Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.
*A paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society held of Urbana, Illinois, September 8–10 1954.
This paper represents one segment of a larger inquiry into the political attitudes and propaganda susceptibilities of non-Communists in countries behind the Iron Curtain. The segment was selected for presentation here because, among other things, its findings illuminate an opinion area of Soviet Satellite life which has generally been neglected in the literature on the subject. They are, moreover, considerably at variance with the kind of inferences that most Americans would probably draw from hitherto available facts about Satellite Communism. They indirectly demonstrate the danger of imputing to members of another political milieu the accepted norms of our own political climate.
Specifically, it is perhaps safe to wager that most people who know anything about the evils and sufferings associated with Satellite Communism would almost automatically assume that the non-Communist sufferers share inimical attitudes toward all adherents of their nation’s Communist Party; for it is the Party, after all, that has been the immediate indigenous instrument of so-called Popular Democracy in Eastern Europe. But this assumption is proved fallacious by the data at hand, the data being three hundred intensive interviews with escapees from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The interviews were conducted abroad by International Research Associates, Inc. (INRA) in late 1951 and early 1952.
Before proceeding further with substance, a few words about method. Although systematic, it was qualitative in character, supplementing a basically quantitative study of the same material undertaken by INRA. (1) The qualitative portion focused primarily on those responses which were inadvertently and disparately evoked, which were not readily amenable to statistical manipulation, and which bore on five major issues of critical interest:
1. How do the captive non-Communists view both their Satellite regime and its Communist Party adherents?
2. What are their primary complaints about the regime in action, and conversely, are there any Communist accomplishments for which they concede a measure of admiration or respect?
3. Which are the Communist propaganda themes that appear to have been most successful, which have proved impotent or self-defeating, and how do captive peoples defend themselves against Communist propaganda influence?
4. What are the state and prospects of anti-Communist resistance?
5. How does their basic hope of liberation structure the non-Communists’ perceptions of Western policy and of Western radio reportage of this policy?
Almost anyone with an interest in foreign affairs would be able to hazard relatively correct answers to some of these questions. Or, stated otherwise, the interviews confirm a number of fairly common notions about Satellite life–especially about the attitudes of non-Communists toward their regime as such. Whether materially or ideologically motivated, for example, they hate and fear it. They blame it for a host of economic deprivations. They recognize its systematic exploitations of human life. They identify it with an atmosphere of terror and total insecurity. And they tend to perceive their countries as colonies occupied by Moscow, with the indigenous Communist Party–that is, the regime—acting as a traitorous tool of the alien Soviet power.
Given the determination of these attitudes, it would superficially seem unreasonable to make an issue of attitudes held toward individual members of the Communist Party. Ordinarily, it is probably safe to assume that at least the direction of intensely held monolithic and disciplined group as the Communist Party will hold firm with reference to most people belonging to that group. And perhaps the issue would never have arisen were it not for the discovery that so many respondents un-wittingly alluded to personal friends who were Communist Party members or to similar friendships back home. This stimulated an intensive examination of all other interview evidence bearing on the subject. And the conclusion is that Satellite Non-Communists clearly discriminate among several types of Party members.
The first breakdown is between “real” or convinced” Communists on the one hand and nominal Communists who only pretend to Party conviction and loyalty on the other. Incidentally, there is substantial evidence that, numerically, the nominal types predominate in the Party, although to what extent it is impossible to estimate.
Attributes ascribed to the real Communist include a sincere belief in the Communist gospel as interpreted from Moscow, unconditional loyalty to the Party, ruthlessness in the performance of Party duties, and complete immersion in activities that serve the interests of the regime. This is the kind of Communist that centers in the “hard core” of the Party; and the respondents emphasize that the captive populations hate him, just as they do the regime itself. Toward the secret police this hatred is filled with overtones of impotence and dread. An intelligent Hungarian kulak speaks for many other escapees when he says: “Nobody knows when a police truck will stop outside his house and arrest the members of his family. At the beginning only the intelligentsia and the rich farmers feared this; now, however, this fear concerns all classes.”
The nominal Communists do not constitute a single type, but rather, four subtypes. Toward each of them, characteristic attitudes are manifest.
The subtype most closely resembling the real Communist in outward behavior is the sheer opportunist, the calculating and unscrupulous careerist motivated exclusively by self-aggrandizement. Intent upon ingratiating himself with the powers that be, he is zealous, unprincipled, and persistent in the performance of the Party work—as long, that is, as there appears to be no real threat to the regime. But he is a potential turncoat and, according to several respondents, had already in 1951 begun to hedge against a future fraught with the possibility of war and Communist defeat. Along with the real Communist, he is both hated and feared; but he is treated with a kind of loathsome contempt for having “sold himself to the regime out of vile selfishness” and for his willingness to “denounce anybody simply to strengthen his position or to get ahead.”
Now we come to those types of nominal Communists who evoke judgements so at variance with superficial and uncritical expectations. Adopting the language of the respondents, we have called them the jobkeeper Communist, the forced Communist, and the disillusioned Communist.
The jobkeepers, a fairly frequent topic in the interviews, are defined throughout by three distinct traits. First, as the name implies, they either want to keep the job they hold or to get one simply for the sake of survival above subsistence level. They are motivated by reasons of self-preservation and the well-being of their families. When referring to them, respondents generally agree that they joined the Party “only in order not to lose their job” or “only to provide daily bread for their families.” Second jobkeepers are unanimously characterized as people who, like the great majority of non-Communists, detest the regime in whole or part and long for liberation. The testimony is filled with such statements as: “They have the same views as the rest of the nation … and wait for liberation.” Third, while paying formal allegiance to Communism, the jobkeepers restrict their Party activity to a bare minimum: “They are very passive. Once a week they go to meetings. From time to time, they will shout ‘Long live Stalin’ and carry a Red banner. Then they have a week to rest and don’t take interest in anything.”
The forced Communist is identical in all respects to the jobkeeper type except that he joined the Party not to keep or get a job, but under such duress as the threat of arrest or the withdrawal of ration cards.
The disillusioned Communist is the idealist who originally joined because he accepted at face value the Party’s professions of faith. Now, with his ideals betrayed and his expectations shattered, he shares most of the grievances animating the non-Communists.
The remarkable thing about non-Communist attitudes toward each of these three nominal Communist subtypes is the lack of animosity displayed. It would seem natural for escapees to castigate the jobkeeper and the forced Communist, especially the former, for having yielded to exactly the pressures they themselves resisted up to the very last. Yet what happens is practically the opposite: in spite of their intense animus toward the regime, almost all respondents who advance the subject accept as relatively valid and defensible the reasons that prompted the jobkeeper and the forced Communist to join the Party. Rather than accusing him of weakness or lack of character, they point to the dilemma he had to face and show sympathetic understanding of the way he resolved it.
As for the disillusioned Party member, respondents give the impression that they react to him not only with the tolerance shown the jobkeepers and forced Communists, but with a sort of camaraderie and respect as well. Jobkeepers, they seem to feel, should be excused for having made inevitable adjustments; whereas disillusioned Communists deserve a measure of indulgence for their original idealism, as well as for their personal integrity which makes them realize and admit what is so profoundly disturbing to any non-Communist–that is, the frightful discrepancy between promises and practices of the regime. As a Social Democratic Czech mechanic explains it. “Formerly they were perhaps convinced Communists. However, they did not become victims of Communist propaganda preserving for themselves an unbiased judgment and thus realizing that the Party has deceived them, not fulfilling its promises. They have remained with the Party only because they are forced to. But as far as their personal convictions are concerned, they already belong to the anti-Communist camp.” In the words of another Czech, “now they are just like us.”
Unfortunately, the interviews provide no completely satisfactory explanation for non-Communist tolerance of nominal party membership. But they do supply a few clues that would be worth pursuing in any future escapee studies.
First, there appears to be universal awareness that the regime, whenever in its interest, is determined to make individual economic survival hinge on Party membership. “If a non-Communist works in a better position, they importune him politically until he joins the Communist Party: or if he won’t do it, the remove him from his position and send him … to a worse one says a young Czech. Another recalls that “after February 1948 (when the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia) a radical change took place in the average family: the father was forced to join the Communist Party in order to keep his former occupation.” And a Hungarian small-town musician avers that “Party membership is decisive … even in the field of entertainment … Musicians who were Communist Party members got most of the bookings.” That the respondents are constantly preoccupied with this theme can be inferred from other statements of this sort as well as from the image–or rather, counter-image–they have of America. Many define the United States as a country where “participation in politics is not a prerequisite for people’s being able to succeed and to support their families,” where “Party membership gives no advantages,” where there is no need for the worker to join a party and to say things that the party makes him say.” In short, the terrible lurking alternative of having to turn into a Communist or being condemned to virtual economic subsistence continues to haunt escapees. And perhaps their absorption in it moves them to sympathize with friends and acquaintances who, on the horns of this crucial dilemma, eventually preferred external adjustment to life in distress. They can afford the sympathy since their own virtue is intact.
Second, such understanding, feeding on friendships with nominal Communists, may be vitalized by another, very private experience: more likely than not various respondents themselves felt tempted to become jobkeepers on occasion. Actually, only one respondent refers directly to this experience, but since the interview circumstances did not favor the admission of questionable intentions his statement may be more representative than its isolated occurrence would seem to indicate. The respondent in question is an intelligent, twenty-nine-year-old Pole, who prior to his escape had been “in charge of the stores in a textile combine.” He is forthright enough to tell about his one-time susceptibility to Communist allurements. “Ever since 1948,” he recalls, “the members of the factory council strongly advised me to join the Party. They motivated their advice by saying that I was young, capable, and would achieve something. But somehow, I kept refusing—although I must admit I frequently wanted to join. Only my wife stopped me. I wanted to join in order to prove the living condition of my family. I’m married and have a five-year-old child.” Several others mention situations in which they were encouraged to become party members, in some cases seeming to protest too much their immediate repulsion of the idea.
Third, it is clear that many of the current non-Communists were themselves, like the disillusioned idealists, at one time impressed with the lofty rhetoric and promises of Communism. Indeed, there is considerable stress in the interviews on the appreciable impact of Communist propaganda during the period immediately subsequent to the Party’s seizure of power. More or less typical is the following statement by a Hungarian worker: “Until 1949 the people still believed the Communists sometimes. Life was relatively good then and some people could have thought that even the communists worked for a good-cause.” Another goes even further when he says that “a great part of the people believed that Communism would bring good to them.” But references to the initial success of Communist propaganda are inevitably followed by assurances that “it has no influence any more” or that “this belief doesn’t exist anymore.” In short, people are painfully aware that they have been let down and betrayed by the regime, just as the disillusioned Communists; so they are in a position to appreciate the latter group’s original motivation as well as its current embitterment.
Fourth, there appears to be general recognition that once committed to the Party, its members are virtually trapped. A typical remark is: “Once you join the Party there is no way out.”
Finally, there are two Hungarian-voiced suggestions that tolerance of the nominal Communists may owe something to the influence of Satellite-beamed Western radio broadcasts. A railway worker recalls that “plenty of workers joined the Party when Radio Free Europe advised them not to throw away their daily bread.” And a knowledgeable businesswoman, herself an ex-member of the party, says: “From my own experience I know how important it would be if the Voice of America would sometimes address the well-intentioned Party members in the way Radio Free Europe already does. This would not only reassure them but would also encourage them secretly to give much more help to those who are persecuted.” Even though no other respondent mentions a Western radio in this vein, it is not improbable that other Satellite radio listeners may have interpreted something said by Radio Free Europe in the same sense—thereby arriving at the conclusion that their nominality at least partially excuses some Party members from the stigma of their formal label.
Each of the above clues offers room for considerable speculation, but their relative importance can only be gauged by further studies designed to shed light on the problem of the nominal Communist.
A word in conclusion. Ordinarily, a qualitative study of the kind reported here is concluded with a deferential bow to precise methods of quantification. The fashionable thing to say is that of course qualitative studies are only valuable as a preliminary to rigorous quantitative conclusions. In this case, however, we feel that in all honesty only a slight and formal bow is necessary. In a sense, the present study is roughly quantitative; we can say, for example, that of the escapees in our sample who said anything spontaneously about the jobkeeper, the forced, or the disillusioned Communist, nearly all tolerated or condoned their behavior. And for any practical conclusions that may be drawn from this particular finding, that degree of quantification is probably enough.
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