TARIQ RAMADAN

Interreligious Dialogue

Excerpt from Western Muslims and the Future of Islam

[This excerpt, a chapter called “Interreligious Dialogue,” is distinctive for arguing, contrary to some interpretations of the Qur’an, that the Qur’an does not mandate conflict between Jews and Christians. Ramadan, a controversialand influential Muslim scholar, made careful footnoted referencesto the Qur’an.]

THERE IS A very long tradition of interreligious dialogue. At various times in history, in very diverse contexts, people of various religions have engaged in interreligious exchanges to try to understand one another better; they have succeeded in gaining one another’s respect and have managed not only to live but also to work together on shared endeavors. Today, we feel the need to engage even more in this process: Western societies’ religious pluralism makes mutual knowledge essential. At the same time, technical developments have changed our view of the world, and daily images of societies and customs different from our own arouse our curiosity. More dramatically, acts of violence perpetrated in the name of religion challenge our awareness: how can such horror be justified in the name of religion? How can we understand it? How can we prevent it?

Many groups of specialists have been formed in recent years. At colloquia, conferences, and seminars, they meet to try to build bridges, discuss sensitive subjects, and prevent conflicts. With time, these specialists in dialogue have come to know one another and to enjoy excellent relationships founded on courtesy and respect. This is an important gain. Nevertheless, the problem remains that these are fairly closed circles whose members are not always in real contact with their own religious groups, and this makes it difficult to convey to the heart of each religious community the advances made in these numerous meetings. Moreover, whole sections of these communities are neither concerned with nor touched by the various dialogues that are taking place. Those who meet do not represent the various denominations, schools of thought, or tendencies of the adherents of their religion. Those who hold the most closed opinions, which in daily life are the cause of the real problem, never meet. Thus, we have, on both the national and international levels, a very uneven picture: dialogue is well under way between specialists from each religion who are more or less open-minded, while ordinary believers meet only rarely¹ and the most entrenched and radical views are never voiced. Common sense and logic would encourage us to hope for the opposite: the specialists do not, or no longer, really need dialogue, and it is within religious communities and between those with the most radical views that the debate should take place. It is a vicious circle: it is precisely because people do not know one another, or reject one another, that dialogue is impossible.

The responsibility of people involved in dialogue between religions is in fact doubly important: whether they have become specialists or are simply members of an interreligious group, it is vital that they play the role of mediators between their partners in dialogue and their coreligionists. It is a question of listening to the other side, challenging it and questioning it in order to increase understanding and then of getting involved in working within one’s own community, informing, explaining, even teaching. At the same time, participants in dialogue should express their own convictions, clarify the place of their own sense of religion among other views held within their religious family, and respond as well as they can to the questions of their partners in dialogue. By acting in this way they create, between the various traditions, areas of trust, sustained by shared convictions and values that, even though they certainly do not bring the extremes together, do open real horizons for living together and at least allow ruptures to be avoided and conflicts better managed.

The need for interreligious dialogue is not in any doubt, but some people still do not understand its real usefulness and purpose. What exactly is it about? Does one want to convert the other? Can one get involved with a clear conscience? What is the real impact of these fine words about respect and living together when we look at how believers from each religion behave? Is there not a place for being doubtful or suspicious about the intentions of one or other side if we take the time to read the scriptural sources? These questions cannot simply be swept under the carpet. They are of primary importance, because, unless they are clearly and succinctly answered, we run the risk of having an outwardly agreeable dialogue that does not eliminate the mistrust and suspicion and that in the end leads nowhere. Let us try, from within the Muslim tradition, to suggest possible answers to these questions, beginning with the last.

THE ISLAMIC TRADITION AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

We recall . . . that, according to Muslims, the last Revelation taught them to recognize all the books of the prophets who had gone before. They all had the same purpose: to remind human beings of the presence of the Creator and the finiteness of life on earth. The Islamic tradition’s concept of humankind emerged through this teaching: after forgiving Adam his sin, God told men: “A guidance will certainly come to you from me. Those who follow my guidance will have nothing to fear and will not grieve.” ² This guidance is the series of Revelations that came throughout human history, each to confirm, complete, and correct the preceding.

NECESSARY DIVERSITY

So individuals, innocent and free, have to make their choices (either to accept or to reject the Revelation); there will necessarily be diversity among people, and so these three seemingly similar verses contain teachings that augment and complete each other: “Had God so willed, He would have united them [human beings] in guidance, so do not be among the ignorant” ³; “If your Lord had so willed, everyone on earth would have believed. Is it for you to compel people to be believers?”⁴; “If God had willed, He would have made you one community but things are as they are to test you in what He has given you. So compete with each other in doing good.”⁵ The first verse instructs us that diversity is willed by the Transcendent, the second makes clear that, in the name of that will, compulsion in matters of religion is forbidden,⁶ and the Revelation teaches that the purpose of these differences is to test us in order to discover what we are going to do with what has been revealed to us: the last commandment is to use these differences to “compete in doing good.” Diversity of religions, nations, and peoples is a test because it requires that we learn to manage difference, which is in itself essential: “If God did not enable some men to keep back others, the world would be corrupt. But God is the One who gives grace to the worlds”; ⁷ “If God did not enable some men to keep back others, hermitages, synagogues, chapels and mosques where the name of God is often called upon, would have been demolished.” ⁸ These two verses give complementary information that is of prime importance: if there were no differences between people, if power were in the hands of one group alone (one nation, one race, or one religion), the earth would be corrupt because human beings need others to limit their impulsive desire for expansion and domination. The last verse is more precise with regard to our present discussion; it refers to places of worship to indicate that if there is to be a diversity of religions, the purpose is to safeguard them all: the fact that the list of places begins with hermitages, synagogues, and chapels before referring to mosques shows recognition of all these places of worship and their inviolability and, of course, respect for those who pray there. So, just as diversity is the source of our test, the balance of power is a requirement for our destiny.

Difference might naturally lead to conflict; therefore, the responsibility of humankind is to make use of difference by establishing a relationship based on excelling one another in doing good. It is vital that the balance of power be based not on a tension born of rejection or mutual ignorance but fundamentally on knowledge: “O people, we have created you from a male and a female, we have divided you into nations and tribes so that you might know one another.” ⁹ Knowing the other is a process that is unavoidable if fear of difference is to be overcome and mutual respect is to be attained. So human beings live a test that is necessary for their nature but that they can—and must—master by making the effort to know and recognize those who are not of their tribe, their country, their race, or their religion.¹⁰ Dialogue, particularly interreligious dialogue, is indispensable.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DIALOGUE

All believers who participate in interreligious dialogue do so having been nourished by a faith or a conviction on the basis of which they understand themselves, perceive the world, and build relations with those around them. Their connection with Truth, with the beliefs of others, and with diversity in general is directly influenced by the content and nature of that faith or conviction. The centrality of tawhid in the message of Islam has been strongly emphasized. It is the principle on which the whole of Islamic teaching rests and is the axis and point of reference on which Muslims rely in dialogue. The intimate awareness of tawhid forms the perception of the believer, who understands that plurality has been chosen by the One, that He is the God of all beings and that He requires that each be respected: “. . . and say: ‘We believe in what has been revealed to us and what has been revealed to you; our God and your God is the One.’ ” ¹¹ It is out of this conviction that Muslims engage in dialogue, and this is assumed in forming relations with the other. What establishes difference from the other, and consequently the direction and terms of the dialogue that is to be built, is whether or not there is commitment to the expression of an absolute monotheism.¹² This is why the Qur’anic call to the Jews and Christians begins with: “O people of the book, come to agreed terms between us and you: that we worship none but God, that we do not attribute any associate to Him and that none of us takes other divinities apart from Him. If they turn away, say: ‘Be witnesses that we are submitting ourselves [muslimun].’ ”¹³ Firmly asserting this principle indicates that tawhid is the point of reference on the basis of which a Muslim engages in discussion: if there are differences on this central point, it is then necessary that dialogue be entered into and developed on the basis of shared values and teachings, since the last Revelation recognizes those that came before:¹⁴ “God, there is no god but God. It is He who sent down the Book [the Qur’an] upon you [Muhammad] in all truth confirming what came before. And He sent down the Torah and the Gospel before as a guidance for people, and He sent down the Discernment [al-furqan] the Qur’an.”¹⁵ This recognition is fundamental and opens up the way for dialogue, which, although it forces us to see our differences, is bound to establish bridges between convictions and traditions.

The Qur’an not only issues a call to dialogue but is also insistent about the form it should take and the way in which it should be conducted. It should not simply be an exchange of information; it should also be a way of being and of speaking, an attitude: “And discuss with them in the best way,”¹⁶ and again: “Do not discuss with the people of the Book except in the best of ways, apart from those who are unjust among themselves.”¹⁷ In this last verse, the restriction is not at all upon dialogue as such, but as it pertains to the repressive attitude some Jews and Christians adopted toward the Muslim community, which was at that time facing serious adversity. This contextualized approach is what gives meaning to the often quoted verse “You will certainly see that those most hardened in hostility toward the Muslims are the Jews and the polytheists and you will certainly see that those closest to you in affection are those who say: ‘We are Christians,’ because there are among them priests and monks who are not swollen with pride.”¹⁸ Here again, it is the attitude of people and potential partners in dialogue that is at issue, and not dialogue in itself. To those who choose to understand this contextualized teaching (warning us to be concerned about injustice, adversity, and the pride of human beings) as an absolute prohibition on dialogue, the Revelation replies clearly: “God does not forbid you from establishing relations of generosity and just behavior with those who have not fought against you over your religion and who have not evicted you from your dwellings. God loves those who act fairly.” ¹⁹ This verse goes even further than all the others: if dialogue is necessary and if the way of speaking about oneself is important, we are here clearly called to establish relations of generosity and justice with all who respect our freedom of conscience and our human dignity. Dialogue is an act of conviction, of listening, of self-awareness, of self-knowledge, and of the heart: together, these qualities constitute wisdom.

VERSES INTERPRETED VARIOUSLY

When we speak of interreligious dialogue, it would not be honest to refer only to the verses we have quoted without mentioning a series of other passages in the Qur’an that can be equivocal and that are moreover variously interpreted by Muslim scholars. Some of the ulama of the literalist traditions read them restrictively, which basically does not leave any real room for discussion. A sincere involvement in dialogue must stop to consider these verses. Thus, one finds in the Qur’an verses that define Jews and Christians, even though they are among the “people of the Book,” as kuffar (plural of kafir), most often translated as “infidels” or “miscreants”: “They are certainly in a state of denial 20 [kafara], those who have said that God was the Messiah the son of Mary” ²¹ or again, “Those among the people of the Book and the polytheists who have denied [kafaru].” ²² According to the perspective of the majority of literalist scholars, this leaves no doubt as to their fate, especially since the Qur’an says explicitly: “Religion in the sight of God is Islam”²³ and again: “He who desires religion other than Islam will not find himself accepted and in the hereafter he will be among the losers.”²⁴ Other verses seem to tell us that we should not trust Jews and Christians (“And the Jews and Christians will not be pleased with you unless you follow their religion”)²⁵ or take them as allies except in extreme circumstances: “Let the believers [Muslims] not take as allies the deniers [kafirin] rather than believers; those who do so will receive no help from God, unless you feel yourselves to be in danger from them.” ²⁶ Such an avalanche of verses has the effect of causing perplexity and raises questions about whether any real place for dialogue remains, the more so since these same scholars clearly explain that they do not believe there is any virtue in discussion unless the intention is to convince the other party of the strength and truth of our arguments. Interreligious dialogue would then become a call to our truth, a dawa (call, invitation, preaching), with no meaning beyond that.

Here we are at the heart of the problem of the types of “reading” where the various schools of thought were described. The advantage of the literalist reading over all the others is that it stops at the primary meaning of the text that, as soon as it is quoted, seems to make immediate sense and gives weight to the argument. No trouble is taken to work out a reading based on critical distance, contextualized interpretation, or determination of the meaning of a verse in light of the message as a whole. As a literalist, what I read is what was said, and God speaks through me as long as my quotations are from His word. It is nevertheless advisable to take each of the verses mentioned earlier and to try to discover whether the literalist reading is the only appropriate one.

It must be said, to begin with, that the Arabic notion of kufr or kafir has often been mistranslated, quite apart from the fact that many Muslims in the West use it as a definite insult. But the word has a neutral sense in the Islamic sciences, and it is clearly perceived at various levels. Without going into technical details here, we may say that, according to the root, the general meaning of kafir could be rendered as “a denier with a veiled heart”: this refers to those whose original longing for the Transcendent ²⁷ has been stifled, veiled, shut off in their hearts to the extent that they deny the presence of the Creator. But kafir may also indicate one who denies the evidence of the truth, like the satanic figure of Iblis in the Qur’an, who knows that God is, since he speaks to Him, but refuses to obey: “He [Iblis] refused, became proud and was among the deniers [min alkafirin ].” ²⁸ To this must be added various kinds of negation, kufr, which are determined according to what is denied: God, the truth of the message, one of the pillars of faith, the nature of a particular commandment, and so on. So to apply the term kafir to Jews and Christians in a neutral sense is justified in that, in a quite natural way, they do not recognize the Qur’an as the last revealed book. They deny [yakfuru] the truth of the message and its Prophet, but this does not mean we may call them “miscreants” in the sense that their faith in God is not recognized, which would be an inaccurate assertion: this would be as senseless as to say that Iblis, who had a dialogue with the Most High, did not believe in Him and was a miscreant. This is neither logical understanding nor a consistent translation. We must add that it is never legitimate to use the word as an insult.

The verse indicating that the religion in the sight of God is Islam has caused a lot of ink to flow. Here again we are dealing with a question of interpretation. We know that in the Qur’an the word islam has two meanings. The first is universal and generic: all the elements are in “submission” to God because they respect the order of creation; in the same sense, all the revelations and prophets came with a message of the oneness of God and the need to “submit oneself ” to Him. Thus, Abraham, well before the revelation of the Qur’an, is commanded by God: “And when his Lord said to him: ‘Submit [aslim]!’ he replied: ‘I submit [aslamtu] to the Lord of the worlds.’ ”²⁹ The words aslim and aslamtu come from islam in the sense of recognition of the one God and acceptance of the obedience due to Him. The second meaning of the word islam is the religion whose text is the Qur’an and whose prophet is Muhammad. Literalist scholars have interpreted these verses giving the word the restricted meaning of the second definition, while the generic definition makes better sense of the Islamic message as a whole, which, apart from being the final revelation, identifies natural religion, one and unique throughout history, as the recognition of the existence of a Creator and conformance to His messages. This is also confirmed by the verse “Certainly those who have believed, the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabaeans, all those who have believed in God and in the last day of judgment and who have done good—they will have their reward from God. They will not be afraid and they will not grieve.” ³⁰ The generic meaning is clear here, and those scholars who have claimed that this verse has been abrogated [mansukh] ³¹ pay no regard to the rule of abrogation, which specifies that only verses stipulating obligations or prohibitions (which may change in the course of revelation) can be abrogated but not information, which cannot be true one day and untrue the next. This verse is clearly giving information.³²

The verse “The Jews and the Christians will not be pleased with you unless you follow their religion [milla]” is quoted at will in times of trouble or simply when people want to justify mistrusting some Jews or Christians. The verse is heard from mosque pulpits, in conferences, and at seminars, with the implication that it explains the attitude of Jews and Christians toward Muslims: their rejection of Islam, their double dealing, not to say deceitfulness, and colonization, proselytism, wars, Bosnia, Palestine, and so on. But that is not what the verse says: the phrase “will not be pleased with you” [lan tarda anka] translates here the idea of full and absolute satisfaction, expressed with the heart as well as the mind. For Jews and Christians convinced, like a Muslim, of the truth of their own message, complete satisfaction with the other is attained when the experience of faith and truth is shared. One has the feeling of living and sharing this essential element that gives meaning and light to one’s life. This does not imply that in the absence of this full satisfaction one can live in and express only rejection, mistrust, and conflict. One can feel and manifest deep and sincere respect toward a human being with whom one does not share this full spiritual communion. It is a matter of being sincere and of recognizing the states of our souls and hearts. It is within our communities of faith that we live most deeply the fullness of the meaning of (rida) with the other who shares our truth, even if it is possible (though it is the exception rather than the rule) that we might experience a unique spiritual relationship with a woman or a man from another tradition. The Qur’an here is speaking only of the intimate and very natural inclination of people of faith toward one another.³³ At a deeper level, believers must be conscious that ultimately what they must seek before all else is to please God [rida Allah], not other people. It is good for believers to remember that the full satisfaction shared with their coreligionists is still only a stage along the way. Seeking the pleasure of God is a demanding path punctuated by testing stations, but this initiation is ultimately the only way that it is possible to become, in humility, fully content with oneself.

With regard to the verse referring to the seemingly impossible alliance with Jews and Christians, we have already referred to it. From the context of the verse, and others like it, we derive that Muslims are commanded in situations of potential conflict not to take deniers as allies against Muslims [min dun al-muminin],³⁴ that is to say, to make an alliance unjustly or treacherously in opposition to their spiritual community. It does not apply absolutely, and the following verse specifies clearly those with whom relations are banned: “God forbids you to turn in friendship toward [or take as allies] only such as fight against you because of your faith, and drive you forth from your homelands, or aid [others] in driving you forth: and as for those [from among you] who turn toward them in friendship [or alliance], it is they, they who are truly wrong-doers! ” ³⁵

Here a word is needed on that concept of dawa, often translated as “preaching,” “call,” or “invitation to Islam” and which has thus come to express the missionary character of Islam. It cannot be denied that some Muslims, on the basis of a certain number of verses, are engaged in straightforward missionary activity, and in their minds dialogue is only a form of mission. To deny this would be dishonest. One must then look at how the Qur’an presents the act of “inviting” or “calling” to Islam. The verse that follows is well known: “Call [invite] to the path of your Lord using wisdom and good exhortation, and debate with them in the best of manner.” ³⁶ If we meditate on this verse, we understand that emphasis is put first on the Muslim who “invites.” He has to have acquired a certain wisdom, know to speak well, and have mastered the best way of expressing things: three injunctions bring together the requirements related to being a good speaker, the content of the message, and the way in which it must be delivered. In other words, to “invite” is first to “bear witness,” as much by one’s behavior as by the content and form of what one says, what the message of Islam is. It is not a matter of wanting to convert, because people’s hearts are God’s domain and secret. It is a matter of bearing witness, which is an invitation to remember and meditate. This meaning also is captured by another verse: “And thus have We willed you to be a community of the middle way, so that [with your lives] you might bear witness to the truth before mankind.” ³⁷ Interreligious dialogue should be a meeting of “witnesses” who are seeking to live their faiths, to share their convictions, and to engage with one another for a more humane, more just world, closer to what God expects of humanity.

At the end of this section, we note that the verses mentioned earlier are indeed variously interpreted. All religious traditions experience these differences, and, depending on the type of reading that is accepted, one may be open to dialogue or absolutely opposed to it. The nature of these difficulties has to be taken into account in order to avoid any illusions about the possible results of our meetings.

TOWARD EXACTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE

The dialogue we engage in must be anything but complaisant. The lack of trust that permeates our Western societies and the situations of religious conflict throughout the world mean that our task must be far-reaching, exacting, and rigorous. First of all, dialogue must be based on mutual knowledge achieved by our seeking to make clear our shared convictions, values, and hopes, while clearly defining and circumscribing our specificities, our differences, and what may even be our disagreements. This is what is done in most interreligious groups, and I believe it is necessary to move in this direction. But this will not be enough: we have already said that the majority of women and men engaged in this kind of meetings are rather open and ready for the encounter. It is crucial that they describe and explain what they really represent in their religious families— what trend, the extent of it, their relations with the community as a whole, and so forth. It is important to know to whom one is speaking; it is no less essential to know to whom one is not speaking, and why. Interreligious dialogue should make it possible for each partner better to understand the various theories, the points shared, the differences and conflicts that are present in other traditions. It is a matter first of not deluding oneself that the other “represents,” for example, the whole of Hinduism, the whole of Buddhism, the whole of Judaism, the whole of Christianity, or the whole of Islam, and second of knowing what links and types of relations our partners have with their coreligionists.

To be involved in dialogue between religions while being completely cut off from the believers of one’s own religion is problematic and can be illusory. Many “specialists” in interreligious dialogue, who go from conference to conference, are totally disconnected from their religious community, as well as from grass-roots realities. This might be conceivable if it were a matter of purely theological discussions, but in most cases, unfortunately, that is not the case.³⁸ How is it possible to have a real understanding of religious traditions and the dynamics that permeate them on the ground if those who dialogue are not actively involved in their communities? Again, how can one hope to influence believers more widely if the specialists’ circle is isolated in an ivory tower and does not report back on the nature of its work to each of the respective religious communities?

So, two fundamental conditions for dialogue with the other emerge: first, to commit oneself, as far as possible, to giving an account of the shared work to one’s own faith community and second, in order to achieve that, to devote part of one’s energy to opening up intracommunal dialogue, which will make possible the advancement of real pluralism. This dialogue is extremely difficult, sometimes much more difficult than interreligious dialogue itself, because discussion with one’s nearest and dearest is so risky. This commitment is nevertheless essential if we want to break down internal ghettoes and sectarianism and try, within manageable limits, to respect one another more. It can never be said enough that intracommunal dialogue between Muslims is virtually nonexistent. Groups know one another, know how to identify one another and work out where they are in relation to one another, but then they immediately ignore one another, exclude one another, or insult one another, without any attempt at discussion. Within one religious understanding, one current of thought, divisions are maintained by intervening organizations. The culture of dialogue has practically abandoned Muslim communities and the respect for diversity, which always has been and should have continued to be their source of richness, has been replaced by dueling disagreements that contribute to maintaining the division, which causes their weakness. Some still tentative initiatives have taken off, but the movement must become more general and must naturally go alongside involvement in dialogue with other traditions.

Apart from getting to know one another, it is also necessary to establish relationships of trust and respect. Trust is lacking today: we meet often, listen sometimes, and distrust each other often. Trust needs time and support. The frequency and quality of meetings and the nature of the exchanges certainly help to create spaces for sincere encounter. However, it seems to me that four rules should be applied which may be quite demanding as preliminaries, but which are fundamentally constructive:

Recognition of the legitimacy of each other’s convictions and respect for them;

Listening to what people say about their own scriptural sources and not what we understand (or want to understand) from them;

The right, in the name of trust and respect, to ask all possible questions, sometimes even the most embarrassing;

The practice of self-criticism, which consists in knowing how to discern the difference between what the texts say and what our coreligionists make of them, and deciding clearly what our personal position is.

These rules are essential. One cannot enter into dialogue if one does not recognize the legitimacy of other people’s convictions. Not to share them is one thing, but not to recognize, deep in one’s heart, their right to be is another. Nor is it fitting to try to become an exegete of one’s partner’s scriptures. This is not our role or our area of expertise. It is for our partners to tell us what they understand or what their coreligionists understand, from such and such a text. Reading the Torah or the Bible for a Muslim, the Qur’an for a Jew or a Christian, or the Bhagavad Gita for all three is certainly useful and necessary in order to try to understand others’ convictions, but these readings should inspire meditation and questions, not a simplistic accusation. We must also give ourselves the right to dare to ask all the questions that occur to us. The answers may or may not be satisfying, they may or may not suit us, but they will have been clearly stated. Trust can be born only from this frankness and clarity: in the meantime, without the latter, courtesy is but artificial or even a masquerade. At a deeper level, these are all questions that help people to go further in understanding their own traditions. Looking for a way to give a deep explanation means making the effort to understand better. The relevance of the question to my partner in dialogue is a gift, an intellectual and spiritual tonic, because I learn to express better what I believe and so to understand more deeply the meaning of what I am. Finally, dialogue involves clarity and courage: our scriptural sources have sometimes been used, or have legitimized (and still legitimize) discourses, behavior, and actions toward others about which we need to make clear statements. This is not always easy, but it is nevertheless vital, and all the religious traditions should be involved in this self-criticism. Some see it as a kind of disloyalty toward their own community; it should instead be a matter of self-respect and dignity before God and each person’s conscience.

SHARED INVOLVEMENT

Dialogue is not enough. Even if it is rigorous, even if it is necessary to give time to knowing, trusting, and respecting each other, even if we should take on ourselves the widest possible responsibility to report back, it is only one stage or one aspect of the encounter among the various religious traditions. In Western societies, it is urgent that we commit ourselves to joint action.

In dialogue, we soon realize that we hold a great number of convictions and values in common. We understand very quickly that we are facing the same difficulties and challenges. But we very rarely move outside these circles of reflection. Together we say “God,” awareness, spirituality, responsibility, ethics, solidarity, but we live and experience, each one on one’s own, the problems of education, transmission of spirituality, individualism, consumerism, and moral bankruptcy. In philosophical terms, we could say that we know one another in words but not in action. Our experience of fifteen years of joint action in South America, Africa, and Asia has convinced us not only that this path is necessary but that it is the only way to eventually change minds and build mutual respect and trust.

In the West, there are many shared challenges, first among them being education. How can we pass on to our children the sense of the divine, for the monotheistic faiths, or of spiritual practice for Buddhism, for example? In a society that pushes people to own, how are we to form individuals whose awareness of being illumines and guides their mastery of possession? Again, how are we to explain morality and boundaries, to pass on principles of life that do not confuse liberty with carelessness and that consider neither fashion nor quantity of possessions as the measure of goodness? All the religious and spiritual traditions are experiencing these difficulties, but we still see few examples of shared commitment to proposing alternatives. And there is so much to do—working together, as parents and as citizens, so that schools will provide more and more courses on the religions; suggesting ways of providing educational modules outside the school structures to teach the general population about the religions—their fundamental beliefs, particular topics, and social realities. Such modules need to be thought out together, not only by inviting a partner from the other religion to come to give a course as part of a program we have put together for and by ourselves. By way of example, the Interreligious Platform in Geneva has launched an interesting “school of religions,” and there is the Center for Muslim-Christian Studies, in Copenhagen, which, under the leadership of Lissi Rasmussen, is scored a first in Europe in establishing a real partnership within an institution promoting and practicing dialogue.

Acts of solidarity take place from within each religious family, but the examples of shared initiatives are rare. People sometimes invite others, but do not act in collaboration. One of the best testimonies that a religious or spiritual tradition can give of itself lies in acts of solidarity between its adherents and others. To defend the dignity of the latter, to fight so that our societies do not produce indignity, to work together to support marginalized and neglected people, will certainly help us know one another better but it will, above all, make known the essential message that shines at the heart of our traditions: never neglect your brother in humanity and learn to love him, or at least to serve him.

More broadly, we have to act together so that the body of values that forms the basis of our ethics is not relegated to such a private and secluded sphere that it becomes inoperative and socially dead. Our philosophies of life must continue to inspire our civil commitment, with all due respect to the supporters of a postmodernism whose aim seems to be to deny any legitimacy to all reference to a universal ethic. We need to find together a civil role, inspired by our convictions, in which we will work to demand that the rights of all be respected, that discriminations be outlawed, that dignity be protected, and that economic efficiency cease to be the measure of what is right. Differentiating between public and private space does not mean that women and men of faith, or women and men of conscience, have to shrink to the point of disappearance and fear to express themselves publicly in the name of what they believe. When a society has gone so far as to disqualify, in public debate, faith and what it inspires, the odds are that its system is founded only on materialism and ruled only by materialist logic—the self-centered accumulation of goods and profit.

We must dare to express our faith, its demands, and its ethics, to involve ourselves as citizens in order to make known our human concerns, our care for justice and dignity, our moral standards, our fears as consumers and televiewers, our hopes as mothers and fathers—to commit ourselves to do the best possible, together, to reform what might be. All our religious traditions have a social message that invites us to work together on a practical level. We are still far from this. In spite of thousands of dialogue circles and meetings, we still seem to know one another very little and to be very lacking in trust. Perhaps we must reconsider our methods and formulate a mutual demand: to behave in such a way that our actions, as much as possible, mirror our words, and then to act together.

NOTES

Although it must be pointed out that more and more dialogue initiatives are aimed at the local level and in the United States and Europe unite believers from various religions.

Qur’an 2:38.

Qur’an 6:35.

Qur’an 10:99.

Qur’an 5:48.

The Qur’an confirms this in a clear general rule: “No compulsion in religion” (2:256).

Qur’an 2:251.

Qur’an 22:40.

Qur’an 49:13.

Read and understood globally, these Qur’anic references bring together all the dimensions of “difference” among human beings: tribe, nation, race, religion.

Qur’an 29:46.

It does not mean that it would be impossible to dialog with pantheistic spirituality or Buddhism, but its ground and its focus would naturally be more essentially directed toward common moral values, ethical commitment.

Qur’an 3:64.

In the mind of Muslims, the Qur’an confirms, completes, and corrects the messages that came before it, and in this Muslims hold the same position that Christians hold toward the Jews. It is a position that is in itself perfectly coherent: to believe in a Book that comes later necessarily assumes that one considers that there is a deficiency or distortion in the former.

Qur’an 3:2–3.

Qur’an 16:125.

Qur’an 29:46.

Qur’an 5:82.

Qur’an 60:8.

Whether one translates this as “they are miscreants who . . .” or “they are infidels who . . .” depends on the sense one gives to kafara. We shall return to this.

Qur’an 5:17.

Qur’an 98:1. We find the same senses here: “who have done wickedly” or “who are infidels.”

Qur’an 3:19.

Qur’an 3:85.

Qur’an 2:120.

Qur’an 3:28.

See part I [of the whole book].

Qur’an 2:34.

Qur’an 2:131.

Qur’an 2:62.

On the strength of an opinion attributed to Ibn Abbas reported in al-Tabari’s commentary (tafsir). It was said to be abrogated by 3:85, already referred to.

After the revelation of the last message, those who had knowledge beforehand would be judged according to their sincerity in the search for truth. Only God is the judge of this, and no human being can declare another’s destiny, or his own.

The concept of “milla” used in this verse to express the idea of religion conveys the idea of “people’s community of faith,” a sense of belonging, much more than the word “din,” which is “religion” or “concept and way of life” per se. 34 In Qur’anic usage, the word mumin (bearer of faith) usually means Muslim.

Qur’an 60:9.

Qur’an 16:125.

Qur’an 2:143.

As I see it, interreligious debate cannot take place by way of a debate on theological questions. We often witness a choice between extremes; either the discussion is completely theological, or the theological aspect is totally ignored and people behave as if the cause of the problem were understood. Both approaches are, in my view, defective and illusory.