The Air War
The massive use of air power distinguished World War II from all previous conflicts. Aircraft had limited uses during World War I, and, even though many could foresee great potential for aviation, postwar developments were slow. In the United States, the economic depression of the 1930s caused limited defense budgets and small allocations to military aircraft production. Germany and Japan were among the few countries dedicated to building modern air forces. By 1939, the German Luftwaffe was able to deploy more than four thousand combat aircraft in the invasion of Poland. By contrast, at that time the United States had about two thousand mostly obsolete aircraft scattered around the world. In history’s greatest industrial mobilization this number would swell to eighty thousand by 1944. Almost two million men and women were inducted into the air forces to maintain and man this vast aerial armada.
In Europe, American military commanders made an early commitment to daylight, precision bombing of German industrial targets. This task fell to the 8th Air Force under command of Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz. Under Spaatz, Brig. Gen. Ira Eaker established 8th Bomber Command headquarters in England early in 1942. The workhorses of this campaign were two heavy bombers then starting to roll off production lines in the United States. The B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator were both four-engine aircraft capable of flying more than two thousand miles with bomb loads ranging from four thousand to eight thousand pounds. These aircraft required crews of ten or more each, necessitating the training of hundreds of thousands of airmen.
Fighter escorts were an integral part of the air campaign, shepherding the bombers through enemy skies to their targets. Due to the limited range of these fighters, bomber losses were horrendous early in the war. Introduction of the P-51 Mustang improved this situation, and by early 1944, fully escorted missions were flying into Germany with fewer losses.
By the end of the war, the 8th Air Force suffered the loss of about forty thousand airmen killed in action. This was a rate greater than that of any other service. Many thousands more were wounded or went down in enemy territory to become prisoners of war. Some have questioned the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign due to the fact that German industrial production increased throughout most of the war. However, it is undeniable that almost the entire Luftwaffe had to be committed to the protection of German cities and millions of men and women devoted to the defense and reconstruction of Germany’s infrastructure. Later in the war, German units in the field lost practically all freedom of movement as the skies overhead were dominated by Allied aircraft.