infer from the actual statements on young people as to the potential role of youth throughout the Middle East. (The study of Lebanon, for instance, speaks of the emancipatory aspirations “of women and young people, particularly young women, in a society where East meets West,” thus implying that these aspirations may not be confined to Lebanon alone. Page 53.)

PROCEDURE

The report is divided into three parts.

Part I centers around the basic proposition, implied in practically all studies, that special efforts should be made to reach the lower strata of population and the youth groups. Based on an appraisal of the whole communications situation, this proposition is broken down into a series of suggestions for the handling of the media along the Soviet periphery.

Part II deals with the content and the presentation of IIA communications, featuring such appeals as might best be suited to get these communications across in the Near and Middle East. Some of the suggestions offered bear on audience dispositions while others concern several U.S. objectives.

Part III develops the thesis that the Arabs should be approached in a different manner from the way in which the Greeks and the Turks are approached; then it concentrates on the problem of how to communicate with the better educated Arabs. Suggestions for a special treatment of the Egyptian elite are followed by an attempt to construct an appropriate line of political reasoning.

I. MASS MEDIA AND POPULATIONS

Recommendations for a purposeful handling of the mass media along the Soviet periphery must be based on an appraisal of the communications situation in that part of the world.

A. THE COMMUNICATIONS SITUATION

The studies reveal that in the whole territory the actual exposure to the mass media depends upon the educational level of the recipients which in turn correlates highly with their socio-economic status, otherwise expressed, different socio-economic groups of population can be expected to react to the mass media in different ways. Since demographic subtleties would only blur the picture, it may suffice to discriminate between the following three major groups which are more or less characteristic of all countries under consideration:

      1.  At the top there is the small group of the elite. It comprises government officials, the nobility, if any, big land owners and prosperous merchants, army officers, religious dignitaries, the cream of the professionals, and students. On an average, these people are well-educated and well-off, if not wealthy; they aggregate in the towns; and many of them show strong affinities for the West. The type of westernized intellectual is found exclusively in the elite. He commands one or two foreign languages, has traveled widely, end cannot help admiring the West. Turkish state officials are recruited from young men who have studied abroad; well-to-do Egyptians are at home in the European capitals and spas. In the Arabic countries proper these “westerners” feel uneasy about the backwardness of their own peoples (Jordan study, p. 60) and the frequent conflict between their affinities for the West and their political convictions. Everywhere the elite are devotees of the mass media which they of all groups of population, are best in a position to patronize. Many listen regularly to foreign broadcasts, read newspapers as a matter of course, and make a habit of frequenting the movie houses. The intelligentsia manifests its cosmopolitan preferences by turning ·its back on the domestic radio stations and reveling in the riches of American magazines. In sum, the elite are familiar with the mass media and highly susceptible to the flow of international communications.

      2.  The broad masses at the bottom consist predominantly of peasants—either tenants of absentee landowners or small farmers subsisting on their own produce. There are, in addition, the nomads and semi-nomads, particularly frequent in Jordan, the service workers, the watchmen, and the groups of plain laborers and factory workers. Industrialization is only beginning; even in countries where unions are legalized the workers can hardly be said to form a strong and class-conscious vanguard, All the more it would seem justified to define these strata of population as submerged masses. They are illiterate, or at best near illiterate; their living standards range from poor to destitute. This in part accounts for their insufficient exposure to the mass media.

Print is inaccessible to them and how could they afford to buy radio sets? Things are rendered more difficult by an ingrained aversion, strongest in rural areas, to let the doubtful blessings of civilization interfere with age-old traditions. The Bedouins reject wholesale the infidels and their devilish inventions. And except perhaps for the Egyptian farmers, the peasants everywhere accept radio, if at all, only to the extent to which it confirms their outlook on life. As illustrated by the studies of Turkey and Greece, they are indifferent to the movies or even condemn them for being a source of sinful temptations. All in all, the communications habits of these submerged strata are still underdeveloped. Messages from the world at large pass above their heads.

However, this applies primarily to the older farmers, laborers or workers. Their progeny feels a natural urge for evading the strictures of tradition and custom. Many young people actually yield to the attractions of modern life. The movies cast a spell over them which stirs their elders to impassioned or elegiac complaints about the destructive forces of the Western world. In rural Greece, for instance, the difference in film attendance between the generations is very striking indeed. It is inevitable that parental authority should often clash with youthful determination to enjoy the forbidden fruits; the study of Turkey goes so far as to speak of a “conflict between generations engendered by movies in Turkey, as in other Middle Eastern countries” (p. 96). Yet there is some evidence that the traditional inhibitions and scruples of the old are slowly losing ground. Ever more young people of the depressed classes learn to read and write, thus gaining an unassailable prestige in districts marked by illiteracy. A typical case is the Greek farmer whose 12-year-old son plods through the newspaper for him (study of Greece, no. 4, p. 13). The discharged Turkish conscripts return to their villages as pillars of grammar-school wisdom. In Lebanon the poor farm villagers rely on their trained offspring for worldly information. The young educated peasant there is a mobile type who, during his stays in town, goes to the movies or lingers in a coffee house listening to the radio. His influence as a news carrier cannot be overestimated (study of Lebanon, pp. 131–46).

      3.  The contrast between the urban elite and the rural masses would even be more outspoken were it not for a variety of groups which somehow fill the vacuum in between. These middle strata, as they may be called, include such different occupations as taxi drivers, smaller shopkeepers and merchants, coffee house owners, government clerks, white-collar workers, technicians, teachers in primary schools, etc., It is a sort of middle class, with a considerable amount of petty bourgeoisie close to the submerged populations; but of course, transitions to the elite are fluid. Also, except for near illiteracy within the low reaches, the educational standards range from elementary school to high school level; living conditions vary between modest and better off. More urban than rural, these strata occupy a middle position with regard to their communications habits. Even though they go beyond the peasantry in availing themselves regularly of the mass media, yet they do not explore them in the manner of the elite because their whole outlook is localized and tradition-bound. Whether in coffee houses or at home, they prefer domestic radio stations to foreign stations and are mainly interested in news which bears on their immediate concerns or strictly national issues. The middle groups tend to keep aloof from international communications.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LOWER STRATA OF POPULATION

Practically all studies point to the possibility of improving the communications habits of those still unfamiliar with the mass media or not yet fully attuned to them. Greek villagers would like to learn about events abroad; the radio owners among Lebanese middle-class people can be defined as potential foreign listeners (study of Lebanon, p. 66); and even the Bedouins are not entirely allergic to news from the outside world with its “effeminate” cities. Such facts and symptoms give rise to the proposition, advanced or implied in several studies, that long-range attempts should be made to reach not only the better educated but the lower strata of population as well—strata which, roughly speaking, extend from the petty bourgeoisie down to the bottom. This basic proposition involves all media of communication. Diverse International Information Administration activities seem actually designed to substantiate it: special press features oater to the needs of worker groups; documentary films are shown in rural areas, etc. Yet it might be desirable to broaden and intensify these activities for the following reasons, all of which corroborate the basic proposition:

    1.  The poverty-stricken masses along the Soviet periphery seem to gain in political consciousness. Rural Turkey is on the move since the 1950 elections; the Lebanese villagers, it appears, are at a stage of transition; the discontented Egyptian farmers are undoubtedly aware of’ the need for economic and social reforms. It is as if inertia were slowly receding. In the Arabic world this desire for change at the bottom, which inevitably affects the urban middle strata, is fostered by unsettled refugees from Palestine, to be sure nationalist passions may prolong the dozing, but their drugging effect is bound to wear off. In short, broad Middle East populations are about to enter into the political arena. And since an opinion vacuum is as dangerous as a power vacuum, their appearance on the scene alone would account for the necessity of establishing contacts with them.

    2.  Such early contacts are especially needed to immunize the masses against the potential impact of Communist propaganda. One might object here that in both rural and urban Greece precisely the less educated nurture the strongest anti-Russian sentiments and that among the submerged classes in Syria protestations of indifference to Communist (and American) influences are fairly frequent. It is also true that Arabic religiosity puts a strain on those inclined to favor Moscow’s foreign policy. Yet all this does not preclude the possibility that in times of crisis the very populations which now are anti-Communist or just apathetic will succumb to Communist insinuations from without and within. And it is always advisable to try to mold a mind as long as it is still malleable.

    3.  Free-world solidarity requires good will on grass-roots level. This more than anything else makes for a sustained effort to reach the depressed and less educated. To leave them to themselves would mean not only to increase the threat of Communism but to abandon the ideas that have shaped the U.N.

A ferment of change, the youth of the lower strata represents one of the most important links between these strata and the West. Appeals to young people are therefore indispensable for an implementation of the basic proposition. Without such appeals communications for the bottom layers of’ Middle East societies might easily fall flat.

And what does the basic proposition imply for the handling of the mass media?

C. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF THE MEDIA

ALL MEDIA

The studies show that people of the lower strata, both rural and urban, are particularly eager for communications which bear on local topics and, for the rest, conform to their traditional style of life. The scope of their interests and experiences is limited, this also means that they are not conditioned to grasp information about remote or abstract subjects, such as international meetings and the like, conveyed to them in highly technical terms. Embedded in their environment, they are averse to breaking away from it mentally and linguistically. The farmer in Jordan, lucky enough to possess a radio, elicits from it only things familiar (study of Jordan, p. 33); the traditional Turk would find it difficult to generalize the circumstances responsible for his personal situation (study of Turkey, p. 18).

Suggestions

Messages to these people should be selected and phrased accordingly. Whenever international issues or themes of a more abstract nature are discussed, it is helpful to focus on what they may mean to a Greek farmer or Syrian taxi driver. The language must be concrete and in keeping with local custom. All this is a matter of course, mentioned only in a systematic interest. It is understood that the adjustments to audience mentality are supposed to work two ways, they should penetrate the peasant mind and at the same time free it from its narrow confines. The whole is a dialectic process requiring much discernment on the part of the communicator. Insufficiently adjusted messages will hardly affect the farmers or laborers, while overadjusted messages will leave them unchanged.

Since less educated people are suspicious of anything foreign, they can be expected to assimilate communications of a domestic origin more readily than appeals from plainly outlandish sources. In the Arabic world news from Egypt has a homely ring. A good way of approaching these people therefore is the use of local channels authorized to pass off foreign communications as domestic products. The material need not even be “planted,” but may be prepared by a local agency with American backing. Such “gray” propaganda techniques greatly facilitate the task of getting in touch with the lower strata.

RADIO

PRELIMINARY REMARK: One of the reasons, if a minor one, why interviewees in Jordan and Lebanon prefer the BBC to the Voice of America is the greater signal strength of the British broadcasts. This argument points up the need for better VOICE transmissions to the Middle East.

      1.  The studies of Greece, Turkey, and Lebanon refer explicitly to the scarcity of radio receivers in rural areas.

Suggestions would be misplaced, for efforts are being made to fill the gap. For instance, in Turkey things have reportedly taken a turn for the better since the time at which the Turkey data have been gathered (see Introduction, Methodological Questions, no. 1, pp. 1–2).

      2.  The VOA is not yet popular in the Middle East, especially in the Arabic countries it ranges, along with the Moscow Radio, among the least known foreign senders, lagging far behind the BBC or 1 say, the Cairo station in this respect (see studies of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan). The reasons must be traced to its poor transmission and the fact that it is a newcomer there.

Suggestions

Pictorial newspaper ads, leaflets, and announcements on local radio stations currently serve to increase the awareness of VOICE broadcasts. In the interest of broader publicity, it would seem advisable to produce a documentary film about the VOA, vividly illustrating its effects on ordinary people everywhere, such a film might tell rural audiences the story of the VOICE in terms familiar to them and tell it with an intensity unattainable in other media.

      3.  For obvious reasons public listening is widespread among the lower strata. Greek and Turkish) villagers assemble around a community receiver or frequent the home of some isolated radio owner, usually a person of standing who may or may not admit everyone. And, of course, there is throughout the Middle East the institution of the coffee houses where those with time on their hands cannot help lending an ear to the radio. Most studies emphasize the importance of both rural and urban coffee houses as places of listening for the populations at large.

Yet these opportunities are far from being all inclusive. The coffee house is a male affair; many laborers or poor farmers may have to work when the radio is playing or people are just too tired to listen in. All this makes for the spread of information through word of mouth. Listeners relate the news to their families, friends, and neighbors, who in turn pass it on, until it lands somewhere in a shepherd’s hut or a desert tent. In the whole area word of mouth is a vital means of communication.

This situation breeds dangers. Public listening compares unfavorably with private listening in that it lessens the attention (study of Greece, no. 2, pp. 10–19). Coffee houses are noisy; the obtrusive presence of crowds interferes with mental concentration. But even assuming that the news is fully digested, it will nevertheless be increasingly distorted in the course of its wanderings from mouth to mouth. Grapevine rumors color the news that has launched them with the fears and hopes of their carriers.

Suggestions

Indistinct or diffuse communications are bound to increase these dangers. Accordingly, VOICE messages to the lower strata should aspire to extreme plasticity so that their salient points can be absorbed and rendered without essential changes, a striking image condensing an otherwise abstract text will stand out long in the memory and thus help preserve the substance of that text. Perhaps it is also for mnemotechnic reasons that the Oriental mind likes to give and receive information in the form of tales, episodes, and anecdotes. Much may be learned in this respect from the Arabic story teller who knows how to drive home the gist of what he is telling in the markets.

PRINT

Among the Arabic lower strata word-of-mouth communications traceable to radio listening seem to prevail slightly over those originating with newspaper consumption; in Greece and Turkey the reverse holds true—no matter, for the rest, whether people do read or are merely read to. Yet such differences are negligible within this context, Since the trend to fight illiteracy, particularly strong in the last two countries, is in the long run irresistible, printed material for the less educated will gain momentum everywhere.

Suggestions

Like radio messages, printed communications to these strata should possess a plastic quality. Photos, cartoons, and picture books are of course indispensable, but they will serve the purpose only if selected with an eye to the recipient’s capacity of assimilating them. This refers to their content as well as their quantity; the pictorial deluge flooding certain western magazines will not do. It might prove worthwhile to gather some information about the average responses of Middle East farmers to visual aids. Considering the role young people of the lower strata are playing, special efforts to supply these shook troops of literacy with adequate visuals and reading fodder would certainly pay.

FILM

The lower strata are exposed to the movies less than to radio and newspaper material. Many are too poor to pay the admission fee; and there is, even more important, a woeful lack of opportunities. At the time of the interviews, Turkey had only 275 movie houses, with, in addition, a scanty total of 6 mobile film units to cover its rural areas; and three quarters of the rural Greek interviewees said they had never attended a screening.

Cultural and religious prejudices, mentioned in earlier contexts, seem to hamper any changes in this situation. The prejudices are sustained by feature films rather than documentaries. In fact, only 56% of the moviegoing Greek interviewees remember having seen a documentary film and only a quarter of the workers and farmers in Egypt are acquainted with foreign products in this vein. (But are not most documentaries of western origin?) In terms of distribution Hollywood pictures are everywhere in the lead. And as the studies of Greece illustrate, it is precisely they which arouse serious opposition, thus keeping alive the existing bias against the medium. Older Greeks of all walks of life worry greatly about the corrupting influence which they believe Hollywood films with their small regard for traditions, their many scenes of violence and their shallow lavishness exert on the young generation. Significantly, the less educated in Greece feel most attracted to them while the better educated prefer British movies because of their cultural appeals and, morally relevant plots.

It looks as if the situation were not yet ripe for a systematic use of cinematic communications. Or rather, things would look this way were it not for several circumstances which alter the picture. The fact that young people of lower education patronize the movie houses decidedly invites an approach to them by way of films. In addition, the resistance of the older generation to the medium might yield to mild acceptance, once this age group is made to realize that not all screen spectacles indulge in frivolous entertainment; Turkish villagers are said to appreciate documentary showings. The situation is actually in flux. And since processes of this kind are irreversible, it would hardly be justified to leave the immense propaganda value of films unexplored.

Suggestions

      1.  Whatever is done to increase opportunities in rural areas will help overcome ingrained prejudices. Mobile film units are mental tractors conquering virgin territory.

      2.  A study or the impact of Hollywood films on populations in critical areas is long since due. This study would have to analyze all factors responsible for the selection of the films, to appraise typical audience reactions to them, and to discuss the implications of its findings.

      3.  Experience shows that people not yet adjusted to the cinema are unable to follow the events on the screen. Cinematic language is still unfamiliar to them. They may neglect the narrative proper in an unimportant incident reminiscent of their everyday life; and they may be utterly confused by flashbacks, closeups and transitions which an ordinary moviegoer takes in his stride. The treatment of documentaries for novices in the medium poses problems which should be studied carefully. To mention only one of them, documentaries will not yield all the effects of which films are capable if those in charge of production rely mainly on verbal communications to make themselves understood. What counts in a film is its pictorial communications. It is they rather than the spoken words which affect the spectator’s unconscious and thus subtly sensitize him to the championed cause. Grierson who considers documentary film a godsend for propaganda messages once said that “in documentary you do not shoot with your head but also with your stomach muscles.” And when asked whether in his opinion the illiterate peasants in India might profit by films popularizing reforms, Pudovkin used surprisingly similar terms: because it teaches “The film is the greatest not only through the brain but through the whole body.” To reach and teach the submerged populations in the Middle East the film maker must subordinate the commentator’s voice to such camera revelations as they are ready to grasp.

      4.  Much as good documentaries challenge the spectator to participate in them emotionally, they involve his total personality to a lesser extent than humanly absorbing feature film. Perhaps the most effective Russian and Nazi propaganda films are dramas centering around an individual conflict—films imbuing the spectator’s whole being with the messages entrusted to them. Feature films, then, might call forth responses of an intensity which films of fact are unlikely to generate. This is a weighty argument in favor of their utilization. There is fortunately no lack of suggestive Hollywood pictures apt to strike a sympathetic chord in traditional Turks or Lebanese farmers; a few random titles will be named later. It would seem highly desirable to incorporate such pictures into the film programs for the lower strata.

II. SIGNIFICANT APPEALS

PRELIMINARY REMARK: ILA communications serve to implement U.S. objectives. To carry out their task, they must be adjusted to the mentality of the peoples or the groups of peoples they try to reach. What kinds of appeals are best suited to get them across in the Near and Middle East? The studies yield a number of pertinent suggestions.

Some of them bear on audience dispositions in these areas, while others concern several U.S. objectives of interest.

A. SUGGESTIONS BEARING ON AUDIENCE DISPOSITIONS

1. RESENTMENTS AND INFERIORITY FEELINGS

In all countries under consideration the elite and the better educated middle strata resent anything which strikes them as Western overbearance. Greek professionals are displeased with American interference in Greek domestic affairs and the “patronizing” attitude of American advisers on the spot. Before Turkey’s admission to NATO college-trained Turks who showed strong sympathies for America nevertheless reproached the U.S. with neglecting Turkey politically and economically. In their touchiness these people sometimes suspect insolence where there is actually none. A Greek law student blames the VOA for callously elaborating upon UNESCO’s intellectual activities while so many Greeks are starving (study of Greece, no. 2, p. 36). Throughout the Arabic territory the elite suffer from feelings of humiliation. Egyptian interviewees of this group are firmly convinced that the British and the Americans look down on them—the former because of their all-pervasive snobbishness the latter because of their equally snobbish bias against those of dark skin. Since the Egyptian elite are fully aware of their cultural leadership in the Moslem world, they may be particularly sensitive to symptoms of Western arrogance, real or imagined.

Suggestions

Several interviewees reveal, without intending it, how the problem of dissolving this inferiority complex can best be tackled. Two less educated Turks are very proud of America’s respect for Turkish bravery in Korea (study of Turkey, pp. 50–51). And an Egyptian respondent states that “British troops never respected us or considered our feelings during the war” (study of Egypt, p. 12). These answers dovetail to perfection for they manifest both overt pride in respect and unavowed yearning for respect. Accordingly, all communications in radio and print should be imbued with respect for those on the receiving end. Besides being desirable humanly, such an attitude is a major political requirement; were it lacking, free-world cooperation would hardly ever materialize. In the case of the better educated Middle East populations an effort to increase their self-confidence suggests itself. Greater self-confidence disposes of inflated resentment. Perhaps they will be more poised psychologically if they are made to feel that Americans do justice to their difficult in-between position.

2. DISTRUST OF U.S. POLITICAL INTENTIONS

Suspicions as to the motives behind U.S. communications, especially VOA broadcasts, are articulate among the elite and the better educated middle groups without being confined to them however. For instance, an unemployed Greek clerk holds that for all her friendliness America tries to convert Greece into a military base on the Balkans, and of course not solely in the interest of Greece (study of Greece, no. 1, p. 82). Similarly, literate Turks on all educational levels believe VOICE messages to be motivated by America’s own personal advantage. “I don’t think that they do it just to please us,” says a manufacturer (study of Turkey, p. 63). In the Arabic countries there is a tendency among professionals to differentiate between the VOICE and the BBC; the former is often considered a propaganda instrument, while even in anti-British circles the latter is credited with being impartial and reliable. For the rest, the Arabic elite mistrust not only Great Britain as a matter of course, but drop hints that in their opinion the U.S. is also plotting and scheming. The Egyptians go furthest in this respect, some of them being convinced that American advertising skills pervade all manifestations of American politics. Many an Egyptian professional accuses the U.S. of imperialism and accordingly identifies American aid as a means of bribing poor but honest nations so that they will be softened up for American business penetration. As a physician puts it: “The United States is trying to control the whole world by her dollars” (study of Egypt, p. 82).

Suggestions

Since these suspicions are particularly strong among the better educated, VOICE broadcasts to them and printed communications should avoid concealing legitimate American self-interest behind protestations of friendship and the like. To be sure, any communicator will be prone to elaborate exclusively on feelings of friendship in cases in which friendship itself is a declared political aim; yet the evidence shows that he would be ill-advised if he did not also point out that the friendship he is talking about is actually a fusion of altruistic and egoistic motives. One shade too much of altruism, and audience suspicions of its material advantages for the other party are bound to soar. Frankness is good policy in communicating with these easily vulnerable people. It implies respect for their intelligence and thus helps remove the psychological causes of their distrust.

Reliability is no less important than frankness—in fact, frankness is one of the aspects of reliability. People of all walks of life prefer the BBC to the VOA for a variety of reasons; when asked to indicate them they frequently refer to their impression, mentioned above, that the British news reports are least tainted by propaganda, A comparative study of the two broadcasting systems would be highly desirable; it might bring out those qualities of the BBC which sustain its unrivaled prestige in the Middle East.1 Meanwhile one is safe in assuming that listeners there consider reliability a main virtue of foreign broadcasts. How does the BBC manage to convey the impression of it? The interviews reveal at least one of the procedures. A Turkish merchant says of the BBC “They are not trying to shape the facts so that news favors their side. They always give you both sides of the argument” (study of Turkey, p. XXIV). And several Egyptians agree that their trust in the BBC is based on the fact that it also broadcasts news unfavorable to Britain (study of Egypt, pp. 77–78). Middle-Eastern listeners, it appears, want to form their own opinion in full freedom and are therefore loath to have it predigested for them—an insistence on independent judgment which may well serve as a compensation for their dependence upon foreign powers in real life. The implication is that VOICE messages to these audiences should manifest the same detachment which seems to radiate from British broadcasts. An occasional bit of news which admits an American drawback or acknowledges a success on the other side of the fence will do a great deal of good. Perhaps the best propaganda in these areas is to seem to make none.

3. ORIENTAL VALUES

Practically all strata of population are imbued with a mentality which for lack of another expression may be called Oriental—a compound of traits and attitudes palpably at variance with Western values and preferences. Even the elite cannot completely rid themselves of it, in spite of their aversion to Koran readings and their affinity for a more modern style of life. Well-educated Greeks voice concern with their cultural heritage. Part of the Egyptian professionals feel strongly about their religion. Of special interest is the case of the Judge of Islamic Legislation in Jordan who is said to be representative of an important minority. He is aware of being at the crossroads; his sense of moral obligation determines him to be open-minded about the West, but his emotional and spiritual allegiances draw him irresistibly back to the fold of tradition (study of Jordan, pp. 85–86).

Within these contexts it will suffice to mention only two groups of typically Oriental notions, one relating to the meaning of human existence, the other to the feasibility of social change. Greek interviewees are very outspoken in what they believe to be humanly significant. Their ideas show in the opinions they form about the American way of life. Many Greeks who sympathize with the American people praise not only its generosity and kindness but declare themselves greatly impressed by its practical sense and enormous “drive”—qualities which inspire admiration rather than love and may be found also in less cultured peoples. There is in effect no indication that those favorable to America would acknowledge her as a wellspring of cultural achievements. Rather, a strong minority of Greek interviewees object to America’s lack of culture. Especially the better educated feel this way although it is understood that their criticism does not interfere with their appreciation of American aid. The critics characterize Americans as money-seeking, callous, and indifferent creatures and are fairly convinced that the American “drive” is nothing but a meaningless bustle resulting in complete standardization and mechanization. Such frenetic activity, it seems to them, contradicts everything they themselves value highest—sentiment, spontaneity, leisure. And this leads to the Oriental concept of time. A student argues that he would not like to live in America because ‘‘there is too much rush and hurry.… for me.” And a teacher says, “I like to waste time once in a while and I like to live on a slowed down Eastern European rhythm” (study of Greece, no. 1, p. 53). All Middle-Eastern peoples live in a time which cannot be counted by minutes and hours. Leisure is vital for them. Their meditations resemble the involved patterns of their carpet weavers.

The other group of Oriental notions centers around the belief that man is not primarily called upon to change his social environment; spiritual preoccupations may overshadow his concern with poverty and injustice. This belief which breeds fatalism in worldly affairs extends beyond the Moslem world, its native soil. Better educated Greek interviewees said to represent a strong minority, manifest their disgust at government corruption by simply shunning the radio news which they say overflows with empty promises; it does not seem to occur to them that they might do something about the corruption (study of Greece, no. 2, pp. 29–30). Turkey is in a state of transition accelerated by the 1950 elections; the Turkish elite embark on social and educational reforms with a zeal which on the surface is about the opposite of fatalism. On the surface—for their infatuation with progress and modern life is too pronounced to affect one as entirely genuine. A middle-aged tobacco executive is quoted as saying that he would not like to live in Britain or America because these countries are not modern enough” (study of Turkey, p. XX). Such excessive opinions point to the possibility that the radicalism of modern Turks grows out of their fear, conscious or not, of being again overpowered by the paralyzing influences in their blood. It is true that many Turks of the lower strata develop a certain restlessness, but their progressive ambitions are timid rather than exacting. And the rural masses still believe themselves to be irrelevant politically. The average Turkish villager questions the propriety of taking interest in public affairs and cannot even imagine that he himself should have to decide upon improvements or changes. The same reluctance to intervene in the social processes pervades the Arabic countries proper. If in Lebanon the farmers are slightly more eager for reforms than elsewhere this may be laid to the strong Christian element which functions as a tonic. The study of Egypt dwells on the impotence of Egyptian nationalism, deriving it from both political and psychological factors; among the latter, fatalistic dispositions may well play an important role.

Suggestions

What many Greeks, but not Greeks alone, imagine to be American reality—frenetic commotion for no purpose other than money-grabbing—bears actually little resemblance to it. And of course, radio talks to all strata of population should try, as they presumably do, to revise this picture by emphasizing, say, America’s modified capitalism and various slow-pace areas in American life. Yet Oriental criticism goes further and deeper; it culminates in the conviction that Americans lack culture. Arabic professionals speak of the alleged mistakes of U.S. foreign policy with a condescension which implies that not too much should be expected of people who have no sense of spiritual values and intricate contexts. The problem of how to refute such opinions is well-nigh insoluble. Any attempt on the part of the communicator to inform Oriental audiences of America’s cultural possessions and endeavors will make them think he is talking or writing about commercialized culture, this counterfeit of the genuine thing. For if they know anything they know that culture is a mode of existence not a commodity which can be advertised. Sales talks about cultural accomplishments are a sure means of convincing the critics that their verdict is justified. The same Greeks who complained about the uncultured conduct of Americans ware favorably impressed by this country’s decision to take up arms against the Korean aggressor. America’s readiness to fulfill her promises is an invaluable in their eyes. It is also an asset which does not lose significance for being communicated. All of which tends to suggest that it might be wisest to feature in messages to the Middle East such merits as are demonstrable and let culture speak for itself. True culture has a way of radiating silently. In view of the little radio time and the fact that criticism mainly originates with the better educated, printed statements on values are preferable to verbal messages, they also permit the communicator to meander, unhurried through the world of meanings.

The dire necessity of social changes in the Middle East calls for a long-range campaign against the existing fatalistic tendencies. These are rooted in psychological depths inaccessible to direct appeals. Nevertheless, to penetrate them such a campaign would have to work by indirection. Examples of active self-help are most likely to touch off mimetic processes in the audience—provided of course they do not seem to impart a moral. Also, they should present success through action on so modest a scale that they cannot possibly be mistaken for, and rejected as, illustrations of American drive. Anecdotes and biographical sketches in this vein which captivate the reader’s or radio listener’s imagination may stimulate him to ward off spells of inertia. Because of their impact on the unconscious films are particularly fit to affect established behavior patterns. Take Buster Keaton’s The Navigator or one of the better Harold Lloyd comedies: it is quite possible that the hilarious resourcefulness of their heroes acts as an antidote against Oriental passivity. These films are understood by everyone and they have the additional advantage of illustrating American awareness of the dangers inherent in mechanization. The better educated in the Middle East are prone to voice suspicions of government corruption, politics and politicians, but their distrust, certainly well-founded in many cases, remains just a grumbling of no consequence. It might prove worthwhile to acquaint these more sophisticated audiences with films like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington and Born Yesterday which feature American initiative in fighting political abuses. There is at least a slim chance that such films. along with similar communications in radio and print, will canalize energies which otherwise disintegrate without leaving a trace.

4. AMERICA AS LAND OF OPPORTUNIT Y

It is true that people of all classes admire and love America as a country where the dream of human freedom seems to have materialized; and it is equally true that the Egyptian elite feels attracted to the West for cultural reasons. But the studies make it unmistakably clear that the lower strata are fascinated mainly by the glittering material advantages which they believe America offers people like them; the America they care about is a land of wealth and opportunity where jobs and riches can be had for the asking. A poor Greek maid servant says, “Living conditions are better there. They have refrigerators, washing machines.…” A Greek customs agent who spent a short time in the States holds that “there are limitless opportunities for everybody in all fields” (study of Greece, no. 1, p. 50). A Turkish manufacturer chimes in “I would like to live in the United States.… anybody who works enough can make a decent life for himself” (study of Turkey, p. 51). Even the proud nomads are not entirely immune against dreams of what money can buy in countries tainted by Jews; a rich Bedouin in Jordan concedes that he might be willing to settle down in America ‘‘Because they are rich. If I go there I can open a ranch and keep thousands of sheep and horses” (study of Jordan, p. 16). Lebanese interviewees of the middle strata. express their crude materialism with disarming candor. “I can become rich in America,” volunteers an officer in the government. And a chauffeur is pleasantly tickled by this very prospect “I hear people who go to America become rich.… I hope I can go there” (study of Lebanon, pp. 77–78). To Egyptian white-collar employees America is alluring because of its job opportunities. An Egyptian worker elaborating on the theme falls into outright daydreaming: “I heard that the workers are well paid there and they can lead a good life like big employees in Egypt” (study of Egypt, p. 197). It should be added that this picture of America which to all appearances is firmly established everywhere owes much of its glamor to letters from relatives and compatriots who either have been a success in America or do not want to admit their failure there.

Suggestions

The situation is somewhat embarrassing. Unequivocal support of these self-centered notions would not only reflect on U.S. ideology but run the risk of producing boomerang effects in the form of resentments against American opulence. Greek objections to the lavishness of Hollywood films reveal a sense of frustration. On the other hand it cannot be denied that emotional attachments to the U.S. profit greatly by the image of America as a terrestrial paradise where kin of the Lebanese chauffeur or the Egyptian worker pursue happiness in cars of their own. The communicator is faced with a dilemma: should he feature the material aspects of American life or had he better suppress them? A practicable method of overcoming this difficulty is applied in VOICE broadcasts; they mention opportunity, but do not mention it for its own sake, References to it are frequently interwoven with comparisons between America and Russia or hints of America’s free-world activities, thus challenging the listener to forget his egocentric views in meditations of a more ideological nature. It should be possible to kill two birds with one stone by systematically combining the theme of opportunity with the motif of self-help. Even though most interviewees assume that work is prerequisite to wealth in America also, they nevertheless seem secretly convinced that wealth is one’s share there, anyway—a miracle ingratiating itself with the Oriental mind. Emphasis on the fact that in America material success is the result of strenuous efforts and unrelenting initiative may make these people realize that self-help is indispensable for prosperity everywhere.

B. SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING SEVERAL U.S. OBJECTIVES

1. COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIA

The populations along the Soviet periphery have only the vaguest notions of Russia. There are no immigrants to Iron Curtain countries who would write letters home; nor is the flow of Soviet communications comparable to that of Western communications. ln both Greece and Turkey numerous interviewees of all classes protest their ignorance of Russia or declare they have no opinions on the subject, whereby it is understood that some of these noncommittal answers may be inspired by the fear of revealing Communist affiliations. Much the same holds true in the Arabic countries. Many a professional there complains that he has to base his views of Russia on conflicting or distorted information. Among the less educated with their predominantly domestic concerns even such knowledge as comes from foreign broadcasts is absent. Lower-middle-class people in Jordan insist that Russia is a complete mystery to them and even those scattered Lebanese interviewees who admit sympathies for Russia are either unaware of Moscow’s Arabic radio program or cannot afford the luxury of a radio. This lack of contact with what is going on behind the Iron Curtain produces the phenomenon of “psychological distance:” nearby Russia is felt to be far away while America beyond the seven seas seems to lie just around the corner (see study of Lebanon, p. 111). In Syria, where living conditions continue to be primitive, information about Russia is spread by word of mouth; its source is obviously the domestic Communist Party which has a certain following among Armenians, Orthodox Christians and Kurds. If this “internal” propaganda does not succeed in luring the submerged classes out of their indifference, it nevertheless promotes pro-Russian sentiments in diverse other quarters. It is a rumor propaganda which has the undeniable advantage of being disseminated by friends or acquaintances and supplying wishful thinking with appropriate food. On the other hand, people can never be sure of its truth; and the doubts they presumably nurture will be increased by rumors from the opposite direction. Be this as it may, the fact that Russia now tries to reach the Arabic countries through the conventional radio channels may well indicate that it does not place too much trust in the effectiveness of sheer hearsay information.

Suggestions

Since so little is known about Stalinism and Soviet Russia, communications in all media and for all strata of population should discuss these central themes with great caution so as to avoid stirring up curiosity where there is perhaps none. It would seem best not to give more information than the current situation requires. And in passing the information on, the communicator should always be aware that the Arabic elite especially are inclined to interpret anything he says against Russia as a propaganda maneuver designed to manipulate their minds. An Egyptian student holds that news from the West about Russia is mostly biased (study of Egypt, p. 69). A lawyer in Jordan declares: “American and British propaganda.… have depicted Russia as an aggressive country seeking to drive the whole world into a ruthless and exterminating war to serve its own interests and welfare.… Who do you think in the Arab world believes American or English propaganda?” (study of Jordan, p. 96). This ingrained distrust, pointed up already in earlier contexts calls for sobriety in references to Russia. Anti-Communist intelligence will not get across in the Arabic world unless it is well-authenticated and restrained rather than exuberant; the surest way of thwarting its effect is to revel in black-and-white contrasts. (Remark for the VOICE: The Howard Mayer commentaries, likely to be explosives in Satellite countries may prove duds in the Middle East).

All this is to say that information about Russia should be strictly adjusted to the opinions held of it. For instance, the Greeks have a strong sense of freedom. Recalling the Civil War, a shepherd says: “We are free.… we are ready to fight anyone for this. Russia tried to enslave us through her bandits” (study of Greece, no. 1, p. 31). These sentiments, strongest among the less educated in both rural and urban areas, induce many Greeks to conceive of Russia as the land of fear and oppression. Anti-Russian messages which play upon such apprehensions stand a good chance of striking home. Incidentally, since the Greeks still have to put up with a Communist underground, they may endorse propositions on Communism which the Arabs would most certainly discount as Western propaganda. In the Arabic countries positive and negative images of Russia intermingle on all educational levels—a muddle increased by the Egyptian elite’s readiness to view Russia with a friendly eye out of spite for Great Britain. (At the bottom of their hearts they presumably know that nothing could harm them more than an advance of Communism.) There is in various groups of population a tendency to praise Russian policy for its non-interference in Arabic domestic affairs; some middle-class interviewees in Jordan even toy with the idea of Russia as a possible ally. But these favorable comments also seem to be largely determined by the fact of Western interference in Palestine. More genuine is undoubtedly the belief, not infrequent among people of the lower strata, that Russia helps those in distress. As a credulous Lebanese village housewife puts it: ‘‘They give houses and money to the poor” (study of Lebanon, pp. 117–18).

For messages to the Arabs it is not enough to invalidate these opinions by pointing, for instance, to Russian expansionism (of which the elite in Jordan are quite aware) or to the rule of inequality in Iron Curtain countries rather, information about Russia will find response only if it succeeds in reinforcing the existing aversion to the Communist way of life. Hence the need for emphasizing such Russian characteristics as are incompatible with Oriental traditions and notions. The Arabs are individualists; this inspires information to the effect that Communism means a definite threat to their personal independence. Much more important, the Arabs are so deeply involved in religion that many of them dislike Russia for its anti-religious attitude. “They have no religion,” objects a Lebanese farmer (study of Lebanon, p. 118). Even those who argue in favor of Russia do not know how to reconcile their political preferences with their religious loyalties. They are under a strain. News about Russia should exploit their ambivalence. But in keeping the Moslem world posted on oases of religious persecution in Russia and the Satellite countries care must be taken to present these cases as a matter of political expediency rather than the outcome of ideological consequence. The Arabs might prove sensitive to Communist intolerance if they get the impression that it is a variant of their own fanaticism. Tolerance is a virtue of civilization which they are hardly in a position to appreciate at least for the time being.

Because of the Arabs’ gift for imagining propaganda traps, it is further advisable to proceed like the buyer in an antique shop who cunningly avoids manifesting a special interest in the object he covets. Statements which treat Russia in a casual way are likely to meet less resistance than the same statements made up as major revelations. In VOICE broadcasts such communications will immediately assume a more incidental character if they are tied up with, and subordinated to, positive incentives bearing on the West. For instance, information about agricultural collectives in Iron Curtain countries may emerge as an afterthought in a report on U.S. farmers. The VOICE actually takes advantage of this device.

Printed material should alert the Arabic elite to the game Moscow is playing and the risk they themselves are running in favoring the enemies of their “enemies.” The odds are that they will be least suspicious of matter-of-fact literature which aspires to a fair exposure of the conflicting views.—A good way of sustaining or arousing anti-Communist moods through documentary films is to insert in them such footage from Soviet films as is apt to impress Middle-Eastern audiences unfavorably. It would be difficult for any spectator to deny the authenticity of these self-portrayals. The method has been successfully used in the Nazi war documentaries and the American army morale films.

2. PROGRESS

The study of Syria, which deals mainly with political attitudes, reaches the conclusion that Russian influence is strongest among the minority of those rank-and-file Syrians who are intense and active psychologically. They may be found at the extreme left as well as the extreme right; and this implies that they are impressed not so much by the Russian brand of Communism as by the radicalism of Russian practice. What makes them look to Russia is her enormous drive—one more reason, by the way, for not playing up Communist intransigence in messages to Arabic audiences (see pp. 30–31). Conversely, it is the moderate, emotionally lass intense Syrians who show sympathies for America. The bulk of them belongs to the middle strata; they outweigh the pro-Russians numerically. Unlike the latter, these people prefer slow reforms to abrupt social changes. Theirs is a middle-class spirit; if they are progress-minded they are so in a conservative way. All this amounts to saying that in the eyes of the Syrians America is more or less representative of the status quo while Russia appears to them as the symbol, if not carrier, of revolutionary events, welcome or not. It lies in the interest of the energetic radical minority to deepen the image of the U.S. as a stabilizing power so that palpable social changes will be laid to Russian rather than American influence. But social changes are needed and bound to come.

Suggestions

The example of Syria indicates that many people in the Middle East tend to misinterpret America’s role in international affairs. Contrary to what they believe, America does not sustain the status quo but is actually the driving power behind efforts to improve conditions in all areas of economic distress and illiteracy, and that the U.S. refrains from interfering in Arabic politics certainly does not mean that it would side with absentee landowners against poor farmers. Since the existing tendencies to associate America with stagnation or reaction involve grave political dangers, it would be important indeed to try to check them. There is a real need for establishing in the minds an America which favors progress and initiates change.

Progress means different things to different strata of the population; among the better educated Greeks cases of apathy caused by disillusionment with politics are fairly frequent—a fact which makes one suspect that the political climate there does not precisely encourage progressive ardor (see study of Greece no. 2, pp. 29–30). In the Middle East proper the necessity for social reform is generally recognized but the upper strata feel ambivalent about it, except for Turkey where the leading circles seem genuinely progress-minded. The Arabic ruling class shies away from sacrifices, financial and otherwise; and the Arabic professionals have not yet developed a mature sense of social responsibility, this is illustrated by the Egyptian elite: they combine nationalist aspirations with a certain interest in economic questions, the result being that the concerns tend to weaken each other (study of Egypt, pp. 57–59). Communications for the upper strata should appeal to their instinct of self-preservation, that is, stress the argument that their chances of survival depend largely on their willingness to support and carry out measures in behalf of the submerged populations.

To the lower strata technical; economic and social progress is synonymous with higher standards of living. Their views of America reveal that they crave relief from their hardships but take it by and large for granted that any such relief is due to outside opportunities rather than efforts of their own. This is a further argument in favor of the earlier suggestion that messages to them should feature the theme of self-help (cf. pp. 23–24, 26). The established practice of referring in radio and print to labor union activities in America and elsewhere may help sensitize farmers, laborers or workers to the inexorable truth that nothing will change unless they join forces and put up a fight, yet something in them resists this truth. People of the lower strata are animated by the fear that the Western concept of progress entails a way of life which jeopardizes their most cherished traditions and beliefs, Religion and industry seem all but incompatible to them. Prodding is therefore not enough. Or rather, it will be more effective if it is supplemented by the proposition that progress need not destroy extant values, nothing is more important than to alleviate the fear of industrialization. The communicator may utilize examples from American everyday life which testify to a continued interpenetration of religious convictions and progressive endeavors. A pamphlet in simple language on this theme would seem desirable. The impact of modern technology on backward cultures is incomparably pictured in the late Flaherty’s full-length documentary, Louisiana Story. Flaherty was in love with these cultures. He believed them to be the last remnants of unspoiled human nature and he was deeply concerned with what would happen to them after their inevitable exposure to Western capitalism. Since his Louisiana Story holds out the promise of a reconciliation between man and machine, primitive attitudes and technological requirements, it should be shown throughout the Middle East. The film is located in the Bayou region, and its hero is a native youth who by and by comes to terms with a freshly imported oil derrick.

3. U. N. AND FREE-WORLD SOLIDARITY

Knowledge about the mechanics of the U.N. and the diverse agencies implementing the American aid program is found exclusively among the elite who keep track of international news. In the middle strata information of this kind is rare and foggy. And the poorly educated rural masses have only the faintest idea of where the radios or tractors they get come from. This state of things, documented by all studies, must be laid to the existing communications habits as well as the actual character of the communications themselves. Judging by a small sample of fairly recent VOICE broadcasts to Greece, Turkey, and the Arabic countries, radio information about, say, the World Health Organization or the Point Four Program seems as a rule to be couched in terms which transmit just the bare facts on a highly abstract level. It is true that the small amount of radio time and the obligation of completeness call for short outs, but it is equally true that even a trained listener will sometimes find it difficult to realize the practical consequences of negotiations, decisions end measures imparted to him in such a way.

Suggestions

Since collective security depends to a large extent on the morale of ordinary people, systematic efforts should be made to bring the message of free-world solidarity and America’s tremendous share in it down to the Greek shepherd and the Lebanese farmer. What counts is to explore the emotional appeal of this message so as to further the growth of allegiances which go beyond narrow nationalism. It is a task which demands that the communicator concretize international cooperation in all media. Nearly all studies insist that concreteness is a “must” for communications to the lower strata; and of course, the same applies to communications designed to involve the better educated emotionally. There is rarely a sample of VOICE programs that would not include colorless news items or an indifferent press survey, no doubt choice information is preferable to such mechanical completeness. Why not weed out the ballast and insert instead occasional talks which make the U. N. a living affair and the E.C.A. something people can really grasp? For instance, case histories which follow up a seemingly lofty decision of an international body from the council chambers to the beneficiaries of that decision in remote villages and suburbs will draw significant activities out of their anonymity and give the populations at large a sense of belonging. Incidentally, it would perhaps pay to test the appeal of Walt Whitman’s passion for the whole world; the Arabic VOICE programs seem to indulge so exclusively in Arabic poems and songs that even the Arabs might welcome a sample of “Leaves of Grass” for a change—not to speak of the less biased Greeks or Turks. Pertinent biographical material in radio and print is another means of enlivening abstract concepts and contexts. To be sure, films are regularly used to these ends; yet it must also be mentioned that many U. N. and E. C. A. documentary suffers from oververbalization, an unbearably extroverted commentator drowning all pictorial appeals that might get under the skin (cf. pp. 13–14). One of the best E. C. A. films is Adventure in Sardinia which pictures the fight against malaria.—To sum up, all communications in this line should imbue plain people but certainly not them alone, with the heart-warming feeling that free- world solidarity is a palpable reality affecting their everyday lives. Thus, pale notions of it may develop into deep-rooted beliefs which in turn may make that reality ever more real.

III. COMMUNICATING WITH THE ARABS

A. ABOUT REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

Indications that different countries require a different approach are already found in the preceding pages. Of enormous consequence in this respect is the following difference between the Arabs, on the one hand, and the Greeks and Turks, on the other. The latter two peoples are favorably disposed toward U.S. policy regarding their countries while the Arabic peoples, with the sole exception of Lebanon, are opposed to it.

In Greece the U. S. is very popular. Sympathies for America and the American people thrive in all strata of population, though not in all of them with the same intensity; the better educated criticize Americans for their lack of culture and their devotion to materialist values (cf. p. 20). Attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy are likewise positive, the sole difference between upper and lower strata being that the professionals endorse that policy with more reservations than, say, the farmers (cf. p. 15). Since U.S. firmness in Korea has influenced these attitudes in a favorable sense, the admission of Greece to N.A.T.O. is likely to work in the same direction. There is a definite correlation between the image the Greeks have formed of the American people and the attitude they entertain toward American policy. And this would justify the assumption that any change of the image provokes a similar change of attitude; that is, the communicator will all but automatically improve on the latter if he succeeds in deepening Greek attachments to the American people (study of Greece, no. 1, pp. 17–19).

A comparison between the studies of Greece and Turkey suggests that in Turkey pro-American attitudes are slightly more pronounced and slightly less qualified than in Greece. They are shared by a majority of interviewees on all educational levels. Only a small minority of Turks voices unfavorable opinions about America and the Americans, but even these critics are inclined to think of U.S. policy in positive terms —an attitude which, as in the case of the Greeks, has certainly been strengthened since Turkey’s incorporation into N. A. T. O. The prevailing political pro-Americanism, then, goes hand in hand with widespread sympathies for America, and exactly as in the case of Greece, one feels tempted to assume that an increase of these human sympathies will affect the political preferences accordingly. In both countries the parallelism of political and human loyalties lends itself to being exploited by U.S. communications.

Unlike the Greeks and Turks, most Arabs are hostile to U.S. foreign policy. The difference is complicated by the fact that many better educated Arabs—the only group to be considered here—show a split in their allegiances. This applies, for instance, to the scattered VOICE listeners among the Lebanese elite; all of them identify themselves with the American character or feel like cultivating existing bonds between themselves and the U. S., yet their pro-American sentiments do not prevent them from criticizing America’s behavior in world affairs (study of Lebanon, pp. 50–60). In Jordan the same conflict is experienced not only within the elite but by middle-class people as well (study of Jordan, pp. 68–71). Or take the few Egyptian professionals who are sufficiently well-balanced to acknowledge American generosity: in spite of this concession they indulge in the same political anti-Americanism which characterizes the rest of the Egyptian elite (study of Egypt, pp. 80–81). The facts available warrant the general statement that most of those better educated Arabs who manifest sympathies for Americans are nevertheless as opposed to U.S. foreign policy as Arabs lacking such sympathies—perhaps even more so because of their difficult psychological condition. Their inimical attitude toward America as a political power is at variance with their friendly image of America as a people. It is therefore doubtful whether attempts to increase Arabic affinity for the American way of life will by themselves alone suffice to reduce Arabic hostility to America’s political conduct.

In sum, messages fanning good will toward Americans are likely to benefit political pro-Americanism much more in Greece and Turkey than in the Arabic countries—always provided, of course, that political conditions do not change. For instance, in Greece as well as in Syria and Lebanon existing attachments to America were strengthened by personal contacts with relatives and compatriots who have settled down in the States. Documentary films about the Greek and Arabic element in America would certainly vivify these contacts for the native populations, but the Arabic films should not be expected to improve the Arabs’ political moods. The two country blocs must be treated differently. In communicating with the influential Arabic elite, adequate political reasoning is the thing that counts most.

B. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF EGYPT

To get political arguments across in the Moslem world, these arguments must strike home with the Egyptians because of Egypt’s leading role in that part of the world (cf. p. 16). To many Arabs Egypt is something like the promised land. Two Syrian interviewees praise it for its glamorous civilization, and a Lebanese housewife is awed by the high development of its artistic culture (study of Egypt, pp. 14–15). Political adversaries will be affected only by arguments which play upon their particular fears and hopes. Hence the necessity of adjusting relevant reasoning to the outlook of the Egyptian elite—especially in communications for use in Egypt. These people admire the West and are quite aware that their country depends upon Western know-how for years to come; at the same time, however, they suffer from the obsession that the West reciprocates their admiration with unbearable loftiness. And this disregard, real or not, offends them all the more since they feel it cheapens their exalted standing in the Middle East, thus reflecting on the whole Arabic cause. Even though the Egyptian elite do not believe the Americans to be as snobbish as the hated British, they nevertheless reproach them with being prejudiced against colored people (cf. p. 16). ‘‘Would my dark color be a handicap to me there?” asks an interviewee whose misgivings in this respect dampen his desire to live in the US” (study of Egypt, p. 13). The tribute a woman doctor pays to America’s economic and scientific standards adds to the bitterness of her criticism: “What I cannot understand about them is that they go on talking about human rights and they violate these rights by their marked attitude or hostility toward the colored in America—especially the Negroes” (ibid., p. 31). Under the impression of Western contempt many Egyptian professionals live in a state of frustration which accounts for their self-doubts and never-dying suspicions. This shows in their emotional instability. On the one hand, they are all aglow with Pan-Arabic aspirations on the other, they crave complete westernization— an urge which often inspires them to learn to speak English fluently, the unadulterated English the British are speaking, so as to convince the others and themselves that they actually match those who think they are superior to them (study of Egypt. pp. 21–23). It is inevitable that this wavering between extremes should lessen their will power. Their nationalism and their admiration of the West tend to neutralize each other (cf. pp. 22, 33).

SUGGESTIONS

As matters stand, the Egyptian elite will not be inclined to accept American reasoning unless the communicator succeeds in reducing their sense of frustration. What has been said in earlier contexts about the need for respectfulness (pp. 16, 18), applies in particular to this group. All messages reaching the better educated Egyptians should therefore imply that the U.S. acknowledges Egypt’s cultural leadership in the Middle East. Since Egypt enjoys prestige all over the Arabic world, little harm would be done if hints of this kind occasionally emerged in the Arabic VOICE programs. A good place for them is of course the re-broadcasts to Egypt via Salonika. Favorable reviews, if possible, of Egyptian achievements in the fields of art and science might help relieve wounded pride. There is also a change that historical talks about medieval Arabic culture and its influence on the West will do something for Egyptian self-confidence. Any communication which thus confirms the Egyptians as Arabs is useful, it cautions them, by indirection, against the danger of alienation inherent in excessive westernization. Most messages in this line should be entrusted to print rather than radio for three reasons. First—the familiar argument— VOICE broadcasts are limited in time and crowded with obligations; second, Egyptian professionals are to all appearances assiduous readers; and finally, not everything told them need be spread about. What they know about American race bias hurts them deeply. It would seem advisable to place extensive literature on the American Negro problem into their hands. This might flatter the Egyptian elite as a symptom of trust in their understanding and also inform them of various efforts to fight prejudice in the U.S. Perhaps the recent Hollywood films against anti-Negro bias will lend force to the pamphlets and books, though it should be added that they lag behind The Quiet One, a full-length documentary about a Negro boy, in seriousness of intention. Speaking of films, another Hollywood picture; Ruggles of Red Gap (1935), seems pre-destined to be shown to advanced Egyptian audiences. It is a comedy which confronts British caste spirit with American freedom, ridiculing, along with that spirit, the awe it inspires in rich Middle-Western “socialites.” Everything ends happily, for the English butler, this incarnation of snobbishness, turns out to be a jolly good fellow.

To say it once more, only in trying to remove the inferiority feelings of the Egyptian elite can the communicator hope to make these people who are so influential in the Arabic orbit more amenable to political argumentation.

C. POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION

Arabic hostility to American foreign policy is of recent date. Except for the pro-Russian extremists among the Syrian interviewees, most Arabs trace it to the odious fact that the U.S. championed the cause of the Jews in Palestine. (It should be noted in passing that Great Britain’s anti-Jewish policy in those days seems to have left a much weaker imprint on the Arabs.) A better educated Egyptian interviewee says: “All the nations of the East loved the Americans, but after that case (Palestine) they became in doubt of it” (study of Egypt, p. 30). And a clerk in Jordan declares that “the United States was very good before,” the emphasis being on “before” (study of Jordan, p. 68). The hostility, then, has a temporary rather than enduring character.

Not satisfied with harping upon America’s Palestine policy, many better educated Arabs condemn the U.S. for having developed into an imperialistic power, whereby it is not quite clear whether they also interpret that policy itself as an outcome of imperialism. Be this as it may, they invariably hold that America has taken a turn for the worse since Palestine. A Ministry of Education official in Jordan derives the growth of anti-American sentiments among the Arabs not so much from America’s partiality for the Jews as from her imperialistic drive (but the two trends may well be identical in his eyes): “The U.S.A., is becoming and working to be an imperialistic state and thus are losing the love and respect they had in the hearts of men” (study of Jordan, p. 99). A lawyer, also in Jordan has it that America’s behavior in world affairs is dictated exclusively by its own interests which, he feels, “are becoming more Imperialistic than those of Great Britain itself” (ibid.). And this leads straight to the suspicion, voiced by many an Egyptian intellectual, that the U.S. has evolved its whole aid program for the sole purpose of conquering the international markets (cf. p. 17).

In spite of such verdicts, good will toward America survives from pre-Palestine times as is illustrated by the numerous Arabs who show sympathies for Americans while opposing the U.S. politically. Previous remarks on this point (pp. 39–40) may be supplemented by the observation that the sympathies are mainly aroused by American kindliness—the qualities of the heart rather than the brain. As a college-trained interviewee in Jordan puts it: “Americans are very sincere and simple hearted and to be sincere is too bad because they follow their hearts and not their heads and as a result they do many foolish actions” (study of Jordan, p. 100). Some of his less educated compatriots advance similar views, stressing both their belief in American good heartedness and their disapproval of America’s political course (ibid., pp. 68, 70). It is the generosity of the American people which attracts the Arabs even now that they are little disposed to admit such a weakness.

The continued ·existence of these smoldering sympathies accounts for the widespread opinion that Americans are not intrinsically bad like the British but act as they do because of their inexperience or immaturity. When for instance a bank accountant in Jordan says that “the United States are very fresh in world politics,” he obviously says so out of a rational desire to explain the bad behavior of people whom he otherwise believes to be likeable (study of Jordan, p. 100). Explicit references to America’s youthfulness are not infrequent. A Lebanese VOICE listener calls the U.S. a “young child” and adds that “it has not been taking the right steps” (study of Lebanon, p. 59). This notion appears to have gained foothold among middle-class people in Jordan; a clerk there declares that Americans ‘are baby politicians so far,” and a less optimistic goldsmith predicts that they “will always remain children as compared to the British or Russians” (study of Jordan, p. 69). The goldsmith’s opinion falls into line with several statements to the effect that the Americans are the dupes of the British masterminds. In forming this image of America as a sort of adolescent who has been led astray by a wicked and more experienced friend, the Arabs evidently assign to themselves the role of old and wise people versed in the ways of the world. Yet their very condescension indicates that they do not completely dismiss the case. Except perhaps for the gloomy goldsmith, they seem to cherish the secret hope that the juvenile delinquent might reform after all.

SUGGESTIONS

In view of the fragile situation, political reasoning should conform closely to Arabic ways of thought. A few preliminary studies are likely to facilitate the necessary adjustments. It might prove useful, for instance, to inquire into the political opinions held by Arabic U.S, residents or citizens. Assuming their opinions on topical issues represent an amalgam of innate Arabic concepts and half-digested American concepts, much can be learned from them about such intricate matters as how to twist an argument to make it work and where exactly to put the emphasis. The study of Egypt advocates an analysis of current political writings in the Arabic countries; there is no doubt that this undertaking would pay dividends. The same holds true of the repeatedly submitted proposition that the Koran be scanned for fitting quotas and adequate methods of approach.

Political argumentation itself is primarily faced with the tasks of setting the Palestine issue in the right perspective and invalidating the Arabic saga of American imperialism. It has been shown previously that efforts in this direction would gain little by too heavy a reliance on Arabic sympathies for the American people (pp. 39–40); many Arabs, especially the better educated among them, concede that they entertain such sympathies and yet continue to chide U.S. policy. What counts is to proceed within the political dimension. Instead of humanizing politics, the communicator should try to convert the human factor into a political asset. This he might achieve by a line of reasoning which, for the sake of argument, accepts the Arabic viewpoint that politically Americans behave like adolescents. Adolescents may commit blunders, but at least they usually act from generous impulses. Again, it is the Arabs who speak of American generosity. Yet if they experience America this way they might as well follow up the, implications of their experience. One of them is that generosity is something genuine with Americans. In keeping with their own premises, the Arabs will have to admit that generosity is one of the essential motives behind U.S. policy—no matter, for the rest, whether this trait is thought of as interfering with American self-interest or forming an integral part of it. Once the Arabs admit that much, they are bound to go a step further and realize two things—that America’s Palestine policy must also be laid to her generous compassion for a tormented people and that the talk about American imperialism does not make sense. Imperialism results from adult passion for power rather than youthful generosity. For Arabs to denounce American aid, including the help to Arabic refugees, as an imperialist maneuver is not only illogical but hardly compatible with their own generosity. Nor can the Arabs, versed in the ways of the world as they are, possibly mistake expanding business for political expansionism. There still remains the basic objection, however, that the U.S. has grossly blundered in supporting the Jews against the Arabs. Has it really? Granted that juvenile impetuosity is sometimes slow in grasping the views of other people and thus hurts their sensibilities, which is a blunder indeed, yet such rashness need not be without political vision. Contrary to what a wrathful Egyptian teacher says—that “Israel is a cancer in the body of the Middle East” (study of Egypt, p. 60)—Israel stands a fair chance of developing into a ferment of economic and social progress in the Middle East. This would meet a need recognized by the Arabs themselves, to be sure, under the present circumstances it is difficult for the Arabic elite to envisage a modus vivendi with the new state, but even now their old political wisdom will perhaps tell them that tiny Israel might become a valuable ally in their fight against Communist infiltration, and here is where their interest coincides with American interest. It is understood that this sketchy argumentation is only for background use. Its main purpose is to stimulate discussion.

NOTE

1.   1.    Something in this line is actually under way—a report on a small sample of VOA and BBC broadcasts to Greece, which is being prepared for the program Evaluations Branch of the Voice.