NO ONE KNOWS FOR certain who first conceived of the idea of a great Union push down the lines of the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers. Perhaps many men thought of the plan in its broadest outlines at the same time. It was certainly evident to anyone who looked at a map that such an offensive utilizing the rivers as avenues of transportation and invasion would be the easiest way to conquer this region in the South, by splitting the Confederacy in two.
In April 1861, while yet an officer of the Ohio militia, young George McClellan proposed to General Winfield Scott, the fat and aging General-in-Chief of the United States Army, that one possible plan of action would be to “cross the Ohio at Cincinnati or Louisville with 80,000 men, march straight on Nashville, and act according to circumstances,” with the ultimate aim of advancing on “Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans.”1 Just days later, Scott presented his own famous Anaconda plan. This proposed a “complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports … in connection with such blockades,” proposing a mighty “movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points…the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent states,” and crush them with the minimum amount of blood shed. Scott went on to say in a letter to McClellan that twelve to twenty steam gun boats would be needed, be sides transports to carry 60,000 men who would be inducted in the army.2 Scott’s plan did not allow for the difficulties that would be set forward in an invasion, and he underestimated the forces needed, but at least he offered a beginning for Union strategy in the West.
Nor were the Southerners unaware of the strategic possibilities inherent in the situation. Work continued on developing fortifications to protect the Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee, while the Confederates were making all efforts possible to mass troops and equipment in the West. A young Southern ordnance officer, Captain W. R. Hunt, in a letter containing recommendations to Major General Polk, written on August 12, pointed out succinctly that “if the war should unfortunately be prolonged, the Valley of the Mississippi must ultimately become its great theater, for the enemy now working to subjugate the South knows the value of our great artery of commerce and of the prominent cities upon it too well for us to doubt that he will bend all his energies to control them.”3 Captain Hunt’s fears were well founded, for just a few hundred miles north, various Union officers were already beginning to mull over ideas for a drive down the river line. One of the first high ranking officers to bring up the matter was Colonel Charles Whittlesey, a graduate of West Point in 1831 and the chief of Brigadier General Ormsby M. Mitchel’s engineers. In a dispatch dated November 20, Whittlesey wrote General Halleck suggesting the propriety “of a great movement by land and water up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.”4 His idea was that this would al low the army to operate along the water lines half way to Nashville with out endangering the supply line, which would be vulnerable to attack by cavalry if operating over land along the crude road system. This would also make possible, even probable, the Confederate evacuation of Columbus, since it would have the effect of threatening their railway communications. Further, it was in Colonel Whittlesey’s opinion the most passable route into Tennessee.5
Only a week later General Buell, commanding in eastern and central Kentucky, on the suggestion of an engineer officer on his staff, recommended to General McClellan the feasibility of an advance along the line of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers toward Nashville. McClellan, or “Little Mac,” as he was called, objected as President Abraham Lincoln did. The President’s objection was based more on political than on strategic grounds, for he was deeply interested in the possibility of a thrust in eastern Tennessee to relieve the supposedly suppressed and downtrodden Unionists living in that section. In a paper which McClellan and other Federal officers read with interest, Lincoln in late September or early October developed a plan of action calling for a movement into eastern Tennessee by the Union army. Apparently Lincoln’s initial military objective in this was to seize a point on the strategic Virginia-Tennessee Railroad “near the Mountain pass called Cumberland Gap.” It was not a bad idea for an amateur soldier, but the president failed to make any provisions in his plan for any operations on the Mississippi River or any other rivers in the area. At least Lincoln was thinking in terms of an offensive movement, though possibly in the wrong direction.6
In the mountainous regions of the state, notably in the eastern third, there was strong evidence of pro-Unionist support, and the vote had been more than four to one against secession in June when Governor Isham Harris had put it up to the people to decide one way or the other. (Actually the vote made very little difference as Tennessee was already firmly committed to the Confederate cause, but it was a shrewd political move on the governor’s part to try and rally popular support.) Through the entire war this would be a scene of true civil strife, with brother against brother and noted bushwhackers and jayhawkers roaming about murdering and torturing with the greatest of enthusiasm.7
Sporadically the East Tennessee Unionists engaged in guerrilla warfare and sabotage against the Confederate administration. Knoxville was the center for pro-Unionist activities, but the surrounding counties contained many citizens who bore no great love for the South, or at least President Jefferson Davis’ government. The most notable of these Rebels was Andrew Johnson, who would eventually become military governor of Tennessee and United States President, but there were many others such as William “Parson” Brownlow, a fire-eating fanatic, who would spread death and destruction upon his pro-Confederate enemies at the least provocation and sometimes without any.
During the fall of the year hundreds of East Tennessee Unionists had begun drifting north, slipping through the thinly held Confederate lines into Unionist Kentucky. Some of them enlisted in ordinary Union army regiments, but others banned together, eventually forming an East Tennessee brigade headed by acting Brigadier General Samuel P. Carter, which set up base at Camp Calvert, near London, Kentucky.8 At the same time those Unionists who did not bother to leave the state to get into the war started a campaign of sabotage against the Confederate rail road system running through their segment of the state. Bridges were burned and Confederate transportation, both military and civilian, considerably disrupted.
The New York Tribune on November 6 carried the story that the East Tennessee loyalists had fought a great battle at Morristown. This was vastly exaggerated, but there had been open resistance to the Confederates and many were arrested, notably “Parson” Brownlow.
It was natural that for political reasons President Lincoln and many of his officials should be interested in seizing control of eastern Tennessee and restoring a civil administration favorable to the North. East Tennessee could then be cited as an example to show that the people of the South were basically in sympathy with the Union and that they had been merely led astray by their wicked and treasonable leaders. This would make good grist for the Northern propaganda mill. It is also extremely probable that Lincoln personally felt great sympathy for the East Tennesseans and simply wanted to relieve them of their sufferings, even though those sufferings might be considerably exaggerated. For humanitarian and for political reasons it was necessary, Lincoln thought, to intervene in this region.
Located strategically, astride the Confederate railroad system and in position to outflank many important Confederate population and munitions centers, eastern Tennessee was destined to become a major battlefield. In this area the slaveholding and propertied classes tended to support the Confederate cause, while the common people, basically yeoman farmers or mountaineers, tended to be pro-Unionist in sympathy. In eastern Tennessee, as well as in some of the other mountainous regions of the South, the secessionist crisis tended to take on some of the characteristics of a class struggle.9
At first many of the East Tennesseans, like their brothers in Kentucky, preferred to occupy a neutral position, but events soon showed that this was impossible. The strategic value of the region rendered it inevitable that military operations would take place in the area. The Richmond Inquirer called it the “Keystone of the Southern arch.” Not only did its passes afford avenues for invasion or counter-invasions, but it was also potentially a great stockpile of salt and bacon, essential to the Confederate armies in particular.
President Lincoln was scarcely in the White House before United States Senator Andrew Johnson and his associate, Horace Maynard, requested assistance for the loyalists of the area.10 A Southern sympathizer wrote to Confederate President Jefferson Davis in November that the East Tennesseans “look for the establishment of Federal authority with as much confidence as the Jews look for the coming of the Messiah,” and that it was impossible to change their feelings, no matter what pressures might be adopted.11
With Lincoln in sympathy with plans for the relief of East Tennessee, it was only natural that many of the Union military leaders should at least be impressed with the idea of cooperating in this movement, even though some of them might doubt the military feasibility of a straight thrust into East Tennessee. Brigadier General George Thomas, then a subordinate commander in the Eastern district of Kentucky, helped make arrangements to send supplies and munitions into the region in June.12
Buell, who took command of the region in November, felt that an excursion into this region was premature. Johnson and Maynard telegraphed him that “our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest; the government must come to their relief.”13 But Buell remained inactive.
During this same time the Confederates were strengthening their hold on the region. In August, Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig carried an address by Brigadier General Felix K. Zollicoffer, commanding the area, in which he assured the people that Confederate authorities were here “only to insure peace to their homes, by repelling invasion and preventing the horrors of civil war. Treason to the state government cannot, will not, be tolerated.”14
The famous East Tennessee bridge burning on November 8 triggered off the real crisis in that region. The execution of the attempt was carried out by the Reverend William Blount Carter after a consultation with President Lincoln, Secretary of State William Seward, and General McClellan. He planned to burn at the same time nine bridges between Stevenson, Alabama, and Bristol, Tennessee, thus crippling 265 miles of railway and impeding the transportation of troops and supplies to the battlefields of Northern Virginia. Five bridges were actually burned, and Carter escaped; however, five of his associates were hanged under the instructions of Judah P. Benjamin, then Confederate Secretary of War.15 Confederate authorities retaliated, ordering Unionist sympathizers to be imprisoned. The Knoxville Whig was finally suppressed and Brownlow committed to prison.16
Whether for military or political reasons, General McClellan was at least partly in sympathy with Lincoln’s desire to aid the beleaguered loyalists, and on December 3 ordered General Buell to send troops to help protect the newly formed East Tennessee brigade from Confederate attack and, presumably, to pave the way eventually for some kind of Union advance. McClellan informed Buell that he could rely on his full support in the liberation of East Tennessee.17
Advancing in this area would mean a difficult supply problem for the Union army, while a drive down either the Cumberland or Tennessee River, or one overland following the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, would be easier to supply. Buell continued to maintain his preference for action in central Tennessee, partly due to the influence of James Gerpy, president of the Louisville and Nashville line, and a most trusted advisor. Gerpy was strongly in favor of driving south, straight along the line of the railroad, with a subsidiary movement down the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers timed to coincide.
Lincoln was not unaware of the difficulties inherent in advancing without the use of either the rivers or railroad as a logistics support, and in his message to Congress in December 1861, he urged upon that body the advisability of constructing a railroad at government expense from one of two railroad terminals in central Kentucky to either the Tennessee state line near Knoxville, the heart of loyalist territory, or to Cumberland Gap.18 The plan for Lincoln’s railroad, although never carried out, was eventually approved.
When Thomas Scott arrived in Louisville, acting more or less as a personal agent of Secretary of War Simon Cameron and President Lincoln, Generals Buell and Anderson attempted to influence him in favor of an advance down the Cumberland-Tennessee toward Nashville. Scott was duly impressed, and he wrote to Edwin Stanton, the recently appointed Secretary of War, that the proposed railroad into East Tennessee was not “wanted at all to meet the enemy or to secure Tennessee.”19 Scott even went so far as to recommend that Stanton transfer forty or fifty thou sand men from the Army of the Potomac and add them to Buell’s force for an advance on Nashville, although this plan was never executed.
One important reform carried out by the Union army at this time that would have a strong effect on the forthcoming campaign was the linking together of the American Telegraph Company and the Western Union Company lines with the headquarters of General McClellan. This placed “Little Mac” in direct communication with Halleck at St. Louis, Missouri, Commodore Foote at Cairo, Illinois, and Buell at Louisville, Kentucky.20 Even before the telegraph was complete, plans for a movement into Confederate territory were underfoot. In the middle of the month of December, at the Planter’s Hotel in St. Louis, Missouri, the subject of a push came up during a conversation between Generals Sherman, Halleck, and the latter’s chief of staff, Brigadier General George Cullum. Many people had urged an advance down the Mississippi River, but the main objection to this was the strong Confederate concentration at Columbus, Kentucky, about eighteen miles below Cairo.
General Halleck had a map on his table and a large pencil in his hand. He asked the other officers in his presence, “Where is the Rebel line?” General Cullum took a pencil and drew a line running through Bowling Green, Forts Henry and Donelson, and Columbus. Halleck then said, “That is their line. Now where is the proper place to break it?” Generals Sherman and Cullum both replied, “Naturally the center.” Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other near its middle, and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River. “That’s the true line of operations,” Halleck said.21
Just days later orders came through from General McClellan for the opening of a demonstration against Johnston’s forces in Kentucky. One object of the demonstration was to make a diversion in favor of General Buell, who was confronting Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner with a large Confederate force at Bowling Green. General Grant was supposed to move in order to pin down Confederate forces and to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Buckner. Grant instructed C. F. Smith to send a force up the west bank of the Tennessee to threaten Forts Heiman and Henry, while McClernand was detailed with six thousand men into western Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with another. General Grant personally accompanied McClernand’s force and gained much information concerning the countryside from the move. For more than a week Union soldiers tramped about in the mud and muck of the winter, the men suffering considerably from the weather. As a result of the expedition, Smith suggested in a report that an assault on Fort Heiman was practical. This confirmed Grant’s idea that the proper line of operations was along the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers.
On January 6, before undertaking this demonstration against the Confederates, Grant asked for permission from Halleck for a conference in St. Louis, whereby he wished to lay out a plan of campaign before the latter. With the confirmation of his ideas by General C. F. Smith, Grant again requested to meet with General Halleck. Relations between the two men were not the most cordial, but Halleck consented. The meeting was not a success, according to Grant in his Memoirs.22 Halleck cut short the plan as being preposterous, being most unfavorable in his opinion.
Grant’s account of this meeting does not support Halleck’s previously stated views on the subject, and it may be that the department commander simply did not understand what his subordinate was requesting, for Grant at times was a very poor speaker,23 or it may simply have been that Grant was not trusted to fulfill such an important operation, in view of the near disaster at Belmont.
One view of this matter is that Halleck, although appreciating the need for an offensive in Kentucky and Tennessee, was reluctant to move until his right flank in Missouri was completely secured, feeling that he did not have enough troops to start two separate movements. Launching two attacks at one time would be a violation of the theories on warfare that Halleck held, since it would mean a divided effort instead of concentrating the resources of movement at a time.24 Once the Missouri campaign began, Halleck told McClellan, when his present plans were executed he would turn on Tennessee.25
Buell, however, kept after Halleck to launch some kind of an advance as a diversion for an effort by him. The commander of the Army of the Ohio said that if Halleck would cut the Memphis and Nashville Railroad, he would assault and capture Bowling Green. President Lincoln, who naturally was interested in the eastern Tennessee Unionists, asked Halleck his opinion on the matter.26 General Halleck quickly replied that it would be sheer madness, since troops could not be with drawn from Missouri without risking the loss of the state, and also that there were not enough men available at Cairo, and that he knew the Confederates had no intentions of pulling troops from Columbus whether or not Buell ever advanced.27 Lincoln finally ended up by telling Halleck to contact Buell in regard to some kind of movement on January 1. “I am not ready to cooperate with him. Too much haste will ruin everything,” was Halleck’s peremptory reply.28
Events in eastern Kentucky came to a head, with results that could have been foreseen by few, if any, of the participants. As early as October 22, fighting had broken out between the Confederates in eastern Kentucky and Tennessee by troops commanded by General Felix Kirk Zollicoffer and Federal forces commanded by General George “Pappy” Thomas. Zollicoffer’s men were repulsed after a sharp but brief action. Wrote one Federal soldier, “The loss among the Rebels is said to be awful.”29 The Confederates probably had four thousand men in action, but their casualties amounted to only a few dozen in reality. Attacking on the following day, Zollicoffer suffered additional casualties, and thereby decided to call it off, falling back to Cumberland Gap. General George Thomas would have preferred to take the offensive and pursue the retreating Confederate general, but General Sherman, who was in command in Kentucky at this time, felt that it would be wisest to remain on the defensive.30
Eventually in December, the fiery Tennessee-born Confederate general began a slow forward movement against Thomas’ command. The Union commander passed the word along to Buell of the Southern advance, and it was agreed that Thomas could advance to the Cumberland, but should not cross the river “unless absolutely necessary.” Zollicoffer saved General Thomas any worry about this by making his camp on the northern bank of the river at a point about eighteen miles southwest of Colonel Albin Schoepf’s position at Somerset, Kentucky. Camping on the Union side of the river was not a particularly good idea, and Major General George B. Crittenden was detached from General Johnston’s army to proceed to the assistance of Zollicoffer. By the time he reached the Confederate general’s army, however, it was too late to make any change. Thomas advanced on the position known as Logan’s Crossroads or Mill Springs, Kentucky, reaching it on January 18. Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer prepared to launch a surprise attack, hoping to shatter the Virginia-born Thomas before he could unite with Schoepf. The two Confederate generals led six Tennessee regiments, the Fifteenth Mississippi, and the Fifteenth Alabama, along with an artillery company and a battalion of cavalry, probably around four thousand troops, out on a night march through one of the worst experiences of the war.31
A blinding rain made the roads almost impassable while adding to the misery of the soldiers as they slogged along wearily, drenched to the skin and half-frozen from the low temperature.32 About 6:30 a.m. on January 19, troops from the First Kentucky Cavalry, U. S., signaled the main force that the Southerners were advancing. Firing soon broke out, but visibility was so poor from the daybreak mist and the smoke from the guns which so thickened the air that it was hard to distinguish friend from foe. General Zollicoffer, mistaking enemy for friend, rode out too far in front of his men, approaching Colonel Speed S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky Infantry. The general told Fry, “We must not fire on our own men,” and nodding his head to the left, remarked, “Those are our men.” Colonel Fry answered, “Of course not. I would not do so intentionally.” Fry began moving toward his regiment, and suddenly he saw another man ride up and join Zollicoffer. The new arrival opened fire with a revolver, hitting Fry’s horse. The Fourth Kentucky’s colonel at once opened with his own revolver at the man. A figure fell off a horse. Thus Zollicoffer died, a bullet through his breast, a victim of the poor visibility and his own recklessness.33
This was the beginning of the end for the Confederacy in the battle. Within a few minutes the Southerners were in full retreat. The foul weather rendered most of the Confederate troops incapable of fighting, not so much from morale as from the fact that their flintlock muskets simply would not function in the dampness. The total Union loss in the action was 40 killed, 207 wounded, and 15 captured or missing while the Southerners had 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 captured or missing. Confederate losses were almost twice as heavy, the most serious loss being the death of General Zollicoffer.34
Crittenden took over the Confederate command and helped make some kind of a retreat, although it was widely alleged that the politician turned soldier had been under the influence of alcohol at the time. He was largely discredited by these events and nevermore would hold important Confederate command. News of the defeat lowered Confederate morale drastically. A Confederate War Department official commented in his personal diary that the battle was a complete disaster.35
The dead Zollicoffer was hailed throughout the South as a fallen hero. Forty-nine years old and one of the leading political powers in Tennessee, the dead general had been the most important and most popular secessionist leader in the entire state. A long time member of the Whig party and a newspaperman, he had helped make and unmake governors, senators, and presidents. In 1852, Zollicoffer fought his famous duel with John Leake Marling, editor of the Democratic Oriented Nashville Union, who had called him a liar. Aside from a year as an officer in the Seminole War, this duel was Zollicoffer’s only military experience. In exchange for a bullet through his hand, he put a shot through his duelist opponent’s head, badly wounding him, although the two political rivals later became reconciled.36
The defeat at Fishing Creek, or Logan’s Crossroads, or Mill Springs, or whatever the battle might be called, was the first significant step in the Union’s conquest of the Confederate heartland. The practical result of the victory, besides a heavy Confederate casualty list and the great loss of supplies and materials, was the complete collapse of the Confederate right wing. Henceforth the way was open for a Union invasion of East Tennessee or a thrust through the eastern Tennessee region against the flank of General Albert Sidney Johnston’s communications, specifically the line to Bowling Green.
On January 4, President Lincoln telegraphed Buell at Louisville asking if weapons and munitions had been forwarded to East Tennessee and requesting a progress report of movement in that direction.37 Buell’s answer was that he had been organizing two columns with reference to the movement, but that he had no real belief or faith in its feasibility, and he expressed the view that an attack upon Nashville, Tennessee, was preferable, which was not well received by the chief executive. On January 6, Lincoln wrote to Buell, suggesting an advance on the railroad at some point south of Cumberland Gap, since this would have the effect of cutting “a great artery of the enemy’s communication, which Nashville does not have, and secondly because it is in the midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, which Nashville is not.” Lincoln went on to tell Buell that he could not see why “the movement in east Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor.” Lincoln’s humanitarian feeling showed through in his expression of concern for the fate of the loyalists in East Tennessee, who were being strongly suppressed by Confederate authorities.38 The following day President Lincoln wired Buell again, ordering him to “please name as early a day as you safely can, on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Gen. Halleck. Delay is ruining us; and it is in dispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like dispatch to Halleck.”39
Lincoln’s patience was beginning to run short, although it is probable that he would really have been willing to settle for some kind of offensive, and would not have insisted on the East Tennessee campaign; but politically, militarily, economically, and from all other standpoints, the time had come for a Union offensive, somehow, somewhere, something.
On January 13, President Lincoln again wrote to Buell and Halleck, urging them into action. The President stated that his general idea of “this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision.” He went on to say that the Union cause would fail, “unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his,” and that this only could be done by “menacing him with superior forces at different points, at the same time,” in order to attack “one or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one,” but the point was to “seize, and hold the weakened one,” gaining very much. In a nutshell this was military strategy as Lincoln saw it, and he was perfectly correct. The President elaborated that his idea was that Halleck should menace Columbus and downriver generally while Buell should harass Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the Confederates should concentrate at Bowling Green, then Buell should not retire from its front but should avoid engaging “him,” and if possible to occupy Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, since the Confederates would have concentrated their main forces at Bowling Green and would be unable to defend them.40
The success of the Grant-McClernand-Smith reconnaissance in force, and probably the effect of Lincoln’s obvious desire for an offensive, brought forth from Henry Halleck one of his more unusual and interesting plans of operations. In a letter to McClellan on January 20, Halleck found fault with politics and politicians interfering in the war, and he charged that the past lack of success of the Union army was “attributable to the politicians rather than the generals.” He seemed confused in regard to many issues of the war, but he did maintain that moving down the Mississippi River using the navy as a carrier would be “impracticable, or at least premature.” He added, “It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point.” In flat words and terse language, Halleck positively and definitely committed himself to the general-in-chief in favor of a drive down the river lines, and not a push into eastern Tennessee.41 Buell had suggested this plan way back on November 27 and again on December 29 to General McClernand, and on January 3 to General Halleck.42
Not daunted by the failure of his conference with General Halleck in St. Louis, Grant, on the 24th of January, forwarded a report to “Little Mac” of General C. F. Smith’s reconnaissance on the Fort Henry bastion. Conferring with Commodore Foote, Grant and the naval officer wired Halleck in St. Louis, on the 28th, that Fort Henry could be captured.43
The weeks and months of delays, confusion, and sometimes downright chaos were about to come to an end. It is impossible to escape the conclusion, however, that many of the leading figures in the Union armed forces at this time were somewhat overcome with the gravity of the situation. Men like Halleck, Buell, and to some extent Grant simply lacked experience in handling large bodies of troops. At the same time they could appreciate the gravity of the situation they were involved in.
On receipt of the Foote-Grant report, Halleck finally decided to take action. Probably he was also influenced by the arrival of a report from McCullum stating that General P. G. T. Beauregard and fifteen Confederate regiments were en route to Kentucky. In any event Halleck promptly ordered General Grant to assault Fort Henry.44 General Halleck immediately followed the order to attack Fort Henry with a second dispatch, dated the same day, January 30, 1862, containing many more details than instructions.
Grant was ordered to mass all possible troops from Paducah, Smithland, Cairo, Fort Holt, Birdspoint, and other places, but at the same time to leave sufficient garrisons to protect those places in case the Confederates at Columbus should launch an offensive. Remarking on the impassable condition of the local roads, Halleck ordered Grant to make as much use of Foote’s transports as possible. Additional artillery units were promised to Grant, and Lieutenant Colonel James B. McPherson of the United States Engineers was promised as chief engineer of the expedition. Halleck reported all the details he knew of Fort Henry, and he cautioned Grant to cooperate closely with the navy.45
Grant quickly set out to launch his invasion. Because of the closing of the Mississippi River to Union traffic, there were a large number of steamships46 tied up in Cairo for lack of employment. Grant immediately began rounding up these ships and their crews, but was not able to find enough transports to haul all of his command at one time. When all of the available boats were loaded, with about one-half of the seventeen thousand Federal soldiers, Grant ordered the expedition to proceed on up the Tennessee River under Brigadier General John McClernand. Rounding up some additional transports from another source, Grant soon followed with more of his army.47
Grant caught up with his advance force two days later, on the morning of February 4, but he did not approve of the landing site McClernand had selected because it was too far away from Fort Henry. The steamers then carried the force to a new disembarkation point about four miles from the Confederate position. The troops were landed and the steamers unloaded and turned about to Paducah to pick up General C. F. Smith’s infantry division, Grant personally going along to insure that everything went off right.48
February 5 was spent in making reconnaissances of the Confederate position while waiting for the rest of the army to show up. Grant’s unofficial chief-of-staff, Colonel J. D. Webster, and several members of McClernand’s staff accompanied a party of Federal cavalry on a reconnaissance of the Southern bastion. A short skirmish developed in which one Union cavalryman was killed and at least two others wounded, besides an undetermined number of Southern casualties. But the Federals were able to get a pretty good idea of the principle features of the terrain on the northern side of Fort Henry.49
On the afternoon of the 5th, very late, the transports returned from Paducah with Smith’s soldiers, General Smith, and General Grant. About dusk Grant, Smith, and McClernand went on board the flag ship of Commodore Foote, the Cincinnati, to arrange the program for an assault on Fort Henry, scheduled the following day. While the officers were engaged in their final conference, the Union gun boat Conestoga returned from a patrol up the river, during which it had checked to see if the channel was clear of obstructions. The Conestoga pulled alongside the Cincinnati, transferring a huge Confederate naval mine or torpedo, which it had picked up in the channel. The ship’s crew quickly congregated about the sinister looking iron cylinder, and as the conference in Foote’s cabin ended and the officers came out side, their attention was attracted to the torpedo.
Examining the five foot long iron cylinder, the curious Grant expressed a desire to see the interior mechanism of the device. The ship’s armorer, armed with monkey wrench, hammer, and chisel, promptly opened the thing up. As he did so a quantity of gas came squirting out. Two of Grant’s army officers, believing the contraption was about to explode, flung themselves face down on the deck. With the agility of a young tomcat, Foote flew up the ship’s ladder, followed by the equally light-footed Grant. Reaching the top and realizing that the torpedo was not going to explode, Foote calmed down; and turning to face Grant, who was just reaching the top of the ladder, he smilingly remarked, “General, why this haste?” to which General Grant with equal presence of mind quickly replied, “That the navy may not get ahead of us.” The whole crew broke out laughing, and the army officers soon scattered to their respective commands on shore.50
Whatever the humor of the occasion, Foote and Grant soon had more pressing thoughts on their minds, for the morrow was the appointed date for the assault on Fort Henry. Foote and his seven warships would hit the Confederates from the river side while Grant and his regiments moved in to isolate the Southerners on the landward side. It was obvious the forthcoming day was going to be one to long remember.