1. Poorer Than Their Parents? Flat or Falling Incomes in Advanced Economies (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2016), 4, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/poorer-than-their-parents-a-new-perspective-on-income-inequality.
1. Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), available at http://trilateral.org/download/doc/crisis_of_democracy.pdf.
2. David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere (London: Hurst, 2017).
3. Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, Freedom in the World 2017—Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2017), 1 and 5, available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf.
4. Ibid., 4 and 1.
5. Patrick Chamorel, “The Political Right(s) in France,” American Interest 11, no. 3 (Winter 2016): 27, available at https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/09/28/the-political-rights-in-france/.
6. Ibid.
1. The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), No. 39.
2. The Federalist Papers, No. 71.
3. The Federalist Papers, No. 63.
4. The Federalist Papers, No. 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Quoted in Graham Allison, “The Lee Kuan Yew Conundrum,” Atlantic, March 30, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/lee-kuan-yew-conundrum-democracy-singapore/388955/.
7. Calvin Cheng, “The West Has It Totally Wrong on Lee Kuan Yew,” Independent, March 26, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-west-has-it-totally-wrong-on-lee-kuan-yew-10135641.html.
8. Puddington and Roylance, Freedom in the World 2017, 23.
9. For the best short summary, see Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).
10. Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns,” in Constant: Political Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102.
11. Ibid.
12. Benjamin M. Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth (New York: Knopf, 2005), 4.
1. For more on these topics, see Amanda Taub, “The Rise of American Authoritarianism,” Vox, March 1, 2016, vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism; Jonathan Haidt, “When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism,” American Interest 32, no. 3 (Spring 2016): 46–53, available at https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/; Stanley Feldman and Karen Stenner, “Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism,” Political Psychology 18, no. 4 (December 1997): 741–70.
2. Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 10.
3. Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 23.
4. Nativism often accompanies populism. The question is whether these two phenomena are inextricably intertwined and, if not, what nativism by itself means for liberal democracy. Takis Pappas argues, “Unlike populism, nativism does not work against political liberalism for the natives. Nativism’s main arguments have to do with immigration and EU multiculturalism. Nativists see both as grave threats to well-ordered, ethnoculturally coherent societies, to their established liberal-democratic values, and, perhaps most crucially, to the sustainability of the welfare states that these societies have inherited from the days before mass immigration.” There is something to this. Some people oppose Muslim immigration on the ground that Islam is incompatible with liberal respect for pluralism and with democracy itself. Some people oppose mass immigration from all sources because, they say, it weakens that sense of solidarity among citizens that undergirds the welfare state. It is unclear, however, what share of nativism is attributable to these relatively benign motives. See Takis S. Pappas, “Distinguishing Liberal Democracy’s Challengers,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (October 2016): 22–36, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Pappas-27-4.pdf.
5. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 138; Cas Mudde, “The Problem with Populism,” Guardian, February 17, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syriza-podemos-dark-side-europe.
6. Quoted in Jan-Werner Müller, “A Majority of ‘Deplorables’?” Project Syndicate, November 10, 2016, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-voters-opposition-to-democracy-by-jan-werner-mueller-2016-11.
7. Müller, What Is Populism? 77.
8. Ibid., 3.
9. Ibid., 9, 3, and 56.
10. Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 3 (May/June 2017): 36–44, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-04-17/liberal-order-rigged.
1. Pope Francis, “Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in Italy for the Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome,” March 24, 2017, available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/march/documents/papa-francesco_20170324_capi-unione-europea.html.
2. Mabel Berezin, “It’s Time to Admit It: We’re All Afraid of Terrorism—and That’s the Entire Point of It,” Salon, July 22, 2016, http://www.salon.com/2016/07/22/its_time_to_admit_it_were_all_afraid_of_terrorism_and_thats_the_entire_point_of_it_partner/.
3. Pope Francis, “Address”; Marine Le Pen, October 27, 2013, https://plus.google.com/+MarineLePen/posts/KMvEFQteEJe; Mabel Berezin, “Electoral Events as Collateral Damages: Sovereign Debt and the Old ‘New’ Nationalism in Post-Security Europe” (2014): 27, available at http://people.soc.cornell.edu/mmb39/BerezinEJSFinalDistributionCopyMay2014.pdf.
4. Cas Mudde, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Today,” in Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies, ed. John Abromeit et al. (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 295; Müller, What Is Populism? 6.
5. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (January 2017): 8, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/02_28.1_Foa%20%26%20Mounk%20pp%205-15.pdf; John Feffer, “Hungary’s Economic Leap,” republished in Huffington Post, May 23, 2014, http://www.johnfeffer.com/hungarys-economic-leap/; Mitchell A. Orenstein, “Six Markets to Watch: Poland,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (January/February 2014): 23, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2013-12-06/six-markets-watch-poland.
6. Lidia Csizmadia, “The Transition Economy of Hungary between 1990 and 2004,” M.Sc. finance diss., University of Aarhus, 2008, 40, available at http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/2620/Csizmadia-Thesis.pdf page 40/; “Poland’s Resurgent Right: Voting for a Better Yesterday,” Economist, October 22, 2015, https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21676782-country-has-benefited-hugely-eu-membership-turns-bit-eurosceptic-voting-better.
7. In this same address, Orban stated that the EPP coalition to which Fidesz adheres is not populist. “We should not be afraid of leftist criticism calling us populists. We know, we are not,” Orban declared. On the other hand, he affirms populist premises and practices. He seems to embrace the populist vision while rejecting the label. See Speech of Viktor Orban at the EPP Congress, March 30, 2017, available at http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/speech-of-viktor-orban-at-the-epp-congress/.
8. Jan-Werner Müller, “Viktor Orban Is Europe’s Enemy Within,” Financial Times, April 10, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/4d4bd9a2–1dc6–11e7-b7d3–163f5a7f229c.
9. Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2016), 8, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/; Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017), 154, available at http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/; Dorothy Manevich, “Hungarians Share Europe’s Embrace of Democratic Principles but Are Less Tolerant of Refugees, Minorities,” Pew Research Center, September 30, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/30/hungarians-share-europes-embrace-of-democratic-principles-but-are-less-tolerant-of-refugees-minorities/; Slawomir Sierakowski, “The EU Has a Moral Obligation to Act against Poland,” Financial Times, July 19, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/f7c7474e-6bc9-11e7-b9c7-15af748b60d0.
10. Quoted in Mitchell A. Orenstein, “Paranoid in Poland: How Worried Should the West Be about the Law and Justice Party’s Victory?” Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2015-11-01/paranoid-poland?cid=soc-tw-rdr; quoted in Nick Gutteridge, “Shock as Hungary PM Says Migrants Are ‘Poison’ and EVERY Refugee a ‘Safety & Terror Risk,’” Express, July 27, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693994/Hungary-PM-Viktor-Orban-migrants-refugees-poison-terror-risk.
11. Elizabeth Collett, “Why Poland Wants Container Camps for Asylum Seekers,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2017-05-04/why-poland-wants-container-camps-asylum-seekers.
12. Müller, What Is Populism? 45 and 48; Ellen Hinsey, Mastering the Past: Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe and the Rise of Illiberalism (Candor, NY: Telos Press, 2017), 100.
13. Sierakowski, “The EU Has a Moral Obligation to Act against Poland.”
14. While near majorities in Hungary and Poland prefer democracy to other forms of government, about a quarter think nondemocratic government is preferable in some situations. Those without college educations are more likely to hold agnostic attitudes toward democracy. See Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
15. Quoted in Hinsey, Mastering the Past, 102.
16. Quoted in Müller, What Is Populism? 26; quoted in “Poland’s Resurgent Right”; quoted in James Traub, “The Party That Wants to Make Poland Great Again,” New York Times, November 2, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/magazine/the-party-that-wants-to-make-poland-great-again.html?_r=0.
17. John Shattuck, “Resisting Trumpism in Europe and the United States,” American Prospect, December 2, 2016, http://prospect.org/article/resisting-trumpism-europe-and-united-states.
18. Ivan Krastev, “The Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (October 2016): 13, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Krastev-27-4.pdf.
19. Quoted in Hinsey, Mastering the Past, 71–72.
20. Krastev, “The Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order,” 10.
21. Quoted in Hinsey, Mastering the Past, 132.
22. Quoted in ibid., 103; quoted in Remi Adekoya, “Xenophobic, Authoritarian, and Generous on Welfare: How Poland’s Right Rules,” Guardian, October 25, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/25/poland-right-law-justice-party-europe.
23. Quoted in “Far-Right Hopeful: French Election ‘Choice of Civilization,’” AP News, February 5, 2017, https://www.apnews.com/e94cf5ff5bc342a5b5e13fd227d083dc; quoted in Adam Nossiter, “Marine Le Pen Echoes Trump’s Bleak Populism in French Campaign Kickoff,” New York Times, February 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/world/europe/marine-le-pen-trump-populism-france-election.html?_r=1.
24. Conrad Hackett, “5 Facts about the Muslim Population in Europe,” Pew Research Center, July 19, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/; John Irish, “French Far Right Uses Halal Accusation to Woo Voters,” Reuters, February 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-lepen-idUSTRE81I06920120219; Kim Willsher, “France’s Muslims Hit Back at Nicolas Sarkozy’s Policy on Halal Meat,” Guardian, March 10, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/10/nicolas-sarkozy-halal-meat-france-election.
25. Cécile Alduy, “The Battle for the Soul of France,” Nation 298, no. 12 (March 2014): 20–21, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/has-marine-le-pen-already-won-battle-soul-france/; Aurelien Mondon, “The French Secular Hypocrisy: The Extreme Right, the Republic and the Battle for Hegemony,” Patterns of Prejudice 49, no. 4 (2015): 402, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1069063?journalCode=rpop20.
26. Yves Bertoncini and Dídac Gutiérrez-Peris, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? France (London: Demos, 2017), 137, available at https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself.pdf.
27. Mondon, “The French Secular Hypocrisy,” 398.
28. Timothy Snyder, “The Reichstag Warning,” New York Review of Books, February 26, 2017, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/26/reichstag-fire-manipulating-terror-to-end-democracy/.
29. Arthur Goldhammer, “Explaining the Rise of the Front National: Political Rhetoric or Cultural Insecurity?” French Politics, Culture & Society 33, no. 22 (Summer 2015): 141, available at http://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/fpcs/33/2/fpcs330208.xml?.
30. Ibid., 135; Alduy, “The Battle for the Soul of France,” 21 and 19.
31. Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 119–20; Abel Mestre, “‘Sudiste’ et ‘nordiste,’ les deux électorats du FN,” Le Monde, July 8, 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2013/08/07/face-nord-et-face-sud-les-deux-electorats-du-fn_3458468_823448.html.
32. Alduy, “The Battle for the Soul of France,” 21.
33. Quoted in Mabel Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 246, 244, and 248.
34. Quoted in Alduy, “The Battle for the Soul of France,” 20.
35. Ibid., 21.
36. Mondon, “The French Secular Hypocrisy,” 397; Berezin, “Electoral Events as Collateral Damages,” 16.
37. Quoted in May Bulman, “Marine Le Pen Refuses to Repay €300,000 in ‘Misspent’ EU Funds,” Independent, February 1, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-european-parliament-funds-eu-misspent-front-national-france-a7556771.html; quoted in Nicholas Vinocur, “Marine Le Pen Makes Globalization the Enemy,” Politico, February 5, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-globalization-campaign-launch-french-politics-news-lyon-islam/.
38. 2nd tour présidentielle 2017: Comprendre le vote des Français (Paris: Ipsos, 2017), 11, available at http://www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/doc_associe/sondage_ipsos_soprasteria_-_6_mai_19h.pdf.
39. Standard Eurobarometer 85—European Citizenship (Brussels: European Commission and Directorate-General for Communication, 2016), 18, available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130; Galina Zapryanova and Neli Esipova, “Most in Eastern Europe Positive about EU Membership,” Gallup, May 10, 2017, http://www.gallup.com/poll/210083/eastern-europe-positive-membership.aspx.
40. Alan Finlayson, “Imagined Communities,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, ed. Kate Nash and Alan Scott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 290.
41. Quoted in Hinsey, Mastering the Past, 103.
42. Pierre Manent, “Populist Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center,” American Affairs 1, no. 2 (Summer 2017), available at https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/populist-demagogy-and-the-fanaticism-of-the-center/.
1. Ralph Scott, Charlie Cadywould, Sacha Hilhorst, and Louis Reynolds, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Great Britain (London: Demos, 2017), 55, available at https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Nothing-to-Fear-but-Fear-Itelf-final.pdf.
2. Unpublished materials from research by Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, Brexit Vote Explained: Poverty, Low Skills, and Lack of Opportunities (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016), available at https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-opportunities.
3. Kirby Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote (London: NatCen Social Research, 2016), 10, available at http://natcen.ac.uk/media/1319222/natcen_brexplanations-report-final-web2.pdf; Scott, Cadywould, Hillhorst, and Reynolds, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Great Britain, 60, 54, 59, and 61; Sascha O. Becker, Thiemo Fetzer, and Dennis Novy, “Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis,” Centre for Economic Performance Discussions Paper No. 1480, October 2017, 29, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1480.pdf.
4. Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, “A Tale of Two Countries: Brexit and the ‘Left Behind’ Thesis,” London School of Economics and Political Science British Politics and Policy blog, July 22, 2016, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-and-the-left-behind-thesis/.
5. Becker, Fetzer, and Novy, “Who Voted for Brexit?” 32.
6. Scott, Cadywould, Hillhorst, and Reynolds, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Great Britain, 81.
7. “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday . . . and Why,” Lord Ashcroft Polls, June 24, 2016, http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/.
8. Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote, 19.
9. Scott, Cadywould, Hillhorst, and Reynolds, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Great Britain, 66.
10. Ibid., 83.
11. Isabel V. Sawhill and Eleanor Krause, “Incomes Are Rising, but It’s too Soon to Celebrate,” Brookings Institution’s Social Mobility Memos blog, September 20, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2016/09/20/incomes-are-rising-but-its-too-soon-to-celebrate/.
12. Inside the Middle Class: Bad Times Hit the Good Life (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2008), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/03/26/iv-trends-in-household-income-1970-2007/.
13. “Rural Employment and Unemployment,” United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, July 6, 2017, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/employment-education/rural-employment-and-unemployment/.
14. Economic Innovation Group, cited in Thomas B. Edsall, “Reaching Out to the Voters the Left Left Behind,” New York Times, April 13 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/opinion/reaching-out-to-the-voters-the-left-left-behind.html.
15. See especially David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, “The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade,” Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016): 205–40, available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041.
16. Raj Chetty et al., “The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22910, December 2016, 18, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22910.pdf.
17. Bruce Stokes, Global Publics: Economic Conditions Are Bad (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), 10, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/23/global-publics-economic-conditions-are-bad/.
18. Ibid.
19. William A. Galston, “Immigration Reaches Critical Mass,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/immigration-reaches-critical-mass-1479857623.
20. Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060 (Washington, DC: States of Change, 2015), 3, available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SOC-report1.pdf.
21. ABC News/Washington Post poll, June 20–23, 2016, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey, June 19–23, 2016, available at http://pollingreport.com/terror.htm.
22. Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).
23. Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2016), 51, 3, and 5, available at http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/.
24. Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, E. J. Dionne Jr., William A. Galston, Betsy Cooper, and Rachel Lienesch, How Immigration and Concerns about Cultural Changes Are Shaping the 2016 Election (Washington, DC: Public Religion Research Institute and Brookings Institution, 2016), 23–24, available at https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PRRI-Brookings-2016-Immigration-survey-report.pdf.
25. Emily Ekins, The Trump Voter Typology (Washington, DC: Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, 2017), 10–14, available at https://www.voterstudygroup.org/reports/2016-elections/the-five-types-trump-voters.
26. Ibid., 6 and 11–15.
27. Ibid., 15; John Sides, How Race, Religion, and Immigration Mattered in 2016—and What That Means for a Trump Presidency (Washington, DC: Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, 2017), 5-6, available at https://www.voterstudygroup.org/reports/2016-elections/race-religion-immigration-2016.
28. Sides, How Race, Religion, and Immigration Mattered in 2016, 12.
29. See especially Daniel Cox, Rachel Lienesch, and Robert P. Jones, Beyond Economics: Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump (Washington, DC: Public Religion Research Institute and The Atlantic, 2017), available at https://www.prri.org/research/white-working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-immigration-election-donald-trump/.
30. Robert Griffin and Ruy Teixeira, The Story of Trump’s Appeal: A Portrait of Trump Voters (Washington, DC: Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, 2017), 18–19 and 23–24, available at https://www.voterstudygroup.org/reports/2016-elections/story-of-trumps-appeal.
31. Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2016), 18, available at http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/.
32. Public Trust in Government Remains Near Historic Lows as Partisan Attitudes Shift (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017), 1, http://www.people-press.org/2017/05/03/public-trust-in-government-remains-near-historic-lows-as-partisan-attitudes-shift/.
33. Beyond Distrust, 26.
34. NBC News/Wall Street Journal polls, 1995–2016, http://www.pollingreport.com/right.htm.
35. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Danger of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016): 5–17, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/danger-deconsolidation-democratic-disconnect; Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (January 2017): 5–15, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/signs-deconsolidation.
36. The 2015 State of the First Amendment (Washington, DC: Newseum Institute, 2015), 14, available at http://www.newseuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FAC_SOFA15_report.pdf.
37. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1933, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14473.
38. See especially Agnes Cornell, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning, “The Real Lessons of the Interwar Years,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 3 (July 2017): 14–28, available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/03_28.3_M%C3%B8ller%20%28web%29.pdf.
1. “Wilson, Charles E.,” GM Heritage Center, https://history.gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Wilson,_Charles_E.
2. William A. Galston, The New Challenge to Market Democracies: The Political and Social Costs of Economic Stagnation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014), 13, available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-challenge-to-market-democracies-the-political-and-social-costs-of-economic-stagnation/.
3. For an elaboration of the argument see Jim Kessler, “Why Not Growth?” Third Way, August 4, 2014, http://www.thirdway.org/op-ed/why-not-growth.
4. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 110.
5. Politics of Aristotle, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), 18.
6. The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought: From Plato to Nietzsche, ed. Andrew Bailey, Samantha Brennan, Will Kymlicka, Jacob Levy, Alex Sager, and Clark Wolf (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2008), 109.
7. Colgan and Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged,” 44.
8. Alice M. Rivlin, “A New Vision of American Federalism,” Public Administration Review 52, no. 4 (July–August 1992): 315–20.
9. Quoted in Emily Heil, “Mark Twain on Congress,” April 18, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/mark-twain-on-congress-idiots-criminals-dumber-than-fleas/2012/04/18/gIQA3J4nQT_blog.html?utm_term=.c009a154f765.
10. Bo Rothstein, “Why Has the White Working Class Abandoned the Left?” Social Europe, January 19, 2017, https://www.socialeurope.eu/white-working-class-abandoned-left.
11. Interview with Ezra Klein, “Francis Fukuyama: America Is in ‘One of the Most Severe Political Crises I Have Experienced,’” Vox, August 26, 2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/10/26/13352946/francis-fukuyama-ezra-klein.
12. The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), No. 47.
13. Bo Rothstein, “The Long Affairs between the Working Class and the Intellectual Cultural Left Is Over,” Social Europe, February 10, 2017, https://www.socialeurope.eu/long-affair-working-class-intellectual-cultural-left.
14. The locus classicus of this argument is John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Scribner, 2002). In fairness, both Judis and Teixeira have since rethought their positions, and neither would advocate strategic neglect of the white working class.
1. Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), 43.
2. Quoted in Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1991), 10.
3. Aristotle, “Art” of Rhetoric, trans. J. H. Freese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 89.
4. For a vivid account, see “The British Royal Visit: June 7–12th, 1939,” FDR Presidential Library and Museum, available at https://fdrlibrary.org/royal-visit.
5. John Kane and Haig Patapan, The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers and Limits Its Leaders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3 and 14.
6. The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), No. 39.
7. The Federalist Papers, No. 68.
8. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, October 28, 1813, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch15s61.html.
9. William A. Galston, “Populist Resentment, Elitist Arrogance: Two Challenges to Good Democratic Leadership,” in Good Democratic Leadership: On Prudence and Judgment in Modern Democracies, ed. John Kane and Haig Patapan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 20.
10. Kane and Patapan, The Democratic Leader, 32–33.
11. Ibid., 56.
12. The Federalist Papers, No. 55.
13. William Shakespeare, Coriolanus, act II, scene iii, available at http://shakespeare.mit.edu/coriolanus/full.html.
14. Quoted in George Charles Mitchell, Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 90–91.
15. Ronald Reagan, “Acceptance Speech at the 1980 Republican Convention,” July 17, 1980, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25970.
16. For a concise narrative, see National Archives, “Documents Related to Brown v. Board of Education,” www.archives.gov/education/lessons/brown-v-board.
17. William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act IV, scene iii, available at http://shakespeare.mit.edu/julius_caesar/julius_caesar.4.3.html.
18. See Howard Jones, Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 146.
19. The Federalist Papers, No. 57.
20. For parallel accounts of this episode, see Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), 267; and David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second World War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 101.
1. Quoted in Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 134.
2. Quoted in ibid., 106–7.
3. Quoted in Roland N. Stromberg, Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914 (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1982), 186.
4. This is not to deny that more personal elements (including a failed romance) also shaped Brooke’s outlook.
5. Quoted in Stromberg, Redemption by War, 9.
6. Quoted in ibid., 191.
7. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Henry Holt, 1994).
8. Quoted in Stromberg, Redemption by War, 88.
9. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2015).
10. Dahl puts it this way: “Polyarchal democracy has endured only in countries with a predominantly market-capitalist economy” and “this strict relation exists because certain basic features of market-capitalism make it favorable for democratic institutions.” Dahl, On Democracy, 166–67.
11. In a remarkable 1792 letter, Madison observed that the difference of material interests is the greatest source of party divisions and urged policies that would mitigate these divisions. Among the steps he recommended are “laws which, without violating the rights of property, reduced extreme wealth toward a state of mediocrity and raised extreme indigence toward a state of comfort.” See Liberty and Order: The First American Party Struggle, ed. Lance Banning (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 104.
12. Abraham Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress,” December 1, 1862, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29503.
13. Ibid.